The National Fleet and the Joint Services Approach

Currently, as just one of the ways we support U.S. strategic objectives overseas, we attempt to provide 370 cutter days per year to DoD Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) in support of naval operations, exercises, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). This allotment does not include deployments in the western hemisphere.

Our support to COCOMs is part of our contribution to the cooperative maritime strategy which integrates seapower with the combined elements of national power: diplomacy, information, economy and military. The cutters work for the respective COCOM to whom they are chopped. In many cases, they are attached to a naval group, such as ESG 5, but they also have the ability to operate independently. One of the strengths the Coast Guard presence brings is the ability to engage on a broad basis with the regional nations. Fact of the matter is, once you get below about the 20 largest nations, most countries of the world don't need a Navy, they need a Coast Guard. Their coast guard-like services often don't fall under their Defense department or ministry, but instead are under transportation, justice, fisheries, etc. Additionally, like our U.S. Coast Guard, they are simultaneously expected to provide both law enforcement and defense roles. These commonalities make U.S. Coast Guard contributions to TSC and the employment of soft-power to enhance regional and global security particularly effective.

Out of Hemisphere Deployments, Web Journal of Admiral Thad Allen, Tuesday, November 25, 2024

The above was a response to a request for information to the Coast Guard regarding the upcoming deployment of the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) with ESG 5, previously discussed here. When I made the request, it was mostly out of curiosity, a Coast Guard cutter will be deploying with an ESG... "cool" I thought, and at the time my thoughts really didn't go much deeper than that. Now with events like Somalian piracy and the terror attack in India, I keep thinking the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) deployment could be an amazing stroke of luck in regards to timing.

I have been thinking alot about the idea of the National Fleet, partly because of the Orbis article by Bob Work, but partly influenced by sitting in the module bay of USS Freedom (LCS 1) wondering what the hell the ship can actually do given both its capabilities and limitations.

For those who aren't familiar with the concept a National Fleet, the National Fleet reflects an agreement between the Navy and the Coast Guard to plan, acquire, and maintain forces that support and complement each service’s roles and missions. The idea is to insure the services will be able to share assets, providing unique capabilities for expeditionary warfare, maritime homeland defense, and security missions. I am not really sure where in the National Fleet the Marine Corps is officially integrated, if at all, but one could assume the intent behind the Cooperative Maritime Strategy is an affirmation that Marine Corps is part of this cooperative initative.

The deployment of the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC-719) with ESG 5 certainly promotes the idea that the National Fleet concept is still alive, but given the current maritime environment and the stated direction of the services articulated in strategy, the question is starting to be asked if more should be done. I understand the National Security Cutter will enable greater cooperation and offer more capability to the Coast Guard to forward deploy out of hemisphere, but is simply assigning a cutter to a strike group representitive of the National Fleet intent?

I am not convinced we are integrating our maritime forces enough to meet the challenges of this century, and I think both the Mumbai attacks and Somalian piracy represent examples why. Piracy is generally considered a criminal activity, but do we have enough maritime law enforcement forward deployed to manage that criminal behavior on the global commons? There have been two ships acting as primaries for the African Partnership Initative, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) and the USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716), It isn't an accident that we would send Coast Guard and amphibious ships for that mission, after all, almost every nation in Africa relates to our Coast Guard and Marine Corps more than they ever would the US Navy.

Should the concept of the National Fleet be expanded, or even persued as part of a joint maritime force, not only in operational cooperation but in force structure, and perhaps procurement decisions? I don't know, I tend to think yes, but I recognize it doesn't always apply. For example, the CG(X) is a Navy centric platform, while every amphibious ship should first and always be a joint platform. What about the LCS? We have already started discussing a Marine Corps mission module, but where is the discussion for a Coast Guard mission module to fight piracy?

I raise these questions in part to start the narrative of the National Fleet. Other than the joint policy statement by the Navy and Coast Guard in 2006, there hasn't been much discussion about it. However, as hybrid challenges in both war and peace become the rule rather than the exception, I'm starting to think this topic deserves more discussion than it is getting, including in regards to future procurement.