SECNAV: "We Don't Understand" Motherships

Zachary Peterson has written a gem of an article for InsideDefense (subscription only). The article is titled Winter Impressed With LCS-1, Says a Mix of Hulls Likely in Future, so the title sums up pretty much what the Navy is thinking there. Essentially, the Navy wants to buy both LCS designs. The article goes on to note both Winter and John Young see a mix of LCS hulls in the Navy's future, and 25-25 or 30-20 are purchasing scenarios discussed.

BUT that was not why we liked this article. There are three quotes worth discussing. We start with this quote where Winter is discussing LCS-1.

“We have a nice ship at the end here,” Winter said of the Lockheed-built Freedom. “It is a warship. No one should be disabused of that -- it is not a fast ferry and it’s going to be a very capable addition to the fleet.”

If the good Secretary insists we call it a warship, then we will call it an unrated warship and everyone is happy. If it was a fast ferry, we would probably like it more, but instead the Navy has built LEVEL I survivability into their new unrated warship and expect to operate it in the most dangerous areas of sea. By the Navy's own definition of Level 1 survivability, these ships are not expected to fight hurt. One may be able to call the Littoral Combat Ship a warship, but lets not not insult Corbett and wrongfully call it a cruiser in the modern era.

Winter believes he has found an operational environment for the LCS to excel.

“When I think back to some of my visits to the North Arabian Gulf, where we have a lot of dependency on frigates and [patrol coastal boats] and things like that, it would be really nice to have a few LCS’s out there right now,” Winter argued. “Not only because you can reduce the crew size. It’s much better matched to that mission and to some of the challenges of operating there than the ships that we have in the region right now. They’re not bad ships, but they really weren’t designed for that type of environment. The speed provides you a lot of flexibility, [as does] the shallow draft and you’ve got a very nice weapons suite.”

So frigates and patrol coastal boats are not well suited for the Persian Gulf? That sounds odd to us, considering almost all naval vessels not a US Cruiser or Destroyer operating in the Persian Gulf are either frigates or patrol coast boats. Under that theory, every local Navy and basically all of Europe is operating the wrong type of vessel in the Persian Gulf. We would have to disagree with the Secretary's analysis here.

Some might argue what he really means is the AEGIS battleships don't belong in the Gulf. That might make a lot of sense, if one can explain how one would provide air defense of the strategic oil resources in the Persian Gulf. We think Winter is talking about frigates and PCs, and is simply wrong. Will the LCS help there? Yep, as a minesweeper during times of war, for that all indications are it will be a great replacement for the Avengers based in Bahrain. However, the LCS is an expensive minesweeper.

Finally, Winter admits what we already know, the Navy knows they are to something, they just haven't really figured it out yet. This is important.

“A lot of it will depend on how we intend to use and leverage these capabilities,” he explained. “I have this nagging sense that we don’t understand all but a small part of the possibilities that this type of platform is going to open up. And that’s good and we’ve just got to let it happen and see what happens.”

Read incorrectly, the title of this post could give the wrong impression. We think highly of the SECNAV, we just disagree with him on some things. In this case, we think he has it absolutely right.

When he says "we don’t understand all but a small part of the possibilities that this type of platform" he is being honest, and he is being correct. The Navy doesn't understand the concept of a mothership, yet. They have all these metrics and requirements, but they lack a clear picture of how to use and make use of the resulting technology and capability in war AND peace. Freedom gets to play the role of the Langley, where concept meets operational reality.

We have a core belief the Navy is on the right track, but hasn't put it together yet. We also believe the LCS will prove us correct, and the transformationalist wrong. The Navy recently discussed emerging strategic threats, but where is the associated emerging capabilities? For the 21st century, unmanned platforms represents emerging capabilities for the Navy in war, but manpower is and always will be the most important factor for managing peace. No way on earth Georgia gets invaded if the Marines are there holding the line, Ivan might by crazy, but he ain't stupid.

The same theories of strategy apply at sea, so apply them. Lets pretend the LCS is in the Persian Gulf; what does it do? If your intention is to observe the movement of the maritime domain, you have achieved that, because other than scouting for war the only thing unmanned technology can do in the field is give the operator a play-by-play of events. If the LCS is operating 6 RHIBs and has the associated manpower, now we are getting somewhere, but the LCS concept is absent said manpower. So when we field a Spartan USV or Protector USV instead, what do we get? A glorified pair of binoculars.

We are encouraged that Winter has a "nagging sense that we don’t understand all but a small part of the possibilities that this type of platform" because it highlights what we have been saying, the Navy isn't thinking strategic about its mothership strategy. The Navy wants MDA, wants peacetime presence, wants irregular warfare capabilities, and wants forward deployed forces to have organic tools on demand for the warfighter. During all times absent great power war this century against a near peer at sea, the mothership will be in the 12st century what the aircraft carrier was in the 20th century. We already see it today, as the amphibious ship plays the role of a mothership, in recent cases delivering manpower capabilities in peacetime. Note how the same platform could deliver tremendous unmanned capabilities in wartime.

So why then in an increasingly dangerous environment where the threat is blue water submarines, anti-ship missiles, and ballistic missiles is the Navy building a whole bunch of Littoral Combat Ships with minimum air defense capabilities and virtually no blue water submarine capability? If scouting is so critical to the fleet in an increasingly dangerous maritime domain, why does the Navy intend to store its 21st century scouting capabilities on its weakest platform intended to operate alone in the littoral, the region that historically speaking is where ships are most vulnerable.

Where is the cruiser? In No Case Can We Exercise Control by Battleships Alone. Maritime Strategy isn't just a slogan you know...

Motherships should be big. Motherships should be thought of as carriers, not gunboats, but instead of aircraft they carry your unmanned weapon and sensor platforms that enable information dominance at sea in the information age. Building a small mothership and pretending it is a frigate ultimately leaves the Navy without a real mothership and without a real frigate.

For the record, we completely agree with Winter when he says "let it happen and see what happens." We are consistent when we suggest of the LCS build a few, see what they can do. However, we do this in the belief the Navy will make sound judgments, because we believe once the Navy gets to sea and develops its operational concept for unmanned technology, particularly in a rapidly changing technology environment, the advantages and disadvantages will be obvious.