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The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.

The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an end.

This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further support than it ever receives.

-Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett

When the Navy first released its maritime strategy, we used the above as part of our argument against it. Things have obviously changed. The discussion at the time was a debate between myself and a guest blogger called Strategy1 at SteelJaw Scribes place. Most readers of this blog know that guest blogger as Commander Bryan McGrath, who at the time was Director, Strategic Actions Group (OPNAV N3N5). Ever since that piece was posted, the transition towards accepting the Navy's maritime strategy has occurred on this blog.

We still have criticisms of the maritime strategy, indeed the omission of Sea Basing as a strategic concept is an issue, but in learning the rest of the story behind the Maritime Strategy development we have slowly adopted it as part of our own narrative for thinking strategically about the maritime environment in the 21st century.

In these times where we observe military action by Russia and continued development of maritime capabilities by China, we still hold strong our belief that the cold war is not on the rebound. While Russia and China represent competitors in the 21st century, they are not preordained to represent adversaries.

We believe our narrative is in line with the Navy's new maritime strategy, highlighting the phrase "preventing war is as important as winning war" as the Navy's mission statement in that strategy. We note that balance is critical for military power to adequately address the 21st century threat conditions, and competition with both Russia and China highlight this. With Russia the competition is resources, and while ground zero for that competition is represented in Georgia today, it could just as easily represent the Arctic Ocean tomorrow. For China the competition is also resources, but that competition is unfolding in Africa, not Asia.

If we have learned anything this week about the competition it is that the competition will be taking place in remote places in the world, and the Navy must be present there. With that in mind, we fully embrace the Navy's maritime strategic concept as a roadmap for success, because it does contain the vision necessary for this world.

Three things prompt us to reestablish the narrative on the blog tonight.

First, despite our frustration with the US State Department and political leadership in general regarding how they managed the Russian military action with complete inaction, we do not see the return of the cold war. The Navy today, despite this conflict, has command of the sea uncontested by Russia or China. The Navy needs to use this command while it exists to 'shape' the environment for our national interests. The Navy understands soft power, for example sending the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) to Georgia is a way to influence beyond our competitors capabilities.

Second, we no longer have a good feel for the size of this audience, nor who our audience has become. A month ago we could point to 75% of the visitors and say that person is either Military, Government, Industry, or Academic. We are no longer so certain. A few kind compliments from brilliant sources, brilliant people, and brilliant bloggers and things have changed. We are truly blessed to have such brilliant support.

Finally, I've been trading emails with now retired Bryan McGrath, and I'm very excited to see he has started a blog, and equally proud to have him linked from our blog. I truly believe the Navy blogosphere is the best small community on the internet, and Information Dissemination is truly blessed to be considered apart of it. As someone who never shys away from debating strategy, I look forward to such banter with Bryan when he's ready to put on his old cap every now and again.