The Strategic Compromise Embodied in the Littoral Combat Ship

Among the many factors--such as armor protection and coal endurance--which enter into the efficiency of a battleship, speed and offensive power--gun power--are at present the leading competing considerations. The proper adjustment of all, allocating to each its exact proportion of the available tonnage, constitutes a problem of no small difficulty, and is not infrequently characterized as a compromise. One cannot easily recall all the loose expressions one may at various times have carelessly uttered, and it may be that I have myself used the word in this connection; but long ago I have adopted, as my view of military compromise, an absurd story I once heard of a dispute between a man and wife where they should spend the summer. He said Newport; she said Saratoga; the compromised on Saratoga. The adjustment between the two necessary qualities of offensive power and speed for battleships may be called a compromise; but it should always be on offensive power.

What do you mean by this vague definition? I mean, primarily, the cultivation of the mental attitude which keeps offensive power in the foreground; a steadfast prepossession in favor of its immortal superiority. I should say next, a studious consideration of how far differences of speed really matter strategically. Control of the sea being the leading object of naval war, and strategy being more conclusive than tactics, what probable advantage does a fleet obtain by arriving ten days o, if it must get behind batteries on coming of an opponent who has preferred offensive power to speed? Again, remembering that for a fleet the speed is that of the slowest, and taking into consideration the incidents of naval war service, is it not possible that there can be determined a very probable serviceable fleet-speed for navies, than which two knots more or less at a given moment will not greatly matter? That the Russian fleet, despite all disadvantage of heterogeneous units, of the long cruise, and protracted anchorages, without docking, was maintaining on May 27 a fleet-speed of at least twelve knots, while the Japanese seem to have used more than fifteen, may afford some initial indications. No one is contending for no speed; but there are those who contend that speed is merely for bringing offensive power into play; that when it exceeds this, and expects to achieve success by running, it has small object, for the sea does not habitually, nor often, present positions at which by anticipating an enemy you achieve strategic effect.

Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japanese Sea, Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 32:447-471 June 1906

When discussing any specific topic, the blog has a tendency to become a dialogue. By that I mean we highlight the news and discuss it continuously, and the conversation as adapted based on news driven events and information does not always allow for context to be added to each conversation. As I was reading Phillip Ewings Reporter's Notebook last week, when he posted this entry regarding the comments of critics, it highlights how a blog can be quickly seen as a vehicle for nothing but criticism as the conversation flows on a daily pace. To clear up any perceptions one might have regarding how I see the Littoral Combat Ship, I use this post to reset the narrative.

When the LCS program was announced, the Navy operated and was developing a replacement for 30 Perry frigates; 14 Avenger MCMs and 12 Osprey MHCs (56 total ships). In essence, the Navy plans to replace these three different ships with 55 modular, multipurpose Littoral Combat Ship seaframes and 64 LCS mission packages broken down as 16 ASW modules, 24 ASuW modules, and 24 MCM modules. Unfortunately, the Navy this century is best known for changing plans, so we really have no idea how long this plan will last.

However, there is a high likelihood the short term plan for the Littoral Combat Ship will continue. With the Osprey class already retired, and with so many lessons to learn from both modularity and unmanned systems, the short term future of the Littoral Combat Ship represents a positive direction for the Navy in my opinion. The other services have developed extensive knowledge and capability adjusting to the challenges of both theaters in the war, but the Navy is making adjustments in peacetime mostly through theoretical assessments, research, and development. The Littoral Combat Ship is the realization of these ideas into a platform that can help shape the future. Is it the right "compromise" in the spirit of Mahan? Time will tell.

It is said this ship should be canceled outright, for a number of reasons based on valid considerations. I disagree, and highlight the class can be produced to at least 12 ships, potentially as many as 26 and still provide a major gain in capability (and a cost effective replacement) as a replacement for existing ships. History of mine warfare teaches us those platforms must be able to self-deploy as a requirement if the US Navy intends to be able to quickly respond to threats to the global system, but that self deploy capability must be accompanied by a realistic dedication to logistical sustainability, an aspect of the Littoral Combat Ship still absent.

As I have made clear on the blog many times, I see the Littoral Combat Ship concept as the first in concept type for the US Navy in the modern era. USS Freedom (LCS 1) is a mothership, intended not to be a platform for sea control but an enabler for deploying manned and unmanned systems that enable US Naval forces to maintain distributed capabilities in the maritime domain it operates in. As unmanned systems concepts are still in its early stage, these capabilities are primarily scouting in nature at this time, but will mature with time as the Navy is able to gain a better understanding of the enabling and limiting advantages of unmanned systems. I believe unmanned systems are excellent scouting tools that can increase the range and persistence of scouting for naval forces, and will provide lethal reach for firepower in times where lethal measures are required, but unmanned systems are very limited in confrontations involving restrictive rules of engagement due to the lack of a peacemaker. For those who haven't figured it out, only human beings can be peacemakers.

The LCS seaframes enables unique 'load capable' options to the warfighter, but only with the newly discussed Marine mission module are we beginning to see realistic load options for times when access is not contested. How the Navy adapts new payloads is for the mission module designers to figure out, and we will offer plenty of suggestions along the way, but on this trip I am looking primarily at the seaframe.

Can a ship with a 57mm, a RAM launcher, a handful of automatic weapons, no sonar, but very high speed that also happens to displace 3,000 tons be effective? Probably, but I still see no evidence it is optimal for its intended enabling function. I have long argued motherships need to be large, and we need frigates in the 3,000 ton displacement catagory. The LCS is an attempt to do both. I don't think we need a 3000 ton AEGIS ship, but 16 VLS cells go a long way. We use 4 torpedo tubes on submarines for long range land attack, we want the LCS to fight submarines without a sonar or torpedos or any other specific ASW weapon. We want the LCS to fight close to shore, but retreat from the DDG-1000 due to truck launched anti-ship missiles. We observe non-state actors developing capabilities similar to what we would see from state competitors, but we fail to give our shore fighting frigate ESSM to fight off near shore aviation threats sure to come in the future. The Littoral Combat Ship, as of my current impression, is neither well suited for fighting in the littorals nor is it actually a "combat" ship, by even its best described intent it is a support ship for deploying technologies and capabilities.

I wholely admit the thing I am most looking forward to is jetting across the Great Lakes at over 40 knots. The one thing I do not understand is why we have spent so much money building speed into this platform. Mahan is no fool, speed can give some tactical capabiity but your strategic speed is always the speed of the slowest required vessel. I intend to use this trip to better understand why the investment for tactical speed in this platform is so important. Where does speed add value in scouting submarines or mines? Why do we need 3000 tons of speed to fight speedboats? We are building JHSVs to move Marines, where is the compelling Navy centric argument for speed?

I could make these arguments, but my mission modules would look very different, and they would involve considerably more manpower for operations involving sailors than the current LCS design allows. Speed could be a critical enabler in environments with restrictive RoE to get the peacemaker on the scene faster, but the LCS with its small crewing capability can't afford to deploy more than a single RHIB for peacemaking purposes.

The Littoral Combat Ship, in its current configuration and intended function, will be a very positive step for the US Navy in replacing the now retired Osprey class, and could be the same for the Avenger class, but I remain unconvinced this is the platform to replace the Perry class, and as the Perry class begins to retire the US Navy will become a Navy with warships solely of the battleship type.

Those who believe in the holy grail of technology say this is not a problem, while others suggest the real holy grail was realized with precision weapons which has changed war forever. Maybe, but Eagleone once made a comment that I think applies to that type of strategic thinking as well as it applies to the tactical promises the comment was made regarding... "Amateurs talk technology, professionals talk conditions."

I don't intend to call people who believe in technology or precision weapons as amatuers, only to highlight that at no time so far this century at sea has either technology or precision weapons significantly impeeded the strategic goals of the challenges facing naval forces in the 21st century. Whether it is off the coast of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea, or anywhere in the Pacific it is the conditions that drives options, and those conditions have yet to offer the option for technology or precision weapons to be the final solution.

Clearly it takes more than technology and precision weapons, but it should be noted the Littoral Combat Ship is specifically the trade off between deploying enabling technology at the expense of precision weapons. I would suggest maybe this is the wrong compromise in the spirit of Mahan, that perhaps the compromise should be more atuned to the challenges of this maritime era. Is the compromise between which capabilities to enable the warfighter with, or is the Littoral Combat Ship intended to be the peacemaker, and the compromise yet to be made is the necessity to enable the Navy to adapt to conditions of globalization to insure offensive capabilities for the peacemaker, also known as manpower at the scene of action on the sea to enforce the peace as necessary. Perhaps the Littoral Combat Ship is the right platform for bridging towards that unspoken but necessary compromise in our Navy's strategic direction, I don't know, but I am off to Buffalo to find out.

The blog is on autopilot, have a good week . Standing orders are for folks to conduct themselves professionally while I'm away.