Observing Early Performance Metrics of the MV-22

In April VMM 162 quietly replaced VMM 263 in Iraq. Might sound like no big deal, rotations take place all the time, but the MV-22 is a little different than most programs because the costs involved raises the interest. By all accounts, the MV-22 performed well, not outstanding but alao not poorly. Earlier this month there was a Pentagon press conference where several details were announced. The statistics give us plenty of information to speculate with.

The MV-22 handled every mission it was assigned, Rock said. The unit flew more than 2,500 sorties during its seven-month deployment, with each of its aircraft flying an average of 62 hours per month. Rock said before the deployment, officials forecast each MV-22 would fly around 50 hours per month.

The aircraft was easier to maintain than the CH-46 helicopters it replaced. The 46 is 1950s-based technology, and mechanics put in 24 hours of maintenance on those aircraft for every hour in the air. The MV-22 took about 9.5 hours of maintenance for every hour of flight.

Based on these statistics we can make a few assumptions, but without specific data we will use a few assumptions and averages to keep it simple. We assume 12 aircraft, even though there were only 10 aircraft originally. With this we are able to calculate 12 aircraft at an average of 62 hours per month equals 744 flight hours per month. At seven months, 744 flight hours means an estimated 5208 total flight hours. 5208 total flight hours divided by an estimated 2500 sorties means the average sortie was around 2 hours of flight time. With 9.5 hours of maintenance for every hour of flight, maintenance time is an average 19 hours. As we have discussed in the past, this figure allows us to calculate sortie rate for the MV-22.

We are estimating turn around time to be 2 hours. This is the average turn around time for a F/A-18E/F on an aircraft carrier, but also the average turn around time of F-15s and F-16s. Because there are no good figures for turn around time for a MV-22, we are estimating at 2 hours because we assume it will be the same as other high priority aircraft of other services.

MV-22 Sortie Rate = 24 hours / Flight Time +Turnaround Time + Maintenance Time
MV-22 Sortie Rate = 24 hours / 2 hours + 2 hours + 19 hours
MV-22 Sortie Rate = 24 hours / 23 hours = ~1 sorties

This makes the MV-22 average sortie rate availability in Iraq ~1 sortie per day. Clearly the MV-22 wasn't quite used that much, but it is interesting to think about. For comparison purposes, the average CH-46 flight time has also been reported at 2 hours, and the maintenance time was reported in the MV-22 press conference at 24 hours maintenance hours per flight hour.

CH-46 Sortie Rate = 24 hours / Flight Time +Turnaround Time + Maintenance Time
CH-46 Sortie Rate = 24 hours / 2 hours + 2 hours + 48 hours
CH-46 Sortie Rate = 24 hours / 52 hours = .5 sorties

Notice we averaged up for the CH-46 and down for the MV-22, so the MV-22 sortie rate is at least twice that of the CH-46. The sortie rate of 1 might give some pause, but some context is required to understand what this means.

This excellent carrier hater article from 1999 tells part of the story, this story skips on some facts, but does a very good job in one detail.

For carrier advocates, Desert Storm constituted a wake-up call. For example, they realized that no naval aircraft was able to drop autonomously designated laser-guided bombs. In addition, a report by the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Va., pointed out that carrier aircraft flew just 6,297 sorties over land to drop bombs, working out to only about 24 sorties per day per carrier.

The experiences of USS Theodore Roosevelt, CVN-71, were representative. CVN-71 arrived on station near Qatar with 20 F/A-18 multirole fighters, 18 A-6 medium bombers, and 18 F-14 fleet defense interceptors. Over 43 days of the war, the F/A-18s averaged only 1.28 sorties per aircraft per day. Roosevelt "surged" during a brief ground war in late February 1991. The result: an average of 2.03 sorties per aircraft per day.

Most people may not be aware of naval aviations poor showing in the Gulf War, which has since been dismissed with excellent showings in Afghanistan and Iraq, but early on the F-18 did not live up to expectations with a 1.28 sorties per aircraft per day rate. We have previously observed that the Navy has consistently demonstrated the ability to reach ~127 sorties per day with the big deck carriers, an average of 2.67 sorties per F-18 that includes multiple strikes per sortie, a much improved sortie rate largely because of the maturity of the F-18. One thing on this, the Navy has a bad habit of assigning each bomb as a different sortie, and has fudged the definition of sortie to reflect the flexibility precision weapons have given aircraft. We reject this, because while 1 target 1 sortie was true in the past, we accept each sortie might consist of multiple strikes and recognize sortie rates aren't the same for comparing eras in regards to strike power, rather for aircraft availability.

As the MV-22 matures, we expect to see two changes. First the average flight time per sortie will increase, and second the average maintenance hours per flight hour will decrease. This is the traditional pattern for every aircraft, and this pattern is usually sustained well past the first decade of an aircrafts life, excluding cases of excess use.

The engine troubles were discussed a bit in the news articles. Does anyone know if the contract award on Thursday is related to the MV-22s forward deployed?

While a starting sortie rate of slightly over 1 might sound low, we are actually encouraged quite a bit by this early showing, because that means the mature sortie rate for the MV-22 can be reasonably assumed to be over 2 sorties per day, exactly where the Marines will need it for the challenges of the 21st century.