5th Fleet Focus: USS Vella Gulf off Hobyo

More US Navy ships have taken up position off the Somalian harbor city of Hobyo to monitor the MV Faina, the recently hijacked ship reported to be carrying T-72 tanks. We note in this photograph the Navy released today that Captain Mark Genung, Commanding Officer of the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) is among those at the scene.

The arrival of the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) signals the arrival of the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group, which means every pirate off Somalia can be blown into small pieces now, if the order was given to do so. Navy NewsStand has the rest of the story.

Several U.S. ships are now operating in the vicinity of Motor Vessel Faina, the Belize-flagged cargo ship, which was captured Sept. 25 and is anchored off the coast of Somalia near the harbor city of Hobyo. The U.S. 5th Fleet continues to actively monitor the situation.

"We will maintain a vigilant watch over the ship and remain on station while negotiations take place," said Rear Adm. Kendall Card, task force commander leading the efforts to prevent the weapons aboard M/V Faina from being offloaded from the ship.

The Navy NewsStand article goes on to note the ship is operated by Kaalybe Shipping Ukraine, but this AP article run on the USA Today website seems to dispute that claim. The AP followed up today with another article suggesting the ship's operator is Tomex Team, out of Odessa in the Black Sea. The AP report goes on to note a "Russian-based ship register indicates that Tomex Team is a subsidiary of the Faina's owner, Panama-based Waterlux AG." The AP article has other interesting information.

U.S. military officials and diplomats say the weapons are destined for southern Sudan. But Morrell said: "We take — and have no reason not to take — the president of Kenya at his word when he expressed to the president of the United States yesterday that this shipment was bound for his government, which is ... a peaceful government with legitimate self-defense needs."

Russian media reported that the Faina's first mate, Vladimir Nikolsky, said its captain, Vladimir Kolobkov, had suffered from heat stroke. The ITAR-Tass news agency said Kolobkov died of a stroke Sunday, and that the vessel has a crew of two Russians, 17 Ukrainians and one from Latvia...

The Russian navy has said it ordered the guided missile frigate Neustrashimy, or Intrepid, to the northwest Indian Ocean to protect commercial shipping lanes and defend the lives of Russian citizens. It is expected to take about a week to arrive.

Morrell said the U.S. Navy has enough ships in the area "to deal with the situation at hand."

"But this involves Russian cargo, as I understand it, so I don't think that we have a particular issue with the Russians coming on the scene, as well. And we will obviously work hard to coordinate, once they are on scene," he added.

So the T-72s are Russian, shipped through Ukraine? One would think when Main Battle Tanks are captured by pirates on the high seas, you could find some accurate information from those who have been robbed. Instead it is a crazy cycle trying to find one person who can speak for the ship, and another cycle trying to find someone to speak for the cargo. I bet we would get good information if that Kilo submarine recently refitted in Russia on its way to India were attacked by pirates as it passed through the Gulf of Aden. In other words, it is easy to tell when legitimacy exists in arms deliveries. This T-72 ship sounds fishy.

Then we get to the meat of the article. Look, the pirates have until the RFS Neustrashimy (FF 712) arrives to get their ransom and run, and if they are lucky be caught by the US Navy. The AP reports exactly why this frigate, and not the battlecruiser heading to smile for Hugo Chavez, is the Russian naval action to watch.

Russian analysts say the hijacking has given Moscow another chance to display its might following its brief war with Georgia — which the Kremlin justified, in part, as an effort to protect Russians living in two Georgian breakaway regions.

"It's another show of the flag intended to demonstrate that Russia would protect its citizens wherever it deems it necessary," said Yevgeny Volk, the head of the Moscow office of the Heritage Foundation.

A hostage rescue would play well with the many Russians nostalgic for the superpower status of the Soviet Union.

It could be as simple as running the frigate up the coast blowing up every little boat on the beach, but put the video on YouTube and Putin pays for his deployment in good PR at home. If the pirates want to avoid being the bloody stain of the Russian propaganda to fight piracy, they would be smart to surrender to the US Navy. Last time pirates were captured, the Danes released them on a Somalian beach. Expect no such sympathy from the Russians.

As we continue to observe this unfold, we are only hoping for one outcome, and it has nothing to do with the tanks or pirates. We want to see excellent cooperation between the US Navy and Russian Navy, and the French as well if they are there... in a joint international effort that produces positive results. In my view the Russians remain a very important partner to be worked with, because unlike most of the partners (including several NATO partners) we have today, the Russians will fight.

New Force Structure Review to be Released Soon

The Naval Operations Concept 2008 (NOC), to be released later this month, is going to dominate the Navy discussion this fall. Zachary M. Peterson reports for Inside the Navy, and in a recent subscription only article 313-Ship Fleet Re-Examined, Navy Undergoing A New Force Structure Review Due This Fall, we begin to learn some early details of what will be associated with the NOC.

The Navy is conducting a force structure review that could change the number of ships the service needs in the 2020 time frame to maintain sea control and support the maritime strategy issued last year, the Navy’s top programmer told Inside the Navy in an exclusive interview last week.

“The 313 plan, as it’s known, was based on a force-structure analysis done in 2005 and it has served us very well,” Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, said Sept. 24. “But as we look at the changes in the security environment in the newly published maritime strategy, we felt it was appropriate to work through a similar methodology that we did in 2005 to make sure that we have our force structure correct.”

The new force structure review should be complete in conjunction with the release of the 2008 Naval Operations Concept, which will outline how the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard will operate in accordance to the triservice maritime strategy published last October.

It will be very difficult to discuss anything else as the details get pored over. A new shipbuilding plan, and the basis for which the new plan is developed. This topic will clearly dominate the discussion for days, which raises the question, will the Navy participate in that discussion?

We are already seeing one change to expect with the new shipbuilding plan.

“As I said in testimony, the proposed Navy plan with DDG-51s is to buy one in FY-10, two in FY-11, one in FY-12, two in FY-13, one in FY-14 and one in FY-15,” the three-star admiral said.

Ultimately, the service wants 12 additional DDG-51s, he added.

If we assume the Navy builds 2 DDG-51s in FY-16 and 2 in FY17, which is possible if the goal is twelve total, and those destroyers serve a full 35 years, the DDG-51 class will span well over 65 years, more than the Iowa class battleships. Does anyone truly believe the DDG-51s will still be relevant after 2050? How effective were those "four piper's" early in WWII?

Just asking...

Small Combatants To Fight... China?

We will always give priority to the strategic thinkers, and Captain Wayne Hughes is one of our favorites. Everything he writes is solid gold in our opinion, because it forces readers to think critically about both strategy and tactics, and his words always encourage professional debate regarding the best ways to conduct the work of naval forces at sea. If you are looking for his credentials, the book on the right that will remain a constant on this blog is a great place to start, because it is the bible of modern naval warfare.

In a recent interview with Inside the Navy's Rebekah Gordon, Captain Hughes weighs in on the Littoral Combat Ship.

“I think we’ve got to get on with building an inshore Navy, a green-water Navy component, and LCS isn’t it,” said Hughes, the former dean of the school’s Graduate School of Operational & Information Sciences. “At $500 million plus module costs, it’s not going to hack it.”

"We can’t afford to lose billion-dollar DDGs, but we can afford to lose $50- or $100-million inshore combatants,” he said. “And instead of having a crew of 350 or 400, have a crew of 12. A combat crew of 12 people so that if the ship gets hit, you just save the survivors and leave the ship as a burning derelict as opposed to having to do damage control and create more casualties.”

Captain Hughes, unlike many who believe building small ships in the US Navy is specifically for fighting the "small wars" at sea, has a different vision for how these ships can contribute to the total naval power of the US Navy.

“The Chinese are getting so that they can give us trouble with our small number of big aircraft carriers and Aegis ships because they’re concentrating on confronting those ships specifically, and they’re developing really good sea-denial capabilities and anti-access capabilities,” Hughes said. “So we’ve got to beat them with something that upsets and gives them new problems to think about.”

The United States must influence China into thinking it never wants to go to war with the “big Navy” by having an effective presence and capability in the green waters, Hughes said.

If he had his way, offensive strike missiles would come off of destroyers and instead the Navy would build reasonably priced small missile ships “so the DDG can concentrate on blue-water operations again and we’d have these little guys to deploy wherever they were needed to provide the cheap firepower to support the land war.”

The idea of small, fast ships with credible offensive combat power is rarely discussed, instead defaulting to the position that small, fast ships in the littorals are for fighting pirates and other bandits of the sea. Captain Hughes is discussing the idea of bringing back small ships with kill weapons for combat at sea. Considering most anti-ship weapons have already been removed from the AEGIS battleships in the US Navy today, building the small ships to carry anti-ship weapons is not much of a reach. At the end of the day, the suggestion is interesting for discussion because it requires critical thought regarding how one believes naval warfare will be conducted in the future.

Captain Hughes goes on to explain why opening these important debates is important today.

Part of the Navy’s problem, Hughes said, is its feeling of being obligated to “be able to do anything it’s called upon to do,” which has created a culture of cramming as many capabilities onto ships as possible.

“There’s a spirit of the Navy which has said we’ve got to be able to go anywhere and do anything, and therefore I’ve always got to hedge my bet and add system X, Y, and Z, as well as its original mission which was to perform A, B and C,” Hughes said.

“Have a primary mission and don’t cost yourself out of business by then adding other capabilities. It has a primary mission and you count to 10 before you add another capability,” Hughes said. Capabilities “have to be carefully thought through and be complementary. And not try and have all the ships be able to go anywhere, anytime. That’s where it gets dangerous.”

We find it hard to disagree with Captain Hughes assessment of the Littoral Combat Ship, the latest press reports claim the FY09 conference has confirmed there will be 2 Littoral Combat Ships in FY09, and the cost cap of $460 million will not be enforced for those ships. The necessity to include language that allows the ship to cost more than $460 million implies a reality the ship cannot be purchased for that price, a development that insures the Littoral Combat Ship is far from the affordable "low end" of the shipbuilding plan it was promised to be.

We also find it hard to disagree with Captain Hughes assessment of the "requirement creep" culture in the Navy. Lets face it, the DDG-1000 has got to be one of the biggest oxymoron in the history of the defense industry. Lets review. The requirement for stealth has driven up the total displacement to around 14,500 tons, while also imposing a design that engineers have raised questions regarding its seaworthiness. This enormous ship, intended to be stealthy, is billed and sold as a littoral warship, operating in the worlds most densely populated areas of sea. Now, years after the Navy has pushed for this primarily land attack ship, the primary reasons the Navy wants to truncate the purchase is because of anti-ship missiles from land, while also claiming the ship cannot support the primary area anti-aircraft missile system of the US Navy. Whether the Navy's claims are true or not, it is clear that both the Navy and Congress agree the DDG-1000 is a complete disaster of a program, and yet both agree to fund a third ship before construction even begins on the first two.

If truck mounted missiles and lack of sufficient air defense explains the reasons why the DDG-1000 is the wrong platform, why doesn't this same argument apply to the Littoral Combat Ship given that platforms bare minimum capabilities in defenses against both threats?

Ultimately, the discussion we see is whether Captain Hughes is advocating the right vision for what future naval warfare will be like. How will small ships threaten blue water forces of the PLA Navy? If air superiority is contested, what prevents a peer competitor from sinking these small fast attack craft being advocated? How do numerous very small, very fast ships help against nuclear submarines? If the Littoral Combat Ship is to be replaced by smaller, dedicated purpose hulls intended to fight forces at sea, what becomes the platform for forward deploying unmanned systems that are critical scouts for the green water force being advocated?

Small ships can be successful against the PLA Navy if air superiority is maintained against the Chinese, and if ASW capabilities exist that can take on enemy submarine forces. Note the use of the word "if."

Finally, how does a logistical model work for very small, well armed combatants? The smaller size implies reduced endurance, so how is that issue addressed?

Clearly there are a lot of questions, but it doesn't mean the discussion isn't important. I don't disagree with the idea, I am just not sure I see how the small ships case is made against China. The DDG-1000/LCS combination of ships in the current plan is a complete disaster, a system of broken assumptions that is costing the Navy hulls and the taxpayers money during a time of limited resources. Why is a small, agile force of missile attack craft a more credible option?

As much as I like the idea of small ships, I still believe the Navy needs capabilities that can self deploy quickly to all points on the globe. To do that with very small, specialized combatants requires a system of systems approach, and after seeing the system of systems approach to Sea Basing, I can't say I believe the strategic thinkers in the acquisition office would come up with a cost effective solution for very small ships. I'm also worried that shifting towards small, manned platforms will ignore the necessity to build up the unmanned technology that will be critical in the next period of war.

That is why on this blog, we believe a small multi-mission frigate and large mothership is the better bet, but we don't dismiss one aspect of this idea that should be considered... In peacetime, the necessity for manpower cannot be overstated. This idea does present the capability to saturate the maritime domain with distributed, credibly armed manpower. That cannot be underestimated as a major capability for fighting the challenges of peacetime.

Commandant Thad Allen and Web 2.0

Arctic shipping routes have global implications through the possible opening of two new shipping routes, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage (NWP). Both offer significant decreases in time and distance from the current routes through the Suez and Panama Canals. In the business of long-distance sea cargo, “time saved is money made.” Some analysts estimate the savings could be as much as $800,000 in fuel and labor per trip for a large freighter.

In both trade and strategic terms, China would benefit substantially from a reliable Arctic passage. Currently, 60 percent of vessels transiting the strategic straits of Southeast Asia are either Chinese or carrying cargo to or from China. Recently, both China and India have had talks with Russia about using the Northern Sea Route. Russia is also considering plans to ship liquefied natural gas (LNG) directly to the United States, which has become the largest LNG importer in the world. Other industrialized nations such as Japan and South Korea could alter their energy import patterns away from volatile regions such as the Middle East and Africa.

While conditions, demand, and technology are not yet right for these routes to be used regularly, it is clear that their use will be feasible in the near future. This will require establishment of consistent and appropriate international regulations for design, construction, and use of Arctic shipping. Additionally, capabilities and procedures must be put in place to respond to safety, security, and pollution incidents that are likely to accompany an increase in traffic. Naval architects have laid out design challenges that must be considered for ships intending to operate in the Arctic. U.S. Coast Guard commandant Admiral Thad Allen expanded on this subject at the International Maritime Organization’s 25th Assembly in November 2007, suggesting that the organization’s Polar Code be broadened to include Arctic navigation and crew training standards, ice-capable vessel construction standards, traffic separation schemes, and pollution prevention and response.

Carpe DIEM, Seizing Strategic Opportunity in the Arctic (PDF), LCDR Anthony Russell - United States Coast Guard, Joint Forces Quarterly, 4th Quarter 2008

When I was in Durham a few weeks ago, RADM Fred Rosa took about 10 minutes to explain what the US Coast Guard does everyday. He didn't spend a lot of time explaining, he didn't have to, because the Coast Guard is currently enjoying one of those "periods of good feelings" in its relationship with the American people. Heroic rescues during hurricanes caught on camera and widely reported in the press, including nothing but praise for Admiral Thad Allen's management of crisis during the early difficult days of Hurricane Katrina, has given the Coast Guard an image in the citizenry's minds eye representative of the true meaning of hero. Like a good sports franchise, the orange and white carries a brand that represents respect.

But even as the Coast Guard enjoys a positive perception from the citizens, most Americans do not understand the increasing responsibilities and challenges the Coast Guard is facing in the 21st century. The only place most citizens are going to learn about the history of the Coast Guard is watching contestants answer questions on Jeopardy, and as the global warming debate has become political, a large segment of the population does not understand that the Arctic ice really is melting, why it will likely continue to melt, and how this is likely to change the way the world conducts commerce in the future. While many in Durham were asking questions about port security concerns, a topic average Americans understand and read about, RADM Fred Rosa didn't have time to explain why the Coast Guard is in serious need of more icebreakers.

As I mentioned yesterday, LCDR Tony Russell, the author of the Joint Forces Quarterly article quoted above (and a great read (PDF) btw), called me this past Friday with RADM Mary Landry and Commandant Thad Allen in a conference call so we could discuss the new social media programs the Coast Guard was undertaking. I basically feinted complete ignorance, which may or may not have been a feint, to allow them to do as much of the talking as possible regarding what exactly the Coast Guard is trying to accomplish. I'm pretty sure they covered the entire list, from drug smuggling to Arctic Ocean issues to port security to deployments overseas and everything in between. The Coast Guard is involved in many critical areas of national interest to the citizens of the United States. As I was listening to the comments, it quickly became clear that simply posting a news story about Coast Guard activity on an official website isn't generating the Coast Guard the attention it believes it deserves, and does little to inject itself into the daily conversation of American citizens.

Basically, the Coast Guard wants to start a conversation about itself that includes all of these topics and more. The discussion is intended to begin inside the Coast Guard itself, but not be limited only to the USCG. The Coast Guard wants your input for the discussion, and they see the internet as the medium to have that conversation. The conversation started today.

The Coast Guard released Commandants Corner 2.0 today, which is one of many steps the Coast Guard is taking as part of its new social media engagement program. The new feature of the Commandants Corner is Commandant Thad Allen's new web journal: iCommandant. Because I had learned about this from the Commandant himself last week, I've had several days to think about this. While I was a skeptic most of the weekend, I'm starting to think this has long term potential if they can learn on the job.

First, the announcement that the journal uses Blogger is very smart. Other than a select few shortsighted organizations that choose to be disconnected from the rest of society, Blogger is the most accessible new media web service from business enterprises today. Most IT networks simply do not block Blogger, for whatever reason. Given the way I've observed the unveiling of this new media initiative, I would bet someone in the Coast Guard did that research and learned that little known IT fact. FWIW, it is why I choose Blogger too.

Second, the Coast Guard has a long way to go. As I was reading through the comments on the first journal entry, I noted one comment that asked "Will this put the Unofficial CGBlog out of business?" That question highlights the ignorance many have of new media, but in fairness, before I started blogging I would have suggested that comment myself.

I've only been blogging for 15 months, so while I'm not a newbie, I'm certainly not a veteran. What makes blogging unique in my opinion is that there really isn't competition among blogging networks, in fact what happens as more blogs join specific subject blogging networks (like the Navy, or Coast Guard blogosphere), is that each compelling blog that joins the network just makes the network as a whole stronger.

When I started blogging, the Navy blogosphere I followed daily was basically CDR, Eagle1, Lex, Chap, SJS, and Bubblehead. In my opinion, there are few websites on the entire internet with smarter, more interesting folks who blog about the subjects I enjoy reading about, and I basically told myself "these are the blogs I will associate myself with" whether they like it or not. Indeed I've barely spoken to Bubblehead or Lex other than occasional comments I leave on their blog, so they are two examples of where the loosest affiliations exist within a similar blog network. I knew I was going to occasionally discuss content they discussed, and I knew I could build a small but interesting audience.

Along the way the blog network I associate with has expanded considerably, The Sub Report and the academics who are simply smarter and more interesting than me being an excellent example. I think, based on the statistics I have run on the blog over the past year, as this blogs popularity has increased, the popularity of the blogs within my blog network has also increased. I can't prove this, but in general my theory of blog networks is that as nodes of a blog network become stronger, other nodes in the network as a whole becomes stronger.

With that in mind, if I was answering the question "Will this put the Unofficial CGBlog out of business?" I would say, "Nope, and if the Coast Guard is successful with Web 2.0, the Unofficial CGBlog will be more popular than ever." If we are to truly measure the success of an official Coast Guard blog, it will only be as successful as the popularity of other Web 2.0 locations that promote the discussions that benifit the Coast Guard, and build a bigger Coast Guard community online.

What makes a Commandants blog so interesting is that if in fact it can build traffic of its own, it will allow the Commandant to act as a sort of core node in the small but smart Coast Guard blog network, pushing traffic towards the discussions the Commandant believes are important to the Coast Guard discussion. While it doesn't allow the Coast Guard to control the conversation, indeed the desire would be for the conversations to come from other authors, it does give the Coast Guard the ability to encourage a conversation and drive interest, and traffic, towards important conversations and debates. If that comes to be, it is impossible for the Coast Guard to lose.

However, even taking this view the question should be asked, how does the Coast Guard deal with Web 2.0 conversations that are disagreeable? I don't know how the Coast Guard plans to manage that issue, but if the decision is to ignore it, it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of why they would want to blog in the first place. Mike and I disagree on many topics, but some some of the best discussions, best comments, and other useful information including links has come from posts inspired from folks I disagree with. I don't always win those debates, but it isn't about me, in all great discussions the winner is the readers and comment contributors, and sometimes the ideas that come from the discussion have legs. If the Coast Guard can't answer its critics in the Web 2.0 domain, then it can't join the debate the Web 2.0 domain encourages.

Clearly there are several questions that will be answered over time. Can iCommandant make itself interesting enough to develop an audience? Will iCommandant develop into a network distribution node, driving discussion topics in the Web 2.0 domain? Will iCommandant be used as a space to encourage debate with content deemed critical of current decisions? How will iCommandant be used to encourage honest, professional discourse about complicated, but important topics where professionals can disagree on solutions?

Time will judge whether this will be successful or not, but the Coast Guard deserves a lot of credit here. In the end, the quality of discussion promoted will be a major factor in the success of the initiative. In other words, the Coast Guard can't insure success of Web 2.0 on its own, the Coast Guard blogosphere and other engaged participants will ultimately determine success.

Photo of the Day

Wow. Yes, despite the problems, we love this ship, and we love this photo.


Click for link to hi-res. This ship and a minor RoE change combined with some political support can solve the piracy issues off Somalia in a hurry, and I don't care what kind of radar the Somalian pirates have, they would never see it coming. Ever looked at a LPD-17 through a commercial radar system you might find on a privately owned ship? If you ever get the chance, check it out. You'll ask yourself how in the world that tiny dot is a 25,000 ton beast.

Monday Morning Reading

When the President jumps out of a submarine hatch in uniform, we think it is noteworthy. No, not the President of the United States, rather the President of Russia. President Dmitry Medvedev recently took a short trip on one of Russia's nuclear submarines and also stressed the importance of new submarine construction for Russia. Makes sense, as we have noted in the past, Russia is spending %25 of its entire defense budget on shipbuilding programs, and 80% of that money is specific to building new ballistic missile submarines. Essentially, the Russian shipbuilding strategy has been to build the most expensive platforms first.

SteelJaw Scribe is noting the NOC will be released in October. The NOC will hold a full week as a theme on the blog. The NOC release will dominate the conversation once it happens, that is a safe prediction. I've been thinking about asking some big names in the business if they would be interested in giving a reaction to be published here. I'm not sure I could get anyone, but I figure asking couldn't hurt, and it beats those people getting quoted piecemeal by the media when they can lay out a full blown opinion.

An academic look at Evangelists and evangelical networks. I think it is a facinating topic.

Mike notes McCain brought up the LCS in the debate on Friday. Actually, what people may have forgot is that McCain has previously weighed in on the topic in this interview. If anyone has a link for any comments by Obama regarding the Navy or any Navy programs I'd be interested.

The Long War Jounral notes that the US and Iraqi forces have stepped up operations against Iranian terror groups. I still expect the IRGC to do something provokative in the Persian Gulf soon. Too much global market uncertainy right now, which is why I believe the timing is right.

Russian Crew Member Dies on Ukrainian Ship

It looks like the Somalian pirates have finally grabbed the attention of the mainstream media. The New York Times has the latest on the Ukrainian ship. Lets examine some of this carefully.

Tensions increased Sunday over what to do about the arms-carrying cargo ship hijacked off the coast of Somalia, as the pirates vowed to fight to the death, a hostage died and Somali officials urged the American Navy to send in commandos.

Sounds tough, but a quick check into the history of Somalian piracy reveals there is no evidence that pirates 'fight to the death.' Indeed the evidence is they flee for their lives, suggesting they do not see glory in death.

The man said he was speaking on a satellite phone from the bridge of the hijacked Ukrainian ship, and to prove it, he handed the phone to another man who said he was the captain. The captain, a Ukrainian, then told the BBC that a Russian crew member had died from hypertension.

Not good. Eagle1 suggests I could be assuming too much when I suggest Russia would probably take military action against Somalian pirates. I don't think so, for Russia the deployment of a ship has a purpose, and it isn't to be a coalition partner. There will be an incident somewhere and plenty of photography to prove it, Putin will have his headline. No doubt this new headline, the death of a Russian citizen in the hands of pirates, shapes the necessity for a new, positive headline for the Russian leadership in the future.

American military officials said that they were closely watching the ship but that there were no plans to raid it.

“We’re deeply concerned about what’s aboard, as well as the safety of the crew,” said Lt. Nathan Christensen, a spokesman for the Navy’s Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain. “We’re hoping the arms don’t make it to shore.”

The article notes the Somalian ministers are calling for an American raid, but a raid is unlikely. The presence of the USS Howard (DDG 83) is almost certainly specific to preventing the unloading of cargo to Somalia.

There does appear to be some confusion regarding the actual demanded ransom of the ship by the pirates holding her. The Associated Press, as reported in this Navy Times article, suggests the ransom is $20 million for the ship. The LA Times is suggesting the ransom is $35 million. The latest reports suggest the figure is $5 million. The New York Times article quotes some western diplomat in Kenya suggesting that no ransom will be paid given how much attention has been given the hijacking. In the same article a western diplomat suggests there is no other option. Because the safest way to release the ship and the crew is to pay the ransom, the various reports regarding ransom totals probably reflect a point in time during negotiations. When the number drops to around $2 million, ransom will be paid.

According to this report out of China, even after the ship is released it still may be seized, as there are questions whether the ship is violating a UN weapons embargo to the Sudan.

Andrew Mwangura of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Program said on Sunday the Somali pirates claim to be in possession of confidential documents showing that the arms were actually destined for southern Sudan and not Kenya.

Mwangura said that the hijacked ship-MV Faina was ferrying the fourth such consignment from Ukrainian to southern Sudan.

"One of the cargo arrived at the port of Mombasa in October last year, two in February this year. The seized load of 33 Russian-built T-72 tanks and some ammunition was the fourth cargo with military equipment for southern Sudan," Mwangura told Xinhua by telephone on Sunday.

As we have mentioned many times before, the pirates claim themselves as legitimate by suggesting they act in the role of a Coast Guard for Somalia. If it turns out true there is some form of illegal HAZMAT on the Iranian ship seized, and the T-72s on the Ukrainian ship were indeed intended for the Sudan, the irony is both of these two seizures would be two of the most impressive Coast Guard style interdiction's in the region, including the legitimate Coast Guards of regional nations. You can't make this up...

Just to highlight the hell hole that region of sea is for the US Navy, the Washington Post has another article about a disaster in the human smuggling trade taking place between Somalia and Yemen, with 52 dead from a total 123 who were abandoned at sea by the smugglers, and spent 18 days adrift in the middle of the Gulf of Aden.

The Ukrainians are simply not in a position to send a naval vessel down to address this incident, indeed the absence of effective naval capability by the Ukraine is what has allowed this ship to captured, due to lack of escort, in the first place. The Russians have sent their frigate, but the ship deployed from the Baltic Sea, and will take awhile to arrive on station. It will be interesting to see where the Russians get logistics from, because the options are the US, France, Britain, or Germany unless the Russians deploy oilers from the Black Sea.

There have been three ships released from Somalian pirates over the last few days. The Earth Times is reporting the Malaysian oil tanker was released for $2 million ransom. Also released were Japanese and Egyptian ships, both of which were released due to ransoms of $2.0 and $1.5 million paid respectively. All crew members of all three ships are safe.

With events happening quickly, it is likely this entire incident will be over before the Russian Navy arrives.

Observing the Little Things With the Coast Guard

On Friday, I got a phone call from LCDR Tony Russell, the press secretary of Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allan. LCDR Russell allowed me to have a conference call with RADL Mary Landry and the Commandant himself to discuss the new Web 2.0 initiatives the Coast Guard is involved in.

The weekend has turned into a real world nightmare of time consumption, and I have been unable to write up my thoughts. While I intend to do a follow up later this week, have you seen some of the interesting tidbits that have popped up just over the last few days?

First, the Coast Guard appears to have selected a common instant messenger application for service use. Second, the 13th Coast Guard district has set up a blog, and is looking for comments to current discussions.

But what caught my attention was the Bollinger contract award news for the design and construction of a series of Fast Response Cutter (FRC)/Sentinel Class patrol boats. Did you see the Coast Guards official announcement? There is a button at the bottom of the official Coast Guard announcement page for citizens to ask questions, I assume about both the ship and the contract?

Once I get a chance to collect my notes in a more organized way I'll follow up with a post about my conversation with Admiral Allen, but I thought these emerging features was noteworthy enough by themselves to highlight.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Thach (FFG 43)
USS Springfield (SSN 761)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RSS Resolution (L 208)
HMCS Ville de Quebec (FFH 332)
FS Courbet (F712)
FS Commandant Birot (F796)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS Nivôse (F732)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Chatham (F87)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Lekiu (30)
KD Pahang (172)
KD Inderapura (1505)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)

5th Fleet Focus: Pirates Not Our Problem

This is an important discussion. If you read it at face value, it can easily piss you off. The US Navy sells the purpose of the Navy in the 21st century as keeping sea lines of communication open to commerce, but statements like this make it clear the Navy does not see piracy as a threat to that strategic objective.

The U.S. Navy said on Monday allied warships were doing all they could to thwart piracy in the strategic Gulf of Aden, but shipping companies should take their own measures to protect their vessels and crews.

The warning came as it emerged Somali pirates had hijacked another vessel off the Horn of Africa on Sunday, bringing the total seized so far this year to more than 30.

The U.S. Navy said the international naval force CTF-150 had stopped more then 12 attacks since May. CTF-150 comprises of warships from nations including Britain, France, Canada, Germany, Pakistan and the United States.

"The coalition does not have the resources to provide 24-hour protection for the vast number of merchant vessels in the region," said Combined Maritime Forces commander, U.S. vice admiral Bill Gortney.

Taking a historical view it pains me to read this. One of the primary reasons he United States of America dumped The Articles of Confederation and wrote the Constitution of the United States was to gain the power of taxation, and the primary reason the founding fathers needed taxation was so the country could build a Navy for the specific purpose of fighting pirates.

I also find it very frustrating that last Thursday the Admirals stood in front of the American people in Durham and discussed in detail the role of naval power to protect the global system to insure the free flow of trade, and here we have a clear example of trade disruption on the seas and the US Navy basically tells ship owners they can't solve the problem.

However, it really isn't such a simple issue, and the discussion requires more intellectual rigor. On one hand, I think the Navy telling civilian maritime traffic to protect itself, which could imply arming up, doesn't really sound like a good idea. On the other hand, stopping piracy in the Gulf of Aden is not easily done, and is a low priority on the list of priorities for naval forces within the 5th Fleet AOR.

The Navy does not do a good job emphasizing the national security specific roles required of the service in forward theaters today. An example is the defense of the Iraqi oil terminals, a critical but rarely discussed role of the US Navy in the 5th Fleet. The American people don't understand what the large surface combatants do when forward deployed to the 5th Fleet. It is easy for people to see the value of an aircraft carrier providing air support including intelligence gathering and combat support in both theaters of war, but the day to day of naval forces are not well understood by most Americans.

That might be a difficult topic for the Navy to discuss with the American public, but it is a topic the Navy may need to make in the future to get more ships. When piracy, a problem that directly effects free trade, is seen as a low priority for the US Navy, it does not make much sense for the US Navy to hold conversations with business leaders and talk about the importance of protecting the global trade system at sea. The discussion is generic anyway, and without specifics the Navy message comes of as inconsistent when matching statements like this one from Admiral Gortney and the one given in Durham last week

The question to be asked is why the US Navy is not committed to stopping piracy in the 21st century? That question is a political question, not a strategic question of the Navy, or a tactical question regarding resources. It represents one of those political issues no one ever running for national political office gets asked about. The Navy correctly points out there is no threat to global system from Somalian piracy, piracy represents a minor disruption that barely shows up on the big picture. Ultimately, without the international political and legal framework to deal with pirates, the US Navy is sticking to national security priorities until mandated by political leaders to give the problem more attention.

While this particular statement comes from a US Navy Admiral, it could have just as easily come from any nation in the world, except France.

The Russians Deploy to Somalia

The Russian Navy operates only one Project 1154 frigate named RFS Neustrashimy (FF 712), which currently serves in the Baltic fleet. RFS Neustrashimy (FF 712) displaces around 4000 tons and has a lower RCS than many older warships in the Russian Navy, but instead of unmanned subsurface, surface, and aviation unmanned systems, the Russian version is a 6th rate frigate sporting 16 SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles and 8 VLS launched SA-N-9 anti-aircraft missiles. The class, designed during the cold war, was intended to replace the old Krivak class frigates. The SS-N-25 is similar to the Harpoon missile, and sometimes called the Harpoonski, while the SA-N-9 is very similar to the Russian TOR SAM system. Despite these weapon systems, the rest of the platform is dedicated to being an ASW frigate.

According to Russian media reports, the ship deployed to Somalia on Wednesday.

Russia's Navy has sent a missile frigate to waters off the Somali coast to fight piracy in the region, a Navy spokesman said on Friday.

"The Neustrashimy (Fearless) frigate from the Baltic Fleet left the main naval base in Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad on Wednesday to ensure security in several regions of the world oceans," Capt. 1st Rank Igor Dygalo said.

There are still many questions, ranging from logistics to intention, and for my personal curiosity, the RoE the Russian Navy intends to operate under. If the ship deployed on Wednesday, that would have been before the seizure of the Ukrainian owned ship by the Somalian pirates that was reported to be carrying T-72s, but also reported to have Russian citizens as crew members.

Also worth a look, RIA Novosti has an interesting photo album of the modernizing Russian Navy.

The Army Asks David a Good Quesiton

When I decided last week to make the theme this week Web 2.0, I got lucky. We are seeing movement on all fronts in both the Army and the Coast Guard, and now David Axe is running a great discussion based on an email sent to him by LTC Tony Burgess.

You will have to read the short post at David's to get everything in context, but I'm stealing the letter that sparks the conversation.

David:

I am on my way to Iraq to interview company commanders and platoon leaders. Over the last three weeks, we rolled out the new version of the professional forums and, as a direct impact of your articles, we are indeed calling the overall learning system “MilSpace.” We will be incorporating new features and capabilities at a rate of about one per month over the next year - in a process of continuous improvement. I just wanted to say thanks and to invite you to feed us additional ideas.

One question I would love to have you thinking about on our behalf is, “What is emerging at the cutting edge that we need to know about and/or consider integrating into the forums?”

Take care,

LTC Tony Burgess

at Ft Benning — on the way to Iraq

David has background on this Army initiative in his role as both a journalist and blogger here, here, and here. More information about “MilSpace” can be found here described as:

One way that leaders are connecting in conversation is through online professional forums (aka online communities) like the Company Command (CC) and Platoon Leader (PL) forums. These forums bring together leaders from across the Army to share ideas and experiences and to improve our collective effectiveness. The PL forum specifically also gives cadets at West Point and in ROTC unprecedented access to the ongoing conversation of the profession they are preparing to join. It is like having a four-year CTLT experience plugged into a living curriculum grounded in the cutting-edge, current experiences of actual platoon leaders.

The Center for Company-level Leaders (CCL) was established at West Point to be a support cell-a small team that exists as a catalyst for members of the profession to connect, to engage with each other, and to advance the profession. CCL serves company-level leaders as well as the cadets who are preparing to lead Soldiers now. In addition to developing and operating professional forums and otherwise connecting leaders across the Army in conversation about leading and growing combat-effective teams, the CCL provides the Army with research on leader development and organizational learning.

A lot more information at the Center for Company-level Leaders (CCL) website (also see PPT here). The last question is an interesting question, “What is emerging at the cutting edge that we need to know about and/or consider integrating into the forums?”

I have not fully caught up with what the Army is doing exactly, but this sounds like an IT project. This is my advice, keep it simple, stick to standard formats of information distribution, and build tools that support those IT standards. Avoid the traps of proprietary technologies, because as time goes on, proprietary technologies always evolve towards the standards to compete.

A few suggestions. First, the forum should have a ranking system so readers can vote on quality of content. As a veteran of online forums, I believe adding that rating system encourages better content, and I would promote the ranking system and encourage users to use it as a way to elevate better content. There are many good examples online where rating systems clearly work to the advantage of the community, two interesting but different models can be seen at Above Top Secret and DailyKos. Neither specific system may be the system the Army should use, but both serve as excellent examples.

I honestly believe blogging is sort of a trap for the services; some can do it, others not so well. It is very difficult for the services to directly support blogs because blogs are driven by opinion, and there is a legitimate concern regarding damage to ones career when giving a critical opinion. A photo blog, unit blog, or blog very specific to a topic are possiblilities, but I am unaware of a mature policy in any military service that would support an official blog or blogging netowrk.

With that said, I think the Coast Guard has it exactly right by promoting service members to engage the blogosphere through comments, and like the Coast Guard, I would make it transparent and require a disclaimer.

Second, distribute content with RSS or Atom, or both. If there is one Web 2.0 technology the services should use it would be social bookmarks, and by embracing the standard of RSS or Atom, military services can adapt to new technologies that adopt the standards in use. A server based, user authenticated portal that supports RSS/Atom for categorized internal and external content distribution to a supported standard like RSS, distributing content to both personal computers and PDAs, would be an easy and optimal way to leverage Web 2.0 information flow for the services. If a "MilSpace" type forum is distributing posts in RSS to a feed reader on a PDA able to account for the ranking system, I think the partisipation would be higher. If the same feed reader was also pulling content from an internal social bookmark system that had links to catagorized external, relevant content where a user had added a personal comment to the bookmark, that would also open up the content flow considerably. The social bookmark system should also leverage rankings.

A smart system would allow authenticated users to customize feeds to be delivered to their client reader. The purpose of a server based feed distribution system would be to cut down on bandwidth usage for new media, centralize the security model for external touch, and leverage a supported standards driven client system supported on multiple platforms including PDAs for the broad distribution of information. The higher the distribution potential, the more likely the system will generate partisipation.

The Army should avoid anything "cutting edge" not using standard formats like RSS or Atom. In that way the Web 2.0 system scales by simply adding support to new accepted standard formats, rather than requiring a new IT integration project for the forum everytime the next big thing comes along.

If you have suggestions, leave them in the comments here, or at David Axe's place.

Canada Extends WFP Deployment

Give the Canadian government credit, they expressed interest in leading on the world stage by example, and they follow through with action.

Canada's navy has extended the deployment of a frigate protecting World Food Program aid shipments to Somalia in an effort to stave off pirate attacks that would hinder relief deliveries to the Horn of Africa nation.

The frigate Ville de Quebec will continue to escort food shipments to Somalia until Oct. 23, the Canadian navy said today in a statement. The frigate was due to complete a six-week mission guarding aid ships from pirates on Sept. 27.

The HMCS Ville de Quebec (FFH 332) was originally deployed to participate with SNMG-2, but she has spent almost her entire deployment to date escorting ships for the World Food Program.

Credit the Canadians, they are exactly who they say they are and the Navy's maritime strategy is clearly executing the national security strategy as put forth by the nations leadership. Yep, I was disappointed when the JSS was canceled, but Canada is a small power that adapts to constraints on budget resources. There is a lot to be admire regarding our neighbors to the north.

Another Hijacked Ship, Another Mysterious Cargo

The pirates of Somalia have hijacked yet another ship off the high seas, this time a Ukrainian RoRo (See Eagle1 for picture) that reportedly has some interesting cargo. IHT has a story reported by the AP from the Ukraine.

The Foreign Ministry says pirates have seized a Ukrainian-operated ship off Somalia.

The ministry says the Faina was sailing with 21 people on board under the Belize flag, though it is operated by Ukrainian managing company Tomax Team Inc.

This is how the Associated Press reported the cargo.

The ministry had no information on the ship's cargo. But the Interfax news agency cited an unnamed source as saying the ship was loaded with about 30 T-72 tanks and spare parts for them.

Like all early reports, be skeptical. The MV Iran Deyanat story has been out there a month, consistently reporting the same thing from the mainstream media in both Europe and Africa (and ignored in the US MSM btw), so at least with that story there is some consistency making it worth keeping an eye on. Who built the T-72s? Where were they going? 30 T-72s off the coast of Africa with an unknown destination raises a lot of questions, and skepticism without more information is warranted.

However, what is noteworthy is yet another ship has been hijacked, this time with Russians part of the crew, and the day after the Russian Navy is deploying to the Somalian coast. Anyone else now see why we believe the Russian deployment to Somalia is more interesting than the deployment to see Hugo Chavez? The French killed one pirate and took 6 prisoners the second time they took military action, the Russians will shoot to kill, and it will be interesting to see if prisoners are optional with the Russians.

If the Russians take prisoners, will the Guardian write a story about prisoners being held for months in a shit hole prison cell on a very old Russian warship? Unlikely. But if we are being intellectually honest, that is the international detainee issue of our time.

On Friday night the presidential candidates may or may not have a debate about foreign policy, and if we are looking for the international legal issue in need of a discussion at the presidential level, or the missing rule set in the maritime domain that requires presidential level attention, the issue of detaining and prosecuting pirates on the high seas is the issue no one is talking about, and the global system needs.

Where is the UN on this international legal issue? Why don't we have an international court for dealing with pirates? Where is the political leadership on this issue in the United States? Where are the legal discussions of this issue in the blogosphere, besides EagleOne? Is the legal blogosphere so small that only one lawyer sees the most obvious missing international legal framework in the 21st century?

After all, when the Danes release 10 pirates they capture at sea to the beach of Somalia because there is no legal system to manage piracy, when the Canadians and British refuse to capture ppirates for the same reason, and when the US Navy gets accused of floating prisons when they do take prisoners at sea, there is a missing rule set in the global system.

I've been suggesting Somalian piracy is costing the global economy half a million dollars a day since doing the math here. I got an email today from a ship owner in Europe, who says the actual figure is more like a million and a half US dollars just in insurance costs, and that doesn't account for rising costs due to labor concerns among unions, and a list of other costs. Meanwhile, absent political action and an international legal framework, this fire continues to burn despite international naval efforts. Al Qaeda is watching us dither.

Unintentionally Maintaining the Negative Stereotypes

This is something we would like to see more of. Indeed, specifics like this are so incredibly rare it is almost stunning to see this reported somewhere, much less spoken in public by the CNO. The Navy doesn't talk enough about their plans, but Roughead did on Wednesday.

Despite the problems, Roughead said he is "very optimistic" about the program based on the first Littoral Combat Ship's sea trials, and said it brings a much-needed capability to the fleet.

That's not the case with the DDG-1000 destroyer program, he said. The ship simply doesn't have the capabilities the Navy needs to counter future threats, he said.

The Zumwalt-class destroyer was conceived in the early 1990s, when the threats the United States faced appeared very different. The Navy originally planned to buy seven ships, but this summer, after sinking 10 years and $13 billion into the program, the service tried to cancel the remaining five ships (it is already under contract for the first two ships). Congress, however, is pressing for a third ship. A compromise version of the fiscal 2009 Defense authorization bill provides $2.5 billion for a third DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer.

And for the first time I am aware of, we get a target for the CG(X).

"What we will be able to do is take the technology from the DDG-1000, the capability and capacity that [will be achieved] as we build more DDG-51s, and [bring those] together around 2017 in a replacement ship for our cruisers," he said.

All right! I'm loving this article. The CNO is speaking clearly, laying out a roadmap, and everything is looking good until...

A turning point in Roughead's thinking about the Navy's future needs occurred in April 2006. That's when the terrorist organization Hezbollah fired a sophisticated missile at an Israeli ship operating off the coast of Lebanon and almost sank it.

"As I looked at the DDG-1000, it did not give us the capability" to counter such threats, he said. "To be sure, there's great technology on the DDG-1000. The program is well-run. That's not the issue. The real issue for me is capability. When you're talking about buying a ship for a cost that will likely exceed $3 billion, we have to look at capability."

Did no one on Admiral Roughead's staff ever caution him not to say something so profoundly embarrassing? Where are the people who are supposed to be looking after the CNO? Whoever you are, how do you misunderstand how ridiculous that argument is?

In other words, the Navy has spent the last ten years and $13 billion dollars building a 14,500 ton stealth, land attack battleship intended to operate in the littorals, and now, a decade later, the Navy has come to a realization that the enemy actually shoots back, and that is the reason the Navy is canceling the DDG-1000?

YOU HAVE GOT TO BE KIDDING ME! As a citizen of the US, I want to believe his rationale is not really the truth. I'm hoping he doesn't really mean it, and he is just a terrible salesman with a staff sound asleep in the strategic communications bus. That 2006 Hezbollah missile attack rational for canceling the DDG-1000 needs to be shoved as far down the trash compactor as possible and never used again. It is especially frustrating because the discussion that begins in the very next paragraph is all Roughead needs to say, particularly since he says it very well.

In many ways, the DDG-1000 was too ambitious for the time and budget requirements placed on the program. The ship has a revolutionary hull design and aimed to include nearly a dozen cutting-edge technologies, weapons and sensors, as well as a new propulsion system. GAO estimated the software requirements alone would entail 14 million to 16 million lines of code.

"It's very easy in the world we live in to become enamored with technology," Roughead said. "I'm not a Luddite, but I think we need to be very clear when looking at the capabilities we're trying to put into the fleet. You can be drawn away by higher technology if you take your eye off, 'What is it we must give our sailors and Marines to go out and do their jobs?' "

The Navy needs to get their message organized for the NOC to be released in October, because saying this kind of stuff sends the wrong message. The DDG-1000 is too expensive, too ambitious, and too much of a liability in a time of limited resources for the Navy to build. Clearly Admiral Roughead believes it will hurt the Navy to admit a mistake, but the perception of arrogance in avoiding admitting poor decisions were made is the actual message being sent. In Durham, the Navy presents itself with a servants heart in the service of the nation. When it comes to shipbuilding, the Navy is presenting arguments that ring the tune of bravo sierra to everyone in the room.

The next administration (regardless of who it is), both the House and the Senate, and the American people are ready to side with Admiral Roughead and kick the DDG-1000 to the curb. There are two ways to exercise the boot: with credibility and without credibility. When the revelation that the enemy shoots missiles at ships from a truck is the reason the Navy doesn't need a land attack battleship intended to operate offshore, the credibility of the Navy is where the boot lands squarely. After all, isn't blowing up said truck the stated purpose of the stealth battleship in the first place?

Another communication opportunity ruined by forwarding the stereotype of a risk averse Navy. If the DDG-1000 can't deal with the truck mounted C-802, the Navy has no business building two or three DDG-1000s at all, and quite frankly, if it is true then I have absolutely no confidence at all in the requirements planning office of the US Navy. It makes absolutely no sense that the Navy would design a land attack battleship with all of these bells and whistles to give it presence in the littoral, and the ship does "not give us the capability" to counter such threats" like a land vehicle launched anti-ship missile.

The Army Vision of New Media

This weeks theme of new media continues with some very insightful commentary by LTG William Caldwell addresses 2008 Milblogging Conference.

It will be interesting to see how the Army Combined Arms Center embraces blogging. I see new media in many forms tailor made for the military services, but official service blogs? That is going to be a real challenge.

An ALCOAST Worth a Read

Released today.

TO ALCOAST

SUBJ: SOCIAL MEDIA - OFFICIAL INTERNET POSTS

1. THIS ALCOAST PROVIDES INTERIM DIRECTION ON OFFICIAL COAST GUARD INTERNET POSTS ON WEB LOGS, KNOWN AS BLOGS, FORUMS, SOCIAL MEDIA SITES, AND OTHER WEB SITES. SOCIAL MEDIA PRESENTS NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO INFORM AND COLLABORATE WITH THE PUBLIC IN MANY WAYS. RECENTLY WE HAVE SEEN THIS THROUGH EXTENSIVE BLOG DISCUSSION OF THE SERVICES EXPANDING ROLE IN THE ARCTIC, BY ENGAGING IN NEW FORUMS SUCH AS THE DOD BLOGGERS ROUNDTABLE, AND THROUGH INCREASING AFFINITY GROUPS IN NETWORKING TOOLS SUCH AS FACEBOOK. POSTS ALSO PROVIDE LEADING EDGE INDICATORS OF COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES AND NEEDS. OUR APPROACH TO ONLINE CONTENT IS VERY SIMILAR TO OUR EXISTING PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY: TO BE AWARE OF POSTS RELEVANT TO THE SERVICES MISSIONS, POLICIES, AND PEOPLE AND TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT LEVEL AND THE RIGHT TIME TO ENSURE INFORMED DISCUSSIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR RESOURCES ALLOW.

What I find interesting about this is that it provides guidance for writing topics as well. In a way one could read this as a way the Coast Guard is telling bloggers "hey, the arctic is an example of a serious issue the Coast Guard would like to see more intellectual rigor given to among the blogging community."

Also in this case, the DoD Bloggers Roundtables appear to be a medium by which the Coast Guard hopes to see new media take up topics for intellectual contribution. Looked at in that way, it could be suggested the Coast Guard sees a long term purpose for blogging beyond social interactions, but to the degree of stimulating conversations around relevant ideas or concepts among a broader audience. In a way, I see the above as a mission statement towards where the Coast Guard wants to be with new media.

2. IAW REF A, AREAS, DISTRICTS, SECTORS, AND SUBORDINATE UNITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND RESPOND TO INTERNET DISCUSSION ON MATTERS THAT ARE IN THEIR LANE AS OUTLINED IN REF B TO ENSURE THE VIRTUAL PUBLIC RECORD HAS ACCURATE AND PROPERLY CHARACTERIZED INFORMATION. UNITS ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO PROACTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO ONLINE CONTENT TO FURTHER PUBLIC INFORMATION, DISCUSSION, AND UNDERSTANDING OF COAST GUARD ROLES, MISSIONS, AND ISSUES. AREA AND DISTRICT PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFFS WILL FACILITATE AND SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS. UNIT COLLATERAL DUTY PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MAY ALSO ENGAGE IN THIS REALM AS RESOURCES ALLOW. COMDT (CG-0922) WILL PROVIDE OR COORDINATE THE SAME FACILITATION AND SUPPORT FOR COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS UNITS.

Put a PAO on the next cutter that deploys to the Gulf of Guinea, arm the PAO with a digital camera, provide a bit of bandwidth, and have that PAO email me. Expect constant responses. I know I would appreciate the ability to discuss the role, mission, and issues the Coast Guard faces on those types of deployments, I'd wager many bloggers would welcome that opportunity.

It will be interesting to see what this looks like in action.

3. THE GUIDELINES FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION OUTLINED IN REF B APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL MODES OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING OFFICIAL POSTS TO INTERNET SITES. FURTHERMORE, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTING INFORMATION OUTLINED IN REF C MUST ALSO BE FOLLOWED WHERE THEY APPLY. CONSISTENT WITH OUR DUTY TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AS PROHIBITED BY POLICY OR LAW, THE GOAL IS MAXIMUM DISCLOSURE WITH MINIMUM DELAY OF AVAILABLE, FACTUAL, AND PERTINENT INFORMATION.

4. THE FORMAT FOR RESPONSES IS INFORMAL, PLAIN LANGUAGE AS OUTLINED IN REF B AND MAY REFLECT A FIRST PERSON TONE IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE. THESE RESPONSES SHOULD FOCUS ON FACTUAL INFORMATION AND NOT INCLUDE DEFENSIVE OR ARGUMENTATIVE WORDING. OFFICIAL RESPONSES SHOULD
INCLUDE THE RANK, NAME, TITLE, AND UNIT OF THE PERSON MAKING THE POST.

5. A DISCLAIMER TO ENSURE COAST GUARD ENDORSEMENT OF THE WEB SITE IS NOT IMPLIED WILL BE USED IN ALL CASES WHEN POSTING CONTENT ON NON-COAST GUARD SITES. THE DISCLAIMER TO USE IS AS FOLLOWS: "THIS IS AN OFFICIAL UNITED STATES COAST GUARD POSTING FOR THE PUBLICS INFORMATION. OUR POSTING DOES NOT ENDORSE THIS SITE OR ANYTHING ON IT, INCLUDING LINKS TO OTHER SITES, AND WE DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR THE SITE AND ITS CONTENT."

Three, four, and five clearly spell out guidance for official social media engagement.

6. COMDT (CG-092S), RECENTLY RENAMED THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL MEDIA STAFF, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY, GUIDANCE, AND TOOLS NEEDED TO PERFORM THIS TASK. COMDT (CG-0922) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SYNCHRONIZING ENGAGEMENT WITH ALL MEDIA-BASED CONTENT ON THE COAST GUARD. THE FOLLOWING BASIC ACTIONS WILL BE USED TO COORDINATE COAST GUARD POSTS ON INTERNET SITES:

• A. COMDT (CG-092) WILL GATHER COAST GUARD RELATED POSTS FROM THE INTERNET ON A CONTINUAL BASIS AND SHARE WITH FIELD PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICES AND HEADQUARTERS DIRECTORATES/UNITS. AREA AND DISTRICT PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFFS MAY ALSO FORWARD ITEMS TO COMDT (CG-092). SPECIFIC DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFFS BY COMDT (CG-092S).
• B. THE POSTS WILL BE REVIEWED FOR ITEMS THAT MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER ACTION. COMDT (CG-0922) WILL FOLLOW UP MATTERS THAT INVOLVE COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS UNITS. AREA AND DISTRICT PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFFS WILL FOLLOW UP MATTERS IN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND UNDER THEIR OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND.
• C. POSTS BENEFITING FROM OR REQUIRING FOLLOW-UP WILL BE ACTED UPON QUICKLY USING THE POLICY GUIDELINES OUTLINED IN REFS B AND C. IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS MAY REQUIRE THE ISSUANCE OF VERY BASIC FACTUAL INFORMATION THAT IS AVAILABLE OR A SHORT STATEMENT EXPLAINING AN INABILITY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION DUE TO PRIVACY, SENSITIVITY, OR INVESTIGATORY CONCERNS, AND WHERE ABLE, FOLLOWING UP AT A LATER DATE WITH MORE INFORMATION.
• D. A HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC PLANNING TEAM WILL BE CONVENED AT THE REQUEST OF COMDT (CG-092) TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT ISSUES REQUIRING CROSS-PROGRAMMATIC INPUT. AREAS AND DISTRICTS SHOULD HAVE A SIMILAR PROCESS IN PLACE TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF OFFICIAL COAST GUARD CONTENT POSTED ON WEB SITES. THE COMMUNICATION ACTION PLAN PROCESS CONTAINED IN REF D MAY BE USED AS NEEDED IN THESE SITUATIONS.

7. COMDT (CG-092S) AND COMDT (CG-0922) ARE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE SUBJECT AND PROCESS SPECIFIC GUIDANCE VIA LESS FORMAL MEANS AS NEEDED.

8. THIS INTERIM DIRECTION WILL BE UPDATED AS NEEDED AND FORMALIZED IN CHANGE 1 TO REF B.

9. COMDT (CG-092S) POC IS CDR GLYNN SMITH

10. COMDT (CG-0922) POC IS CDR RON LABREC

11. RELEASED BY RDML MARY E. LANDRY, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

12. INTERNET RELEASE AUTHORIZED.

I find it very interesting, and I note the complete absence of buzzwards. I think this is well done, indeed, if I was in the public affairs office over at Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or General Dynamics... I'd be thinking about how this could apply to a private sector strategic communications model as a way to sell a brand name.

Observing the Story of the MV Iran Deyanat

There is an interesting twist bubbling up to the surface regarding an Iranian ship that was hijacked off the coast of Somalia back in August. The ship in question is the MV Iran Deyanat, a 44468 dead weight tonnage bulk carrier. The Long War Journal has some interesting details.

The MV Iran Deyanat is owned and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) - a state-owned company run by the Iranian military that was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on September 10, shortly after the ship's hijacking. According to the U.S. Government, the company regularly falsifies shipping documents in order to hide the identity of end users, uses generic terms to describe shipments to avoid the attention of shipping authorities, and employs the use of cover entities to circumvent United Nations sanctions to facilitate weapons proliferation for the Iranian Ministry of Defense.

The MV Iran Deyanat set sail from Nanjing, China, at the end of July and, according to its manifest, planned to travel to Rotterdam, where it would unload 42,500 tons of iron ore and "industrial products" purchased by a German client. Its arrival in the Gulf of Aden, Somali officials tell The Long War Journal, was suspiciously early. According to a publicly available status report on the IRISL Web site, the ship reached the Gulf on August 20 and was scheduled to reach the Suez Canal on August 27 - a seven day journey. "Depending on the speed of the ship," Puntland Minister of Ports Ahmed Siad Nur said in a phone interview on Saturday, "it should take between 4 and 5 days to reach Suez."

This is a very interesting article, and you should read it all, because this is the context at which point the story begins to get very interesting. Back on September 7th, Reuters ran an article that suggested Puntland authorities were requesting pirates to hand over the ship. At the time, the pirates in Eyl were very busy.

He said the Iranian ship with 28 crew members including two Russians, two Pakistanis and a Syrian would soon be freed once the $2 million ransom agreed upon was paid.

"The bargaining about the ransom is over and pirates are just waiting for the money," he said.

"Puntland requested the pirates two weeks ago to hand over this Iranian ship, saying that it is carrying weapons to Eritrea. I have seen food and other odd items on the ship but I do not know what is hidden underneath."

The Puntland officials were alerted shortly after the ship was captured that weapons were onboard. This is an important point, the pirates of Somalia often claim legitimacy by stating their purpose is to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Somalia, just like they often claim legitimacy by suggesting they insure no illegal fishing takes place in Somalian waters. While clearly piracy is not legitimacy, and the pirates of Eyl are a far cry from a Coast Guard, the claims of illegal fishing or weapons on ships have been proven true in the past. Whenever the pirates make these claims, they call in Puntland officials to investigate and put the word out in the media. In this case, something odd is happening in regards to this specific Iranian ship. The Long War Journal continues the story.

The MV Iran Deyanat was brought to Eyl, a sleepy fishing village in northeastern Somalia, and was secured by a larger gang of pirates - 50 onboard and 50 onshore. Within days, pirates who had boarded the ship developed strange health complications, skin burns and loss of hair. Independent sources tell The Long War Journal that a number of pirates have also died. "Yes, some of them have died. I do not know exactly how many but the information that I am getting is that some of them have died," Andrew Mwangura, Director of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Program, said Friday when reached by phone in Mombasa.

News about the illness and the toxic cargo quickly reached Garowe, seat of the government for the autonomous region of Puntland. Angered over the wave of piracy and suspicious about the Iranian ship, authorities dispatched a delegation led by Minister of Minerals and Oil Hassan Allore Osman to investigate the situation on September 4. Osman also confirmed to The Long War Journal that during the six days he negotiated with the pirates members of the syndicate had become sick and died. "That ship is unusual," he said. "It is not carrying a normal shipment."

Follow the time line. The ship was hijacked around August 23rd. Before the end of August, several of the pirates who took the ship began suffering from serious sickness, in some cases resulting in death. On September 4th, Puntland government authorities were brought in, and they witnessed some of the deaths due to exposure to something on that ship.

Pirates have stated unable to open the hold without causing extensive damage to the ship, and have threatened to blow it up if anyone tries to inspect the ship. The statements by the captured crew has been inconsistent regarding what is carried on the ship. The $2 million dollar ransom agreement, which was supposedly secured on September 6th, never took place for reasons unknown. After September 10th, when sanctionso on IRISL were applied specifically because the company is said to smuggle for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, negotiations have all but broken off completely.

Then things get really wierd. Two days later, Iranian press runs a report that the US has offered $7 million for the ship, $5 million more than what the Iranians were offerning. The reason cited by the Iranian press report was so the US could "receive entry permission and search the vessel." According to the Long War Journal story, Puntland officials are convinced the ship is carrying weapons for Eritrea Islamist insurgents.

Clearly this is a strange story, and there is no clear resolution in sight regarding the ship now that Iran seems unable to do anything with the ship now on the sanctions list. Let me add a few details to this story...

The US Navy (and the French) are sitting off the coast of Eyl, and that ship isn't going anywhere once released, it will be siezed once it gets to sea. The specific clauses that have been approved in both the UN and in Congress would allow the US Navy to sieze the ship under the suspecion clause. The claims that there are weapons onboard, and the possibility there might be chemical weapons, will insure there is at minimum an inspection of the ship.

And that should have the US Navy worried a bit. If there are chemical weapons onboard, which is the least likely scenario but the prevailing rumor, what is to stop Iran from sending one of its Kilo class submarines down to put several torpedos into the hull? We know the hostages have been moved off the ship, that is standard operating procedure now thanks to the French, who will perform a rescue operation anyway.

This is a very strange story worth keeping an eye on. It is unlike pirates to say no to a $2 million ransom, which they apparently did. It is very odd to see an Iranian press report that suggests the US is offering $7 million for the ship, but apparently that wasn't denied when questions were asked of US officials by The Long War Journal. This might turn out to be a whole lot of nothing, but when it comes to Somalia, anything can happen.

It is worth noting that Russia announced this week they are sending warships to Somalia. The Russians do not intend to operate with Task Force 150, and could be the force sent to take military action and rescue the Iranians. Of all the naval deployments Russia has made this year, including the Pyotr Veliky deployment to Venezuela and the Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean Sea, we see this naval deployment by Russia the most noteworthy to date, because it is a true logistics mission.

In the case of the other two naval deployments, Russia was able to make a number of friendly ports to supply vessels, and the ships never spent long periods of time at sea. Not in this case, this will be a major logistical undertaking by the Russian Navy, with the only port option available perhaps, maybe, being Eritrea. It is also very possible Russia could take military action including hostage rescue operations against the pirates, and that would certainly be worth watching.

Others are also looking into sending ships. Norway is planning a deployment next year, and the Indian government is under some domestic pressure, including a potential strike by major mariner unions, if they don't take action against Somalian pirates. The Indian government has not made a decision yet.

With the United States fighting a war in Iraq and a war in Afghanistan, it remains the activities around Somalia that is slowly becoming a major challenge for the US Navy. With a Greek ship hijacked this week, there are at least 10 ships near Eyl under pirate control. That town is litterily a shit hole on a hill, one imagines it looks very odd to see 10 ships sitting off the coast. In the meantime, the effect to the global economy based on insurance premiem costs alone remains somewhere around half a million dollars a day.

Something Was Missing From the Conversation

I have discussed a few of the things I enjoyed about the Conversation with the Country in Durham, specifically I thought all three services presented themselves well and kept it at the appropriate level for the audience present. However, walking out of this little adventure in observation I noted something odd that didn't quite work.

Shortly before the symposium began, and when I accepted the reality I had no shot of picking EagleOne out of the crowd, I began scouting the room for where I wanted to sit. The back row of tables were reserved, so I figured I would set up shop at a table in the back near the reserved seats, giving myself an opportunity to introduce myself should I get a chance. There were 30 tables, each table supporting 6-8 seats, in a configuration 6 across and 5 tables back aligned in rows. I picked a table in the fourth row in the back corner away from the entrance. When I sat down there was only one person at the table, a very interesting man who introduced himself as Jack Taylor.

I know, I should of known who Jack was, but I didn't. He immediately gives me his card which reads Director, Military Sealift Fleet Support Command. Quietly excited, I ran a quick Google search on my blackberry as the coffee begins to kick in. At that point we started talking about the MSC.

Jack was great, skeptical as hell of some young guy being advertised as a blogger, I don't think he knew quite what to make of me. When I talked about how the Navy could use an evangelist the other day, allow me to note that the MSC already has one, because when Jack talks about the MSC this quiet part of the Navy that gets very little mention becomes this global logistical operation available on demand.

As we were talking, Jack kept going back to the service relationship between the MSC and the Navy, the civilian character of the mariners in the MSC, and the always active aspect of the MSC that gets lost in the way the Navy presents itself. The MSC is that 'other' service that is always there, indeed several times throughout the day the Navy emphasized the soft power approach with the hospital ships, and General Conway mentioned the Sea Basing operation off Liberia, but throughout the day no one ever explained the difference between the Navy and the MSC.

I thought it was an opportunity missed. As Eagleone noted, the encouraging aspect of the questions and comments from those in attendance was the reoccurring question from a business leader participant asking "What can we do to help?" The Navy's answer for that very exciting question... was absolutely terrible. Let me explain...

RADM Fred Rosa described the Coast Guard perfectly, he discussed the Coast Guard as a military service that bridges the Department of Defense with the Department of Homeland Security. Everyone in the room understands that, it was simple and comprehensive at the same time. The Navy should use the MSC in the same way by leveraging the MSC as a way to bridge the maritime services with the civilian population. For example, how many stories does Captain Bob have after a deployment to the South Pacific. Captain Bob is a maritime mariner, a civilian, and I can tell you I've enjoyed all of his stories over the last few months. Captain Bob is one of many Captains with stories from a civilian perspective that can relate to, get this, civilians!

Before the Q&A session that ended the day, what if Captain Bob took the stage for a few minutes to discuss the MSC, and told this story.

I’m going to stray from this precept of mine to share with you a comment from my last post. This came from "Nenginin" in Chuuk who posted:

"We the people of Chuuk would have to agree with you when you said your visit to Chuuk was "amazing," but in a different perspective of course. Even after your departure today, we are still amazed when we think back to what you and everyone on the PP08 team did for the people of Chuuk. All of you must have heard so many 'thank yous’ and 'kinisou chapur', but I do not think we can ever thank you ENOUGH. We are truly blessed to have been visited by angels on their big white angel boat :) The sight of the beautiful Mercy in the Chuuk Lagoon will forever live in our hearts."

Wow! "...visited by angels on their big white angel boat." Not bad!!! And just a little humbling…to say the least.

That is a soft power story worth telling. How many NGOs and private sector organizations were involved in the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) deployment? Did the Navy fill up the Mercy or did the Mercy have any space to spare? What about the Kearsarge or Peleliu when they deployed? How much spare capacity does the Navy have that the private sector can contribute in these soft power deployments? Unless the answer is none, the Navy missed an opportunity.

Other ways the private sector can get involved includes what Eagleone suggested.

I wish the answers had been a little stronger instead of just "Write your Congressman," -- there should have been something like join the Navy League (the services should invite the local Navy League, Marine Corps League and the Coastie equivalent and introduce them), tell people to invite their Congressman to speak on maritime matters (that will keep such matters on his/her mind) and having the ability of interested people to sign up to get training to take home to their Rotary Club luncheons...

To be fair, the services did have the ROTC from the local universities there, and they were able to meet General Conway, so there was some of this. It was also a good opportunity to highlight some of the care programs for wounded Marines, you know, since we are a nation at war. If you don't know of a good private organization to recommend, allow me to recommend a great one. Then, after the Navy has given out as many options as possible, the 'write your Congressman' option can be given as the final fallback position for citizen action.

I thought that was a missed opportunity, but it doesn't need to be. The Military Sealift Command, specifically because of its civilian culture, is a perfect vehicle to transition the conversation from the service to the civilians towards the purpose of encouraging private citizen action. Maybe next time.