The Responsibility to Develop This Necessary Support...

A second element of a military service is the resources, human and material, which are required to implement its strategic concept. To secure these resources it is necessary for society to fore go the alternative uses to which these resources might be put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the military service. Thus, the resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. The service has the responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security. Hence this second element of public support is, in the long run, dependent upon the strategic concept of the service. If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Proceedings, May 1954, Samuel Huntington

Something most people may not know. After the House hearing on July 31st, when the Navy made its case before the House to truncate the DDG-1000, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough did not stay and answer questions from the media. From all accounts he basically ran into a waiting black SUV and drove away quickly without talking to the press.

With the exception of Admiral Stavridis and Admiral Keating, we do not see many Admirals out talking to the press, and nobody can remember the last time Admiral Roughead did an interview with the press. The Navy is not making its case, or any case for that matter, and by ignoring the press, the Navy ultimately ignores the American people. We are less than a year from the release of the Navy's Maritime Strategy, and yet we see no broad public follow up, no emphasis of it in the decision process, and the only people the press quotes these days are LTs and Captains who get sent out to speak on behalf of Navy decision makers.

It isn't just the top Navy leaders though, the inability to say anything intelligent to the American people is particularly obvious in places like NAVSEA. Admiral Goddard was so inexperienced talking to the American people that when given a chance to talk about the DDG-1000 on signing day, he compared it to HMS Dreadnought apparently oblivious to how ridiculous that made the Navy look. The Littoral Combat Ship is an excellent example, Lockheed Martin is out selling their ship to the American people with a full court press strategic communication effort, highlighting the technology, with Moosally out front touting the capabilities. When we look at this, what sticks out for us is that it is the industry, NOT NAVSEA, out selling the Navy's ships to the American people. Hell, when the Littoral Combat Ship was questioned from a strategic perspective in Proceedings, it was Lockheed Martin, not NAVSEA, out front defending the potential strategic flexibility of the LCS. We didn't buy the argument, but we noted who made the argument! Now we are noting who DIDN'T make the argument.

The only communications the American people ever get from the Navy outside an operational activity briefing is when we see Congressional testimony. Given this stage, do we see the Navy emphasize its maritime strategy? Nope, we see operational considerations drive acquisition decisions behind the backdrop of a shipbuilding plan that is absent considerations of available resources. The results are predictable, news coverage highlights events then finds any number of dozens of observers who note the inconsistencies and problems. As should be expected, the inconsistencies and problems get highlighted and becomes the focus of the Navy's strategic communication with the American people, resulting in chaos.

My question is who are the folks behind the scenes advising Navy leadership regarding its strategic communications effort? Are they Officers, or consultants? It is a serious question, because this is the question the Navy needs to answer.

What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?

It is a serious question, and the problem right now is the Navy doesn't have a compelling answer for itself. I could make that case, but it isn't my job. Huntington asked that question of the Navy in 1954 when the Navy was losing the strategic argument to the Air Force regarding its vital contribution to the national interest. With the Army and Marines engaged in two wars, and allegations that the planners of the Navy's new Maritime Strategy see NO ROLE AT ALL for the Navy in the current environment, the Navy appears to lack a credible answer. While intentionally not naming China as a serious future challenge of the Navy, but claiming the capabilities of China is driving acquisition decisions, the Navy lacks a clear and concise strategic message to the American people. The result is confusion, just as Huntington advised it would be. With the American people uninterested, undersold on the value of the Navy, and ultimately apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the Navy regarding its financial requirements, the House and a Senate are making decisions based on their interests, under no obligation to consider the Navy's interests.

Huntington had advice for the Navy in 1954, and it applies to the Navy of 2008.

This attitude can only be overcome by a systematic, detailed elaboration and presentation of the theory of the transoceanic Navy against the broad background of naval history and naval technology. Only when this is done will the Navy have the public confidence commensurate with its important role in national defense.

Consider for a moment the direction of the Navy's strategic communications with Congress and the American people. The Navy intentionally avoids the media, thus does not utilize its available resources by which to communicate to the American people. The Navy completely ignores blogs, so the service has no stake in the daily narrative during the information age. The Navy classifies almost in entirety the links that connect ends, ways, means, and context... assuming of coarse there are links. Finally, the Navy appears to ignore every opportunity to capitalize on the rich US Navy history of which has the power to capture the imagination and tell a compelling story relevant to today.

I think the Navy's current communication strategy is scary stupid. I may not be as smart as the consultants advising the Navy, but given the opportunity to make a point, I would highlight one enduring fact. You have to talk if you want to be heard. When the Navy decides to start talking again, we suggest telling the country what you believe, but equally important, believe what you tell the country.