Observing Chinese Reactions to the New Maritime Strategy

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is one of the premier sources on Chinese Maritime analysis, and a blog favorite. Previous coverage of his work here and here. Last year Dr. Erickson published New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses, an examination and insightful study of China's reaction to the new US Maritime Strategy. The following sample is but a taste of this brilliant document, a 22 page PDF that we found to be outstanding.

Nevertheless, several articles already offer some insight into possible Chinese assessments of the U.S. Maritime Strategy. One of the first Chinese reports appeared in International Herald Leader,26 a weekly general affairs newspaper.27 The article describes a new emphasis on soft power and highlights the document’s balance of preventing war with winning war. While seemingly open to this new
approach, the article quotes a U.S. official as stating that the new strategy fails to address such critical issues as “[c]ommercial fleets, industrial bases, polar resources and missile defense.” In a theme common to nearly all Chinese articles on the subject, the author states, “so-called ‘international cooperation’ still serves the global deployment of U.S. sea power.”

More blatant suspicions of U.S. intent are also often on prominent display. Many Chinese observers contend that U.S. military activities are specifically designed to “‘encircle’ China.” In one case, emphasis is expressed with regard to U.S. military activities with the Philippines, which, being located in Southeast Asia and so close to Taiwan, is seen by two Chinese reporters as being vital for such “encirclement.”29 This last point, while seeming to ignore the overwhelming rationale for counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Manila, does underscore the centrality of Taiwan to the U.S.-China relationship.

Such a tendency to ascribe malign motives to nearly all U.S. actions, even those specifically targeting terrorism, is at odds with Beijing’s frequent insistence that it has no intention to exclude the United States from East Asia, or even to challenge its position there. Moreover, on this basis, what is the United States to make of increasing Chinese influence in Latin America, particularly given Beijing’s close ties with Cuba and Venezuela? The U.S. media has certainly exaggerated some of the latter issues. Elements of China’s media are increasingly subject to market forces, which promote a similar demand for sensationalist reporting. Still, the theme of Chinese “encirclement” is likely to continue to influence bilateral strategic interactions. The larger question is, given that China avowedly accepts the current robust U.S. presence in East Asia, how would the United States demonstrate that its actions were not specifically designed to “contain” China?

Characteristic of many foreign policy writings on China’s Liberation Army Daily website in its tone of suspicion, one representative article infers ulterior motives for the new U.S. Maritime Strategy.30 It seems there is a foregone conclusion about the intentions of the United States and that therefore its strategy’s content matters little. This suggests that some elements in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at this early stage of the new strategy’s application may already believe that U.S. sea power and ambitions remain fundamentally unchanged, and continue to challenge China’s interests. By this logic, the manner in which Washington describes its maritime policies will have little effect on PLA perceptions. This apparent willingness in at least some PLA quarters to prejudge the U.S. Navy without specific evidence raises important questions about strategic communications and transparency. Does the United States have the responsibility, or even the ability, to convince China that its intentions are sincere? Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that this particular assessment does not reflect official Chinese policy, which in any case is largely determined by the nation’s civilian leadership.

Other unofficial sources do articulate the balance of challenges and opportunities for China in the area of maritime strategy. The People’s Daily Online attempted to place the new document within the larger context of America’s strategic conditions.31 Having previously suffered from a “strategically confusing” period with the removal of its Soviet competitor, and having labored mightily to respond to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Navy has been too busy to conduct a systematic self-examination of its longterm development until very recently. The new U.S. Maritime Strategy is thus correctly seen as an attempt to recreate strategic clarity and direction for U.S. maritime forces. On a more positive tone, the article allows that the new U.S. Maritime Strategy is “quite gentle, and it really embodies the lofty ideal of ‘cooperation’, and regards war prevention as an important mission of U.S. sea power.” Moreover, the author notes, “this is the first time that a U.S. official document has put forward the concept [of a] ‘multi-polar world’,” a foreign policy goal long championed by China.

Yet, the gist of the analysis is consistent with the others in its concern with and suspicion of U.S. motivations. Had Washington not revised its maritime strategy to emphasize fighting nontraditional security challenges such as terrorism in keeping with world events, “the mighty U.S. fleet [would] be like a giant that [had] lost its way, a colossus without any merit.” Renewed U.S. emphasis on cooperation and humanitarian operations is thus not seen as being altruistic - what nation’s policies truly are? Rather, they are a utilitarian repackaging of a time-honored “power-politics approach.” “Americans have recognized the weaknesses of the unilateralism of the last several years,” the article concludes. “What [the strategy] expresses can only be one thing, that is, American hegemony has put on a new cover called ‘cooperation.’

These preliminary unofficial Chinese reactions suggest that revising America’s maritime strategy alone will not persuade China of positive U.S. intentions. In these Chinese views, while the new Maritime Strategy recognizes the limits of unilateralism, a perceived fundamental arrogance of American power is seen as structural and unchanged. Thus, while there is a degree of competing perspectives on the future use of U.S. naval power, the initial reaction remains highly circumspect and more will need to be done to overcome Chinese suspicions. In this regard, America’s actions must ultimately speak louder than its words.

If your interested in China, China Security should be in your bookmarks. Very well done analysis there, top to bottom insights. Current issue focuses on Taiwan, an excellent contribution.