Beware of Gnomes and Falling Debris

If time permits, the blog will hopefully get a makeover this weekend. While the current format works for the under 40 crowd, after several dozen emails from the over 40 crowd there are clearly navigation problems I need to address.

Makes sense, there are about 3000 more daily readers than there were since last time I screwed around with the 'look and feel'.

Apparently, I appeal to the last generation more than the next generation. I'm not sure that is a good long term strategy for the blog...

Anyway, if you hit the blog and something isn't right, it is because the gnomes are hard at work in the background. If it looks like a mess as I'm going through it, leave a comment here and let me know what you like, or don't like, because I doubt I'll have time to do it all at once in one sitting. To date I've literally put about an hours worth of work into the design, but I'm probably going to end up writing code to get what I want as I can't seem to find the widgets I want.

As many of you know, the role of dad (and being on call 24/7) is one of constant interruption on weekends. So it could get really ugly for short periods if I'm messing around and get called away for a few hours. I still haven't decided if I intend to blow up this theme or not, my art skills are horrible, but I think it may be time to shake it up without blowing up the load times.

Suggestions are always welcome.

Gulf of Aden Declared Warlike Operations Area

Catchy title? According to Lloyd List this morning:

British shipping employers and unions have agreed to declare the Gulf of Aden a warlike operations area, in a deal that will double the pay of seafarers on many ships operated from the UK while serving close to piracy prone Somalia.

Reuters also has some comments from Pottengal Mukundan, director of the London-based International Maritime Bureau regarding a desire to actually go to war with pirates, including some sage tactical advice.

"We want pre-emptive action against the mother ships before the pirates carry out a hijacking," said Captain Pottengal Mukundan, director of the London-based International Maritime Bureau, which monitors international piracy, referring to the ships pirates use as bases from which to launch attacks.

"The positions of the mother ships are generally known. What we would like to see is the naval vessels going to interdict them, searching them and removing any arms on board.

"That would at least force the pirates to go back to Somalia to pick up more arms before they could come back again," he told Reuters in an interview.

The world has allowed Somalia to take their gangster lifestyle to sea, where they can do driveby shootings on ships moving the commerce of the world. If the positions of mother ships are generally known, and we aren't doing anything about it, that would be very odd. It would be nice if we could get a real assessment from the US 5th Fleet that gives some insight regarding the challenges that prevents any action from being taken. Meanwhile, the article continues.

U.S., European and Russian navy ships, including a fleet operating under NATO, have moved into the Gulf of Aden in recent days to try to stem the piracy threat and protect some of the 20,000 merchant vessels that use the waterway each year.

Around 60 vessels have been seized by pirates this year, with an estimated $18-30 million paid in ransom for the release of crews and ships. A Turkish vessel with 20 crew on board was seized on Wednesday.

Interesting, some hard numbers. We already highlighted the average increase to insurance costs are up $8000 a ship. That makes the financial impact of piracy in insurance premiums alone around $160 million dollars a year. Now British crews are getting double pay working the region. Throw in around $24 million for randoms paid, and we have hit the $200 million annual cost.

That is simply not enough money for anyone to care, and the problem is compounded by international fishing. The fishing off Somalia is very, very good, lots of rare top types of tuna and other great eats that sell big. This LA Times article says 800 ships are fishing Somalia illegally every year. I would guess each is averaging at least half a million in hauls annually, probably a hell of a lot more. Well, do the math, 800 ships making a minimum of half a mil in fish comes to $400 million. You see, piracy not only pays the local pimp who can whore off the women to the high paying pirate, but it pays in the east, specifically China and South Korea, who steal the natural fishing resource from the region.

Until the illegal fishing problem is resolved, don't expect the pirate problem to be resolved.

Maritime Open Source Intelligence Cyber Tool

SteelJawScribe has my attention, this is easily one of the most interesting internet tools I have seen in awhile. A Live Ship Map built on GoogleEarth technology that allows you to track maritime commerce in certain regions in real time. The map to the right (click to expand) was a live shot from 12:00am EST of the west side of the Strait of Hormuz. Sorry folks, you won't be able to track US Navy ships with this tool.

That big island is Forur I., you can see the west bound traffic moves in the deep shipping lane to the north, while the east bound traffic moves in the deep shipping lane to the south. Those deep water shipping lanes for the big maritime traffic is only 2 nautical miles wide in some places, so you can get a feel for why a big fight between Iran and anyone is a real bad thing for maritime traffic, they simply have no maneuver space and they have to pass within launch range of even small anti-ship missiles. It is a powerful strategic position, and no matter what anyone ever claims, in a war against Iran it would require Marines on that island to secure those shipping lanes.

That is also why China is building its blue water capacity, they know that when, not if, the US moves to alternative energy sources it will be China who has to keep those lines of communication at sea open. All of these things are interconnected, and often abused as fodder in militaristic rhetoric.

The Live Ship Map FAQ defines the purpose as thus:

This web site is created as an academic, open project. It is dedicated in providing free real-time information to the public, about ship movements and ports and our main objective is to expand it to other research applications. The project is currently hosted by the Department of Product and Systems Design Enginnering, University of the Aegean, Greece. The initial data collection is based on the Automatic Identification System (AIS). We are constantly looking for partners wishing to install an AIS receiver and share the data of their area with us, in order to cover more areas and ports around the world.

More on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) can be found here, but this is the overview.

Picture a shipboard radar display, with overlaid electronic chart data, that includes a mark for every significant ship within radio range, each as desired with a velocity vector (indicating speed and heading). Each ship "mark" could reflect the actual size of the ship, with position to GPS or differential GPS accuracy. By "clicking" on a ship mark, you could learn the ship name, course and speed, classification, call sign, registration number, MMSI, and other information. Maneuvering information, closest point of approach (CPA), time to closest point of approach (TCPA) and other navigation information, more accurate and more timely than information available from an automatic radar plotting aid, could also be available. Display information previously available only to modern Vessel Traffic Service operations centers could now be available to every AIS-equipped ship.

With this information, you could call any ship over VHF radiotelephone by name, rather than by "ship off my port bow" or some other imprecise means. Or you could dial it up directly using GMDSS equipment. Or you could send to the ship, or receive from it, short safety-related email messages.

The AIS is a shipboard broadcast system that acts like a transponder, operating in the VHF maritime band, that is capable of handling well over 4,500 reports per minute and updates as often as every two seconds. It uses Self-Organizing Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA) technology to meet this high broadcast rate and ensure reliable ship-to-ship operation.

It is noteworthy that we track every airplane in the world, but we only track a small fraction of global commerce at sea, and yet 90% of global commerce moves at sea. Very cool tool, and a step towards Maritime Domain Awareness (PDF).

Su-33 + Beidou

I thought I'd share some interesting news coming out this week.

The first one is this Jane's Article. Basically, this is sort of a follow-up on the story from 2006. I've actually first heard of the negotiations starting in 2005 after Peace Mission 2005. It's been about 3 years since the negotiation first started, so many people might wonder why it hasn't progressed any further. Part of the reason is that there was a weapons freeze by China toward Russia after the IL-76 debacle. Another reason is that negotiations between China and Russia always takes a long time. For me, I think the real reason is that China's indigenous project to navalize flankers has not advanced as fast as it would like and PLAN would like a comparatively mature platform like su-33 to start training its new naval pilots. Using a brand new naval fighter on a brand new aircraft carrier with no previous carrier operations experience does not give a lot of confidence to a lot of people. By bringing in the Russians on this deal, they might also be willing to teach China some carrier operations. I think this deal is going to stop at 14, because the indigenous naval flanker project is not going to be abandoned. If they get 50 flankers, it pretty much would cover the first 2 carriers and remove the need for a 4th generation naval fighter.

I also read an interesting article this week from China. If you can read Chinese, you can try this link. It basically says that China will launch 12 new satellites for the Beidou navigation system in and around 2009. It will hope to provide full service to China and surrounding area by 2010. I'm not too sure what the "surrounding area" is referring to because we've already seen everything that Chinese military uses are equipped with Beidou despite the fact that only 5 satellites are up in the sky. The goal is to eventually have over 30 satellites.

The Bias, Balance, and Independence of Journalism

While some are focused on the bias in media regarding the political campaign, Bing West opens a can of whoop-ass on Nir Rosen and the Rolling Stones.

Rosen described how he and two Taliban fighters deceived the guards at a government checkpoint. Suppose during World War II an American reporter had sneaked through the lines with two German officers wearing civilian clothes. “When we caught enemy combatants out of uniform in the 1940s,” a veteran wrote in The American Heritage, “we sometimes simply executed them.” The Greatest Generation had a direct way of dealing with moral ambiguity.

"I am a guest of the Taliban." Rosen wrote. Supposing in 1944 he had written, “I am a guest of the Waffen SS.” It is doubtful if Rolling Stone would have published Rosen’s article during World War II. The norms and values of American society have changed enormously in the past half-century.

Yet had Rosen been captured by Afghan soldiers, it is likely Rolling Stone magazine would have asked the US military to intercede for his release. But if the reporter has no obligation toward the soldier, does the soldier have the obligation to protect the journalist? Should Rosen, if captured, have been released or put on trial for aiding or abetting the enemy?

Not fully trusting the Taliban, Rosen employed the threat of murder more commonly associated with drug lords than with Rolling Stone magazine. “… Those I accompanied knew that they and their families would be killed if anything happened to me,” Rosen wrote, alluding to shadowy Afghan associates who had arranged his trip. But supposing Rosen had died and in retaliation six children were beheaded. What is the difference between the Mafia and Rolling Stone, when reporters are protected by threatening to wipe out families?

Thomas Barnett is taking a shot at the folks who claim media bias in the election. In his larger point, he is correct, but he is only correct up to the point where one side or the other calls for a mandate of balance applied against the perception of bias. Barnett's larger point is that bias has always been the springboard for the side losing an election, and the historical trend of victories by the GOP doesn't support the claims of media bias for the left. He is right, Americans find their media sources where Americans want to find them, and the evidence to support his claim is best illustrated by the decline of the print media in general as other options are now available to Americans.

The argument on the right is that there is political bias in the mainstream media, but on the left we have a similar call towards the "fairness doctrine" to balance political speech in talk radio. If there is bias in media, why would the right be against a "fairness doctrine" to insure a sense of balance? If there is no bias in media as the left claims, then why would be need a "fairness doctrine" at all? Both sides are stuck in a catch-22 regarding journalism independence in politics.

Dr. Barnett does use terrible judgment with the term anti-intellectual to describe conservatives or Republicans, whichever he is doing, but when attacking the other side, politics has a tendency to bring out the worst in people. It is why in general, I like to keep it off the blog, and why I have ultimately decided to withdraw my book from the Obama line and run it independently, I simply don't want the political attachments.

In this discussion as we think about what Bing West is discussing, the cry of bias and calls for balance in politics are applicable to the larger issue of journalism independence, and that is where Bing West is focused.

I think this idea of "journalistic independence” Bing West is discussing is influenced by the demagoguery of the political media. Both sides of the political spectrum are participating in this demagoguery, whether it is the claimed bias of the New York Times, MSNBC, Fox News, or Rush Limbaugh; at its essence complaining about media bias or calling for media balance is a bipartisan tactic. I think it is all interconnected, and it manifests itself occasionally with articles like that of Nir Rosen's Rolling Stones piece.

Bing West calls for a national debate regarding the subject of journalistic “independence” during a war. I think it is an important topic for a national debate, but it is a lot more complex than people realize. There are moral obligations that trump media independence, but the application of morality only applies as a national war obligation for protecting the nation-state from its enemies. The issue though is who are the enemies? The politics in America is entertaining to be sure, but the media has lost all moral objectivity in its bipartisan bias. Depending upon who you listen to, Barak Obama is a smooth talking Muslim who intends to bring a caliphate upon America as he saves the planet with Marxism while aborting all your babies; while John McCain is a senile cancer patient who intends to bomb Iran funded with your 401K while the middle class without health care dies of cancer due to the pollution caused by new oil derricks in Anwar.

With moral judgment like this from the media in our political election, are we really surprised by what Nir Rosen has done?

With that said, can we really mandate moral responsibility on the media domestically if we desire a healthy democracy? I believe the distinctions where a moral obligation overrides is critical to the national debate of what "journalism independence" is. There is a tendency for people to suggest that the market for media should be allowed to work this out. Really? The Rolling Stones no doubt sold many copies thanks to Nir Rosen's article, so there is a legitimate argument the market approach will not be sufficient if that media industry refuses to police itself, much less acknowledge a problem.

Does our elected political leadership have the wisdom to make moral distinctions on media content in wartime regarding domestic media coverage of the war without influencing our system of free political speech through the media? I don't know, but I do know that regardless of the best intentions, it isn't as easy as it sounds.

This Is How To Name a Warship

That picture has significance. Background here.

During the service, as Monsoor's coffin was taken from the hearse to the gravesite, Navy SEALs lined up in two columns. As the coffin passed, video shows each SEAL slapping down the gold Trident from his uniform and deeply embedding it in Monsoor's wooden coffin.

The slaps were reportedly heard across the cemetery.

Ever since the Navy began naming submarines after states, which I still consider a significant change from naming them after cities, it only makes sense to name our battleships after the nations hero's. In that regard, it is appropriate that we name our soon to be biggest battleship after one of our biggest hero's from the latest war.

“DDG 1001, the second ship in our newest class of destroyers, will be named after Michael Monsoor,” Navy Secretary Donald Winter said remarks prepared for an address to be given Wednesday night in New York.

“Michael Monsoor’s name will now be linked with one of our nation’s most visible examples of military power — a U.S. Navy warship,” Winter said in the address prepared for a Navy SEAL Warrior Fund dinner.

The Michael Monsoor will be the second DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class advanced destroyer. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding is expected to begin construction of the ship next year at its Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss., with delivery projected to take place in 2014.

Master-at-Arms 2nd Class (SEAL) Michael Monsoor is one of two sailors awarded the Medal of Honor since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began. The first, Lt. Michael Murphy, is the namesake of DDG 112, now under construction at General Dynamics Bath Iron Works of Bath, Maine, and is expected to be delivered in 2011.

The term hero is passed out too lightly in American society, and some take for granted the real thing. If you are confused on the definition, ponder these actions.

“One of the key aspects of this incident was the way the overwatch position was structured. There was only one access point for entry or exit and Monsoor was the only one who could have saved himself from harm. Instead, knowing what the outcome would be, he fell on the grenade to save the others from harm. Monsoor and the two injured were evacuated to the combat outpost battalion aid station where Monsoor died approximately 30 minutes after the incident from injuries sustained by the grenade blast.”

Also due to Monsoor’s selfless actions, the fourth man of the SEAL squad who was 10-15 feet from the blast, was unhurt. A 28-year-old Lieutenant, who sustained shrapnel wounds to both legs that day, said the following in crediting Monsoor with saving his life: “He never took his eye off the grenade - his only movement was down toward it. He undoubtedly saved mine and the other SEALs’ lives, and we owe him.”

As Kristen Scharnberg of the ChicagoTribune summarized in tribute, “The men who were there that day say they could see the options flicker across Michael Mansoor’s face: save himself or save the men he had long considered brothers. He chose them.”

Blackfive should be pleased, DDG-1001 is a more fitting tribute to the memory of Michael Monsor than the Galley at NAB Coronado. By giving such an important name to the second ship of the Zumwalt class, the Navy has sent a clear signal the first two DDG-1000s will be built, let there be no doubt. It doesn't explain why steel isn't being cut for the first one yet, but it certainly guarantees steel will be cut.

Final thought, while gold tridents made statements at Michael Monsoor's funeral, we noted there was also appropriate respect in tribute to Michael Monsoor at his Medal of Honor ceremony. Our nation is blessed with men like Michael Monsoor manning the watch tower of our nation, and these men as well.

Bravo Zulu to the Navy. Let us never forget.

"The Danger Here is Absolutely Real"

This was released October 28, 2024 from the International Chamber of Shipping.

Action required: Members are invited to note a report form a merchant ship in the Gulf of Aden today and to distribute it as required.

Members are invited to note a report on the experience of one merchant ship in the Gulf of Aden today. If evidence is needed of the lawless situation in this part of the world then the attached report provides it. It illustrates both the effectiveness of organic defensive measures as well as the need for active military intervention.

This is the merchant ship report:

A report received today from a merchant ship in the Gulf of Aden

To inform you of events that took place today. Situation: Vessel was under full lockdown with anti-piracy lookout posted on both bridge wings night and day and navigating in Gulf of Aden safety corridor.

First attack took place at 08:00 in posn 13-26N, 48-27E. Three high speed craft approached with direct intent from port side 45degrees off the bow.
Interesting was that 2 were the typical white type but the centre and forward attack vessel was actually a Yemeni skiff fitted with large outboard engine and was being used as a screen to mask the other two craft. I called the company on the telephone, I made evasive maneuvers, mayday call on vhf, mustered all in our security muster station (conference room) and kept 3/O on the bridge with a helmsman. We came under automatic small arms fire targeted at the bridge. No damage or injuries. I was also sounding the air horn whilst making S-turns and calling Mayday on VHF16. After about 10min the attackers gave up chase and stopped and re-grouped. We escaped. When I was sure the situation was under control I debriefed the crew to calm them and assured them we would remain on high alert.

The 2nd attack was more serious and came at 15:00 in posn 12-54N, 46-40E where 3 fast attack boats were seen departing from a mother ship fishing vessel white in colour. I set off the Ship Security Alert System [SSAS]. The boats were same as in the photos sent out being white and had 4 men in each. I immediately called Mayday on vhf, mustered crew in safe place and was again fired upon by automatic small arms fire but with more aggression lasting about 5 minutes into the accom block. Fortunately a coalition warship (Spanish Navy) heard my mayday call and responded by sending out a Russian aircraft to our scene which was patrolling the area. I was told 20min until it arrived but we were actually being fired upon at the time. The fire was a lot more intense than the morning attack. I maintained S-turns but was unable to determine visually if we had been boarded or not due to the amount of fire coming in.

I maintained mayday calls and was assured by the Spanish warship on vhf that 10min to help. The attackers were then seen to yield, re-group then re-attack. I was contacted by the aircraft to tell me he had me in sight and would be there in a few minutes. I was very happy to see the echo on my radar of the inbound aircraft. The pirates were within 100m when the small fixed wing Russian bomber arrived and gave a very low passing. The pirates yielded. The aircraft then proceeded to drop ordinance on them. The situation became safe very quickly with the bomber in attendance. About 20min later a French attack helicopter arrived to check our situation was under control and we alerted him as to the estimated position of the pirate mother ship. I thanked them and made communications with the office and UK MTO commanding forces to inform all ok and debrief.

The danger here is absolutely real. I will be in Red Sea in 12hrs time and clear of the hazardous area. Except for some paint being damaged by gunfire, we are fine and have no damage or injuries at this time.

Emphasis mine. That would be the Spanish warplane mentioned in the last paragraph of this AFP report, but no identification on type. Is it Russian or Spanish? Who knows. If anyone knows which Spanish warship is discussed, please add to the comments.

Welcome to the Gulf of Aden. Stay alert and stay safe.

Potential Marine Corps Shipbuilding Strategy

Rebekah Gordon from Inside The Navy had an article out on Monday that discussed the Marine Corps shipbuilding requirements. She describes what sounds like a baseball card passed out the National Defense Industrial Associations expeditionary warfare conference that contained five bullet points, or tenets that represented the "Commandant's Intent" for shipbuilding strategy.

Anyone who has been reading the blog awhile will understand why I love all five. They are described as:

“Warfighting: Attain a minimum 33 amphibious ships (11 [dock,] 11 [assault and] 11 [aviation]) to generate 30 [ships for operational availability] for [two Marine Expeditionary Brigades], plus one MPF(F) to support forward presence, power projection and execute [joint forcible entry operations] in support of [Marine operations].”

“Incremental LPD-17: Designate LPD-17 for LSD replacement.”

“LH(X): Truncate the LHA(R) no well deck big deck at two ships and assess big deck surface interface requirements to get LH(X) right.”

“1.0 MPF(F): Attain full MPF(F) squadron capabilities and ship mix to enable [one] MPF(F) vertical and surface reinforcement for [Marine Expeditionary Force]-level fight from the sea base.”

“NSFS: Carefully execute and monitor [a]nalysis of [a]lternatives and assess all hull forms to meet NSFS requirements.”

This follows Chris Cavas's article in Defense News which laid out the following as part of the NOC discussion.

The ideal Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to transport a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is four ships: a big-deck assault ship (LHA or LHD), a dock landing ship (LSD) and two amphibious transport dock ships (LPD) - one with enhanced command and control capabilities. This is an expansion of the 3-ship formation that has been used over the past decade. The four-ship ARG would "support split operations by a two-section ARG/MEU" and "provide the ability to more widely disperse the platforms that carry the Marines and the ability to embark more capability on the smaller, dispersed entities." To meet this need, the amphibious ship requirement would need to be raised from the current 32 ships to 36. The use of amphibious ships to support special operations forces and mine countermeasures forces also pushes the requirement to 36 ships, the document said.

The value of using amphibious ships to support the five Global Fleet Stations locations further pushes the number of "gators;" assuming that at any time two ships would be deployed on GFS missions and ten percent of the force would be in maintenance, a fleet of 42 amphibs is needed.

Lets take both articles, combine the line of thinking, and discuss.

Lets assume the Marines have decided 36 ships is the new minimum, and 6 more amphibious ships of some kind are being evaluated for Global Fleet Stations. We can also speculate that if the Marines move towards a four ship ARG, with 36 ships the Marines are sticking with the 9 ARG total. If the LPD-17 is replacing the LSDs currently in operation, that would imply the LPD-17 construction line needs to remain open.

With only 2 LHA(R) planned now, that means the Navy will have only 10 LHDs/LHA(R)s, with the last discussion I've seen suggesting the LHA(R)s would be funded in FY11 and FY15. That means the LH(X) would begin construction in the FY19 time frame and 2 would be funded by 2025 if they were built on 4 year intervals. Note, if you build them on 4 year intervals, as per the POM10 planning docs I've seen for LHA(R), that means you have 10 every 40 years, 40 years being the life of the ship class.

I don't want to fully explore this yet, instead choosing to wait for the NOC. My only observation is thus:

When you factor in the Sea Base concept, all of these amphibious ship numbers, the necessity for naval fire support, adding a Marine Corps mission module to the LCS, and recall it has been the strategic decision of Congress to increase the size of the Marines, one can get the impression the Marine Corps is looking to for somewhere around $4 billion dollars annually of the Navy shipbuilding budget to meet these requirements.

This leads directly into a discussion of national priorities and strategic direction, balancing requirements, existing capacity, and desired capabilities within a resource restrained defense budget. I don't intend to fully engage that discussion until we see the NOC. In the meantime, check out this (PDF), this (PDF), and this (PDF). All three are worth careful consideration on many points. Note the map in the documents, somwhere Thomas Barnett should be smiling.

Sea Basing in South America

Captain Frank Ponds (PDF) can sell soft power from the sea, and he needs a date in about 6 weeks on The Daily Show (yea CHINFO I'm talking to you). I've been involved in the blogger roundtable process for at least a year now, and this morning was the most informative, most interesting discussion I've experienced to date in these conversations with the blogosphere.

Operation Continuing Promise 08 is a strategic sea basing engagement that represents the very best of the diplomatic, national, military, and humanitarian power of the United States Navy. The Navy leverages the uncontested sea for an interactive, cooperative local engagement tailored to the host nations requirements, needs, and requests supporting medical, dental, veterinarian, and engineering engagements that significantly portraits a positive perception of the United States, and does so empowered by the invitation of the host country.

While I admit to still being concerned how we quantify results, I am convinced this is an emerging pillar of peacetime strategy that must be fully supported, encouraged, and emphasized by political leadership in the 21st century towards the national strategic ends of building partnerships, supporting regional security, and preventing regional conflicts.

Below is the transcript portion of my questions to Commodore Ponds.

Galrahn: Hey, Captain Ponds. It's great talking to you. Listening to you discuss the Continuing Promise mission, it sounds to me like everything is very tailored to the locals' needs, so this question might sound a little absurd. But, I was wondering if there's a typical day: How many people do you bring on the ship? How many sites do you put people at? How many people per site? And I understand there's probably no such thing as a typical day, but I'm just trying to get a feel for a daily operation within Continuing Promise.

CAPT. PONDS: Well, let me just tell you, the Continuing Promise mission requires a continuous day. It is non-stop. There is no break in this process ever. I mean, because when the mission stops ashore, it continues with planning on the ship. So, Continuing -- Continuous (sic) Promise off the ship is continuous operations on the ship.

So, let me give you the life in the day of a sailor onboard Kearsarge: You wake up at 4:30 in the morning. You -- you know, you clean up; you brush up; you have breakfast at 5:00. You muster at 5:30 if you're going to go on a mission -- and that's where we get the accountability of who's going ashore and what they need to do.

You're either on that helicopter, that landing craft at about 06:00 or 06:30. It normally takes you about 30 to 45 minutes to go from the ship to shore, of which you get on another transport vehicle to go to the project site, and that could be anywhere from 15 minutes to an hour and a half, depending on the traffic and the way to get there.

Once you get there, we engage immediately, and work through lunch sometimes -- or to lunch. Lunch is normally 30 minutes, which it consists of a healthy MRE right there on site, which we share with our Force Protection brethren there. We stop lunch at about 13:00 and we reengage until about 17:00. At 17:30, we breakdown the equipment we're going to bring back to the ship, or we stow that equipment that's going to be secured by the host nation. And so you get back on a bus and you travel back to the point of the embarkation -- or debarkation, and then you come back to the ship either by helicopter or by surface conveyance.

You may get back on the ship about 19:00. And they had the hiccup like last night where the waves, and the tides and currents didn't allow those individuals to get back until about 22:00. And then you come back and you're tired; and you shower; and then you eat. And then you get your orders for tomorrow.
And then you link up with the plans that has been going on while you were off the ship. And so once you get your marching orders, at 21:00; and then the day begins again a 04:30 the next day. So, that's a day in the life of a typical operation on-board the ship.

Now let's talk about the project ashore. It depends. On an average day, we have about, maybe anywhere between 100 to 150 individuals that may go ashore to cover the medical sites, the dental sites, the veterinarian sites, and the engineering sites.

Galrahn: So, you're doing one site for each dental, medical, engineering --?

CAPT. PONDS: Well, I mean, like, right now we have two medical sites, two dental sites, and we have a -- we're going to set up a (rove ?) and veterinarian sites. So, these things are not running consecutively, they're running concurrently. So, we could have, like, three medical sites running at the same time; and three engineering sites running at the same time.

Let me give you a snapshot of the total number of sites we've been working within the different countries: In Nicaragua we had eight projects going on -- everything from engineering and medical projects; in the Dominican Republic we had a total of -- let me see, looks like about nine sites in the Dominican Republic; in Colombia we had -- five, six, seven -- looks like eight sites; Guyana, we're going to have 13 sites; and here in Trinidad and Tobago, we can have up to eight sites. So, again, it's a mixture of medical, dental, veterinarian and engineering sites.

Galrahn: Thank you very much, Captain.

....

Galrahn: I talk a lot on my blog about humanitarian -- proactive humanitarian missions and these medical diplomacy missions. And there's a general consensus among my readers that this is a great thing.

But the debate begins when you start talking about how -- and I don't want to get into the white hull, gray hull debate, but I am curious about the capability sets on the ship that you emphasize -- that you would emphasize. Like, you know, is it storage capacity? Is it your medical facilities? Is it your welldeck? Is it your aviation capabilities? What is the capability set that you think requires emphasis for these missions to be successful in deployments like Continuing Promise?

CAPT. PONDS: Everything that you just named. If I had to answer your question, I would just answer just the way you said. I mean, it all depends in what country we are. I mean, as you know, right now I just told you we are off the coast of the country, and not pier-side.

And when you're off the coast, and we call that "sea-based operations," the aviation lift, the heavy lift that's provided by the HMH Fourth and by the 53s -- MH-53s, it's a critical component of being able to lift these heavy, you know, CONEX boxes filled with materiel or supplies -- whether they be medical or engineering, deep into the host nation. It saves times on the logistics -- (inaudible) -, and also it reduces the footprint ashore.

And then let's talk about also the surface lift. Some of these countries have very well-developed ports, some of them -- some of them do not. So, when we can't go pier-side, we have to use the LCMs and the LCUs that are normally used for landing Marines, but now we landing humanitarian assistance and supplies. I mean, so it's critical to be able to broach the beach to get that humanitarian assistance across the beach.

Now, let's talk about the on-board capacity. This ship, as you know, is second only to the U.S.N.S. Comfort and the U.S.N.S. Mercy for being able to deliver this medical capacity. And so whether the ship is gray, white or green,
it's the function that it brings, it's the capacity and the capability that it brings. Just because it has an LHD-3 on it -- I mean, the host nation doesn't care what the number is, or the color, all he cares about is that this ship is bringing a critical capability by sea, air and shore to their citizens.

And that's all they care about. And you know what? That's all we care about. We are no threat to any host-nation down here because we are here on a humanitarian assistance mission. That is it. Period. Point-blank. So, I think the strategic communication sometimes gets lost in the media when it gets -- and when they try to portray this ship to be doing something that it is not. This is an HA mission. This happened to be a (gray hold ?) conducting an HA -- carrying out HA operations.

Galrahn: Captain, has your ship been full? I mean, when you deployed, where you've just crammed in everything you possibly could, like the Marines were deploying? I mean, I know how the Marines deploy. Their loading plans are to pack everything you possibly can. Was that the way you guys are deployed, or do you still have capacity? Is there -- is there non-governmental organization capacity that you could support?

CAPT. PONDS: Oh yeah. Yeah, when we left we were -- we were packed in -- stem to stern, port to starboard. I mean, you couldn't move anything because, between the vehicles, the boats and the supplies -- I mean, it was, it was loaded out.

But, as we moved from one country to another country, we've expended and used those supplies and that equipment, and so we created space because of that. So when we get back we hope to be empty of only -- everything that we needed to do the job. So, yes, we can accommodate. And, again, that's what makes this ship so perfect for HADR missions, because if we had to go and support another hurricane, or whatnot, we could on-load the necessary supplies and equipment and go out and do that mission.

A few notes. It was good to hear that northeastern accent of Boston Maggie whose voice always contains an uplifting spirit within. She set the tone before the call began with energy and I thought it woke everyone up. Keep her in your prayers as she beats cancer. The questions by ID friends Boston Maggie, David Axe, and Chuck Simmons were all very good, and Tom Crowes who I am unfamiliar with, but has this excellent photo album from his trip aboard Kearsarge earlier this year; also had some excellent questions regarding the NGO and medical components of Operational Continuing Promise 08.

For me, the discussion of what platform has become mute, we need ships of various types and my impression from speaking with Captain Ponds is that this deployment, particularly in Haiti but also for the planned HA aspects of the deployment, is simply not possible without any other ship than a LHD. I've heard people complain about them, and after doing my research, I think they are superbly ignorant and uninformed.

There is a retired professor of economics who is a member of my lodge, and he has a special interest in the economy of Africa. I will not identify him by name, but note there are other sources that say at least as much as this...

He believes that the lack of security alone contributes in numerous forms towards $50 billion annual loss of GDP to the Gulf of Guinea region. A LHD costs about $3.5 billion to build, and around $100 million to operate annually for 40 years, not including life cycle modernization. It would take 4 LHDs to operate year around in that region. Even if the United States invested $50 billion over a period of 40 years in the form of LHDs for the Gulf of Guinea, which comes to around $1.25 billion annually over 40 years compared to whatever our actual total annual investment in Africa is.

The return on investment for changing the security conditions of that region, if that $50 billion annual regional GDP loss could be recouped into the global economy, would be a minimum of $2 trillion dollars of regional GDP over that 40 year period. The way I see it, soft power via joint service, multi-national cooperative engagement efforts like what the Navy is doing in the case of Operational Continuing Promise 08 with the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) is the best bang for the buck going for US soft power. Think about it...

Full transcript here of the bloggers roundtable, and even if he is an alumni of the Crimson Tide you can check out Commodore Pond's blog here. Sorry, a bit of displaced Razorback frustration from a terrible football season spilling over...

A View of Freedom in Duluth

Captain Andy Niemyer (c/s "Comjam") (ret.) gives his take on LCS-1 Freedom as he photographed the ship from watching her arrival at Duluth, MN on Sunday, October 26th. He does not profess to be anything other than an interested observer and has not followed the LCS program intensively in design or construction detail. He is an airdale though, which is kind of like sleeping in a Holiday Inn Express every night, or so the brown shoe folks tell me.

I'm very pleased he is sharing his insights and imagery with the community. The comments below are his observations based on this photo album he has uploaded. 71 pictures in all.

Image 1751: As this image shows, she's currently riding somewhat bow down. Seas were not too bad, although the wind was from her starboard side, at about 27 knots, gusting to 35. She was however in the protective lee of the large bluff to her west as she came closer to the entrance to the open vessel transit canal into Duluth's outer harbor. Given she did not have an air complement embarked, and, I'm willing to bet, minimal equipment below the hangar deck aft, I'm not surprised at the bow down aspect. When more GFE is onboard I expect she will trim to the correct mark.

Image 1753: Her joint military and civil heritage is apparent here. If you look at some of the mega-yachts that have out of various yards over the past few years, her lines have some familiarity. The radar L/O architecture so familiar with the DDG-51 class is also evident here, as are the now standard "mushroom farm" of antenna covers all over the area mainly fore of the mainmast. The hard chine of the bowline is also interesting; not seeing her at flank I can't address the affect on bow wave and wake formation that it could affect, much less seakeeping in higher sea states.

Image 1756: Her solid mainmast and antenna farm. A later image shows many of the radio antenna are raked aft, in keeping with the L/O emphasis. Two surface search radar antennas and one flat arrayed air search system, covered to protect the array from the environment and prying eyes. I presume there's an IFF antenna in there as well. EW array, running lights, etc. are all present.

Image 1757: Wow, are those bridge wings small! That's a lot of confidence you can really see as well as you want from the enclosed bridge. I know I have seen larger, more expansive air intakes before, but I'm not sure where! Would be a great place to put a nice phased array system if your center of gravity and buoyancy reserve allowed it. Turbines aren't that fussy as to where you route the air supply from, just as long as it enters the face of the inlets in a smooth manner. And yes, she really is two-toned right now.

Image 1760: Better shot of the area above the bridge. Note the E/O system turret perched below the surface radar on centerline. Nice to be able to see in the dark in the Straits of Hormuz!

Image 1761: Starboard side, looking aft. Note the dual engine exhausts, possibly from auxiliary diesels, with commensurate soot. Now look at other imagery showing stacks on the superstructure, as well. Lots of stuff coming out of her, all at better than ambient temperatures, I would be willing to surmise. It's called "IR signature" boys and girls. For an old attack guy who learned to love his FLIR, I really, really like high IR contrasts.

Image 1763: Close up of the bow with a nice view of both the noticeable chine and the single anchor hawser. Yep, very low to the waterline. I'm old school, lots of holes near a waterline make me nervous. Reduces radar bloom to be sure, and it's only on the starboard side. No dual anchors out in a roadstead with her!

Images 1764/65: Better imagery of those two exhaust stacks and that BIG hucking hatch on the starboard side aft, under the flight deck. Practically a Ro-Ro hatch. Here's to the hope there's not a lot of working of the hull aft in high seas.

Image 1768: Area from foc'sl aft to bridge showing bow area and hull flare to some advantage. Note multi L/O facets on gun turret.

Image 1769-1771: Bridge wing and O levels, plus mast. Sailor on wing gives an idea of just how small, for L/O purposes it is.

Image 1773-74: Nice shot of the mast, E/O turret and antenna farm. Rake of main antennas is more evident here.

Image 1777: Area aft of funnels, showing RAM mount, search light and empty .50-cal mount. (I'm kind of thinking Duluth is a "low threat" environment, anti-war activists not withstanding.)

Image 1778: Close up of aft starboard two-piece hatch. I think that's the biggest non-VDS hatch I've observed on a combatant.

Image 1779: Given I observed these exhausts on both sides, I have to wonder if they're aux diesel power that would, hopefully, be secured in a GQ situation.

Image 1781: Hangar deck, Pri-Fly, hangar door, RAM mount and port .50-cal mount. I wouldn't want to be manning the .50-cal when the RAM was shooting.

Image 1783: Closer shot of RAM mount. I am unsure as to the protective function of the curved shield on the port side nor the function of the apparatus it is shielding.

Image 1784: Shot of funnel complex, plus steel grid aft of there. I need to get some good overheads to figure those out.

Image 1786: Nice Starboard stern quarter shot, showing stern doors to good effect. I swear this hull has more holes in it than DoN's excuses to sink the DD-1000 program. There's going to have be a lot of weight stuffed in under the hangar deck!

Image 1787: Close up of stern doors. They look sturdy enough... Note bumper rub mark on starboard stern halfway up from waterline.

Image 1788: Note blast shield on superstructure behind RAM mount.

Image 1794: This gives a good sense of scale of vessel size. Image 1798/1802: Nice shots of L/O facets on turret mount. Too bad it's a pop-gun. (Real sailors start measuring real guns in sizes 5" and above)

Image 1803: Part of the standard mushroom farm. Bandwidth rules the seas these days, so no matter how many antennas you have, if you don't have frequency access, it's going to be a bitch. Which leads to a very long and digressive discussion on connectivity, netcentric warfare, micromanagement, motherships, total platforms, hulls and a host of issues that will require another time and place to discuss.

Thank you Captain Niemyer, excellent stuff.

The Timeline Problem

The images are courtesy of InsideDefense, who has a remarkable ability to get a hold of just about everything. Some people don't think this is a big deal. I guess it depends, but I think it is interesting that someone in the Navy thought this was a good idea. This comes from an August 27th memo called Service POM briefs and Resulting Actions available at InsideDefense. No one outside a few defense trade news media folks are highlighting this, but one would think this would be interesting to a broader audience.

The first document is the Navy's plan regarding the DDG-51 as submitted per questions from OSD. Now when the information became public, the Navy denied this was the plan, but note where I have added red boxes. You can hit the images to see a hi res version. The question reads:

How will Navy sole source production of DDG-51s in FY10/12/14/15 to Bath? Provide the legal specifics / relevant documents for the Bath Iron Works versus Northrup-Grumman Ingalls Public Interest Determination and Finding Issue.

I boxed in the response in red. It reads:

Response: DoN General Counsel June 16, 2024 Public Interest Determination & Findings (D&F) INFORMATION MEMO and D&F Issue Summary are ATTACHED.

Thank god the rest of this reads:

The Navy has not prepared the D&F for DDG 51 procurement. The Navy is examining acquisition strategy alternatives, including competition plans, regarding DDG 51 procurement. The need for a D&F will be determined out of these acquisition strategy discussions.

The second paragraph is the official Navy position, but what has everyone wondering what the hell is going on is what what I highlighted in the red box on the first page, specifically the date. The Navy was looking into doing sole source contracts for the DDG-51s as far back as June 16, 2024, long before any public indication that the DDG-1000 would be truncated, and before Gene Taylor called the Seapower sub-committee hearing in the HASC.

I'm going to take a WAG... wild ass guess, and suggest maybe Gene Taylor is not very happy right now. While he is doing his best to help the Navy cancel an unpopular shipbuilding program, the Navy is looking to sole source DDG-51 contracts to Bath Iron Works, and short change the shipyard in his district. Uhm... dumb.

The other two pages outline the Public Interest Determination & Findings (D&F) to help build the legal case for sole-source contracts for destroyers to Bath. I don't know who thought it was a good idea to begin this discussion, but it is just plain dumb to include this in a document likely to get out. I cannot emphasize the word "dumb" enough, and I'll wager a pint ADM Roughead has probably said as much to whoever did this.

On October 24, 2024 Senator Kennedy sent a letter to Admiral Roughead that lists information Congress had yet to recieve as of just last Friday. Senator Kennedy's letter states:

The Navy has yet to provide the Congress sufficient justification in support of your proposal to truncate the DDG-1000 program at three ships and instead restart the DDG-51 production line.

As yet, we have not seen:

• Intelligence analysis reflecting the coordinated assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency supporting these changes to the mix of platforms;
• Validation of this shift that is supported by reviews by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for an Acquisition Category I program;
• An approved acquisition strategy for cruisers and destroyers that supports the approved requirements baseline and is consistent with previous Navy studies on what investment is required to support the surface combatant industrial base;
• Evidence that potential changes in the shipbuilding program reflect:

- Modeling and simulation, including war gaming conclusions regarding combat effectiveness;
- Assessments of platform operational availability; and
- Cost savings or penalties from changed vessel manning levels to accomplish missions.

• Verification by the commanders of the combatant commands that the Navy's currently preferred program would be better than the Navy's previously preferred shipbuilding program in meeting their future mission requirements.

The letter goes on to slice out some pages of what looks like one of Ronald O'Rourkes reports and demands a comparison on a number of issues between the DDG-1000 and DDG-51s. It will be interesting to see if the Navy answers the letter. There is a school of thought that the Navy can play for time, specifically until the next administration transition begins after next weeks election. The idea is, the next administration is going to ask what can we cut, and the Navy will offer up DDG-1000. I could be wrong, but I think if the Navy does this, you can bet your money maker the Navy loses DDG-51s too, because the new administration wants the money and the DDG-51s aren't cheap. Congress may decide otherwise, and if they make the choice, now that the CNO has used his credibility like toilet paper on Capitol Hill, Congress would probably just stick with the DDG-1000 plan. Based on the numbers I've seen (and that first doc has the numbers of the DDG-51 I discussed previously here), the DDG-51 plan is more expensive than continuing the DDG-1000 plan... at least until the DDG-1000 goes over cost.

With that said, am I the only person who thinks the Navy is working overtime to make canceling the DDG-1000 as difficult as possible?

How many bridges on Capitol Hill does the CNO have to burn to explain his way out this nightmare? Next time a CNO wants to push an agenda in shipbuilding, for the low cost of a cool $250K (just so I can make Barak Obama's category for rich!), I'll work with CHINFO and have Senator Kennedy's next letter begging the CNO to cancel a program. In political capital alone it will be the best investment the Navy spends on shipbuilding so far this century. OK, so I'm exaggerating my PR skills a little, but compared to this PR nightmare am I really? Would anyone be?

You know who has the best PR? Lockheed Martin. Here we are watching an assault of every reputation involved, from Gordon England all the way down to the broad reputation of NAVSEA. Basically everyone involved is getting burned except Lockheed Martin, who is very much involved in reaping the rewards of the new direction. Lockheed Martin is also enjoying a very successful PR strategy with the first LCS even though unlike the DDG-1000 so far, the LCS is over 200% over cost. I would suggest the CNO hire Lockheed Martin to do PR for the Navy, but that would probably require another sole-source contract, and that probably wouldn't look very good right now.

I have no idea where all of this is going, but at the current pace, when we get there the trail blazed could be littered with bodies.

Strategery in Surface Combatant Shipbuilding

Yes, I am invoking Saturday Night Live. I've mentioned lately that I have two problems with the Navy right now, surface combatants and the necessity for straight, honest talk from Navy leadership on the challenges the Navy is facing. I want to briefly explain why I am frustrated. As they say, misery enjoys company.

There is something quietly out in the broad daylight staring the Navy directly in the eye that nobody appears to want to highlight, the thought of which says absolutely nothing good about the state of the Navy today. I don't know if it is the election next week, or all the furious activity by the various industry players who are posturing for their programs, or simply the constant distractions of other issues, but shipmate..., you have a serious problem on your hands.

What is the Navy's current surface combatant shipbuilding program? Did you know as of right now, TODAY, there are in fact currently ZERO surface combatant shipbuilding plans. Think about it.

Technically speaking, the Navy has pushed back the CG(X) and truncated the DDG-1000. The DDG-1000 officially ended in the Navy's view in FY09, and this was reinforced when Congressional appropriations did not fund the $51 million long lead funding for the 4th DDG-1000 in the FY09 budget.

Technically speaking, the Navy has not had the DDG-51 plan approved, so it doesn't actually exist and it is the responsibility of the next administration to put the DDG-51 plan forward. Finally, while the LCS is NOT a surface combatant, both Lockheed Martin and the Navy foolishly believe it is. Technically, it is also a shipbuilding program without an official shipbuilding plan, also to be released with the next administrations budget. Sure, there is money out there for something, but there was money out there for a LCS funded in FY08 that is no longer going to be built.

The LCS program, as of today, is essentially a Prototype program of 2 types, with no official, finalized follow on plan as of today. With the next administration coming on, not to mention all the questions, it is in a perfect place to have a new administration walk in and ask for an analysis of the program before moving forward. In other words, due to position and timing, it is in a perfect place to be truncated at two ships, just like DDG-1000 as the new administration arrives.

If the next administration is paying attention, which is a guarantee, they have the option to walk in and cancel the entire Seapower21 hi/low shipbuilding plan outright by simply not approving anything. After nothing but problems in 21st century surface combatant shipbuilding, we officially end the Bush administration with 0 official plans for surface combatants. I think it is interesting that nobody has been discussing this blatantly obvious and troubling reality of the moment.

Five Good Reads

Defense of the Realm sees the writing on the wall, and has posted some final thoughts. The faith was lost with the recent announcement new secretary of state for defense John Hutton become the "first defense secretary to back a French plan for a European army, branding those who dismiss it as 'pathetic'." What does it say when one the most popular British military blogs in the world has given up faith in a rebound of British military in its current state of decline? Not sure really, but I would note if was me, this would give me some pause for consideration if I was European. Keep the faith guys, we are only 16 days removed from one of the important event to date that has discredited the European Unions conceptual existence. It takes a bit longer than that for everyone in Europe to catch up and realize what just happened. Hell, I don't think either US Presidential candidate has figured out the ramifications yet.

Australia is beginning to look beyond the Collins class, and has begun to study the problem. It shouldn't be too difficult to write down the first problem, a submariner in Oz needs to be one of the highest paid jobs in government. Once you fix that issue, everything else will get easy as you can pick from volunteers, rather than struggle to find them.

The Russian Navy Blog thinks the end is near for the whole MV Faina episode. Good stuff.

Robert Farley did a book review on Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon. I haven't read the book, but Rob can sell books with a review like that. Also check out the comments, interesting discussions. I would add only one thought. While I agree with the suggestion a victory at Jutland by the Grand Fleet over the High Seas Fleet would not have had a significant impact on the Germans in WWI, I do think there is a legitimate discussion that it could have had an effect on both the Germans and the Royal Navy in the buildup towards WWII, and perhaps some spillover influence on Japan who was heavily influenced by the doctrine of the Royal Navy. If someone has ever discussed that angle of speculation, please let me know in the comments. It is something I have thought about, but never really explored and would be interested reading speculation to those alternative future ends.

CDR Salamander fires a broadside at the surface combatant/surface warfare thinking coming from the Navy. I have a bunch of thoughts, which I'll save for a later date.

Check out the size of LPD-17 in context of the other ships in the photo above. Dirty Little Secret, it is very likely the smallest target on that radar screen. Think about it. Click for hi-res.

PERSIAN GULF (Oct. 25, 2008) A multi-national group of Foreign Navy ships participate in a photo exercise with ships from the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group during a bilateral exercise in the Persian Gulf. The Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group is supporting maritime security operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Chad R. Erdmann

RAND report on PLAAF vs USAF in Taiwan for 2020

I recently read the RAND analysis on possible encounters between China and Taiwan/USA in 2020. You can find it here. I have to say that after some initial prejudice toward their analysis, I became fairly impressed by the different scenarios they talked about. I think one must look at this as a good starting point rather than a realistic study. I've always found Taiwan scenario to be too complicated to be discussed on a military forum, so I try not to get into such debate. So the following is an attempt to ask more questions, trying to think of more possibilities rather than answering what is and is not going to be successful.

I think an interesting part that they went over are the number of air bases available to both side in this scenario. The important part is pointing out that Kadena is basically the only USAF base close enough to Taiwan strait and Anderson is the only other base close to there. It also showed the possible and the number of other possible air bases available to America in the area from Japan and South Korea + give some thoughts into areas that would be considered safe for the US carrier and would that would mean to this scenario. So, I think the important questions they raised include the following:

1. Can China take Kadena out of the picture with missile strike and if so how long can they keep it out of commission? In order to answer this question, I would have to know the kind of air defense available at the beginning of the conflict (assuming that USN cannot get there in time to support with its Aegis umbrella). If it is taken out, how fast can it be repaired? If it's repaired, how fast can it be re-supplied? If does have USN protection after being repaired/re-supplied, will it be taken out again by further strikes of ballistic missile, KD-88s and PGMs? So basically, will USAF be able keep this air base open and maintain adequate sortie rate? Even if this can be accomplished, will USAF risk placing any advanced units there?

2. In any Taiwan/China scenario, with South Korea and/or Japan get involved? I think South Korea would unlikely be involved, but will Japan help out Taiwan by sending its navy? Or will it let USAF use its air bases? I certainly the latter case is likely, because Japan has been very vocal about its commitment to USA alliance and its problems with China. There will obviously be some logistical issues of USAF using Japanese bases, so the question would be how long it would take for these bases to be useful? And if Japan allows its bases to be used by USA, will China also be targeting those bases? And if China does target those bases, we are looking at a much larger conflict.

3. The Andersen air base is the only other air base that's within operational range of Taiwan strait. Will this air base remain unscathed in possible conflicts. One thing that has been brought up is that we will likely see B-2 going into Chinese territory to attack Chinese air bases and SAM sites. On the flip side, what about Chinese bombers carrying LACMs against Andersen air base? It is certainly within the range of a H-6K carrying 6 long range LACMs. The report states that 34 missiles would in effect cripple Kadena air base? How many tomahawk LACMs would put Andersen out of commission? And even if Andersen is not taken out, can they significantly reduce the number of sorties launched from there? Similar to point 1, would the risk of getting hit in the hangar prevent USAF from placing a valued asset like F-22 there?

4. What about air bases in China? It's certainly inconceivable that USAF would leave these air bases and SAMs alone in any kind of war scenario. I could imagine that B-2s would be sent in to hit bases that are close to Taiwan and also field elite units. And when USN carrier groups get in there, you can guarantee that many Tomahawk missiles will be sent to Chinese SAMs, GCI sites, long range radar stations and air bases to reduce PLAAF's readiness and sorties. Even if we believe in the invincibility of B-2 and conjecture it can come, drop off the bombs and leave unscathed, how many of its bombs/missiles and Tomahawks from USN ships will not be intercepted? If the air bases get damaged, oil depots get hit, how long will it take for these bases to be fixed and re-supplied? And if China's inland bases are hit, what kind of retaliation can be expected? One would imagine all US military bases in surrounding regions could possibly be targeted. The most vulnerable one would be in Afghanistan due to the number of troops there and relatively lack of air defense against terrain hugging cruise missiles. Consider that Chinese missiles can Afghanistan flying through Kashmir and Pakistan, I don't think it would get any serious objections to such an attack And if we consider Iraq, it is another possible hit location, although the Chinese missiles might not have the range to go that far.

5. What about the general logistics for PLA? We can assume that USAF and USN would not have any problem with all of its experiences recently. Can PLA keep all of its bases supplied? More importantly, can it ensure that its fighters will get jet fuel needed in an extended conflict? With USN guaranteed of choking China's supply lines (either by itself or through its allies), how long can China keep on going? It has 30 days of strategic supply right now. Even if we assume increased domestic production + increased supply from Russia and Iran in the event of a war, how long can it really last? It's no wonder that Chinese plans all involve quick victory over Taiwan.

The next question is what kind of forces will be available on both side. Seeing how there will be a maximum of 183 F-22s overall, it will hard to see USAF being able to commit more than 4 squadrons (96 aircrafts) in the theatre (Andersen and Kadena air bases). And let's use the number 72 + 90 = 162 F-35A from Kadena and Japan air bases (I think we can rule out F-35A from Andersen due to its range). So, I'm guessing we will see a maximum of 96 F-22s and 160 F-35s at the disposal of USAF. If we take Kadena totally out of the picture, we might be looking at 48 F-22s and 72 F-35As. Remember, these are just hypothetical number I'm throwing out, without actually knowing the full capacity of the two air bases and also the number of tankers supporting them. If we use the commonly accepted figure of 2 USN Carrier groups in action and the air wing as described by Galrahn here:
24 super hornets, 24 hornets, 4 EA-6B, 4 E-2C, 6 SH-60.
Replacing them with planes we are likely to see in 2020, we will likely see a total of:
48 JSF, 48 super hornets, 8 E-2D, 8-12 EA-18G? and 12 SH-60

USAF/USN will also be supported by possibly 200 F-16s + a good number of M2Ks and IDF from ROCAF. The problem with Taiwan is the same with Kadena air base and Chinese air bases. Taiwan will likely see a steady bombardment from DF-11/15s, LACMs, WS-2, ASM and PGMs in the initial part of the conflict. The aim is obviously to take out the SAM sites, air bases and radar/communication sites. At this point, it's hard to say how this would affect ROCAF's sortie rate. I don't really have any data on the strategic jet fuel supply for Taiwan, the pace of repair work, the ability to keep foreign planes flying during high intensity situations or alternative lift-off options (flying off highways?). So, it's really hard to say how much ROCAF will be able to help US in the air after the first couple of days.

As for PLA, it's just as cloudy what kind of forces it will have at that time. One thing I can say is that RAND's vision of PLA fighters is really off base. I cannot imagine under the current scenario that Chinese flankers will be like su-35, but rather something domestic (as I have talked about in the past). And even aside from that, one would imagine that in 2020, PLAAF will be a force with mainly J-10 of different variants, about 300 JH-7 series fighters, about 300-400 flankers of different variants and a small number of 5th generation fighters. And one can imagine that plenty of buffer planes in the mode of JF-17 and J-8F in action also. We've seen from RAND example of all the air bases around Taiwan. We certainly can't expect all of their fighters to be used in this theatre. We also can expect a portion of the air bases to be out of commission from US missile strikes. Knowing that, it's also hard to know which air bases are equipped to handle the more "advanced" fighters. For example, would an air base usually accommodating JF-17 be able to handle J-10B fighters operating from there? How well would they handle small non-military air strips? If their air base is destroyed or too far away, would they be able to use remote civilian air strips? And for the elite units that are stationed further away from Taiwan, they would need tankers to get there. At the moment, China only has a limited number of H-6U and not much experience with them. In 12 years, how much would the Chinese refueling capability increase and how would that affect the number of sorties performed by these units? There are far too many unknowns to figure out the amount of sorties generated by PLAAF over Taiwan. And I don't expect each sortie to have the same airplanes. That will obviously change with different missions.

Also, the aerial warfare is only part of the overall battle. With the numerical advantage of ROC army over the invading PLA, one could argue that PLA would need absolute air dominance over all of its missions. And it would need to maintain air supremacy to accomplish any of its missions. In that case, all USAF would need is to prevent that to keep PLA from accomplishing its goals. However, that's outside of the scope of this discussion and I am really not knowledgeable enough to go there. So, this piece is just to raise some interesting questions on the RAND analysis.

What's In Your Trash?

This sounds clever. Described as a flying periscope, the article does not cite the cost of this one shot toy.

America has gone one better than Germany in the race to develop the world's most powerful submarine-launched robot aircraft. US arms giant Raytheon has announced a model which can be deployed at depth without modification to the submarine.

The new U-UAV is dubbed SOTHOC, for Submarine Over the Horizon Organic Capabilities. The launch system works by deploying a sealed can through the sub's waste disposal lock. The can then sinks away safely to get clear of the boat. On reaching a preset depth it dumps weight to become positively buoyant and ascends to the surface. Once stable at the surface, it aligns itself into wind and launches a one-shot, disposable UAV.

It is certainly a clever weapon system, but how do we counter it when the enemy does this to us? Lets assume you can detect this at 10 miles and it is watching your ship under good visibility. Now lets say you are a destroyer, how do you shoot it down at that range? Electronic attack?

These small UAV systems don't have to be submarine launched, the real danger comes when everyone is actively using these small UAVs to recon naval forces. Depending upon cost and capability, the counter could be something as simple as a smoke machine, or something as complicated as a remote control bullet.

A EW option could be best, if we can use it without revealing a precise position to a larger degree than a UAV operating at 10 miles already is.

Nuclear Attack Submarine - On the Cheap

Isn't this kind of like asking to borrow a cigarette, you'll give it back when your done? This is one of those stories where the hard truth is elusive. All we really know is that there is a new modern nuclear attack submarine, and a lot of people think it will soon be operated by Indian sailors.

"The submarine, built under a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry, has been moved from the shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur to a maintenance facility in the Primorye Territory and fitted with all necessary equipment. At present it is undergoing sea trials," a spokesman for the shipyard told RIA Novosti.

Indian media have reported on various occasions that the construction of the submarine was partially financed by the Indian government. India has reportedly paid $650 million for a 10-year lease of the 12,000-ton submarine.

According to Indian defense sources, Nerpa is expected to join the Indian navy under the designation INS Chakra in the second half of 2009.

Is $65 million lease plus operational costs a good deal for a nuclear attack submarine? Yep, it is cheaper annually than buying and supporting the operational costs of a US Navy Virginia class submarine, so it is hard to blame the Indians for wanting the deal? It also can't be a bad thing for Russia, insuring the shipyard remembers how to build nuclear attack submarines is important as Russia looks to the future. Looks like a winning deal for both sides.

Now if we could just get some hard data regarding the comparisons of a Type 093 and the Akula II. I don't know about you, but I'd be interested to know if India just passed China in terms of underwater nuclear submarine capabilities with one swing of the checkbook.

The Navy's Premiere Counterterrorism Tool

Rear Adm. (sel.) Mark Kenny, director of the new Navy Irregular Warfare Office, told the Submarine Naval League Symposium in Virginia last week that the SSGNs are being sent "where al Qaeda is at...it's that simple" according to an article in Defense Daily (subscription) this morning.

"The first two deployments, the Ohio and Florida, were groundbreaking deployments," he said at the Naval Submarine League Symposium in McLean, Va. "The ships work as advertised, brought home the bacon. And I wish I could give you the briefs in detail, because they are eye-watering..."

"These ships are the Navy's premiere counterterrorism tool, no doubt about it," Kenny said. He added that's the view of "those that lead this fight"--officers such as Special Operations Command leader Adm. Eric Olson--as well as the intelligence community.

We recently observed the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) with two dry deck shelters, which one would imply that there were at least two special operations teams aboard. The article goes on to the discuss unmanned systems in development for the SSGN, including submarine versions of the Sea Stalker and the Boeing ScanEagle, to improve ISR capabilities.

The SSGN has an advantage over aircraft because it has both the intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities, he said, and doesn't need permission from other nations to take off and land.

If you have read here long, you should already be aware that it is the submarine force quietly leading from the front lines for the Navy. Good to see the submariners get some credit. However, ADM Kenny should have stopped while he was ahead.

He added that the SSGN can fill the gap in surface-fire support created by the planned truncation of the DDG-1000 destroyer line.

Sigh. ADM, stick to irregular warfare, that last comment drove a Marine sitting 20 feet from my desk to use his outside voice indoors, and when you remove the colorful adjectives of his comment it goes something like "that guy knows nothing about fire support." Maybe you were making an important point, but the Tomahawk Cruise Missile is not fire support, and if that is what you are talking about I will agree with the Marines.

On the NOC

There are discussions out there regarding the Naval Operational Concept soon to be released. SteelJaw Scribe and David Axe both noted the new article by Chris Cavas in DefenseNews on the subject, and I am admittedly encouraged.

Knowing it has not been finalized has kept me cautious in regards to the discussion. I have not seen a copy of the drafts in circulation, and it is hard to comment based on a breakdown of a single news article.

If the draft holds up with the general tone in the NOC, and all that gets added is some of the details filled in for the final version, my impression is that Bob Work of CSBA has basically won every argument in the strategic discussion. There are several examples including but not limited to his realist perspective in that discussion, Chapter 5 in that document (PDF), his perspective on the Maritime Strategy as expressed here (PDF), his view on amphibious warfare and sea basing as outlined in detail here (PDF), and personally I think it is impossible to miss his influence on the way ahead portion of the decision to truncate the DDG-1000, being he was the one who publicly suggested bringing back the DDG-51s in this report (PDF) long before Roughead was CNO. One thing I have not seen, but do intend to spend more time focusing on in the future, is his emphasis of the National Fleet as expressed in the Fall 2008 issue of Orbis. I spoke to both General Conway and Admiral Allen last month in a period of about 10 days, and upon reflection I think it is interesting both men discussed at length the National Fleet concept. With that in mind, it is probably time to update this document (PDF).

I may not be doing Bob any favors with this observation, but the Navy is doing itself a favor if it is true. In my opinion, the Navy has two serious problems right now; Surface Combatant vision and the lack of an articulate message as part of the decision process. Both have generated recognizable symptoms, including the absence of a public conversation, the hits to leaderships credibility that ultimately stands out in the process of developing programs, ideas, and explaining decisions, and finally the perception the Navy doesn't have a vision that looks forward, instead, too often putting out a perception that what is in development now is all the Navy is concerned with.

Bob Work's reports have the potential of changing that perception a bit, because each report does represent the development over time of ideas and a future look that has the feel of a plan in motion. As a side bonus, he's popular with both the press and the industry, and has given numerous speeches all of which have been well received. With a little political support, something both he and CSBA probably doesn't want, the Navy may have found their evangelist.

While I will wait for the official NOC before discussing, the summery by Chris Cavas is very good, and could end up being an indication of the decisions that have come about as a result of the last many months/years of debate as the Navy reorients itself for the 21st century. For example, a strategic document that suggests a fleet of 42 amphibs are needed? Too good to be true in my opinion, because I'd have to suffer the pleasure of spending a week telling Mike why I am right.

Although it might be nice to break out my copy of England in the Seven Year's War by Julian Corbett and put together my take on 21st century strategy in the context of a classic.

Remembering the Largest Naval Battle in World History

It was the largest naval battle in world history, and it has a little bit of everything to prove it. The Battle of Leyte Gulf included five major naval battles: the Battle of Palawan Passage, the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engañ, and the Battle off Samar.

The Battle of Palawan Passage - The USS Darter (SS-227) and USS Dace (SS-247) intercepted the Japanese "center Force" near Palawan Island around 5am on October 23, 1944. The USS Darter (SS-227) is credited for sinking the Japanese flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago, and the USS Darter (SS-227) is credited for causing heavy damage to the heavy cruiser Tatao. The USS Dace (SS-247) is credited for sinking the heavy cruiser Maya. THe Tatao was ordered to return to port with two destroyers. A Japanese fleet of five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and fifteen destroyers had lost 3 heavy cruisers and 2 destroyers in 45 minutes thanks to the actions of two submarines. The submarines later chased the crippled cruiser and two destroyers, but the USS Darter (SS-227) ran aground. Her crew was rescued by the SS Dace (SS-247).

The Battle of the Sibuyan Sea - On October 24, 2024 Halsey's 3rd Fleet flew 259 sorties against the remaining ships of the Japanese center force in the Sibuyan Sea. While the American pilots scored several hits on several ships of the Japanese fleets, damage to the Japanese was light and ultimately concentrated on only two ships. The super battleship Musashi was sunk after having her steering crippled, and the cruiser Myōkō was crippled. Every other ship of the Center Force survived the attacks.

The Battle of Surigao Strait - The last battle where battleships faced battleships in a gun dual. The Japanese force, divided into two groups, consisted of two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers. The US Navy had six battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, twenty eight destroyers, and thirty nine PT boats. THe US 7th fleet was able to cross the T of the Japanese battleline, and ultimately sink every ship except for one destroyer.

The Battle of Cape Engañ - A Japanese "Northern Force" consisted of four heavy aircraft carriers, three light carriers, two hermaphrodite carriers that had flight decks in the rear of WWI era battleships, three light cruisers, and nine destroyers faced off against Halsey's 3rd fleet. In 527 sorties, the US sank one heavy carrier, two light cruisers, and one destroyer. One heavy cruiser and one light cruiser was crippled in the fighting. The light cruiser and a destroyer were later sunk by a US surface action squadron, while the heavy cruiser was later sunk by the USS Jallao (SS-368).

The Battle off Samar - The morning of OCtober 25, 1944, the "Center Force" consisting of of four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and thirteen destroyers turned south after crossing the San Bernardino Strait that night. That force encountered Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3) consisting of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. In a final tally, the Japanese lost three heavy cruisers while a fourth heavy cruiser and three battleships were damaged severely enough they never saw action again in the war. A Japanese destroyer was sank late that night by surface forces of Halsey's 3rd fleet. Taffy three lost two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort.

This summery is little more than statistics, and does nothing to capture the essence of the largest naval battle in history. The Battle for Layte Gulf was both less and more than this summery does justice. Not only was it the most lopsided victory by the US against the Japanese Navy in WWII, it is more often remembered as one of the greatest blunders in Command in US Navy history in the criticism of ADM Halsey.

I've read dozens of books on this battle, and would recommend at least ten of them. This is probably my favorite. Check out EagleOne's Sunday Ship History and CDR Salamanders Fullbore Friday, as both take a look at the Battle of Leyte Gulf as we remember the largest battle in naval history.