From the Desk of the Armchair Admirals

Since the American navy now possesses command of the sea, however, and since the Soviet surface navy is in no position to challenge this except in struggles for local supremacy in the Baltic and Black Seas, the Navy can no longer accept this Mahanite definition of its mission. Its purpose now is not to acquire command of the sea but rather to utilize its command of the sea to achieve supremacy on the land. More specifically, it is to apply naval power to the decisive strip of littoral encircling the Eurasian continent. This means a revolution in naval thought and operations. For decades the eyes of the Navy have been turned outward to the oceans and the blue water, now the Navy must reverse itself and look inland where its new objectives lie. This has, however, been the historical outlook of navies which have secured the uncontested control of the seas, and as Admiral Nimitz has pointed out, during the period of British domination "it is safe to say that the Royal Navy fought as many engagements against shore objectives as it did on the high seas." It is a sign of the vigor and flexibility of the Navy that this dificult change in orientation has been generally recognized and accepted by naval writers and the leaders o fhe naval profession.

The application of naval power against the land requires of coarse an entirely different sort of Navy from that which existed during the struggles for sea supremacy. The basic weapons of the new Navy are those which make it possible to project naval power inland. Those appear to take primarily three forms:

1. carrier based naval air power, which will in the near future be capable of striking a thousand miles inland with atomic weapons;
2. fleet-based amphibious power, which can attack and seize shore targets, and which may, with the development of carrier based air lifts, make it possible to land ground combat troops far inland; and
3. naval artillery, which with the development of guided missiles will be able to bombard land objectives far removed from the coast.
   

The navy of the future will have to be organized around these basic weapons, and it is not Utopian to envision task forces with the primary mission of attacking, or seizing, objectives far inland through the application of these techniques.

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Proceedings, May 1954, Samuel Huntington

We learn from history, and the folly of memory loss by those who attempt to emphasize "new" absent the context history provides. OK, granted the inclusion of nuclear weapons was specific to 1954, and the Soviet Union no longer exists, but the need to strike a thousand miles inland still exists... and one could replace Soviets with someone else, change a few places of geography, and this is still applicable advice for maritime strategy. This is the second time we have quoted from this Huntington article recently, and I assure you it will happen at least two more times. Written in 1954, the article applies directly to 2008 in too many ways to count.

The challenge facing shipbuilding today is what type of fleet to build, and what should that fleet look like in order to address both the operational and strategic requirements of the current era. The question is loaded, because we must account for an existing shipbuilding plan, a fiscally constrained budget, a rising China, an increasingly confrontational Russia, a global economic system enjoying many decades of relative global peace, and oh by the way... we are engaged in two land wars which have stretched the Army and Marines about as much as possible.

What needs to be replaced? First, the existing LHAs are on the way out, they are very old. By the end of the year, USS Peleliu (LHA 5) will be the only Tarawa class LHA remaining, and will be replaced by the new USS America (LHA 6). The Navy would normally build LHA 7 during the next 5 years, although configuration has not been decided. Another ship is dire need of replacement is the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, which are essentially barely armed 200+ crew member ships with a flight deck. These ships are expensive to maintain, expensive to operate, and have almost no practical use beyond securing against the least of the threats at sea. Also worth noting, the coastal minehunters have all been retired, and the Navy is actively retiring Los Angeles-class nuclear powered attack submarines that are reaching end of life. We won't even both listing all the old logistics ships, or note the Sea Basing ships to be built, only to note the number of ships retiring is not small and that the Sea Base is going to be expensive.

What is your budget for replacement? According to the GAO, an average of about $13 billion a year, or put another way, about $65 billion between FY10-FY14 (5 years). We note that of that $65 billion, around $10 billion will be used for one new CVN, while another $20 billion will be used to purchase 10 Virginia class submarines. That leaves roughly $35 billion to buy new ships with.

A new LHA(R)s will cost between $3.5 and $4 billion, while T-AKEs cost around $400 million. The LCS is expected to cost $550 million per, while we have no idea what a new DDG-1000 or DDG-51 will cost, $3.5 billion and $2 billion respectively is a fair estimate we think. A new LPD-17 runs around $1.7 billion, while a new SSN on top of the 2 purchased each year would go for about $2 billion.

Looking for more purchase options? The LM LCS for Israel runs around $500 million, so we will say with NVR, etc... a LM/GD combat LCS version will run same as the LCS, $550 million. Sea Fighter (FSF-1) is always popular, but a sixth rate Sea Fighter with 16 VLS and 8 Harpoons with NVR would run around $300 million. You cannot buy European ships, because Congress says no.

Given Huntington's advice, the Navy's existing plan, the operational considerations, the Maritime Strategy, and $35 billion over 5 years... what would be your shipbuilding plan, and why? The FY09-1FY13 plan the Navy released in this budget year can be found here for comparison. Remember, we are talking about 5 years from FY10 - FY14 here, but it should be part of a larger strategy.

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Why this exercise? Because we are curious how our readers see things. Are we big picture or singularly focused? Are we worried about confronting China in the South China Sea, or Africa? Are we worried about piracy and terrorists, or Russia? How do we account for South America? How do you embrace the major emerging naval capabilities like unmanned technology and ballistic missile defense? How important are the MEB requirements from your perspective, and is it a sealift or amphibious assault issue from your POV? When it is your turn to make the call, which call do you make? Use the charts if you need them. Should be interesting.