Potential Marine Corps Shipbuilding Strategy

Rebekah Gordon from Inside The Navy had an article out on Monday that discussed the Marine Corps shipbuilding requirements. She describes what sounds like a baseball card passed out the National Defense Industrial Associations expeditionary warfare conference that contained five bullet points, or tenets that represented the "Commandant's Intent" for shipbuilding strategy.

Anyone who has been reading the blog awhile will understand why I love all five. They are described as:

“Warfighting: Attain a minimum 33 amphibious ships (11 [dock,] 11 [assault and] 11 [aviation]) to generate 30 [ships for operational availability] for [two Marine Expeditionary Brigades], plus one MPF(F) to support forward presence, power projection and execute [joint forcible entry operations] in support of [Marine operations].”

“Incremental LPD-17: Designate LPD-17 for LSD replacement.”

“LH(X): Truncate the LHA(R) no well deck big deck at two ships and assess big deck surface interface requirements to get LH(X) right.”

“1.0 MPF(F): Attain full MPF(F) squadron capabilities and ship mix to enable [one] MPF(F) vertical and surface reinforcement for [Marine Expeditionary Force]-level fight from the sea base.”

“NSFS: Carefully execute and monitor [a]nalysis of [a]lternatives and assess all hull forms to meet NSFS requirements.”

This follows Chris Cavas's article in Defense News which laid out the following as part of the NOC discussion.

The ideal Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to transport a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is four ships: a big-deck assault ship (LHA or LHD), a dock landing ship (LSD) and two amphibious transport dock ships (LPD) - one with enhanced command and control capabilities. This is an expansion of the 3-ship formation that has been used over the past decade. The four-ship ARG would "support split operations by a two-section ARG/MEU" and "provide the ability to more widely disperse the platforms that carry the Marines and the ability to embark more capability on the smaller, dispersed entities." To meet this need, the amphibious ship requirement would need to be raised from the current 32 ships to 36. The use of amphibious ships to support special operations forces and mine countermeasures forces also pushes the requirement to 36 ships, the document said.

The value of using amphibious ships to support the five Global Fleet Stations locations further pushes the number of "gators;" assuming that at any time two ships would be deployed on GFS missions and ten percent of the force would be in maintenance, a fleet of 42 amphibs is needed.

Lets take both articles, combine the line of thinking, and discuss.

Lets assume the Marines have decided 36 ships is the new minimum, and 6 more amphibious ships of some kind are being evaluated for Global Fleet Stations. We can also speculate that if the Marines move towards a four ship ARG, with 36 ships the Marines are sticking with the 9 ARG total. If the LPD-17 is replacing the LSDs currently in operation, that would imply the LPD-17 construction line needs to remain open.

With only 2 LHA(R) planned now, that means the Navy will have only 10 LHDs/LHA(R)s, with the last discussion I've seen suggesting the LHA(R)s would be funded in FY11 and FY15. That means the LH(X) would begin construction in the FY19 time frame and 2 would be funded by 2025 if they were built on 4 year intervals. Note, if you build them on 4 year intervals, as per the POM10 planning docs I've seen for LHA(R), that means you have 10 every 40 years, 40 years being the life of the ship class.

I don't want to fully explore this yet, instead choosing to wait for the NOC. My only observation is thus:

When you factor in the Sea Base concept, all of these amphibious ship numbers, the necessity for naval fire support, adding a Marine Corps mission module to the LCS, and recall it has been the strategic decision of Congress to increase the size of the Marines, one can get the impression the Marine Corps is looking to for somewhere around $4 billion dollars annually of the Navy shipbuilding budget to meet these requirements.

This leads directly into a discussion of national priorities and strategic direction, balancing requirements, existing capacity, and desired capabilities within a resource restrained defense budget. I don't intend to fully engage that discussion until we see the NOC. In the meantime, check out this (PDF), this (PDF), and this (PDF). All three are worth careful consideration on many points. Note the map in the documents, somwhere Thomas Barnett should be smiling.