It Has Been Suggested They Are Expendable

In one of several Q&A periods with Cmdr. Don Gabrielson of USS Freedom (LCS 1), Cmdr. Gabrielson mentioned that one of the first things he intends to do when he gets to Norfolk is to open up the ship so that the fleet can come aboard and see the new ship. I thought this was very smart, it reminded me of several stories I heard regarding the USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750) when it came up to the northeast and visited Baltimore, among other ports, and allowed Congress to get a good look inside that ship. It was noteworthy how many Congressman bit their upper lip and swallowed their tongues regarding criticism of the cutter after visiting the ship.

The reason is simple, when one has a lot of questions and opinions, seeing for yourself is important. The phrase is "Seeing is Believing" or something similar. I don't believe every critic of LCS who takes a tour will stop being a critic, but I do think that the ship will soften anyone who does visit the ship. There are several reasons why I believe that, but I will say I honestly believe the ship has the ability to inspire imagination in anyone who actually has unique ideas, on many occasions my imagination was inspired observing some of the small details of the ship.

Upon departing to Buffalo to meet up with Freedom for my short cruise last week, I left a post up specific to the idea of compromises. With all small ships, there are compromises that must be made, and this ship has several core capabilities that require compromises. For example, the ship only has berthing for about 75 people, more berthing space simply doesn't exist unless it is a mission module. This was a conscious decision by the Navy to force a small crew on the ship. As one who digs deep into the Navy budget, I understand like most do that manpower is the most expensive aspect of the fleet, and despite the headlines, technology including ships are relatively inexpensive. The need to reduce crew size isn't cavalier, it is a necessity if the fleet intends to maintain numbers, the question is how can the US do this without reducing capabilities beyond survivable levels.

There are several side effects of a small crew on a ship, and they require compromises that must be made to account for less manpower. The most popular criticism that results from this compromise is damage control. How will a ship with about ~70-75 people manage damage control on a ship with level I survivability? I went into this trip seeking answers to that question, and specifically focused on three areas of damage: fire, shock, and flooding.

Fire

If you get the chance, take a tour of USS Freedom (LCS 1). When you see the ship the first thing you will probably notice is just how much emphasis towards fighting fires is built into this ship. This goes well beyond automated systems, both Chris Cavas and I agreed we have never seen a ship with so much emphasis in every single space towards fighting fire. There are stories that may or may not be classified regarding the materials on the ship used to protect certain spaces from fire, but if you recall, there was a fire on Freedom while it was still under construction, and it is noteworthy that a lot of this protective fire material that was in place for that fire worked exactly as designed. It was also noteworthy that when the topic of damage control came up, Cmdr. Don Gabrielson was ready to talk about fire. It isn't an accident, I have to say and I think anyone who takes a tour will agree, the availability of fire control equipment is not a concern on that ship. With all of the active and passive fire control capabilities built into the ship, I do not see fire as a major issue in damage control.

Shock

I was given virtually unlimited access to the ship during my stay. Sure, I couldn't go into the lockers where self defense weapons were stored, but I do believe I did visit every other room on the ship except perhaps the quarters of the officers. One of the things I noticed is that several components of the ship that were most likely to be damaged by shock were built for quick replacement. The glass windows are a good example, I studied those windows a bit, and if you take the tour you will notice they are built to be replaced easily and quickly. Indeed without giving away too much information, I noted there are several places this was evident on the ship. If it is a part or piece of the ship that is expendable, you will note that the part or piece is built to be replaced quickly. This is an interesting compromise, it is probably cheaper to replace the parts I noted in this configuration many times than to build these parts to be shock proof,. This is a new philosophy to the US Navy who is used to super specifications for everything on a warship. I look at it like this, the US Navy is adopting some of the damage control concepts more likely to be found on a European ship, and I don't think this philosophical change is a bad thing towards the goals of reducing construction and maintenance costs. It is a change most businesses have made in terms of IT departments, and tomorrows Navy is essentially a floating IT shop.

Flooding

More than any other form of damage control, flooding is best known for being managed by active means best represented in manpower. The reduction in crew creates an unstable situation in this regard, and while we are on this subject, let me note that I believe one of the real unspoken reasons Roughead wants to cancel the DDG-1000 is specific to the absence of flood control capabilities with that platform that has a relatively tiny crew. Ever read Friedman about ship design? If so, consider the hull form of DDG-1000 as you reflect upon the thoughts I've noted below.

With the ship having a core requirement of a small crew, the issue of active flood control pops up quickly as a challenge that needs to be addressed. Lockheed Martin has some sharp folks, and while the specifics are classified, I did pick up one thing (and have had this confirmed since my return) that I found very interesting. Instead of trying to find some novel way to improve active flood control, the design of USS Freedom (LCS 1) builds in a tremendous amount of reserve bouyancy. In other words, to augment the absence of active flood control, the designers built in extra passive flood control. I am very well informed with how much reserve bouyancy was built into the FFG-7s, indeed I believe a few books covering the Stark and the Roberts incidents have disclosed the exact details, and the amount of reserve bouyancy built into the USS Freedom (LCS 1) design appears to well exceed that class of ships, by a lot.

Does this mitigate the issue of damage control? Like all things, we will have to wait and see. It is a big ship with a small crew, but I do think the ship has made a major commitment to addressing the fire issue, one might argue there could potentially be too much active and passive fire control capability on that ship. Shock? Depends, I could see where shock could cause serious damage to the ship, but I could also see the ship turn around from a serious shock event very quickly assuming the supply office is prepared. Flooding is the major question mark because too much of that information is apparently too sensitive to discuss. I did not see a problem with compartmentalization in any spaces other than the mission modules, and as I will highlight later, the mission zones are broken down into 3 compartments, not a single large compartment. Despite the pictures of long, wide passageways on the ship I could really only find one such passageway, and it was not as long or wide as the picture makes it look. I think a tour will fix that complaint.

I would suggest to the NAVSEA folks that they need to find a way to talk about the reserve bouyancy of LCS 1 in a way that doesn't compromise sensitive information, because I think there is something there worth talking about to help ease concerns about flooding. I think this conversation would be useful for the CNO, because any novice design evaluation could quickly highlight how this would be a serious, major, and potentially fatal problem with DDG-1000. After all, there is probably not much reserve bouyancy for a ship that sits almost entirely on the waterline.

In the end, I don't know if the ship can survive a massive hit, but I don't think it is as big a problem as I thought it was when I walked onto the ship. The fact is, I know it has more survivability built into the ship than every frigate in Europe, every single one... so it isn't like picking a European design is a better option in regards to damage control. In many ways the LCS represents a partial adoption of the European philosophy of damage control regarding frigates, they are built so the crew survives battle damage, with the survival of the ship a secondary consideration.

That in and of itself is a new, interesting compromise... one that many who advocate for European designs have probably never considered as part of their advocacy. For small ships, I see it as a compromise towards getting more numbers fielded, and right now I think more numbers of ships that aren't perfect is a better way ahead than a fewer number of ships that could be considered perfect at any cost.