I admit to being one of many who got caught up in the euphoria following the announcement in Congress on July 31, 2024 that the Navy intends to cancel the DDG-1000. As I have made the case on the blog for over a year, I don't believe the DDG-1000 is the cost effective way to build a surface combatant force the Navy needs in this time of regionally distributed threats. The high cost and low quantity of DDG-1000s cuts into the shipbuilding budget on a disproportionate scale to the product returned in my opinion. For me, it is mostly a cost issue, not a capability issue that diminishes the value of the DDG-1000 program of record. The final product will undoubtedly be an amazing ship.But as the euphoria clears I am becoming painfully aware of the costs of canceling the program, and it is starting to eat at me some that the costs of cancellation are much higher than simple budget numbers. Timing is everything, and costs are not always valued in dollars. The OPNAV and NAVSEA leadership credibility regarding surface combatant construction has been strained over the last year, and if we simply review the facts as presented, the absence of serious answers to serious questions further diminishes the OPNAV leadership credibility.
Lets review how we got here.
The Navy spent $11 billion starting in 1994 and over a period of 5 CNOs developed the analysis that led to the DDG-1000 program. The DDG-1000 program has 10 new technologies, is a little controversial with its hull form and small crews, is fairly expensive but not overly so (yet), but is well designed to meet the requirements of operating in the littorals. The ship also addresses the requirement for naval gunfire support.
In the July 31 hearing, Gene Taylor revealed that Admiral Roughead approached him last fall with the idea of truncating the DDG-1000 and building DDG-51s instead. Considering Admiral Roughead took over as CNO in September of 2007, Roughead must have entered the CNO position with this objective. Gene Taylor became instrumental in building the case for more DDG-51s instead of DDG-1000s, because while under oath Gene Taylor asked Admiral Keating which platform Keating would prefer. Keating, who had previously worked with Roughead in the Pacific, said the DDG-51.
From September through the end of June, the DDG-1000 program proceeds under normal conditions, with a few noteworthy exceptions. Contracts for the first two are awarded in February, and the DDG-1000 gets promoted throughout the year, including in testimony by the CNO himself on March 6th, 2008, when Roughead touted the mature design of the DDG-1000 that will lead to improved cost certainty for the program. Another example was the Navy League convention, where Captain Syring discussed the program at length with reporters. The exceptions are highlighted in the lack of public statements by leadership regarding the DDG-1000 best noted in the Chris Cavas article earlier this year, or the Norman Polmar article in Proceedings this month.
However, there was some inside baseball taking place during this time, and it all came to a head in early July when PEO, Ships was removed from his position for a private matter that almost never makes the press. Goddard may have been a scoundrel, but the fact is this type of conduct event is almost always handled internally and no one ever hears about it. While it was interesting at the time, in hindsight we are learning it is part of the story.
Late on Friday July 12th, a news leak to InsidetheNavy suggests the Navy wants to truncate the DDG-1000 at 2 ships, and by Sunday afternoon Gene Taylor had already scheduled a hearing in the HASC for July 31st to hear from the Navy on the issue.
On July 31st, all hell breaks loose. The Navy testifies before Congress, under oath, that a new threat assessment consisting of ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, and blue water anti-submarine warfare has become a priority. The Navy also announces that the DDG-1000 cannot support the area anti-air missile mission because the platform cannot support the Standard missile. All of these statements are both incredible and unbelievable.
The obvious answer for truncating the DDG-1000 was the concerns over cost, but under oath in a question asked by Rep Joe Sestak, VADM McCullough outright denies cost as a consideration, and has repeated this in news articles since. The reason testified is threat, but the example he gives is ridiculous by any standard. VADM McCullough suggests that no one saw the truck mounted anti-ship missile attack by Hezbollah coming, and the threat of an anti-ship missile in the littoral is a great threat that makes the DDG-1000 the wrong investment. The implication of such a suggestion is that while developing a littoral battleship since 1994, not a single time did anyone in the Navy raise the possibility of a truck mounted anti-ship missile in the threat assessment environment the ship might operate in? That is outright impossible to believe, because it would also undermine the Navy's own argument since it would imply the same threat assessment folks are now claiming BMD, ASMs, and ASW in blue water is the primary threat.
The argument the DDG-1000 can't support the Standard missile has also since been discredited. Ronald O'Rourke noted in his Congressional Research Service report Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options (PDF) for Congress that the Navy contending that the DDG-1000 could not launch the SM-2 missile "came as a surprise to observers who have believed for years that the DDG-1000 could employ the SM-2 and perform area-defense AAW [antiair warfare]." The recent Heritage Foundation report notes the history of this subject, and notes inconsistency in previous testimony and briefings by the Navy regarding the capabilities of the DDG-1000 when compared to the statements made on July 31.
In Geoff Fein's September 17, 2024 Defense Daily article DDG-1000 Lacks Ability To 'Talk' With SM-2, Can't Do Air Defense Mission, Official Says notes that VADM McCullough has changed his tune a bit, noting "as currently configured, DDG-1000 cannot perform area air defense.", and "Additional Research and Development investment through 2013 would be required for DDG-1000 to have these capabilities."
These comments make almost no sense at all, because of course a ship under development wouldn't have the capability to do a mission today, and if R&D continued through 2013 the capability to perform these missions would exist before the DDG-1000 was completed. In other words, the Navy's argument that tarnishes the capability of the DDG-1000 is akin to saying a house under construction doesn't have running water, which makes sense only because the house is still under construction and the plumbing isn't completed.
The answers the Navy offers Congress under oath simply doesn't stand up scrutiny, has not been justified with any sort of analysis, and leaves important questions unanswered:
Why the change in SCN plan, after more than $11B in research since 1994, full
support by 5 CNOs. What changed here?
Where is the analysis that supports the need to change? Congress asked this on July 31, 2008, and there is no record of an answer.
Where is the analysis that supports the changed direction? Congress asked this on July 31, 2008, and there is no record of an answer.
The CG(X) has long been planned to use the R&D funding for the DDG-1000 to eventually support the CG(X) on the same hull, in an effort to conserve costs down the road for what we all know will be an expensive cruiser replacement program.The Navy estimates the next 5 Zumwalt class to cost $11 billion total. Eric Labs, in his June 9 report estimated the last 5 ships to cost $18 billion. In the same June report, Eric Labs estimated the CG(X) conservatively, using the same hull as the DDG-1000, to cost around $80 billion for the entire class of 19 at an average of $4.2 billion per. Until the Navy can prove otherwise, Eric's numbers are the ones I use, and by my math makes the total planned investment of the DDG-1000 / CG(X) plan around $98 billion + the $11 billion already invested, or $109 billion total.
With a potential price of $109 billion attached to this strange, abrupt, unsupported decision process, the Navy's decision to truncate the DDG-1000 at two ships makes the Air Forces KC-X Tanker decision look like a game of poker with penny's, and that is a presidential campaign level issue.
With no analysis conducted at all, the CNO, a handful of Admirals, and a handful of members in Congress have teamed up to blow up the shipbuilding program of record ignoring any legitimate process, indeed ignoring the process intentionally. There was no review of approval from OSD, there was never an analysis of Alternatives (AOA) conducted, and JROC has not relieved any obligations of the ORD warfighting requirements including naval gunfire support. This has the perception of being nothing more than making a decision to change on the basis of an unvalidated opinion. This is not how a warfighting military service is supposed to make major procurement decisions. Hell, I've worked in government for years, and no government agency I've ever worked for would be allowed to make a decision like this, absent any researched justification, or if we are being honest, completely contrary to the researched justification. You may not like the DDG-1000, but 14 years of analysis was put into the program.
Even the operational arguments make no sense at all. A threat assessment analysis was never conducted that suggests BMD is the most important standard for all major surface combatants, and many in Congress have confirmed no such analysis has ever been provided to Congress by the Navy. Where is the blue water submarine threat, and who is this threat from? Are we retooling the entire program of record based on the Chinese who patrol their nuclear submarines on average once every leap year! The analysis suggesting that the blue water submarine threat has taken on priority has never been conducted either, and if it has, it has never been given to Congress, and the Navy has not been using this analysis as a reason to promote the most successful shipbuilding program: the Virginia class submarine.
Something is very wrong here, this is the most expensive decision in the history of the US Navy and the complete absence of analysis to support the decision raises all kinds of legitimate unanswered questions. If cost is not the issue, as the Navy has stated under oath, why has the Navy truncated the DDG-1000?
In asking this question of many experts, most suggested the reason is cost. Most experts are happy with the result, the DDG-1000 is unpopular. I am not a DDG-1000 supporter either, but I must not have got the memo because there are some serious questions and several red flags here. Inside baseball time:
The announcement to truncate the DDG-1000 was made in the CNOs office absent input from almost everyone else, and Goddard's firing was directly related. Goddard was a known strong supporter of the DDG-1000, and was removed to get him out of the way so the program could be canceled. Since July 18th, Captain Syring has been in what one reporter told me was akin to "a Navy witness protection program" because no one has heard from him since. Captain Syring is by all accounts a really sharp guy, but he never once gave a detailed classified briefing to the CNO on the DDG-1000, not once...not ever. Director, Surface Warfare Division, N86 was reportedly excluded from the process to truncate the DDG-1000, as was NAVSEA00 and PEO Ships, all of whom I've been told were completely out of the loop. However, I keep hearing PEO IWS was in the loop, has been pushing for this, and based on other events I think that is very interesting…
Because whether it is true or not, the notion that PEO IWS is involved suggests the perception that the Navy has decided to cancel the DDG-1000 to preserve the monopoly by Lockheed Martin on AEGIS. Have you been following the Raytheon protest in front of the GAO, because if you haven't you might want to read up. PEO IWS is involved there too.
Many believe Raytheon has a good case in that protest, because while the Navy has suggested there would be competitive work on AEGIS, in reality there hasn't been any.
Whether it is true or not, it is almost impossible to watch this process and not see the money flow away from Raytheon towards Lockheed Martin as part of each decision made, and the decision and process by which these decisions have been made appears to emphasize a perception of impropriety in how the Navy is doing business. It is very odd the Navy gives the impression it wants to cancel the competitive product alternatives Raytheon is developing for the DDG-1000 radar system, most of which are touted as being a better long term capability (particularly for BMD btw), including being 100% OA. It is odd because at the same time, the Navy is touting the importance of funding the very same products that Lockheed Martin is still developing to integrate in AEGIS, in particular BMD.
Speaking of OA, what are the ramifications to open architecture if the DDG-1000 is canceled? The DDG-1000 was the core of OA implementation, and without the continued systems investment would it not only further insure the AEGIS monopoly? This takes place against the backdrop of questions still being raised whether AEGIS will ever truly be OA.
The decision to truncate the DDG-1000 involves a staggering sum of money. The Navy continues to shift the story why they want to cancel the DDG-1000. The constantly shifting story is the story. The reason to truncate the DDG-1000 at two hulls is not cost, as stated by the Navy under oath. The decision was made absent the analysis process to legitimize change, analysis that still doesn't appear to exist. The process was conducted without the input of those who would normally provide the input, leaving several groups out of the loop. The deal was ultimately done in a backroom that included the CNO on Capitol Hill, not the Pentagon. Were the executive appointed civilian leaders in the loop? No one seems to know.
What is the real reason the Navy has blown up the shipbuilding program of record for surface combatants potentially valued at over one hundred billion dollars? When one hundred billion dollar decisions are made, is it asking too much to ask for a reason?
When no one forcefully asks this question, and no data is being given to Congress regarding the answer, it can lead to the wrong perception if transparent and honest information is not made available. When the decision process is so visibly done in favor of one specific defense contractor over that contractors competitor that is in the process of bringing on a product that many believe is superior, are we supposed to ignore the perception of what is happening?
In what is ironic timing, in the July issue of Proceedings Norman Polmar suggests major shipyards could close if the DDG-1000 gets canceled. His suggestion highlights the enormous, widespread industry implications in the Navy's decision. This decision involves an enormous sum of money with only a handful of individuals making the decisions, and doing so absent any analysis to support the decision. If Norman Polmar is right, then one of the two shipyards that could close as a result of this decision is either Bath Iron Works, recently upgraded but in need of more work, or the shipyard down in Gene Taylor's own Mississippi district suffering from labor shortages. Why is Gene Taylor going along with a process that could, according to Norman Polmar, potentially close a shipyard in his own district? I assume he doesn't believe any shipyards will close, and if one does it will be Bath Iron Works that is closed first.
None of this makes any sense to me. The perception of what is going on here is very troubling, and the Navy isn't offering any information to Congress or the media to change the bad perception. The perception I am talking about is the implication of inept OPNAV and NAVSEA leadership combined with a perception of agenda driven decision making that has the look and feel of favoritism towards specific industry players; favoritism that has already driven Raytheon to protest the award of sole source contracts to Lockheed Martin.
Surely the decision to truncate the DDG-1000 is about cost! Right? The Navy insists under oath it isn't cost, so what am I missing here?
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