Submarines in the Indian Ocean

The Pakistan / India naval balance has been and is continuing to be an excellent look at a regional naval competition between states with differing goals. Strategy Page offers an update on the submarine acquisitions of both sides. Pakistan is retaining consistency, moving to acquire three modern SSKs via licensed production of the German Type 214. Although I'm not sure if the Pakistani 214s will have the fuel cell systems of the several European models of this boat, it seems that they will get the AIP systems and, possibly, retrofit these onto some of their older Agosta 90B boats.

Pakistan's navy is a small frigate navy with a submarine force which appears optimized for either commerce raiding or attacks on high-value warship targets. Although they possess two AORs, they do not possess significant power projection assets. This is in line with their navy's position in the region, that of a defensive force (and spoiler) against India.

India, on the other hand, has a much more varied set of naval capabilities. Through construction and purchase, they have built up a respectable amphibious capability, and are working on setting up forward outposts to support sea control missions around the Indian Ocean basin (notably on Madagascar to support African coast antipiracy missions). Their submarine force is at present a conventional one, but they have experience (via a lease for several years) at nuclear submarine operation. They have indigenous nucs under construction and have recently been in the news for their maneuvering to acquire ex-Soviet SSN hardware. Rumorintel has them planning to use their domestic nuclear submarine production cap to produce at least one SSBN for nuclear deterrence.

India is also upgrading its SSK fleet, choosing to pursue the French Scorpene with AIP as well. Their submarine fleet is presently some three times the size of Pakistan's, at 16 boats not counting those under construction. Their indigenous production and 10 boats of the ex-Soviet Kilo boats (in Indian service, the 'Project 877'/ Sindhu class) has left them with a relatively new and capable force (despite arguments in the Indian journals and press about the 'lack of capability' of the 877s).

Are these new acquisitions upgrades, increases in capability, or simple fleet maintenance? It's a bit clouded, but we can make some guesses.

Pakistan's acquiring three new boats is numerically simple replacement of their oldest - two Agosta 70 boats commissioned in 1979 and 1980. At that, these boats are coming up on thirty years of service, and with their new boats not scheduled to come online for four to five years, this makes the new acquisitions a relatively straight fleet-maintenance purchase by numbers. The AIP capability, especially the refits, are a different story. It's harder to tell if this is a capability acquired simply because it has become relatively common and affordable on SSKs, or if it reflects different thinking on the part of the Pakistani navy.

Although not comparable to nuclear propulsion, AIP (Stirling and fuel cell operation) does offer a significant upgrade to a SSK. These boats can operate quietly, if conservatively, for several days submerged - which in combat scenarios with a coastal neighbor is nothing to sneeze at, especially when that neighbor has high-value naval assets such as large amphibs and aircraft carriers. Pakistan's navy has not done well in prior clashes against the Indians, but those clashes are also not properly characterized as high-effort naval combat. Gunboats and frigates have gone head to head in sea actions, mostly.

India has now (and will in future) the capability to credibly prevent Pakistan from operating at sea either commercially or militarily in the case of full-scale conflict. India, however, is also concerned with other adversaries; in addition to the antipiracy mentioned earlier, India worries about the rising influence of China in Africa and in the Indian Ocean, and their fleet reflects this. They have long maintained at least one active CV, and their efforts to acquire new ones (Gorshkov) are well-documented. In the case of high-effort conflict, I would expect the Pakistani navy to attempt to engage Indian navy assets to prevent them from supporting ground operations and in general to attempt to whittle down India's capabilities and influence in the region. India, on the other hand, would attempt (as in the past) to fix and engage the smaller and less capable Pakistani fleet in order to achieve local sea control in support of anti-commerce and shore strike missions.

At first glance, if and when India manages to acquire nuclear attack submarines, they won't directly increase the threat to Pakistani naval assets, which will mostly operate in the littoral anyhow. The Indians will, however, gain the ability to credibly oppose the PLA(N) in their own ocean, and will gain sea denial at long ranges through SSN patrol. At present, however, their determination to both modernize their SSK force as well as pursue a blue-water SSN capability indicates at least two components to their goals. The SSK force is good for commerce attacks and for sea denial in the littorals, where Pakistan operates. The SSNs are a statement of intent to pursue sea denial farther afield, and perhaps even threaten SSBN assets of their opponents.

I remain interested in India's acquisition of SSBN capability. Given that their most likely target sets (Pakistan and China) are relatively nearby, their patrol patterns and technological requirements are somewhat eased. India gaining a secure second strike capability is of high importance against Pakistan, since land-based missiles (even mobile ones) are high-value and fragile targets in the event of an all-out conflict. While it will not necessarily increase their counterforce capability against Pakistan or China, it will up the deterrent power of Indian nukes - and if they only have one or two SSBNs, those will become high-value targets for other submarines.

I will be watching closely to see if Pakistan and India and China slip into the patterns the U.S. and U.S.S.R. evolved during the cold war of shadowing each others' assets both for potential counterforce and for simple warning surveillance.
Image from Wikipedia of an Agosta 90B