Decision to Keep Gates Could Hurt Navy Leadership's Credibility

I've been following with interest the reporting following the decision by the Obama administration to retain Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, because of all the events over the last month, this one ranks higher than the election itself as one of the most important events to impact the Navy. A lot of the analysis regarding the Gates decision has focused on the war, but I am yet to see any analysis regarding what that might mean for defense acquisition, and in particular, what that might mean for the US Navy.

Ever since the late July hearing in the House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, the Navy has given every impression of a changed direction. It is unclear what direction that might be exactly, indeed the release of the NOC that was first reported to be released as early as October (we are now entering December), and was supposed to explain the new direction. At the hearing, the Navy insisted the maritime environment had recently changed, that blue water submarines, anti-ship missiles, and ballistic missile defense had all become the new priorities for the Navy. Analysis that justified this change has been unavailable, and ultimately every argument has essentially been discredited over time. This has left the Navy in a mess, and absent evidence of leadership willing to take control of a ship without a helmsman.

Lets face it, the Navy is a huge mess right now, and the inability to cancel the DDG-1000 is about as good of an illustration why as any evidence you can come up with. First, the Navy submits a plan for DDG-51s to replace the DDG-1000s that is more expensive and hurts the shipbuilding industry, then the Navy tries to work with the DoD regarding a legal trick to insure fewer destroyers are built in Mississippi, Gene Taylor's district (whoever included that information with the submission is the Navy's village idiot). Then earlier this month, right before the election, John Young comes out and says the Navy's argument to truncate the DDG-1000s is based on weak analysis. That is a huge deal, because there is no way John Young goes to the press with such condemnation of the Navy's plan without support from Secretary Gates, meaning the current position of Secretary Gates is to keep the DDG-1000.

And the really sad part is, given the Navy's absolutely abysmal argument against the DDG-1000, it is really hard to fault Gates for that position. The DDG-1000 is still the best move for the industry, the shipbuilding budget, and it is actually better aligned with strategy than the stated new position that supports more DDG-51s, unless you favor building a Navy specifically for an all out war with China. To compound the issue, the NOC is still nowhere to be found, the LCS is being supported despite the fact the LCS concept only works with a platform to ride shotgun, which I will talk more about in the future. For a service really proud of their maritime strategy for the last year, there is certainly a lack of coherent strategic thinking coming from Navy leadership right now in regards to acquisition.

Think about all of the decisions that have been punted to the next administration, and ask yourself if the Navy has demonstrated the leadership, articulation, and sound strategic logic necessary to manage the challenges. There is a fighter shortfall looming, the Navy needs to fill the gap between now and the Joint Strike Fighter, which has a bunch of questions itself. The Navy is spending billions to maintain the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) for what amounts to 1 more deployment. The Navy is spending billions to retain amphibious ships long after their scheduled retirement because not only is LHD 8 late, but LHA(R) will be late as well, while the LPD-17s are all arriving late due to problems with the first in class, which itself is inspiring absolutely nobody. Hurricane Katrina is a factor in the amphibious ships. It is actually worse than you think, consider for a moment that the US Navy hasn't built a surface combatant awarded since the first Bush administration. Sure there has been Freedom and Independence, but the LCS is not a surface combatant using a modern rating system. The first two DDG-1000s have yet to begin construction, despite being given names that are important.

Then this new strategic environment, which drives me crazy to be honest. The Navy is saying we need to expand ballistic missile defense for the future, but do so on our 1970s AEGIS technology.

Then the Navy hypes the anti-ship missile threat, with a favorite SWO talking point being the Hezbollah attack on the INS Hanit. This argument goes unchallenged against the Navy, which sort of gets on my nerves. Have you ever really studied the history of anti-ship missiles? Have you noticed the vast majority of successful anti-ship missile attacks have been against targets not defending themselves, and in most cases anti-ship missiles are defeated by indirect means like chaff. Just saying, the Navy is over hyping the anti-ship missile threat, the statistical evidence clearly shows that world wide, any ship defending against anti-ship missiles is more likely to defeat the missile than be hit, just like any ship not defending against the missile is more likely to be hit than not.

Then we are supposed to get worked up over the blue water submarine capabilities of... who exactly? Even if China is beginning to build up their nuclear submarine fleet it will still be years before they have a credible capability, particularly since the number of deployments by nuclear submarines is fewer than the number of deployments by just our 3 forward based nuclear submarines in Guam! Are these critical near term threats, or are we confusing future threats and current threats?

Don't get me started on the mythical ballistic missile that turns into an anti-ship missile. I don't know if you have heard or not, but there is a rumor China already has a weapon that launches from a ground based ballistic missile, and in flight transforms into a super-sonic anti-ship missile and blows up aircraft carriers. Sounds dangerous, but it also sounds too good to be true. After all, if the Navy was serious about countering such a weapon, wouldn't the Navy be advocating the construction of more submarines, not more surface ships?

The US Navy is a mess right now, and Obama's decision to retain Secretary Gates can't be seen as a good thing for US Navy leadership. Think about the gamble facing the Navy with the Obama administration, the argument to change plans just for the DDG-1000 with the current argument expects the Obama administration to come in, override the recommendation of Secretary Gates, hurt the shipbuilding industry (piss off or on the Unions, however you want to call it), spend more money on the alternative Navy plan, build a fleet for a strategic environment best represented by a nuclear war with China, and finally, take action counter to the majority Democratic Congressman and Senators who are supporting the DDG-1000 plan.

Where is the NOC? If the Navy is smart, it is in revision to come up with better talking points than the nonsense we have seen over the last 6 months. Otherwise, the first year of the Obama administration and the last year of the Gates term is going to be brutal for a Navy that can't seem to articulate a believable reason to cancel one of the most unpopular programs in the DoD today.