An Absence of Trust in Anything But Bigness...

Our present condition is that of abandoning all attempt at a guiding conception of types, or standards, except the crude one that each ship must be bigger than the last. The ultimate tendency of this, of course, will be to make ships after too short a time unequal to a place in the line. The moral effect is still worse, for it is inducing, in the navy as in the public, a simple trust in bigness, and, what is worse, an absence of trust in anything but bigness. Undoubtedly, if all other things -- skill, courage, numbers, combinations, fortitude--are the same on both sides, bigness, barring accidents, will carry the day; but when have all other things been the same? We are putting in the foremost place of consideration that which military history shows to be the least of several factors. We have, indeed, the proverb, that "Providence is on the side of big battalions;" but we know it is not true. Napier is nearer the truth, in saying that the presence of Napoleon on the battle-field was equal to a reinforcement of 30,000 men. Providence is most often on the side of men who best know how to manage their battalions, or their ships; the smaller have more often triumphed by their conduct, than the bigger by their weight...

The ever increasing size and startling cost of the battleship brings us also face to face with the opposing considerations of numbers and reduction of expense. That the relative cost of the larger ship is less than that of the smaller, that expenditure increases at a smaller ratio than tonnage, as stated, only partially qualifies the fact of the absolute increase, and does not at all modify the ultimate effect upon the numbers of the fleet. Budgets not being illimitable in size, there results between numbers and individual costs of ship an opposition, in the adjustment of which, as in that between speed and offensive power, there should be no compromise. The superior claim of the one or the other should be admitted; and when admitted, enforced in practice. A nation with wide naval responsibilities must have numbers in proportion; and this consideration is greatly reinforced by another, advanced before this war and confirmed by it, that naval war henceforward will be marked by greater losses of material than of personnel; that reserves of ships will be more needed than reserves of men. The exigency of renewing coal supply works in the same direction. When not able to coal in the open, ships must be more frequently sent to the base to re-coal. This means a greater number of ships in order to maintain a given minimum on the cruising station. The bigger and fewer the ships, the greater the propertionate loss when one goes into port.

Mahan, A. T. Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea. U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 32:447-471 June 1906

I was immediately reminded of Mahan, and how very little the Navy heeds the wisdom of our great maritime strategist as I read the latest Navy Times article on the DD-1000. Susan Collins, speaking to the press on behalf of the Navy, has told the AP that the Navy will in fact now push for the third DDG-1000.

The Maine Republican said Navy Secretary Donald Winter informed her of the decision that comes one month after the Navy said it was scrapping the Zumwalt destroyer program once the first two are built. The Navy said at the time that it was opting instead to build more of the current-generation DDG-51, or Arleigh Burke, destroyers.

The article goes on to note the consideration is almost completely industrial. Understandable. Navy shipbuilding is incredibly broken at this point and it may not be able to be fixed, so from the point of view of the Senate, it is only about keeping the industry healthy. The reality is, that's a more strategic decision than any decision the Navy could make regarding shipbuilding right now, because at least with a healthy industry said industry will exist when the Navy leadership gets its shit together.

The question at this point is what can be done? There are no clear answers. Admiral Roughead has not been heard from, and has instead appointed Gene Taylor as his spokesman. The press has not been able to speak to anyone over the rank of LT regarding shipbuilding since the July 31 hearing, which begs the question where the Navy's leadership is hiding. The strategists are looking for links between strategy and acquisition, while the Think Tanks are talking about the “strategy-reality disconnect."

As Mahan reminds us in many of his writings, resources drive both acquisition and strategy, and if we do not plan operationally within our means, we cannot align our strategy within our means. Is the United States Navy a global Navy defensing the system, or a Navy that will specialize to specific regions to protect our interests? Are we "a nation with wide naval responsibilities" ignoring Mahan's advice, or have we conceded our naval responsibilities as a strategic choice to others and left part of the global system for them to manage?

The Navy refuses to state the strategic challenge of competitors like China in its own strategy, and yet cites the operational challenges their technology poses as reasons to adjust shipbuilding, only to change directions again in less than 3 weeks. Have we learned anything?

Yes, that ultimately there is an absence of trust in anything but bigness, whether the considerations are operational, strategic, or industrial... and as Mahan warned, it now exists in the navy and the public.