DDG-1000 Drama Never Ends

If there was ever a good reason why politicians are poor substitutes for dedicated assessment folks for determining force structure, the DDG-1000 drama is the case study. Emelie Rutherford has a new article out regarding the Senate markup, and notes some of the fine print the Senate will be voting on. The article, SAC-D Gives Money To Restart DDG-51 Line; Taylor Prods Navy On DDG-1000 Production Problems, is dated September 15th and is likely to find itself in Mondays CHINFO CLIPs. An excellent read in full, we highlight one part of the fine print.

The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee (SAC-D) last Wednesday became the only of the four defense panels to nearly reflect the Navy's current destroyer plans in its budget blueprint. The SAC-D's marked up FY '09 defense appropriations bill includes $2.5 billion for buying a DDG-1000 and adds $397 million for advance-procurement of one DDG-51 combatant. In addition, the SAC-D also sticks the Navy's February budget request and includes $50.9 million the service initially sought in advance-procurement monies for a fourth DDG-1000.

The report accompanying the SAC-D's bill explains why it includes the initial DDG-1000 procurement and advance-procurement funds sought by the Navy back in February, along with the advance-procurement DDG-51 funds that were not on the radar until more recently.

"The Committee believes that a decision of this magnitude (to end the DDG-1000 program and restart DDG-51 production) should not be made without a comprehensive review and evaluation by the next administration and the Congress," the SAC-D's bill report states. "Therefore, the Committee recommends full funding for the DDG-1000 program. The Committee also believes that it is prudent to preserve the option for the next administration to restart the DDG-51 program. In order to preserve this option, the Committee has included $397,000,000 in advance procurement funding for one DDG-51 class destroyer."

Hilarious. The Senate believes the "next administration and the Congress" should decide the fate of the DDG-1000, so in the meantime, this Senate will not only fully fund the 3rd DDG-1000, but also fully fund FY09 money for the 4th DDG-1000, AND fund $397 million to restart the DDG-51.

Meanwhile, Christopher P. Cavas has an article out in Defense News that asks Will DDG 1000 Produce Any Ships at All?

Sources familiar with the ship tell Defense News that issues have arisen in guaranteeing the seals between the composite construction panels of the huge Zumwalt deckhouse. The structure - one of the program's 10 key engineering development models - is to be built by Northrop Grumman's dedicated composite facility at Gulfport, Miss.

The deckhouse is one of the major changes in DDG 1000 over previous warships. All of the ship's major sensors - radars, missile guidance systems, electronic warfare and other sensors - are embedded in the structure, and all of the ship above the first superstructure level is contained in the composite structure. A partial test section of the structure has been built, and Northrop and Navy officials have maintained that there are no significant problems with the composite deckhouse.

But, and there is always a but...

But one source familiar with the situation said the Navy is so worried about the problem that it has been canvassing other manufacturers of composite structures to see if an alternate production source could be found.

So will any Zumwalts be built?

"I think the Navy has undermined its own case made over a decade," Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, and a key supporter of the DDG 1000, told Defense News. "I still expect the Navy's going to abandon the DDG 1000."

I love Chris, he has no problems telling the truth, the whole truth, and letting the truth tell the story. This is the part of the story that is very ugly for the Navy.

The service has never released a public announcement on what it's trying to do with the program...

A well-attended hearing of the House Seapower subcommittee followed on July 31, when two senior Navy officials testified about the destroyers. At the hearing, several lawmakers expressed frustration at the lack of analysis and explanation for the move, and Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, the Navy's requirements chief, and Allison Stiller, the top ship acquisition executive, afterward rushed away from reporters and declined to answer questions about why the Navy wants to end a program that has cost about $11 billion in research and development and taken more than a decade to develop.

Susan Collins steps up, and asks the same question we did. What cold war?

"If there is a serious new threat from China," Collins said, "it seems to us the Navy should have come to us and given us a classified briefing. That still hasn't occurred. There are these vague references to this new Chinese missile, but the Navy's never given us a briefing. You would think that if this threat was emerging and potent the Navy would have come and given us a classified briefing.

"This whole thing is very strange," Collins declared. "I'm baffled by the way this has been handled."

Chris has much, much more in his article, and he takes on the SM-2 question regarding the DDG-1000. Another interesing read is this Q&A between Chris and Susan Collins.

Gene Taylor's letter is the next step, at least he follows up. The Senate wants to punt the issue, has not held a hearing, and if Senator Collins is representative, there are tons of questions no one can seem to get answers to. The Navy doesn't talk to the media, hasn't responded to the questions, and as the Defense News article notes, has apparently ignored the industry as well.

And now we have an engineering issue, seals for the composite super structure. Has there ever been a hull that produces less confidence than the DDG-1000? Does anyone else think this entire program needs the axe before we spend any more money? Think about how many critical systems of the DDG-1000 will be "protected" by composites. Once upon a time the thickness of steel was a credible consideration for the protection of critical systems.

But no. Now we get "transformational" thinking, which inserts composites to replace steel, and that's what we call protection. Unwise.

The Senate is making a good point, for the purposes the Navy is claiming why the DDG-1000 is the wrong platform, there is no research. Had the Navy simply cited the costing problem has identified by the CBO, supported by the problems identified by the GAO, the Navy would have the high ground. The level of bullshit required to cover the ass of the Clark/Mullin/England/Young careers, reaching for reasons that don't deminish their efforts for the DDG-1000, is getting old. While the approach may demonstrate loyality to these people, it deminishes the legitimacy of current Naval leadership.

Which may be why the Senate is willing to punt, thinking these people may sent packing.