The PLAN Type 022 Sourced From Australia

Apparently, in Australia you can help the PLAN build warships.

An Australian company is working directly with the Chinese navy to develop catamarans capable of firing missiles, an international policy institute says.

The company, AMD Marine Consulting, is a naval architectural and marine engineering consulting firm based in Sydney, which develops catamaran designs for ferries, utility vessels and patrol boats.

According to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, AMD has set up a joint venture called Sea Bus International with a Chinese company - GUMECO - working directly with the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN).

PLAN has selected a military boat designed on the AMD 350 catamaran which is "markedly like" a new generation of missile-armed catamarans - Type 022 - being built for its navy, the institute's blog site The Interpreter said.

The articles goes on to say no laws have been broken as part of the Joint Venture.

"But China's admirals, recognising that these hulls allow for speeds of up to 36 knots and a more stable platform for firing weapons, came calling," The Interpreter said.

"They were not turned away and Type 022s are now being turned out regularly, with possibly 30 of them built so far."

The article goes on to discuss the potential of a Taiwan naval war scenario, where Australia would potentially side with the US against China, but would have helped China build the Type 022 which is specifically designed to sink ships.

I would note that if China and the US ever go to war over Taiwan, if China shoots down even a single Satellite the US would use, it would be a Satellite that Australia uses, as one aspect of US Pacific strategy has been to tie together the communication networks of Australia and the US. In other words, such an attack against a Satellite would be an attack against Australia.

In general though, I can't find fault with the Chinese. While the Type 022 doesn't fit very well in any aspect of US strategy, from a regional maritime defense perspective of China it is one of their best platforms. It is basically the Chinese streetfighter, except instead of a powerpoint, they have built 30 and are expected to build at least a couple dozen more.

Project Valour-IT Contest WInner

Thank you to everyone who participated. Most importantly thank you to everyone who contributed to Project Valour-IT and Soldiers Angles, who my wife and I, as well as the crew, has proudly associated ourselves with for 3 years now.

1st Place - Mike for the two pictures shown.
2nd Place - Steve for excellent pictures of Bath
3th Place - Erik for excellent pictures from outside the LRAFB

Observing the Democrat Debate

This debate has been interesting to observe, credit CNN, but major credit to the Politico. I'm hearing something for the first time in my lifetime, a thoughtful discussion on foreign policy by two Democrat Presidential candidates that lasts longer than 10 minutes on a TV station other than CSPAN.

....

In my opinion, Obama just kicked Hillary Clinton's ass on foreign policy on national TV. Obama might be the first Democrat presidential candidate who can articulate a clear foreign policy vision in my lifetime, the contrast between Obama and Clinton was stark on the topic. Hillary was almost completely guided by the talking points of the Center for American Progress, but Obama was specific in vision and articulate in presentation, and didn't rely on any of the typical rhetoric.

I'm not saying I buy in, but I am saying I was caught off guard by Obama's clarity. From my point of view, it has been very rare to observe a Democrat that can project strength in foreign policy in an articulate way. Traditionally clarity in politics from Democrats comes on domestic policy, at least in presidential contests. Clearly Obama is ready to pull out of Iraq, I think most Americans are and that was the ultimate goal of the surge, to set up that capability for our Iraq policy, but instead of shaping a perception of retreat he discusses transition strategies while also quickly shifting focus to Afghanistan. Clinton didn't bring up Afghanistan until after Obama did, which I think is a major distinction. Public visible statesmanship on foreign policy was one aspect of leadership Bill Clinton always fell short, his skills in statesmanship were always in domestic leadership, and his wife is similar in that regard. He charmed other countries, particularly allies, but he never could influence and Kosovo is a visible example.

What is interesting is Obama sounds like a Hawk on Afghanistan. I think that is an interesting dynamic because if Bush is able to close out a force reduction strategy in Iraq, the implication going into the general election is that Obama will deal with Afghanistan. Should he win the Democrat Primary, that would be a fascinating dynamic, observing two presidential candidates in John McCain and Barack Obama debate the Long War. That's a debate I'd watch.

Clinton sounds simpleton when talking about foreign policy, in fact other than a very sharp wit, something every wife inherits with the words "I do", I'm yet to observe one instance of her implied intelligence or wisdom on any policy issue.

Clinton is all talking points on the war and foreign policy, she offers no substance and no vision on the subject. She lacks the depth to educate which implies either a lack of interest, or a lack of understanding. Sad she is on the Senate Armed Services Committee. She goes back and forth, playing to the base on how the war is terrible, then citing Operation Desert Fox as her reasoning for authorizing Iraq. She wants it both ways.

I still think Clinton would be more impressive staying where she sounds smartest, in the center and behind her voted positions, but like Mitt Romney she doesn't have an identity so she comes off as speaking at the political party base, rather than with the political party base. Both Hillary Clinton and Mitt Romney have records that say one thing while the mouth is saying something else. That doesn't fly in Presidential elections, I don't think either can or will win a general election if they win their respective nomination.

It is interesting that both Obama and McCain are exactly who they say they are. Everyone knows McCain is in the middle, and that is where McCain has stayed, being true to himself. Obama is very similar in that regard, Obama is on TV even now in the midst of a very competitive election exactly who he says he is in both of his books, and as reflected by his voting record. Say what you want about the policies of either man, but it is quite refreshing to observe American politics where there are viable candidates in both parties who appear to be exactly who they say they are, as opposed to what we have seen in the past where a front runner establishes themselves, says they are everything to everyone, then does their own thing. In that regard, being true to oneself, both Obama and McCain are like Reagan who was also every bit who he said he was. Such statements are blasphemy to partisans, who get caught up on policy positions.

I have read the political analysis that says the Republicans are divided, or that the Democrats are divided. I'd argue there are two factors being ignored to explain why. GenerationX never fit very well into either party in lockstep like the Boomers who came before, and when large section of the base of the Democrat party shifted to the fringes of the left, it dragged the center further to the left and has resulted in a bigger tent Republican party that includes many with liberal views who reject the progressive movement, and prefer being simply 'moderate' and or independent.

One last thought. I hope during the general election someone in the media realizes there is a war taking place and sponsors a general election debate at the Naval War College or maybe even Ft. Leavenworth. The foreign policy discussion was clearly the highlight of the debate. I think the biggest divide right now between Republicans and Democrats is foreign policy. A general election debate on the subjects, which include everything from globalization, global trade, Asia policy, Middle East policy, military policy, and homeland defense would be a good thing for the country, and a good thing for both political parties, moving into the 21st century after Bush.

Storming a Frozen Beach

I live only a couple hours from Fort Drum, so in the winter when I'm out shoveling snow off my driveway at 7am I keep in mind I could have it worse, I could have to be doing drill in this northeastern winter windy hell. Of coarse even that looks like it would be more fun than this.

The ships, some of the biggest warships in the Royal Navy, will be joined by the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, and supported by the frigate HMS Cornwall and the Support Ship RFA Mounts Bay. Warships, aircraft and marines from Holland and Norway are also expected to take part in the exercise.

...For many marines and sailors this will be their first taste of conducting amphibious operations in the demanding arctic conditions found in and around Norway, and a great deal of time has been spent training and preparing for the unique challenges that will be faced.

God bless Marines, including those crazy 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marine bastards who get to storm one windy, cold, frozen beach in Norway in the middle of February to keep their skills sharp. I do have one question though, which cold weather beach would the Royal Navy Commando's actually storm for real?

Either this is a signal to Russia, or Canada is in trouble... Actually does it get that cold in the Falklands? When you look at it, there is really only one nation where this cold weather assault capability would be realistically required for, and that nation has a pretty good record throughout history fighting in the winter.

Submarine History Via Visuals

I have been reading a number of books lately, basically my Christmas presents, and had somehow completely forgotten about my copy of the February 08 Naval History Magazine. As always great stuff, it is by far the best periodical I subscribe to.

One article in particular I enjoyed was an article by Norman Polmar offering an Illustrated History of American Submarine Development. I was very pleased when I looked on the Naval Institute website and noticed, it is not a members only article, meaning anyone can read it.

The article, called "From One-Man Submersible to High-Tech Behemoth" requires the reader to register free on the site to view. This picture in particular caught my attention, I inherited a few pictures of the Greenfish (SS 351) from my grandfather. If I had to guess, this picture looks like it was taken in the early 50s in Pearl Harbor, because it is very similar to pictures I have, although that picture is much better quality.

Top stuff from Naval History Magazine and Norman Polmar, definitely worth the free registration, although I would argue the magazine subscription itself is well worth it too.

Fleets Win Wars With Firepower and Mobility

Milan Vigo reminds us what wins naval wars as he examines the shrinking US Navy and the shipbuilding strategy heading into the future. From National Defense Magazine.

The Navy needs a larger number of ships, not only for winning a war at sea against a stronger opponent but also for carrying out diverse missions in peacetime, ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, enforcement of maritime agreements, counterpiracy, vessel traffic service, multinational exercises, countersmuggling and counterdrug, to regional deterrence through forward presence in selected parts of the world’s oceans. In operations short of war, the Navy’s mission includes prevention of transnational terrorist acts on the high seas and in international straits and larger ports, support of counterinsurgency or insurgency, and peace enforcement operations.

The Navy today lacks both the numbers and the type of combat ships to successfully carry out all its diverse missions in times of peace and war. The reasons for such a long-standing unfavorable fleet structure include the Navy’s preference for building an ever-larger number of high-capability but large and expensive ships optimally suited for operations on the open ocean; the associated costs of building such large ships; the use of purely business considerations in determining fleet size/composition and deployment patterns; the belief that new technologies are a substitute for numbers; and a false reading of the future strategic environment.

...The Navy’s efforts to increase the number of ships in the battle force are also greatly complicated by the widely held belief among high Defense Department and Navy officials that in the information age, the number of ships is not as important as their combat power based on the new technologies. The belief that technology by itself can substitute for the quality given by numbers of platforms is based on sheer ignorance of both military history and strategy. Above all, it is based on misplaced confidence in the powers of technology.

...In the past, the Navy had a large number of decommissioned destroyers and frigates in reserve that could be put into active service in the case of a national emergency. This is not the case today. Over the past six years, some 80 decommissioned naval vessels were sunk. This number included a 31-year-old fleet of 27 destroyers, while 22 others have been scrapped or sold. In contrast, during the Clinton administration only, eight 46-year-old hulks were sunk. Many of these ships could have been reactivated by undergoing a life-extending refit and returned to service for another 15 years. This policy of scrapping relatively new ships should be reversed soon to provide additional ships for the fleet.

...The gains in combat power of a netted force essentially depend not on raw organic power, such as firepower and mobility, but on one’s ability to decide and act faster than one’s adversary. Such an increase in one’s combat power depends on many intangible factors, but primarily on the human element. Among other things, micromanagement, excessive command and control, and poorly educated and trained commanders and staffs can not only drastically reduce but also even eliminate any potential gain achieved through superior information technologies.

Experience has repeatedly shown the fallacy of relying exclusively on technological superiority and arbitrarily reducing the size of one’s forces. Technology must always be properly integrated with other, mostly intangible, elements of one’s combat power — specifically, combat leadership, unit cohesion, morale and discipline, doctrine, and training. Otherwise, the new technologies will be of little or no help in defeating a stronger and more agile opponent. Experience conclusively shows that numbers have their own quality. Hence, the importance of the numerically larger fleet should not be dismissed as irrelevant in the information age.

The entire article is excellent. Regulars to this blog will recognize several themes covered in the past. Well done, very well done.

- Milan Vigo is a professor of operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

The Air Force Blacklists "Blog"gers - Updated

Bumped and Updated: Looks like a simple case of switching vender's has created a massive increase in the black listings for the Air Force.

From what we are hearing the contract with SmartFilter expired and the Air Force has gone with BlueCoat Web Filter instead.



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We are getting word the US Air Force has begun blacklisting blogs in mass from USAF networks. At first we thought they were blacklisting what they saw as a few troublemakers (from the AF perspective), but it appears to be more widespread. We observed this FCW article yesterday which discussed the possibility under consideration by the DoD, but apparently the USAF had already made up their minds. This could be a trend for the whole DoD soon.

The Defense Department is considering a policy that would banish all traffic not proven to be purely official DOD business from its networks, said Lt. Gen. Charles Croom, director of the Defense Information Systems Agency

...DOD’s consideration of the proposal, however, is in the preliminary stages, and it’s too early to predict if the department will proceed with the idea, Croom said.

...In practical terms, the rules are intended to eliminate traffic that’s entering DOD networks as employees surf Web sites that aren’t expressly banned or blocked but that would be difficult to justify as necessary purely for official business

From a security perspective I really can't disagree with this line of thought, but I do think there is potentially as much lost as gained. I see irony that the same DoD making decisions on the value of information through Net Centric Warfare also sees access to information on the internet as a potential threat.

I don't disregard that threat, I deal with it daily so understand where the mentality comes from, but I believe whenever access to information is restricted there can be tangible loss. When we approached this issue we started with social networking sites like MySpace and YouTube, but we were careful not to deny information to blogs and media. Our approach was not to interfere with the creative processes and ideas that can be generated through open source access to other creative processes and ideas. Our requirements for balancing security and access is on a much smaller scale than the DoD though, so we understand how the need for security can overpower the need for access at various levels of a high security enterprise like the DoD.

We are hearing the blacklist is basic and unsophisticated. If what we are hearing is true, the blacklist is specific to any URL with the word "blog" within. If that is in fact true, call us unimpressed with the 'skillz' of the blacklist admin in the USAF, who basically did nothing but declare war on blogspot and blog search engines.

We expect more from the agency with a major role in securing networks of the United States. What, did the Air Force's Websense maintenance contract expire or something?

6th Fleet Focus: Picture of the Day

Last week we discussed the Russian exercises in the Atlantic. From an observers perspective, I'm betting the sailors of the USS San Jacinto (CG 56) had the best seat in the house. This appears to have been taken before the exercise.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA (Jan. 18, 2008) The guided-missile cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG 56), foreground, and Russian Navy destroyer Admiral Chebanenko steam alongside each other. San Jacinto is operating in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility to help improve maritime safety and security and support the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. U.S. Navy photo by Aviation Warfare System Operator 2nd Class Justin Phillips

Click the photo to the high res link.

The Last of the Le Reduoutable's

The French ballistic missile submarine L'Inflexible, the last Le Redoutable class ballistic missile submarine, sailed for Cherbourg on January 14th to be decommissioned. After serving for 22 years, the submarine is set to be replaced by the fourth and final new Le Triomphant class ballistic missile submarine Le Terrible, due to be commissioned in March of this year.

It really is a shame the French have decided to scrap these submarines, at barely 30 years they are optimal platforms to enable French special forces, of which the French have a lot of. The conversion process of ballistic missile submarine to special operations submarine would be even cheaper than the conversion the US undertook with the Ohio class, which focused mostly on turning ballistic missile submarines into conventional missile submarine platforms with special forces capability.

Considering how much progress the French have been making with unmanned systems, and observing the change in strategy to be more active with their naval forces in forward theaters, these submarines represented an opportunity lost for French special forces.

Perhaps the UK MoD will come to its senses when they look to replace their Vanguard class with a new ballistic missile submarine, and take the opportunity to outfit the Royal Navy with a special forces capability recycling older systems for a new mission. Probably not, but they could use the hulls... of any type.

Appearances Are Deceptive With Russia and China

As January ends we want to acknowledge one final article from January 2008 Proceedings. We hope every issue this year is as well done as this months was, which exceeded the quality of almost all issues last year combined. By the way, that includes the article by Lieutenant Claude Berube, whose outstanding (members only) article we did not discuss (yet), even though his might be the best article in this months publication.

Norman Friedman uses the column regarding "World Naval Developments" (members only) to make an interesting point on the potential for a future war for resources. His conclusion points out that as the west moves to alternative fuels, we will probably be spared the need to engage in such a war, but will observe such a war between nations that will have very real needs. In making his point, these two paragraphs stuck out.

Even so, it might be interesting to examine the strategic effect of a West less dependent on oil, imported or otherwise. Imagine a future in which, although we no longer depend on Middle Eastern (and Russian) oil, the expanding Chinese and Indian economies do. Both use energy far less efficiently than we; the Chinese the least efficient of all. Much of the rising price of oil is attributed to the increasing thirst of these two economies. There is also a long-term prediction that ultimately India and China will compete for the mastery of Southeast Asia, where both have interests. Does all of this suggest that the two great Asian powers will ultimately fight in the Middle East? Neither country appears to have anything like sufficient oil reserves of its own. For example, Chinese attempts to find oil in Sinkiang were unsuccessful, and so far nothing has come of the repeated predictions that vast reserves would be found under the South China Sea.

For China, Russia represents an interesting alternative. The main Russian oil reserves are in Siberia. For some years Chinese farmers have been emigrating into largely empty areas of that territory. Chinese historians have long pointed out that much of central Siberia was once Chinese, before the tsarists seized it and ejected all the ethnic Chinese living there. Much of the rationale of communist rule over present-day China is that the party can and will restore all of the territory stolen by foreigners. Although that is usually taken to mean Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, widely-published Chinese maps of thefts include Siberia. At some point Chinese ethnics in Siberia might be inclined to raise the issue. Right now they may be happier to have escaped direct Chinese rule. However, the 20th century offered numerous examples of ardent nationalism by those separated by borders from the mother country. Why should Chinese heirs to a rich and ancient civilization be immune to nationalist impulses, particularly if they are sitting near resources of such importance to the mother country?

Every once and awhile I come across a conspiracy theory regarding the rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). I don't buy it. For as much as Putin has made it clear he doesn't like the United States, I have a hard time those same Russian leaders so easily dismiss the rise of China on their southern border. China and Russia were not friends during the cold war, there is not a historical partnership there, and the suggestion that they haven't been using each other over the last decade seems to be in defiance of the facts. In particular, I find it hard to believe Russia is comfortable with the pipeline being built to link Kazakhstan and China, or the natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan (by transit through Uzbekistan) and China. I am not ready to buy the theory that relations between China and Russia are as good as some would try to paint it, it is counter to the personality of Putin, and Russia in general.

With that in mind, Rick tips to an interesting article in Forbes today discussing the collapse of Russian weapon exports to China. It highlights the problem the defense sector of Russia is facing, specifically that Russia isn't willing to give its best technologies to China to be built under license there, although Russia does sell those same technologies to India.

From a situation where 40 pct of Russian earnings from arms exports came from China, 'recently exports to China of our military equipment and weapons have dropped almost to zero,' the paper said.

But the main issue is indecision over which technology can safely be sold to China, as well as Beijing's desire to receive licences to do the work itself, the paper said, citing a senior officer overseeing the arms industry.

The paper said Moscow's willingness to deliver cutting-edge technology to India, another major importer of Russian weapons, had 'embittered the Chinese generals,' the paper said.

Russia has sought close military ties with China, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, while the two countries have often aligned their policies as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Even in that last paragraph, the media attempts to sell the Russian - Chinese relationship as something more than it is. Standing together against a US policy position doesn't make countries close friends. Most of the GCC nations stand with the US on Middle Eastern positions, and the US sells them plenty of defense systems, but that doesn't make the US and the GCC nations close friends. If simply having something in common made nations allies, the US and China would be major allies based on economic policies alone.

Russia has been using China as a source of income during hard economic times, but those times appear to have run their course. India doesn't require licenses to build the highest level Russian defense systems inside India, although admittedly that is the primary reason both Europeans and the US are making headway into the Indian defense sector. China wants the high tech Russian equipment, but doesn't want to buy it, they prefer the license to build their own industry.

This will be interesting to observe unfold. China was important to Russia while China was spending billions on Russian defense equipment, but without those purchases Russia may change its position, and that cold Siberian north may turn a cold shoulder to China in favor of India, where income opportunities are still available. Either way, this is just more evidence in my opinion that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is named after "Shanghai" for a reason, as it really only represents an organization designed to empower China to consolidate natural resources in Asia.

Perspective

I work too much to stay hip on entertainment aspects of the web, specifically anything related to Myspace or Youtube. My wife tells me this is why we have kids. My 12 year old passed this on, which ironically, had me watching and thinking of my two year old.

Shift Happens

Food for thought.

Two Stories, Same Topic

National Defense Magazine has two stories by Grace V. Jean in its February 08 edition discussing Marine amphibious forces. My first question was, why is this two different stories?

The first story, Marine Corps Makes Strong Pitch for ‘Sea Bases’, highlights the point made by Bob Work that Seabasing lacks definition.

So far, however, there is little consensus on what exactly constitutes a sea base. Some officials have argued that the Navy already deploys sea bases — in the form of aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships and cargo vessels. Others, particularly in the Marine Corps, contend that future sea bases require more sophisticated equipment that the Navy currently does not have.

General Conway gives us an idea of what he believes Sea Basing is.

The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James T. Conway, recently endorsed the sea basing doctrine.

“One of the important cornerstones in my mind is this concept of sea basing,” he said. “To be able to put something at sea that serves as a port and an airfield, to flow things through to shore” in an anti-access environment is crucial, he said.

In other words, Conway appears to want a transshipment dock at sea. The advantage to the Marines under that approach is it turns the entire concept of Sea Basing into a MSC issue, forcing the MSC to work out the transfer system problems for the Sea Base itself. It also removes the amphibious force as part of the problem (from the perspective of the Marines), because today's amphibious ships doesn't have the same number of cranes the ARG of the cold war did. By giving up 3 aviation deck amphibious ships, the Marines basically get to upgrade 1 MPF to a forcible entry brigade. We believe this concept of Sea Basing ultimately kills the "Joint Services" approach to Seabasing though, because the capability is only enabled for the prepositioned forces of the Marine Corp.

We tend to think General Conway has the right idea, but the specific approach being sold isn't going to work as advertised. Did anyone tell General Conway what "anti-roll tanks" will do to the cargo load of a LMSR? Beyond that small nugget, if the article is correct, it looks like they are trying to solve the skin to skin transfer problems with the LMSR, but that doesn't make sense, the MLP is the dock. By specializing the transfer system to the LMSR, this approach hampers the capability of existing ships to participate in the Sea Base. That will mean the transfer system for all other ships supporting the Sea Base (like say those supporting the Army),those outside the MPF(F), will have to transfer equipment via cranes. UNREP isn't going to be a fast process.

The second story, More Amphibious Ships Are Needed, Marines Contend, is an interesting article on the problems the Marines are facing with their Amphibious fleet. General Conway offers thoughts on the size of the amphibious fleet.

To support the deployment of two Marine expeditionary brigades in 2015 will require 17 ships for each brigade, Gen. James Conway, commandant of the Marine Corps, told a National Defense Industrial Association expeditionary warfare conference.

“You need 33 or 34, because you have to apply an 85 percent availability factor against that,” said Conway.

“When you go from 17 to 15, you’re leaving about 38,000 square feet of equipment on the pier side,” said James Strock, director of the sea basing integration division at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Having more ships would enable the Corps to respond to multiple contingencies, such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions. Strock said studies concluded that the minimum requirement is 11 big deck amphibious ships, 11 amphibious transport dock ships and 11 dock-landing ships.

However, here is the real crux of the problems facing the amphibious fleet.

In recent years, equipment has become heavier because so much armor is being added to trucks and combat vehicles.

“The medium tactical vehicle, a 7-ton truck fully dressed out, is showing up at the pier for embarkation in excess of 50,000 pounds,” said Strock.

As a result, 55 percent of the amphibious ships are exceeding weight and stability limits. Another 16 percent exceed only stability limits.

Next generation weapon systems, such as the joint light tactical vehicle, are expected to weigh even more than current equipment.

“Maybe we ought to think about taking the L’s out of that name, because the lightest version is 14,000 to 15,000 pounds,” said Strock.

Amphibious ships are built to accommodate certain numbers and types of equipment and supplies. The problem with vehicles becoming heavier is that the ships can carry only so much extra weight.

“The number of aircraft, tanks and rolling equipment you can put on an amphibious ship is already fixed. You can’t jam a lot more equipment on that ship than what it was designed for,” said Carnevale.

Future weapons systems in all categories are expected to be heavier than current technologies. Increasing the number of ships to accommodate more of those technologies may be one of the only solutions.

I don't care what Northrop Grumman or the Navy says, DIDs LPD-17 page has a paragraph that highlights the broken promise that was in part the justification for the massive size increase in the ship as a replacement.

Navy sources note that the 9 scheduled ships of this class (reduced from 12) are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships. These include the USA's older LSD-36 USS Anchorage Class dock landing ships (all decommissioned as of 2004, LSD-36 and LSD-38 transferred to Taiwan) and its LPD-4 USS Austin Class ships (12 built and serving, LPD 14 Trenton now India's INS Jalashva). The San Antonio Class ships may also replace 2 classes of ships currently mothballed and held in reserve status under the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP): the LST-1179 Newport Class tank landing ships, and LKA-113 Charleston Class amphibious cargo ships.

Clearly that is no longer true. The comments above highlights a problem facing the Marines today, the LPD-17 isn't a replacement for the LST or LKA. While the JHSV can supplement the lost LSTs, so many aspects of the LKA is where the Marines find themselves lacking today, for example the lack of cranes for amphibious ships, the lack of cargo square, and the lack of vehicle square are all problems specific to the lack of a replacement for the LKA.

These are tough lessons learned in war. The answer isn't to take the armor off, it is to to find a way to meet the lift requirements, starting with putting lift back in the ESG as a metric! There are a number of ways to meet the challenges, and it doesn't have to be either Sea Basing or amphibious. I am not impressed how NDM took two stories on virtually the same topic, where you can mix and match the challenges, and broke it into two stories. Both stories is the story, and if it is the Marines and not NDM treating the issues as separate and unrelated, that is another story worth writing.

For the most part though, both stories simply combine to tell half the story. No one mentioned the part about the Sea Basing concept falling short on the aviation requirements. No one mentioned that CH-53K, the primary heavy lift aviation connector for the Sea Base, is underfunded in FY09, and very few on Capital Hill appear interested that as the number of amphibious ships and MSC ships continues to shrink, the demand for both has increased in recent years.

Consider the irony, the Marines want to move entire brigades through a transshipment point in the middle of the Ocean, and the Navy lacks the tenders to reload a single VLS cell at sea. The current Sea Base design doesn't appear to address this maritime anomaly either.

It is also worth noting that amphibious ships are being utilized by the Navy rather than the Marines, which applies another cut into the total capabilities of the amphibious fleet.

Here is something I keep noticing, and maybe the question should be asked to General Conway. Why is it anytime someone discusses Sea Basing, or the amphibious fleet, both are sold with the condition of being able to provide the same capabilities. The (insert either one) will be able to provide greater response to contingencies like disaster relief or humanitarian assistance, and will have forcible entry capability against the enemy. Either topic, just insert either Sea Basing or amphibious ships and you can create the same sentence in either story.

It is time for clear definitions. It is time to apply a clear strategy for expeditionary warfare at sea. Only then will the requirements be right.

Hate the Message? Attack The Messenger!

In From the Cold published its second in a three part series that examines the mistakes that led to the nuclear mishap at Minot. You can read the second installment here. We had previously looked at the first article. The Spooks have done a wonderful job dealing with a difficult topic objectively, attempting to get to the source of the problems that led to the incident occurring, not weighing too much blame on system or people, rather highlighting how both contributed as a process.

It would appear however, that such responsible approaches don't sit well with the Air Force, who has apparently blocked In From the Cold from DoD computers. While the Spooks respect such a decision, I tend to think selective restrictions based entirely on what amounts to professional evaluation and criticism raises red flags. What can possibly be gained by blocking one of the only Air Force blogs with high numbers of daily visits in the US? What is it with Air Force PR these days?

Looks to me like a case of being personally offended by the message, and taking it out on the messengers.

Hell we rarely hold back our own criticism of the Navy, particularly the Royal Navy or MoD, how long before we get the blacklist? I've observed the Navy tends to handle bloggers with wisdom, they engage them in discussions instead of treat them as the enemy. Once again, the Air Force could do well to learn from the other services, and would be wise to stop treating everyone outside the Air Force as the enemy.

Perhaps that would have been a more interesting topic for their last leadership forum. Just saying.

PLAN Submarine Reference Guide

Found this picture looking around Chinese BBS today. It is a well done visual for all current PLAN submarines.


Click the picture to enlarge. Even if you don't read Chinese you should be able to figure it out.

On Cyber Threats...

This is brilliant. Clearly someone who works in my line of work, or has been there and done that. This statement expresses the perspective of cyber security professionals in government better than any I've ever read.

We’re in our second decade of cyber threats being on the national security radar and we are still not dramatically better off today than we were when we started. For an issue that should be moving at Internet time, we are still clearly operating at the speed of government.

The links are great too. Very well done.

Bob Work Defines Sea Bases and Seabasing

We quote from this excellent Bob Work report. Nothing quite captures the definition of Sea Basing, as defined today, than this bit.

Although the definition found in the Seabasing JIC was subsequently approved by the services and the Joint Staff, the constantly changing (or evolving) definitions of seabasing (note: henceforth, this report will adopt the spelling convention found the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) and seabase (analogous to airbase)—and the concepts that underlie them—helps to explain why current discussions about seabasing so often resemble two simultaneous monologues rather than true dialogues. As implied above, some proponents see seabasing as a naval concept that “enables” joint operations,” while some see seabasing as a maritime concept that is an integral part of emerging forms of joint littoral warfare. Some see seabasing as more about building bases at sea to replace land bases, while other see seabasing more about using the sea as a base of operations to overcome a temporary lack of land bases. Some see seabasing more in terms of the static support of joint forces operating ashore, while others are attracted to the more dynamic aspects of seabased maneuver. Meanwhile, the DSB views it as a way to conduct seabased forcible entry operations more rapidly, supplanting traditional “amphibious assaults.” Without a common understanding and acceptance of seabasing that simultaneously embraces all of these things or resolves their conceptual differences, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to initiate a fair and informed debate about current seabasing plans and programs.

Lingering confusion about the concept is especially evident among those analysts and planners outside the relatively small group of officers and planners familiar with the evolution of joint and naval seabasing efforts. As the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council of the National Academies wrote in 2005:

Planning for the sea base (sic) is still in its infancy. Coordination across the Services is just beginning, with discussions between the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps, and in response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives. As a consequence, the details have yet to emerge, especially with respect to joint operations and with respect to the availability and needed development of technology to perform the tasks that are envisioned for the sea base.

These thoughts were echoed in January 2006, five months after the new definition for seabasing was agreed to in the JIC. That month, the Vice President of Naval Systems at Boeing commented that the seabasing concept is going to require a partnership between government and industry to help everyone clearly understand what end capability or outcome the Pentagon is looking for. “It’s a very complex problem,” he said. “It takes a partnership to come close to defining the level of clarity for industry to start to build components.” He went on to say that Boeing was investing to expand its knowledge of the seabasing concept so that it can better understand some of its capabilities and limitations, “To help both ourselves, and to share with our customer, things they should consider as they try to add more definition to what seabasing means to them” (emphasis added).

These thoughts were seconded soon thereafter by a former head of the Navy’s Warfare Development Command who now works with General Dynamics. While on active duty, Rear Admiral Robert Sprigg, now GD’s Director of Advanced Warfighting Concepts, was right in the middle of the rapid evolution of seabasing that occurred in the first years of the 21st century. He rightly observed that the “seabase discussion has been a discussion that has developed in segments, not in one coherent manner.” While he believes that the picture of a “seabase’s desired operational capabilities” are getting more coherent, he stated “It’s not there yet to start building too many things.” He recommended an open dialogue begin between the operating forces, acquisition community, and industry to help better define the concept and to understand better the required capabilities.

Juxtaposed against this lingering confusion about what seabasing is or should be are the associated material solutions being so aggressively developed and pursued by the Department of the Navy. While these plans now have a joint stamp of approval, this paper will argue that the programs are being conceived of and pursued long before the full range of desired and possible joint seabasing capabilities have been adequately explored and debated. The end result: current seabasing plans are rather narrowly focused on two key capabilities—landing a single brigade on a hostile shore in 11 to 17 days, and thereafter providing seabased logistical support for two early entry brigades until follow-on joint forces arrive. It is true that these two key capabilities do indeed reflect the “top level requirements” identified in the Seabasing JIC. Nevertheless, it is hard not to get the sense that DoN plans are first about recapitalizing the Department’s amphibious and expeditionary maneuver fleets, and only second about developing an inclusive maritime concept of seabasing more attuned to the evolving strategic environment and the likely security challenges of the 21st century.

Sea Basing, or seabasing, lacks definition today and Bob Work captures that reality perfectly with his report from 2006. It could be argued in fact that the definition has actually expanded since this report, as it doesn't even address Global Fleet Stations.

A number of professional magazines are producing articles on Sea Bases and Expeditionary Warfare in general, and while the Marines are trying to distinguish the two, it is getting increasingly difficult to see how the decisions of one doesn't directly effect the other. I wanted to get this on the blog though, because as I continue to discuss Sea Basing it will help explain why my definition may not be a definition you have formulated in your own mind. Thus is the way with undefined programs.

The French Navy Feeds Somalia

We don't see enough stories like this. The French Navy is getting positive press for their efforts to deliver food to Somalia through the World Food Program. They deserve it, it amazes us that it took so long to get this done. We note there are several things changing in the region though, with US ships recently being allowed to chase pirates in Somalian waters the struggle to solve the piracy issue off the east coast of Africa is starting to take a turn for the good.

Before the French Navy took over the responsibility of escorting ships carrying relief supplies from Mombasa port to Somalia, WFP’s humanitarian activities had nearly ground to a halt.

Shipping companies that were involved in transporting the relief supplies started withholding their vessels after pirates targeted some of them.

Apart from hijacking the vessels and detaining the crew, the pirates demanded ransoms running into hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The increased piracy pushed insurance premiums to an all time high resulting in increased costs to shipping companies and higher costs to WFP in chartering ships.

What caught our attention was the French will be concluding their mission in February, and will be replaced by the Danes.

He said the French Navy contingent would continue with its mission to escort vessels carrying relief supplies to Somalia until February when they are expected to hand over to the Danish Navy.

That is news to us, but hardly surprising. Naval humanitarian efforts tend to score domestic headlines that serve the purpose of supporting the fleet, and we note that the Danes have had their own ships hijacked off the African coast by pirates, so their Danish Navy is no doubt ready to get a bit of payback.

We should note that fighting piracy doesn't pay anymore, at least not like it did centuries ago for nations looking to provide security to their commercial shipping, but there is still an economic cost worth preserving. Note the term "insurance premiums". Those not familiar with maritime trade should be aware, the difference between low and high insurance rates for the shipment of food by the WFP can pay for the naval presence alone. The cost can ultimately be measured in millions per month, much higher than the cost of a few French frigates ready to put steel on a pirate target in the Indian Ocean.

More French Nuclear Sales

It has been a busy month for the nuclear salesmen of France. On January 15th France signed a deal with UAE for cooperation in building civilian nuclear power. On January 25th it was reported France signed a civilian nuclear power agreement with India similar to the one the US signed back in 2006. Then today, it is announced France wants to help Brazil build a nuclear submarine.

Brazil is discussing with France the purchase of a $600 million Scorpene class submarine as part of an intended military alliance, a government official and a media report said on Monday.

Brazil is looking to France not only for submarine technology but to renew part of its jet fighter and helicopter fleet, he said.

"The idea is to discuss a strategic defense alliance with France," Ramos said. "The important part is technology transfer.

"He is not going to sign any deal yet on this trip."

The Scorpene deal would involve payments over 20 years at a rate of 2.4 percent, Folha de S.Paulo newspaper said. It put the price of the submarine at $600 million.

The Brazilian government, which wants to build the submarine in Brazil, is spending more than 1 billion reais ($560 million) to complete a nuclear reactor for it by 2015, the spokesman said.

The Brazil Naval blog notes there are four aspects of defense cooperation under study; submarines, Rafale, Cougar helicopters, and military exercises and cooperation.

The nuclear submarine aspect is clearly the biggest net gain for Brazil, a major boost in naval capability over any regional South American neighbors, and the best defensive weapon for the offshore oil fields recently discovered. It is hard to see any of this as anything other than a good thing for both Brazil and France.

A Service Can't See When Leadership Has No Vision

Surfing the net this morning I caught this nice picture over at the Small Wars Journal by Tom Ricks as well. In looking around some more I noticed Mike sharing his wisdom at abu muqawama's place, a link I really need to add to the blog.

I don't know what to say that hasn't already been said. SteelJaw Scribe covers the Naval angle very well, in fact after reading his analysis and commentary I shook my head for several minutes. What is it with those people?

I was a bit upset last week when I heard the Air Force isn't getting anymore Raptors, but not anymore. Screw em. Take a close look at that picture, note what the CSAF sees as the problem.

Only the air force would see a strategy as the problem in a budget discussion. That is what they are saying about the Navy is it not? Who thought this was a good idea for a "Leadership Forum?" It would be a real tragedy of government leadership if Congress didn't rake the air force over hot coals for this nonsense, after all the entire purpose of the CSAF exercise is to get Congress to take a closer look at the Air Force during the budget process.

I say give them their wish.

The HSV Swift Replacement?

Lee Wahler tips to a new solicitation by the Military Sealift Command for a new High Speed Vessel. This looks like it could be the replacement request for the HSV Swift. The solicitation reads as follows:

The Military Sealift Command requires a time charter of one (1) US flag, self-sustaining high speed vessel (HSV) with a minimum capacity to carry 305 passengers and 500 short tons. The HSV will provide a transformational capability supporting the Global War on Terrorism and emerging operational concepts including Seabasing and Global Fleet Station. It will also support theater presence strategies, providing intra-theater lift for tailored modular forces into areas where austere, unimproved or degraded port facilities preclude their use by larger, slower surface platforms. High Speed Intra-Theater Lift will provide surface links between advanced bases, sea bases and forces operating ashore and will play a supporting role in all phases of sea-based operations. The capability will provide forward presence allowing responsive support in a range of operations.

The charter period is for 12 months, with three 12 month options and one 11 month option. Some of the details include the a minimum 12,000 sq. ft. of enclosed vehicle deck stowage with at least 10,000 sq. ft. with 15 feet vertical clearance. The vessel shall have a full load draft of not greater than 15.0 feet and a maximum length overall of 375.0 feet. The ship shall be PANAMAX capable. The vessel, loaded with 500 short tons, shall have a minimum operating range of 1100 nautical miles at 35 knots in Sea State 3 with 10 % fuel reserve. The vessel shall have a minimum transit range of 4000 nautical miles with no cargo and 100 combined ship’s crew and mission personnel at an average transit speed of 20 knots with a 10 % fuel reserve in Sea State 3.

Lee also adds some interesting commentary.

This is a larger load than the HSV WestPac Express and the deck area approaches that of my old Newport Class LST. Also the load profiles, aka cargo characteristics, are for a full range of tactical vehicles up to M1A1 MBTs. While requiring a stern and/or side ramp would be expected in a tactical sealift ship, this ship is also required to have a stern AAV/EFV launch system which is quite unusual and I predict very hard to do on a catamaran hull? Another interesting item in the details is a requirement for the ship to work alongside with Navy Lighterage both new and old types? The charter requires a NAVAIR small sized flight deck - a pretty standard feature on MPS ships and other MSC charters. In addition, there is a requirement for three C4ISR spaces - interesting? The messing and berthing requirements are significantly larger than that of MPS/MPF-E up to 235-305 max!

MV WestPac Express is noted to have 32,000 square feet of cargo capacity designed for roll on/roll off, but does not include the stern AAV/EFV launch ramp capability. As far as I am aware, that has never been done on a High Speed Vessel, and would be an interesting addition to the arsenal. It raises the question if such a requirement is part of the Joint High Speed vessel of which the first is planned for funding in FY09..., this year.

Also included is support for 2 H-60s, including maintenance facilities and fuel. This will be one contract worth watching, particularly regarding the cost.

Northrop Grumman UCAS Update

Flight International has an update on the UCAS-N, including an update for 2008 and a bit of insight for the schedule.

With a length of 11.6m (38.2ft) and wing span of 18.9m, the X-47B is 6.74m shorter than a F/A-18E/F, with span 0.6m less than a Grumman F-14 with its wing unswept. Folded, the X-47B's span is 9.4m, just 0.1m more than the F/A-18E/F. One change from the J-UCAS configuration is the "clipping" of the wing tips to increase clearance when folded on the maintenance hangar deck.

Maximum launch weight is 20,190kg (44,500lb) and maximum carrier landing weight 10,670kg. Mission requirements for the demonstrator include a 90min loiter time within the carrier control area at 280km (150nm) radius, and the endurance to perform eight bad-weather carrier approaches.

AV-1 is to be completed and ready for proof-load testing by mid-2008, beginning an extended period of ground testing leading up to a first flight in November 2009. "It's a pretty slow pace compared to what we could do," says Winship. Paced by funding, assembly of AV-2, the second demonstrator, will begin after AV-1 taxis. "We will use all of our 2008 funding for ship 1," he says.

Northrop Grumman X-47B Video

First trap scheduled for November of 2009 highlights the patience in regards to the program. Should be interesting, there is a lot of potential here, but anyone who thinks the UCAS-N is going to replace the fighter pilot for interceptor roles anytime soon is mistaken. The AI is not there yet for the intercept role, and it will only take one battlefield mistake for the autonomous role for strike to be seriously examined.

In the meantime, the F-35 will still be needed, but ultimately may be the last major manned carrier aircraft purchased in significant numbers as it fills the several decade gap that will be required to get Artificial Intelligence to where it needs to be to support all warfighter roles.

Further Erosion For Royal Navy ASW Capabilities

When the MPs start talking, it is never a good thing for the military of the United Kingdom. The Financial Times has an interesting report on the condition of funding military operations.

Britain's armed forces are unlikely to be able to take on fresh operations because of their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, a parliamentary inquiry will warn today.

The Ministry of Defence acknowledged at the end of last year it was unlikely to meet one of its official targets, to be able to provide troops capable of responding to the full range of potential contingent operations, says the report from the influential Commons defence committee.

The real point though is that the MoD is underfunded, but they don't mention that little detail, instead the focus is that cost increases on platforms has created a £2 billion increase in major programs, and as the Guardian points out, the programs being looked at for cuts are programs of the Royal Navy.

The report, by the Commons defence committee, says the cost of ambitious weapons projects continues to rise, while Britain's soldiers and pilots are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the demands placed on them.

It says the MoD must be "realistic" about what weapons systems it can afford. The problems are compounded by expensive delays in developing Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, and in the Astute submarines and Type 45 destroyer programmes, which are already estimated to cost more than £2bn more than originally forecast, the report notes.

The choice facing ministers is limited since they have said that decisions to build a new four-boat Trident nuclear missile submarine fleet and two new aircraft carriers will not be overturned.

You see, they have no choice, choices are limited, because the choice to increase the funding for the Royal Navy doesn't even enter as a possibility. The lack of wisdom in government across the pond is incredible. So while Russia, China, and virtually every nation in the world, belligerent or otherwise, is building submarines at one of the fastest rates in human history, the British are looking to cut their top two primary ASW programs; the Astute class submarine and Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft. That makes a lot of sense, you know, considering Great Britain is an island nation already dependent upon imports from the sea, not just for economics but Great Britain is very shortly a net importer of food as well.

The sad part though, there is no bottom to the Royal Navy cuts in sight, the cuts come every year and there is no reason to expect there won't be more next year, or the year after, or every year forever. Expect Putin to praise the social system of European countries like Great Britain in the near future, it is by far the best weapon nations like Russia have in weakening the power of potential rivals in that part of the world.

Warship Design Decisions Are Never Easy, and Rarely Perfect

In World War II virtually every major category of warship (except for mine warfare) changed roles from the intended role leading into the war, to the utilized role by the end of the war. The most well known example is how the Aircraft Carrier and Battleship swapped roles. Prior to the war the aircraft carrier was intended to perform a scouting, support, and defensive role for the fleet to enable the Battleships to engage the enemy fleet, however by the end of the war the Aircraft carrier was the primary offensive platform against both land and sea targets.

The Battleship, originally intended to be the major offensive strike platform from sea, leveraged new technologies like radar to become a primary early warning vessel (a scouting role) for the fleet, and also transitioned into a supporting role for amphibious operations, while also becoming the primary AAW warship for the carrier fleets. While it is easy to be distracted by the big guns of the Iowa class, it was her killbox capability in AAW defense that made the ship a devastating platform by the end of the war.

What is less well known is how the roles of other combatants changed as well. Heavy Cruisers were originally designed to be scouts for the fleet, but by the end of the war the Heavy Cruiser had hardly done any scouting in any engagement of the war, rather had performed virtually every other role. The light cruiser was intended to be a destroyer leader, but by the end of the war was a primary AAW escort for aircraft carriers. Destroyers were originally designed to defend the van and rear of the battle line against torpedo attacks by other destroyers, but by the end of the war they were primarily a AAW and ASW defensive platform. Even submarines, intended to provide forward reconnaissance and an early strike platform against enemy warships were ultimately given the task to destroy merchant ships and disrupt enemy lines of communication.

One would think the Navy had learned the lessons of WWII, but there are a number of examples since WWII where a ship designed for a certain role in war has ultimately been used for an entirely different purpose.

We have previously described the example of the Oliver Hazard Perry class. Originally intended to be a convoy escort platform never intended to operate independently in a war zone, the ship class went on to do exactly that. In No Higher Honor by Bradley Peniston, the book does a masterful job outlining the decision making process behind the intended role of the Perry class frigates, and the role ultimately provided during the Tanker Wars.

Another modern example is the Spruance class destroyer. Originally designed to be the primary ASW defensive platform for the fleet, the combat record of the class tells a completely different story.

In October of 1987 the USS Leftwich (DD-984) and USS John Young (DD-973) participated with the guided missile destroyers USS Hoel (DDG-13) and USS Kidd (DDG-993) in Operation Nimble Archer. Both Sprunace class destroyers, despite the lack of adequate AAW defenses, sailed at night through the Strait of Hormuz to attack a pair of Iranian oil platforms. Using their 5" guns, the combined force put thousands of shells on both platforms before special forces were sent over to gather intelligence and destroy the platforms. After the attack, the destroyers returned the following night back through the Strait of Hormuz.

In 1991 and 1999 the Spruance class was also utilized in the Gulf War and Kosovo conflict respectively. Rather than defend against enemy submarines, as originally intended, the Spruance class was instead utilized as a launch vehicle for Tomahawk cruise missiles against enemy defenses. Throughout the entire career of the warship class, despite being designed and deployed specifically for ASW, the ship never engaged and sank a single submarine. There are numerous other examples. In 1966 the USS Tortuga LSD (26), a ship designed for Marine amphibious operations, was positioned at the mouth of the Co Chien River to support Navy riverine and coastal interdiction operations in operation Game Warden. The Burke class AAW destroyer has never shot down an aircraft, while the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) was used as a Sea Base to support Army, Marine, and SOF forces into Afghanistan following 9/11.

We note that in every case, the design which did not attempt to overemphasize a specific ship characteristic allowed these ships to be flexible and support some other role during the lifetime of the class. That is particularly true with surface combatants, even the limited multi-mission weapon payload ultimately allowed for independent operations, while the extra space of the Spruance class allowed it to ultimately support cruise missiles. The Arleigh Burke class today is being adapted to shoot down ballistic missiles, a role never envisioned when the class was originally built.

We are observing other examples today. Amphibious ships are designed and built solely for the purpose of amphibious warfare, which ironically is the least likely role these ship will be utilized for in their lifetime. Observing the last 6 deployments of an L class ship not related to a scheduled Expeditionary Strike Group deployment, five of the six ships deployed were done so for reasons in the service of the Navy rather than the Marine Corp, and if you go back further than the last half dozen deployments this trend holds true.

The Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) Partnership of the Americas deployment, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) African Partnership Initiative deployment, the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) 5th Fleet deployment (PDF), the current USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) 5th Fleet deployment, and the USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) deployment for CARAT have all been amphibious ship deployments in support of Navy operations, not specifically Marine operations. The only exception we have observed was the USS Wasp (LHD 1) deployment to ferry MV-22s to Iraq.

In other words, the we have observed the last 5 independent deployments by LSDs have been primarily for the purposes of providing a naval mission. The LSD, an amphibious ship with the major design characteristic being its rather large well deck or rather large cargo deck, depending upon class, is in fact becoming a major asset for the surface Navy utilized in a role never intended during the design of the platform.

We offer this observation for consideration because this week we intend to spend extra time discussing expeditionary warfare strategies. JROC will be getting together in February to discuss the MPF(F) composition, and because there are so many issues involved that are rarely discussed in the open source outside of large professional studies, we intend to discuss as many of the issues as possible.

After all, decisions at design time matter, but should never be made with the intention of perfection. It is with some irony we point out the last two incidents of the surface Navy employing their weapon systems are not Cruisers, Destroyers, or Frigates, rather the USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) against some skiffs off the coast of Somalia, and the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) firing some warning shots at a boat getting a bit too aggressive in the Straits of Hormuz. In both instances the ships were either positioned or positioning themselves for operations under the category of Sea Basing.

Why does that matter? Because the JROC should recognize today's surface Navy not only has active duty Captains with considerable modern day Sea Basing experience in the form of the afloat staging bases in the 5th fleet, but these Captains also have more real time combat experience at sea than most Captains in the Navy. We believe if JROC fails to utilize these officers as obvious resources for a discussion of modern Sea Basing it would be a tragedy of wisdom.

Video From Russian Naval Exercise

What, you don't speak Russian? Well that's ok, you'll still be able to figure out what's happening in this video from Russian TV.

Enjoy. I had to pause a few times to let the stream pre load.

To start the movie, hit the picture of the Moskva on the right.

HT: CaptainMaxwell at HHQ

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

The Truman Carrier Strike Group

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56) - 6th Fleet
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)
USS Montpelier (SSN 765)


Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Tarawa (LHA 1)
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Hopper (DDG 70)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F792)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
HMS Campbeltown (F86)
HMS Argyll (F231)
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

Those Loose Air Force Nukes

What Happened at Minot--an In From the Cold Special Report.

"Nathan Hale" breaks a story. This caught my attention.

“Only one nuke troop was promoted to Chief Master Sergeant (E-9) last year. Why stay in a career field where your chances of getting promoted are so low? They have cross-trained senior NCOs from missile maintenance and even supply to fill the [nuclear] ranks because the Air Force is cutting manpower in favor of UAVs and fighters.”

The result, he says, is a career field where experience levels are dropping, particularly among the NCOs and officers who provide critical leadership.

“No officer wants to be in nukes,” the source explained. “It’s boring, picky, and can be a real career ender. The glory is in the war. Even conventional munitions is better because they get a chance to deploy to the Middle East and build up bombs for combat. Nuke techs are a drag on resources because they typically don’t deploy. Senior officers fill the key slots just to fill a square on their resumes.”

Whenever the most dangerous, most critical, and most deadly aspect of your military branch becomes the least desirable for the highest quality people of your service, it is an invitation to mistakes. Considering the topic is nuclear weapons on US soil, mistakes are simply not an option.

There is a promotion process problem in the DoD that someone needs to get on top of, and it isn't just the Air Force. It is becoming too similar to the processes of promotion we see too often in public service, a seriously flawed government system of politics that all too often leads to accountability problems, a process in which an entity loses sight of its business priorities. When nukes go flying away unaccounted for on an air force base in the United States due to a leadership issue, the USAF has lost sight of its business priorities.

5th Fleet Focus: The European Surge

Following the conflict fought in 2006 between Israel and Lebanon, the Europeans shifted their naval deployment strategy. With a UNIFIL commitment and a lot of attention being paid to troop movements into the UNIFIL areas, the European Navies moved to support the UN peacekeeping operation. Since the conclusion of that conflict, only Britain, Germany, and France have operated warships for any extended period of time south of the Suez canal.

During that same period, Pakistan had increased their presence in Task Force 150, while Australia and Singapore have continuously deployed their naval forces to support Task Force 158 in the Northern Persian Gulf. The US Navy filled the gaps with a number of surges to the region while the Europeans dealt with the situation in Lebanon.

When we began the blog in June of 2007, our first Order of Battle for the 5th Fleet AOR indicates there were 2 CVNs, 3 CGs, 7 DDGs, 1 FFG, 1 LHD, 1 LPD, 2 LSDs, and 4 MCMs bringing the total theater contribution to 21 US Navy ships. Allied contributions however highlighted a different story, the Royal Navy had 2 frigates and 2 minesweepers, while Germany, France, and Australia each had only one frigate deployed regionally. Of the US naval forces listed, 1 CVN, 1 CG, 2 DDGs, 1 FFG, and 1 LSD were surge deployments.

In 2008 the European Navies are returning to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. We have previously discussed both the Orion 08 deployment and the German Training Cruise Flotilla, but we can now add the Italian Medal 08 deployment. In all, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy are deploying an aircraft carrier, 8 warships, and 2 minesweepers to the AOR by late February, and none are replacing the 6 European warships and 2 minesweepers already in the region. That is just the Europeans; Canada, Australia, and Japan all either have forces in the region, or on their way.

Why is this noteworthy? Because unless the US has a hidden Strike Group somewhere, by this time next month there will be more allied naval forces in the 5th Fleet AOR than US naval forces since 2001. We list the forces by nation:

US Navy
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75)
USS San Jacinto (CG 56) (*Black Sea)
USS Hue City (CG 66)
USS Carney (DDG 64)
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79)
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81)
USS Tarawa (LHA 1)
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)
USS Germantown (LSD 42)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Hopper (DDG 70)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)
USS Cole (DDG 67)
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)

(submarines and support ships not listed)

Royal Navy
HMS Illustrious (R06)
HMS Edinburgh (D97)
HMS Manchester (D95)
HMS Westminster (F237)
HMS Campbeltown (F86)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)

(submarines and support ships not listed)

France
FS Jean Bart (D615)
FS Surcouf (F711)
FS Guepratte (F714)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F792)

(submarines and support ships not listed)

Germany
FGS Augsburg (F 213)
FGS Hamburg (F 220)
FGS Köln (F 211)

(support ships not listed)

Italy
Comandante Borsini (P 491)

(support ships not listed)

Spain
SPS Mendez Nunez (F104)

Canada
HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)

Australia
HMAS Arunta (FFH 151)

Japan
JDS Murasame (DD 101)

(support ships not listed)

By my count the US Navy has 18 if you include the USS San Jacinto (CG 56), while Europe has 19, and Japan, Canada, and Australia combine for 3. By the way, I've done the math on the various support and command ships as well, and it looks like without counting Japan the numbers are close to equal in that regard as well.

This may not be the top number for the Europeans either, the Mistral will be making its deployment to Asia in February, the Dutch and the Danes both have deployments to the region scheduled for 2008, and the US Navy Global Fleet Station off east Africa is expected to begin this spring.

We note that come February 2008, the US Navy will have reduced the number of ships by 3 since June 2007, but allied nations will have increased their naval presence from 7 ships to at least 20, with Japan operating one ship and one support ship during both time periods. I don't know what you would call a three fold increase of naval power by the Europeans to the Indian Ocean, but we call it a European Surge.

What Gates and Bono Have In Common

In From the Cold has an interesting post up regarding the recent visit by Bono to the Pentagon, apparently where Bono had a 20 minute meeting with Secretary of Defense Gates. George Smiley (you have to love the spook nicknames) approaches the development with a healthy mix of skepticism and potential, and if it was anyone but Gates I would almost certain dismiss this as a development without a second thought, but our observation of Gates is 'he is one clever bastard' and we consider him one of the most impressive Presidential appointments in decades. Reuters has the story.

U2 lead singer and activist Bono visited the Pentagon to discuss Africa and the fight against global poverty with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, representatives of the two men said on Wednesday.

Among the topics at the 20-minute meeting on Tuesday afternoon were U.S. plans to set up a new U.S. military command for Africa, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said.

"I think this was a chance for two people who care about the problems facing the continent of Africa to talk about their shared interest in solving those problems," Morrell said of the meeting that was not publicized in advance.

A spokeswoman for DATA, the group co-founded by Bono to fight poverty and AIDS in Africa, said the singer had been in Washington to meet members of budget committees in Congress.

One could assume that this perhaps has something to do with AFRICOM, and it indeed may, but if Gates had done his homework and we are almost certain he does, he would have recognized that DATA is about AIDS, and when you are talking about AIDS one of the largest areas where AIDS related non governmental organizations have set up shop is in the nations around the Gulf of Guinea. It just so happens, the Navy is in that theater and AIDS is on the agenda. It's called the African Partnership Station, and it is unlikely Bono knows what he should about its purpose.

Consider this, the same week Gates is meeting with Bono about "issues involving poverty in Africa", the same Bono who sponsors one of the largest high profile AIDS organizations in the world (DATA), the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) is pulling into Sao Tome and Principe, a nation well known for AIDS issues.

We have discussed the African Partnership Station on this blog many times, but early on we specifically highlighted the desire of an international partnered, joint agency, and non-governmental organization approach, and in our example we specifically cited AIDS in in Sao Tome and Principe. At the time I discussed an observation made by a friend of mine who works in AIDS relief for an NGO in Sao Tome and Principe.

In that area there is a stigma from people regarding others with AIDS, and it leads to people with AIDS not getting treatments because they don't want others to know they have it.

He sees some of the other NGOs demonstrating the same stigma towards the API. While all the NGOs are trying to breakdown the stigma of AIDS, he sees some of the NGOs in hypocrisy because of their stigma over the US military.

The only weakness observed to date with the Global Fleet Station approach, and in particular the African Partnership Initiative is getting the NGOs to get involved. The European NGOs in particular are so skeptical of the US Military based on their perception of credibility issues that they would rather not work with the Americans for no other reason than their personal bias against the military.

If the African Partnership Initiative was able to get DATA involved in the process, and produce positive press regarding the enabling capability the US Navy can offer in their capacity, it could potentially break down the skepticism the Navy is encountering from the European NGOs and truly bridge the gap in creating a joint approach. The Navy desires to be the security enabler for the host nation, but also a logistical enabler for NGO contribution, leveraging civilian rather than military cooperation as a force enabler in connecting to African nations.

Did Gates and Bono discuss the African Partnership Initiative? Of the number of discussions about Africa where Gates and Bono could find common cause, we certainly believe it is one of the more likely topics the two could discuss and both contribute to the 20 minute discussion.