ASW Will Always be a Secondary Mission

From this viewpoint it is possible to define the relation of the Navy's important anti-submarine responsibilities to these newer functions. Submarine warfare is fundamentally a raiding operation directed at the Navy's base. If not effectively countered, it can of course have serious results. But A.S.W., although vitally important, can never become the primary mission of the Navy. For it is a defensive operation designed to protect the Navy's base, i.e., its control and utilization of the sea, and this base is maintained so that the Navy can perform its important offensive operations against shore targets. Antisubmarine warfare has the same relation to the Navy as guarding of depots has for the Army or the protection of airfields and plane factories has for the Air Force. It is a secondary mission, the effective performance of which, however, is essential to the performance of its primary mission. And, indeed, the successful accomplishment of the primary mission of the Navy--the maintenance of American power along the littoral--will in itself be the most important factor in protecting the Navy's base. For holding the littoral will drastically limit the avenues of access of Soviet submarines to the high seas.

National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy, Proceedings, May 1954, Samuel Huntington

This paragraph immediately follows this paragraph previously quoted on the blog in this timeless, brilliant article by Samuel Huntington. Written in May of 1954, this article could be reprinted in full today by the US Naval Institute and would be spot on in offering guidance for the next generation of officers looking into an uncertain future.

I have a theory that the reason antisubmarine warfare gets second fiddle to other capabilities is somehow linked to the theory in guidance laid out in this article. Within the context of an offensive strategy, Huntington is fundamentally correct. Submarine warfare is fundamentally a raiding operation against naval forces, and the defense against submarines, while vitally important, can never become the primary mission of the Navy. Technology, including the advantages gained with nuclear propulsion, have not changed this strategic imperative regarding how the US Navy should approach submarine threats today.

With this said, it should be noted the threats from submarines are changing. It is also noteworthy that the US Navy and China appear to be going two different directions in this regard. For the US, we have made major configurations to ballistic missile submarines to support more conventional capabilities. The Ohio class SSGNs are not only the most powerful cruise missile platforms in the Navy's arsenal, but also have advanced capabilities to support special forces, anti-submarine warfare, and mine warfare.

The Chinese are moving a different direction with submarine capabilities. We have previously discussed the development of anti-satellite capabilities in discussion in China for submarine forces. As we have discussed, the Chinese are also developing a ballistic missile with the properties of a cruise missile, or what is also being described as an anti-ship ballistic missile. When you add in the large numbers of conventional submarines, it is easy to see the differences in how the US and China view the tactical application of submarines.

However capable these new technologies China is developing become in the future, these new capabilities do not adjust the fundamental strategic point Huntington is making regarding the primary mission of the US Navy. What it does do though is raise a serious question, while defensive operations like ASW today is still a defensive operation designed to protect the Navy's control and utilization of the sea, is the United States slow in adopting the offensive capabilities necessary to use the sea as base against enemy targets? The world in the 21st century is rapidly becoming more networked, systems are no longer fixed to land, but are distributed to land, sea, and space.

As the Navy moves into the 21st century, while it is vitally important to maintain ASW capabilities to protect naval forces that leverage the sea as base, it is also important the Navy maintains perspective that this is a secondary mission of naval forces. US Naval forces today must embrace the realities of the 21st century environment and recognize that the primary mission is to be capable of taking the offensive against the distributed, networked 21st century foe. That means the US Navy needs to embrace the ability to strike not only to targets on land or sea, but it is time to start discussing how the Navy intends to neutralize targets in space when required. This is a difficult subject, primarily because many people in this country are yet to embrace a view into the future of the 21st century.

It is noteworthy that the PLA Navy, although not yet capable of actually implementing all of these offensive capabilities yet, appears to have already embraced the necessity to do so. In this regard, the DoD has not done the legwork necessary to educate not only the political leadership, but the population whose support will be required in adopting what many will consider a radical suggestion to build weapons capable of waging war in space. The US population has not been prepared, and does not have a clear understanding of the necessities to fight war in the 21st century. When one looks at the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it might be fair to say the US population has actually adapted more towards understanding the 4th century challenges the Army is facing in Afghanistan than the population has adapted to understanding the 21st century challenges facing Naval and Air Forces in the 21st century from other emerging major powers.

Only a dedicated, steady, patient approach from both political and military leadership will be effective in bringing about the slow change necessary to build towards a 21st century defense posture and capability. The nation does not need these capabilities today, but may need them by the mid 2020s, and if ballistic missile defense is an example of the political challenges... the sooner the discussion starts on space capabilities, the better.

After all, China is now well past the political stage of the development process.