Heritage Foundation on Surface Combatants

I am a disciple of the theory promoted by Michael Tanji. I tend to agree that the Think Tank will soon be dead and Think Tank 2.0 will replace it in the future. Unlike Michael, I am unwilling to suggest the Think Tank is completely dead yet, although the spear has clearly pierced the skin and it is only a matter of time. The major hurdle for TT 2.0 is the revenue model.

The Navy in particular is a great example how the Think Tank is slowly making itself irrelevant though. With one exception and two people (Bob Work and Jan van Tol), it is very difficult to find strategic analysis on the big issues of the day for Congress to weigh when asking questions and making decisions regarding the US Navy. Keep in mind, CSBA has almost no competition, this junk from CSIS (PDF) is the posterchild for Michael Tanji's argument. CSIS still owes a royalty check to Ronald ORourke, Eric Labs, Chris Cavas, and Paul Francis for producing that report.

As if to observe the empty void of professional Naval analysis, The Heritage Foundation has jumped into the discussion. Mackenzie Eaglen (not to mention Eric Sayers and Lajos Szaszdi) has contributed the best documented history of the DDG-1000/DDG-51 discussion to date, and this piece all at once becomes the gospel for reference regarding major surface combatant issues facing Congress today.

This is fantastic background and analysis. For me, it is so refreshing to read an open source document not written by Bob Work that gets the technical details right. That is not a trivial detail, read it and you'll understand what I'm talking about regarding how refreshing the clarity of accuracy is.

The paper asks eight very interesting questions, which the paper elaborates on very well, and we will briefly discuss here.

QUESTION #1: If the DDG-1000 cannot con­duct area air defense, why is it classified as a guided missile destroyer? Could the DDG-1000 be upgraded to employ the Standard Missile? What is the growth potential and cost of the DDG-1000's Dual-Band Radar and combat man­agement system for ballistic missile defense?

That is 3 solid pitches, strikes even. The classic DD vs DDG question, the important upgrade definitive answer, and the critical DBR question which drives to the heart of a technical monopoly. Under oath is the appropriate place for the Navy to say whether Lockheed Martin's monopoly will be backed by the Navy, or if the Navy is serious about a competitive product for AEGIS from Raytheon.

QUESTION #2: What are the Marine Corps' specific naval surface fire-support requirements? Can they be met sufficiently without the planned sevenDDG-1000s?

Inquiring Marines want to know...

QUESTION #3: Is the Navy's decision-making process being driven mostly by budget restraints or by changes in the threat assessment and requirements?

Yet to see the Navy cite budget restraints as a reason, but the question is raised because it is so damn obviously a concern that it makes no sense at all that the Navy doesn't want to talk about. It is the winning argument for the Navy, but only because no one has shot down the threat assessment and operational requirements argument. Hard to do when both the assessment and requirements are clearly not to be discussed in public since the Navy will not name China in public.

QUESTION #4: If China's military capabilities are such a significant factor in the Navy's decision-making process, why did the Navy avoid dis­cussing China in its recent Maritime Strategy?

That is a DAMN GOOD QUESTION.

QUESTION #5: What are the growth poten­tials of the Zumwalt and Arleigh Burke classes in terms of adding new systems, weapons (e.g., lasers), and combat capabilities?

This is an important question as well. The answer determines how effective the Zumwalts will be as technology demonstrators, but also address an important issue... how relevant will new DDG-51s be in 2035, with 15-20 years of life remaining on these new construction battleships?

QUESTION #6: What are the design flaws, if any, in hull strength and/or weapons locations?

This is an interesting question, because the Flight IIA DDG-51 new construction ships may or may not have upgrade capability down the road. Would be interesting to know if the Navy has options when it comes time for a mid-life upgrade. My big concern here is total power generated.

QUESTION #7: What are the life-cycle costs of adding new systems and combat capabilities?

The answer here may be irrelevant, hard to assess what the costs of the low manned DDG-1000 will be. After recent INSURV results, not to mention the results of Sea Swap, it is unclear how effective the life-cycle cost analysis and predictions will be. We ultimately won't know the truth until after a few years at sea, which makes the technology demonstrator idea very smart.

QUESTION #8: Has the projected timeline for procuring the CG(X), the next generation lead cruiser, slipped from 2011 to 2015 or even later? If so, what is the Navy's specific plan for cruiser pro­curement, particularly in light of its concern about anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles?

The answer to the first question determines the quality of the answer of the second question.

I would add two more questions here:

QUESTION #9: SC-21 was sold as a series of 21st century combatants. With the DDG-1000 being truncated, how does this effect the Littoral Combat Ship as the low end of the SC-21 system of systems. Seems like when you cancel the littoral battleship, that would have some effect on the littoral flotilla ship.

QUESTION #10: Lack of design options in surface combatants has influenced the decision of the DDG-1000/DDG-51 debate. The LCS displaces slightly over 3000 tons, while the DDG-1000 displaces slightly less than 15,000 tons. The DDG-51 displaces slightly over 9000 tons. The rest of the world is building warships displacing between 4500 - 6500 tons. Should the Navy have a surface combatant design between 3000 and 9000 tons? Why or why not?

Read the whole thing. Excellent stuff. It is very nice to see someone of my generation adding a voice to the Navy shipbuilding discussion at the Think Tank level. Don't get me wrong, I love Bob and I'm convinced Jan is a great guy, but gentleman, you aren't getting any younger! The lack of good commentary and discussion in Naval shipbuilding from the Think Tanks has been a notable void, and consistency on the subject by the Heritage Foundation would be welcome trend indeed.