Observing Positive Signs For the Future Fleet

Gene Taylor is doing what nobody else will, he is fixing the fleet. The United States Navy in the near future will consist of 22 CG-52s, 62 DDG-51s, and 2 DDG-1000s. We observe all 86 rate as battleships by modern naval rating standards. Only three other Navies in the world have first or second-rate battleships; Russia with 1, South Korea with 3 planned, and Japan with 6. This is the most powerful surface fleet in history, providing more cruise missile firepower than the next 17 largest Navies combined. The current plans for the rest of the US Navy surface fleet includes 55 unrated mini-motherships, also known as the Littoral Combat Ship. This leads us to the the strategic question regarding fleet constitution, Where are the Cruisers?

We have made the argument many times regarding how and why the 313-ship plan, and more specifically the SC 21 design is flawed. We believe the requirement for change will have to come from Congress, the Navy's hands are tied. We believe the way ahead requires the cancellation of the DDG-1000, because once the Navy loses its surface combatant of the future, they will design a new one that is more affordable. We believe that will be followed by the conversion of the LCS program into that surface combatant replacement. Because motherships for unmanned platforms is the major technology in this maritime age, we believe that will eventually lead to the development of large motherships. This approach to balancing the fleet first requires the cancellation of the DDG-1000, which is why we see this as great news.

One of the Navy’s top Capitol Hill critics was as good as his word Thursday and formally recommended that Congress make several changes to the Navy’s near- and long-term shipbuilding plans.

Rep. Gene Taylor, a Mississippi Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower subcommittee, passed up to the full committee a bill that would delete a third DDG 1000-class destroyer, for the time being, to pay for another San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock and two T-AKE-class cargo ships.

It is absolutely true that the LPD-17 is built in Gene Taylor's district and that the T-AKEs are built in Duncan Hunter's district, so cry politics all day if you want... but if you do, you have to make the case why this is not better than the DDG-1000. Considering every major new naval ship construction has gone over 100% cost for nearly 2 decades, and the DDG-1000 costs $3.3 billion, tell me how the likely spending of $6.6 billion dollars on a single ship is worth buying 3 mature designs where the last several have hit cost benchmarks? If you can make that argument, I'll entertain the politics.

The reason for the 10th LPD isn't political either, it is desired by the Navy for the forward deployed Expeditionary Strike Group. The requirement was introduced with the 313-ship plan, but cut by the Navy in favor of the DDG-1000.

Gene Taylor has some fairly blunt words for the Navy, and he is absolutely right.

In one of his harshest indictments yet, Taylor blasted the DDG-1000 as incompletely designed, too expensive and unnecessary, given the success of the Navy’s long-running Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The unfinished design and unproven systems on the ships would lead to inevitable cost overruns, he said, which would “cripple the Navy’s shipbuilding account and drastically impact fleet size and capability.”

“The solution offered every year is that the solution will be delayed to future years,” Taylor said. “I do not believe the plan to achieve a 313-ship fleet is achievable in its current form. I am convinced that the only path to a 313-ship fleet is to build ships of a proven design and build them in sufficient numbers to realize shipyard efficiency.”

So what are the alternatives? This is where he loses me a bit, after suggesting proven designs are the way ahead, something we partially agree with, he piles on costs to existing designs.

Compounding the money standoff for the next decade and beyond, Taylor’s recommended legislation would require the Navy to make its next generation of amphibious ships nuclear powered, in addition to lawmakers’ proposals that tomorrow’s cruiser be nuclear-powered, and Taylor’s call for nuclear-powered Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

Asked after the hearing, Taylor said he was “absolutely” still committed to a nuclear-powered Arleigh Burke and to nuclear-powered combatants in general. Their high initial cost will ultimately provide a savings over buying fuel in the era of expensive oil, Taylor said.

“I think Adm. [Hyman G.] Rickover was right all along, the nation got lazy when fuel was cheap — fuel is no longer cheap.”

The article goes on to highlight the break even point for amphibious ships is supposedly $178 a barrel. We actually think it is much less than that, because that average was conducted based on estimated time at sea. The problem with estimates, and the LSDs are great examples, is that they aren't applied well. Amphibious ships spend more time at sea than any other surface ship besides carriers in the US Navy, and it isn't close. Considering amphibious ships have been running above estimated time at sea, they are consuming above estimated amounts of fuel. This brings down the red line currently discussed at $178 a barrel. That would also only apply to amphibious ships.

We know there are a lot of people concerned over the nuclear issue, so we'd like to highlight this report from Ronald O'Rourke titled: Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress (PDF) dated April 2, 2007. The following is but a bit of the excellent information found in that report.

In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost.

• For a small surface combatant, the procurement-cost increase was about $600 million.
• For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and 26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600 million to about $700 million.
• For an amphibious ship, the increase was about $800 million.

Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account. A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.

The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:

• $210 per barrel to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;
• $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and
• 210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo, and the higher dollar figure is for a low ship operating tempo.

At a crude oil cost of $74.15 per barrel (which was a market price at certain points in 2006), the life-cycle cost premium of nuclear power is:

• 17% to 37% for a small surface combatant;
• 0% to 10% for a medium sized surface combatant;
• 7% to 8% for an amphibious ship.

The life-cycle cost break-even analysis indicates that nuclear-power should be considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants, and that life-cycle cost will not drive the selection of nuclear power for small surface combatants or amphibious ships. A nuclear-powered medium-size surface combatant is the most likely of the three ship types studied to prove conomical, depending on the operating tempo that the ship actually experiences over its lifetime.

Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation for a contingency, and operational presence (time on station) in the theater of operation.

We like big motherships built from the LPD-17 hull and small corvettes/frigates built from the LCS hull, but we acknowledge there are a lot of ways to approach the problem. The best way in our opinion is the one absent the DDG-1000, so that money can build more ships.