The Sea as Base, not a Base at Sea

In the old theory the sea was the scene of operations and navies consequently had to be based on land. In the ultimate sense that is still true since man must still draw his sustenance and materials from land. But it is also possible to argue that the base of the Navy has been extended far beyond the limits of the continental United States and its overseas territorial bases. For in a very real sense the sea is now the base from which the Navy operates in carrying out its offensive activates against the land. Carrier aviation is sea based aviation; the Fleet Marine Force is a sea based ground force; the guns and guided missiles of the fleet are sea based artillery. With its command of the sea it is now possible for the United States Navy to develop the base-characteristics of the world's oceans to a much greater degree than it has in the past, and to extend significantly the "floating base" system which it originated in World War II. The objective should be to perform as far as practical the functions now performed on land at sea bases closer to the scene of operations. The base of the United States Navy should be conceived of as including all those land areas under our control and the seas of the world right up to within a few miles of the enemy's shores. This gives American power a flexibility and a breadth impossible of achievement by land-locked powers.

The most obvious utilization of this concept involves its application to carrier aviation. In the words of Admiral Nimitz:

The net result is that naval forces are able, without resorting to diplomatic channels, to establish off-shore, anywhere in the world, airfields completely equipped with machine shops, ammunition dumps, tank farms, warehouses, together with quarters and all types of accommodation for personnel. Such task forces are virtually as complete as any air base ever established. They constitute the only air bases that can be made available near enemy territory without assault and conquest, and furthermore, they are mobile offensive bases that can be employed with the unique attribute of secrecy and surprise, which contributes equally to their defensive as well as offensive effectiveness.

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Proceedings, May 1954, Samuel Huntington

The idea of using "the Sea as Base" has been realized in Admiral Nimitz's vision for carrier aircraft. Today the US Navy Carrier Strike Group, centered around a Nimitz class aircraft carrier and supported by first and second rate battleships, allows the Navy to maneuver combat aircraft to any shoreline in the world from which to conduct operations. The flexibility and capability gained by using the sea as base has resonated within the Marine Corps and is in art the basis by which they intend to develop their 'floating bases' Sea Base concept.

In National Defense Magazine this month, Kimberly Johnson has an article about some of the problems currently facing the Marines as they realize their vision of the Sea Base concept. In reading the article we raise the question, beyond carrier aviation how much is the Navy and Marines really extending their capability to use the sea as base?

Both the Marines and the Navy for years have endorsed the notion of building a sophisticated family of ships that would serve as floating bases for ground troops. The Navy’s support is essential to the Marines because their plan is tied to a multi-billion dollar effort to build a mix of troop-carrying, warehousing and amphibious assault vessels.

But the Navy and the Corps have been at odds about the intended use of these ships. The Marines want the sea base to include helicopter-carrier amphibious assault ships, while the Navy has endorsed a less expensive concept that allows for amphibious assault ships to be interchangeable with troop-transport vessels.

The use of sea as a base of operations should be more than just carrier aviation now that we are in the 21st century, but we do not believe that is what the Marines and Navy are discussing as the next evolution. Rather than using the sea as a base, the tranformationalists have twisted this idea, ignored the strategic ramifications, and focused purely on a tactical capability set that interprets the idea to mean a base at sea.

The vision is to create a port at sea from which to marry Marines and equipment for transport from sea to land, and utilize a similar system to move supply from sea to shore. This harbor at sea is intended to provide assured access when no access is assured in a nearby port, taking the strategic concept to use the sea as base and morphing it into this idea to create a base at sea. This "Sea Base" requires specific parts to work, and it is noteworthy that loss of some parts will diminish if not eliminate the capability of the whole in its function.

This idea looks backwards. It looks to 2003, sees the inability of the US to move men and material through Turkey into northern Iraq, pretends like it is that capability, and sells itself as such. It could not perform that mission ever, as there is no capability to move the heavy material all the way over Turkey from a sea based harbor, and would only be able to move the men without material ONLY enabled by the MV-22. In other words, all of the enabling at sea logistics of this idea fall well short of the desired capability, and as is critically relevant, the aviation aspect of the "Sea Base" idea is unaffordable now that the Marines have decided to use the first 3 LHA(R) for their own amphibious purposes.

We need better ideas, this is not the best and brightest, rather than the convenient ideas based on what is affordable. Lets look at alternatives.

Build a Real Base at Sea

If the desire is a "Base at Sea" or "Sea Base" why not build a MLP capable of moving a platform built on oil rig technology? I know, the tacticians stress the need for mobility, but that is a false promise! Defense weaponry, not mobility, will be decisive in the protection of forces leveraging the sea as base. The Navy cannot on one end suggest that weaponry has evolved to the threat level where countering ballistic missiles, blue water submarines, and anti-ship missile technology is a minimum requirement for naval forces, and on the other suggest the threat environment doesn't rise high enough to the level that Marines can 'get by' on the least protected commercial hull platforms.

A Sea Base built on rig technology that supports weapon systems found on the most capable battleships, but also leverages technologies like large cranes, a flight deck capable of supporting multiple MV-22s, and serves as a warehouse for material at sea accomplishes the same purpose. It also helps in the area most needed by the shipbuilding industry, building more oil rigs (lack of capacity to build oil rigs is what prevents offshore drilling more than anything, regardless of what the politician's say!)

Build Airship Alternatives

We are already seeing the effective use of blimps, for both security and industry. It is past time to take the advice of the Defense Science Board (PDF) who ten years ago advised the DoD to begin looking into airships as a heavy lift option. It does not make sense that the Navy believes it can move commercial style troop transports near enough to shore without being detected so it can begin the slow process of offloading supplies at sea for transport to land, but we cannot fly an airship down into a secured landing zone to be offloaded quickly. There is no credible reason to be scared to move forward with this technology, as the challenges for defending the capability is less than what would be required to defend a full scale ship-to-shore operation by sea.

What it Means to Leverage the Sea as Base

How many capabilities does the Navy and Marines now "perform as far as practical the functions now performed on land?" Well, lets think about it. How many patrols on land are the Army and Marines making in Iraq or Afghanistan per day? Does the Navy even have this capability at sea, you know, to guard against piracy? Certainly no where near the distributed power we see on land, and for the record, the absolutely dismal results of the US Navy in fighting piracy reflects their total inept capabilities toward preventing piracy.

What about unmanned aircraft patrols? How many unmanned aircraft are patrolling the skies in both theaters of war? How many similar platforms can the Navy field from its forces at sea? We'll explore it later this week, but in all honesty, isn't the unmanned aircraft platform the most realistic platform to be used on the USS America (LHA 6), after all, the Marines rely heavily on their unmanned technologies in the air and the Navy is too busy thinking about their next FA-XX to look into the future themselves.

Can the Navy deploy a riverine squadron directly into a river delta? What about into a river region of land locked country? How many operations conducted daily in Iraq or Afghanistan can be conducted by naval/marine forces? The necessity to move brigades in mass via a "Base at sea" is a false promise, because the necessity to use the "Sea as Base" is the strategic enabling capability that gives naval forces the ability to "prevent wars" before they become major wars, and "win wars" by opening lanes into land through the littorals that any platform at sea can utilize to supply land forces.