6th Fleet Focus: Observing Operations in the Med

This is something we intend to keep an eye on.

The US Navy is sending three warships to the eastern Mediterranean Sea in a show of strength during a period of tensions with Syria and political uncertainty in Lebanon.

Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters the deployment should not be viewed as threatening or in response to events in any single country in that volatile region.

"This is an area that is important to us, the eastern Med," he said when asked about news reports of the ship movements. "It's a group of ships that will operate in the vicinity there for a while," adding that "it isn't meant to send any stronger signals than that, but it does signal that we're engaged, we're going to be in the vicinity and that's a very, very important part of the world."

Another military officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because full details about the ship movements are not yet public, said the USS Cole is headed for patrol in the eastern Mediterranean and that the USS Nassau, an amphibious warship, would be joining it shortly. The officer said a third ship would go later, but he did not identify it by name.

The USS Cole (DDG 67) had been part of the HMS Illustrious (R06) Orion 08 deployment. That raises the possibility there are other ships from other countries that might react to the situation in Lebanon, and I am thinking specifically about France who has been all over Syria about staying out of Lebanon.

The third ship could be any number of ships. The USS San Jacinto (CG 56) is currently operating in the Black Sea. The USS Gonzalez (DDG 66) and USS Nicholas (FFG 47) both deployed to work with the NATO fleets recently. One of the other ships in the Nassau ESG that recently deployed could also be rotated into that theater.

However, we believe the most likely ship the Navy sends as the third ship will be the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41). The first order of business for the Navy if hostilities breaks out is evacuation, not confrontation, and the other three ships have specific missions that probably will go on without interruption unless hostilities breaks out. If that is indeed the 3rd ship, it will be several days before we learn of it because it will take several days to arrive to that location.

It is very interesting the USS Nassau (LHA 4) is being sent. We note, the ship does not have Marines onboard, in fact we aren't really sure what the Nassau has onboard for this deployment, so it will be interesting to see how the ship (and what tools) will be utilized in this type of peacemaking scenario. I know we are very interested.

We only have two requests for those ships moving into that theater. Keep a sharp eye out for ASMs and mines, because the last ASM fired and last mine found were both in the 6th fleet AOR.

The Most Important Naval Discussion in a Decade

I'm not sure but it is entirely possible that CDR Salamander and I are not as far apart as the titles of our observations may indicate. I don't disagree with his comments warning of legislative solutions, but we note change will only come from the legislature as long as Mullen, the architect of the 313-ship plan, is CJCS. I also observe, one cannot bring a strong bias against Murtha if one is to measure these comments in good faith.

In observing an article by Geoff Fein, I observed the beginning of what might be the most important naval discussion in the last decade. On Wednesday, John Murtha discussed the 313-ship plan, and in the process asked several good questions. We quote the 5 noteworthy comments from the article:

"A couple of suggestions staff has made is to take one of the DDG-1000s out and put in two more T-AKEs because they are stabilized platforms. I don't know if that is the right answer," he [Murtha] said. "Our industrial base is so small now, there is so little competition, and we obviously need competition. But on the other hand, we need to build as many ships as we can, so we need to look at all the options."

In its FY '09 budget, the Navy has requested $14.2 billion to build seven ships. Of that amount, $2.55 billion is for full funding of a third DDG-1000 and advanced procurement for the fourth ship of the class.

"If we took the ships the administration sent over, we would never get to what the Navy says it needs," he added. "So we are going to try...Bill and I are going to try...and convince the committee that we need three or four more ships. [We need to] find a way to get to take us to 313 ships in much less years."

"There are three (DDG-1000s) now in '09. If you take one out what does that do to the shipbuilding distribution," Murtha said. "If you take one out and go to two T-AKEs, what does that do to...capability of the force?"

If you take one of the other DDG-1000s out, it would fund a 10th LPD-17 and two T-AKEs, Murtha said. "We are looking how we can shift this and not affect you," he said. "What happens to the shipbuilding industry, how will it affect them?"

Lets break this down. Murtha is looking to do what must be done for the future fleet to have more than 313-ships, he is looking to cancel the DDG-1000. His idea is to replace the DDG-1000 in FY09 with 3 ships, the 10th LPD-17 and 2 additional T-AKEs, all of which the Navy has listed in its unfunded priorities listings.

This article is so damn good, if Geoff Fein could get an award for writing about the Navy, this would be the winner. The article gives us 5 very insightful comments from the Navy's point of view on the subjects Murtha discusses.

"NASSCO likely could not execute four in one year," Allison Stiller, deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), told lawmakers. "They would have to spread them out. We felt they could go to two year; that's why we put two in '09," she added.

Stiller said any reduction in DDG-1000s would be an issue for the surface combatant force as well as Bath, which is one of the Navy's surface combatant providers, she said.

After the hearing, McCullough told reporters the cost to do a Service Life Extension Program on the four amphibious ships was less than buying a new LPD-17. "It's around $1 billion to get 27 years of ship life out of those [ships], and that includes operations and maintenance...it might be $1.2 billion, but it's a billion dollars," McCullough said "Currently one LPD-17, on our unfunded list, is $1.7 billion. So for me to get 27 years of ship life is about a billion...by extending the estimated service life of those four ships. To buy a new one is $700 million more, and that's not counting the operations and maintenance."

While the CNO supports Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway's requirement for 11 aviation capable amphibious ships, 11 LSD-class and 11 LPD-class ships, the Navy has to balance that in its budget, McCullough added.

LPD-25 doesn't deliver until 2012, so there is a backlog of ships, she added.
The Navy wouldn't be shutting down the LPD-17 production line once the final ship is built, Stiller noted.

Lets break this down. According to Allison Stiller, NASSCO cannot build more than 2 T-AKEs in one year, and there are already 2 T-AKEs in the FY09 budget. While the Navy claims to support the 10th LPD-17 (and supposedly the 11th too) requirement of the Marine Corps, they would prefer to extend the lives of 4 older ships an average of only 6.75 years per hull, even though they will still be retired within the next decade (basically a plan to stall the problem), than to get a new ship that would last for the next 40 years. The Navy does not intend to shut down the LPD-17 production line in the future, meaning the Navy intends to use the LPD-17 for other purposes in the future (BMDCGN? Hospital ship? Command Ship?).

Additionally, the Navy can't stop production of the DDG-1000 because it will hurt Bath Iron Works, which we agree is an important consideration. Is it just me, or is the solution plainly apparent to everyone, just waiting for someone to shout it out loud?

We believe any major changes to the 313-ship plan will require solutions that benefit the Navy, the Industry, and Congress. If it cannot do all three, it will never happen. In this case, assuming it is even possible, we see a solution that might do exactly that.

Congress needs options. Lets face it, for the last decade Congress failed to give itself low mix alternatives by not forcing the Navy to produce designs for frigate sized warships. This is a lesson that needs to be learned, retained, and never repeated, and if necessary forced upon the Navy starting this fiscal year. Congress must always have options in regards to building ships, because it can never be assumed that all programs will work out.

The Industry needs work. The idea that $2.5+ billion dollars annually for the next five years tied up in only 5 warships will help the industry, helping competition, and sustaining the workforce is dead wrong. The only way to boost shipbuilding is to build more ships, it is the only factor that is universal, while all other factors can only contribute to industry stability as long as that factor exists. The DDG-1000 must be canceled, and the Navy must build any ships above and beyond 313 before 2020 as afterwards all money must go directly to replacements.

The Navy 313-ship plan doesn't even meet the requirements of the Navy's own maritime strategy, so the Navy really can't even defend it intellectually. I'll debate any Admiral all day long on the merits of building more battleships for an already battleship centric fleet within the context of the new maritime strategy, and I'd win that debate even though Admirals are a hell of a lot smarter than me. The sole reason I'd win is because the position really can't be defended due to strategy. The Navy may defend specific metrics of specific programs, but all they do in those discussions is raise even more compelling questions whether the current approach matches strategy.

Seems to me the answer is obvious. Cancel the DDG-1000 after two ships. Take the $2.55 billion this year, spend $1.7 billion on LPD-26 to recover the $1 billion that would be used on the 4 old amphibious ships. Take the recovered $1 billion and leftover $855 million and build 1 General Dynamics LCS MMC and 1 Lockheed Martin LCS MMC. Build the General Dynamics ship at Bath to insure they have some work, and equally important, let Lockheed Martin decide where to build its ship based on where export orders for Israel and India may come from.

Seems to me building two more first in class now would be a good idea, to at minimum offer an alternative to the low mix to the LCS concept, but also very important, set the industry up for potential exports of MMC versions. It would be hard for the industry to complain, as it begins the process of spreading the work around, and most importantly, gives the Navy a fifth-rate to evaluate as part of its future fleet constitution, something we believe is very important in the context of strategy. We see this as a winning approach from all sides, if it can be done. We also note that if it is to be done this year, it would only happen if John Murtha pushed for it.

Where are the Cruisers?

By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean nothing but an enunciation of the fundamental principles which underlie all naval war. Those principles, if we have determined them correctly, should be found giving shape not only to strategy and tactics, but also to material, whatever method and means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation exhibiting a tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely differing conditions of method and material, we should be able to show that those forms bear a constant and definite relation to the principles which our theory endeavours to express.

In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation is not far to seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers are the eyes of the fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of naval warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as being to scout for a battle-fleet. It is perfectly true that the control depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far as is necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. But it does not follow that this is the primary function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet which it cannot do for itself.

Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function of cruisers by the highest authorities. In Nelson's practice at least their paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with his battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not that his cruisers were not numerous in proportion to his battleships—they were usually nearly double in number—but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare necessity. The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. It was that the escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was charged to maintain. His judgment may have been at fault, but the strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his record, no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical view.

- Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by Julian Corbett

This blog adopted Bob Work's rating system for surface combatants (with permission) primarily for discussions like this, exploring fleet constitution through the prism of history and strategy. Julian Corbett defined first, second, third, and fourth rate ships as those that constitute the battle-line, and he described Cruisers as fifth and sixth rate vessels, with everything below that as unrated.

Using our rating system, we believe the same theories of Maritime Strategy he described above fits well for modern rating for ships in comparison. Based on our rating system, the Navy today has either commissioned or has ordered 86 first and second rate battleships consisting of 22 CG-52s, 62 DDG-51s, and 2 DDG-1000s. The Navy's strategy for fleet constitution in the future is to build 55 seventh rates (what Corbett would call unrated, or the flotilla) in the form of the Littoral Combat Ship. The US Navy has decided to build a fleet without the Cruisers that have dominated all previous naval eras. We note this because upon no era of naval history has a fleet without cruisers, or a ship capable of filling the sum of the roles Corbett assigns to Cruisers, has ever established and maintained Command of the Sea over an adversary during an extended period of naval war.

We therefore find ourselves constantly asking the question; Where is the cruiser? The Navy appears to have determined (without explanation) that the Principles of Maritime War have changed so much due to modern technology that Command of the Sea can be achieved with only battleships, and with that Corbett's principles regarding the roles of Cruisers within a fleet are no longer valid, indeed replaced by unrated platforms. Our problem with this view is that it must be done in the absence of historical study, as it has been proven for hundreds of years of maritime warfare that the Principles of Maritime War have not changed as maritime eras, often defined by technology changes, have.

It is important to note that historically, even in the more modern eras of war at sea, whether one is discussing WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, or the Tanker Wars with Iran; the Cruiser as defined by Corbett continued to establish itself as the primary warfighter vessel required for command of the sea. Without any explanation why, this principle of maritime war is absent US Navy future plans.

We find the apparent lack of applied historical study to current fleet constitution in this context as unwise, but don't take our word for it...

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day.

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, by Alfred Thayer Mahan

We acknowledge that both Mahan and Corbett make a greater point within and outside these quotes that Navy's should apply the technologies of a particular era to their fleets constitution, and therefore the application of their principles of maritime strategy support the argument for the Littoral Combat Ship concept, a concept of a mothership for unmanned vehicles. However in the scope of applying those principles, it leads us right back to our original question regarding the principle characteristics that govern success within the context of fleet constitution.

That question being... Where are the Cruisers?

Funding Submarnies The Smart Way

Lawmakers from Connecticut and Rhode Island are getting out front of the FY09 budget to protect last years funding for moving up the date to build 2 Virginia class submarines a year. If this is right, we like the approach.

In addition to protecting current funding, submarine backers are seeking more money as Congress crafts a new defense spending bill for fiscal year 2009.

Submarine supporters want $79 million in new funding to speed up construction on a second sub. They're also seeking an additional $53 million for design work on next-generation submarines.

While the number of SSNs matters a lot, what is very important is R&D and sustainment of the design base for submarines, and we like that the lawmakers are looking for money in that area. As we have observed with the Virginia class, investment of millions in the submarine design base can save billions in submarine construction costs, and in effect that is exactly what we are seeing with the Virginia Block III. For example, the roughly 200 million spent the last decade on submarine R&D will result in savings of between $4-5 billion for the first 7 years of two submarine annual construction rates.

Not only are the Block III Virginia class submarines less expensive, but they are more capable. In our opinion, R&D in shipbuilding is an excellent investment, not only for Congress and the Industry, but also for the Navy.

India and Russia Make Nice, For Now

Everything looks to be back on track.

India and Russia have ended a protracted dispute over the cost of a Soviet-era aircraft carrier which will be now sold at a higher price to the Indian navy in 2011, officials said Thursday.

Indian Defence Secretary V. K. Singh, returning from Moscow, said a new undisclosed price had been agreed for the 44,570-tonne Admiral Gorshkov.

Does anyone honestly believe India is goign to ever get the Admiral Gorshkov? I don't, the good faith in this deal existed last time too. We will have to wait and see, but there are no positive signs one can point to why this will work out. This part is just funny.

"India is sending more than 100 trained personnel from its shipyard to the Sevmash shipyard to join 1,200 Russian personnel who are working on that ship," a ministry official said.

So let me get this straight... India is sending 100 shipworkers to Severodvinsk, most of whom probably don't speak Russian, to work on an aircraft carrier during winter at the most northern shipyard in the world? Let me know how that works out.

Here is what we know. The 1200 folks who work for Sevmash shipyard have all been working on the Borei class SSBNs under construction there. No one has been working on the Admiral Gorshkov for months, and Russia has already spent all the money India originally paid. The Russian budget is getting another boost this year, and if it turns out to be anything like last year, a lot of the money will go to Sevmash shipyard so Russia can rapidly field the Borei class, which is Russia's top defense priority.

There is a shortage of skilled shipbuilding labor in Russia. In fact, as we understand it the problem is Russia went years without being able to properly train shipbuilders. Given the choice, which project does India believe Sevmash shipyard is going to assign its best workers, a new SSBN for the motherland or an old carrier for a foreign country?

The fighter deal part of the Kitty Hawk horse trade won't be decided until either the end of this year or next year, lets see how the construction of the Gorshkov has come along at that time before closing the book.

Because there are no positive signs, and let me use the word none for clarity, that give confidence to the future delivery of the Gorshkov to India, we still maintain this isn't over, and every rupee poured into Russia on this project is a rupee wasted. We still believe this will end badly for India. Guess we will have to wait and see.

The Congressional Quote of the Day

Murtha has a few interesting comments for the Navy.

"We hope we can come to agreement with yourselves and the Senate to get at least 10 ships" next year, Murtha told Navy leaders at a budget hearing. "Our industrial base is so small now. We need to build as many ships as we can. We need to look at all the options."

Murtha also expressed concern about long-range Navy plans that would reduce the aircraft carrier fleet from 11 to 10 temporarily.

"I worry you're talking about going down to 10 carriers," he said. "I know how expensive they are. On the other hand, you can only force yourselves out there so often," he said of ship deployments. "You're going to have breakdowns."

As we have previously highlighted, Congress wants 10 ships this year, not 7. I honestly have no idea how this will happen until either Congress or the Navy kills the evil infection within the shipbuilding plan.

Yep, that one.

Why the USS Enterprise Is Part of the Big Picture in FY09

The most recognizable ship in the Navy may in fact become one of the most discussed aspects of the FY09 budget. Hidden within the FY09 Long Range Shipbuilding Plan is a little nugget that raises several legitimate questions regarding future fleet constitution. In fact, this is something we are well aware is on the minds of many both in the Navy and in Congress.

The minimum aircraft carrier force level requirement remains at 11 ships. However, the Navy is seeking a Congressional waiver to decrease the carrier force to 10 operational carriers between the inactivation of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) in November 2012 and the delivery of GERALD R FORD (CVN 78) in September 2015. During this 33-month period, Navy will mitigate the operational impact of the shortfall through selective rescheduling of carrier maintenance availabilities and by applying the inherent flexibility of the Fleet Response Plan. This risk mitigation strategy will support presence and surge requirements during this short time period, although it is not sustainable over a long period of time.

33 months is 2.75 years. That is a lot of time to only operate 9 CVNs, after all, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) will be having a nuclear fuel conversion during this time, so the reduction isn't to 10, it is actually 9. We also believe the Navy might be exaggerating the Fleet Response Plan a bit, because basically what they are saying is the deployment tempo will be very high for CVN sailors during that period.

I have heard so many aspects of this discussion I'm not really sure what is real and what is speculation, so I figure I'll share all of it as speculation and we can observe what happens. These are not conspiracy theories, this is open speculation I have heard both in and out of the Navy and Congress. I would bet most media who have covered the Navy have heard variations of this speculation.

First, we must review and understand the Ford class replacements. The first Ford Class CVN began funding in FY08 (this year) and will continue for FY09, FY10, and FY11. The second Ford class CVN is funded in FY12, FY13, FY14, and FY15. The third Ford class CVN is funded in FY16, FY17, FY18, and FY19. If the Navy stays with the split year funding spread over 4 years, which we believe they will, there will not be any CVN funding in FY20. Advanced procurement or funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 is included in the FY09 annual 5 year plan. We believe all three Ford class carriers will be built. CVN-78 is expected to enter service in FY15, CVN-79 is expected to enter service in FY19, while CVN-80 will enter service in FY23. By FY19, when CVN-79 enters service, the Navy is expected under current plans to have 12 operational CVNs.

This is where the speculation begins. Many people, both in the Navy and in Congress, believe one aspect of this Congressional waiver is to get Congress used to the idea of only 10 CVNs. When the USS Ford (CVN 78) enters service in FY15, the Navy will be back up to 11 total CVNs according to current plans, with the USS George Washington (CVN 73) ready for a refueling. The current theory is the Navy would not refuel the USS George Washington (CVN 73) and retire her at that time and maintain a 10 CVN force. The Navy could then choose not to refuel the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and maintain 10-11 CVNs through 2023, when CVN-80 comes online and replace the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) who would also be retired early.

The idea behind that speculation is the Navy would maintain a force of 10 CVNs and save costs on two Nimitz class that require Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH), Going forward the Navy would evaluate their strategy for Naval Aviation. For big deck carriers, construction of CVN-81 would begin as currently planned in FY21. However, the Navy may also choose to develop a new small deck class of aircraft carriers that capitalize on smaller UCAS-N aircraft beginning construction in FY21.

There would be some cost savings under that plan, a combination of fixed refueling costs and operational cost savings of retiring two Nimitz class CVNs half way into their life span. We note neither of these costs would save on shipbuilding budget costs. For that, we have heard another idea floated.

Existing funding plans for the first three Ford class CVNs and Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) for all Nimitz class CVNs would continue as normal through the FY19 budget. The Navy would then choose not to spend shipbuilding budget money on CVNs as planned in FY21 for CVN-81 or in FY25 for CVN-82. By not building two Ford class CVNs in the 2020s, the Navy is able to save at least 20 billion dollars in the shipbuilding budget at a time when all the CGs, several DDGs, and most of the SSBNs are being funded for replacement. This plan would allow the Navy to maintain 10 big deck CVNs until around Fy2035, when the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) would retire, meaning the Navy wouldn't have to pay for another aviation ship from FY19 until FY29, by which time the Navy would have developed a lower cost aviation ship for deploying UCAS-N systems.

Do we believe any of this? Yep, the Navy is clearly run by bean counters who favor the surface combatant fleet first and foremost, so we'd agree that some of this is possible to happen. We'd also suggest that the big issue begins by the Navy not approaching Congress with a strategy regarding the aging USS Enterprise (CVN 65) during the gap period.

The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) returned home from its deployment in late December 2007. The Enterprise completed the second of 2 major deployments back to back, the first being from May 2006 until November 2006, then again from July 2007 to December 2007. That is basically 14 months deployment time over a 20 month period, and between November 2006 and July 2007 the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) conducted several training cruises off the east coast. The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) will enter the yard this year and basically be out of action for all of 2008, and won't make another deployment until mid to late 2009.

Rather than asking for a "Congressional waiver to decrease the carrier force to 10 operational carriers" simply to retire the CVN early, we would encourage the Navy to ask Congress to invest in the USS Enterprise as a test platform for developing Sea Basing technologies, which would remove it from the operational carrier list but retain the ship for redundancy purposes until 2015. This would remove the need by the Navy to maintain many of the aging aspects of the USS Enterprise, most of which are centered around carrier aviation support. In fact, we would suggest Congress forces this on the Navy to insure the Navy is applying its best ideas to the Sea Basing concept, which is largely missing from the Maritime Strategy. This also gives the Navy a reserve during a period of naval build up around the world, a 'just in case' ace card but at a lower cost to maintain. We would term this a 'Conditional Congressional waiver" instead of simply granting wishes.

We note in all periods of major transition between maritime era's, which is what we call this period of transition after the cold war, naval superiority has historically been retained through operational Research and Development. It is why we would love to see the DDG-1000 in the FY09 budget get the axe in favor of other platforms, including more T-AKEs, LPD-17s, and technology demonstrators of both Littoral Combat Ship Multi-mission combatant versions, all of which offer more to the current war and current maritime environment than the DDG-1000 does. Technology Demonstrators, Prototypes, and the development of new technologies (particularly unmanned) will be critical for the fleet after 2020 for warfighting, around the same time the peer competition is expected to be more clear for the US Navy.

By applying the term technology demonstrator to the first two DDG-1000s, and leveraging the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) as a technology demonstrator for Sea Basing, and building variants of the Littoral Combat Ship to produce operational alternatives at the low end of the fleet, the Navy builds up its most flexible forces currently engaged in the current war (logistics and amphibious ships) while developing multiple technology demonstrators for the future fleet which offers options and flexibility to the Navy who may need to adapt to an emerging maritime era.

We expect the USS Enterprise 'conditional waiver' debate to give us insight regarding not only the future of naval aviation, but also provide us insights regarding the Congressional view of the Navy in the future. Nothing says hard power like an aircraft carrier or a major surface combatant. In that way, how Congress and the Navy reconcile the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) discussion and the 3rd DDG-1000 in FY09 should provide us some revealing insight regarding what the future fleet will look like.

Lockheed Martin Strikes Back

Just in case you were wondering who is out front defending the Littoral Combat Ship, Proceedings opens our eyes. The most interesting section of Proceedings last year was easily the Comment & Discussion section. We note the content so far in 2008 has been outstanding, so naturally other articles have caught our interest, but the March 2008 Comment & Discussion section delivers an eye opening tidbit.

We previously linked to two articles on the Littoral Combat Ship in the January 2008 edition of Proceedings. In the first one, we noted an excellent article by Lieutenant James Rushton to "Fill the Middle Gap: Rediscover the Corvette" in the spirit of Thomas Barnett. His article was excellent, well articulated, and leveraged strategic thinking in his approach. The second article, which we linked to indirectly, is by Coast Guard Captain James C. Howe regarding the use of the NSC as an alternative to the LCS. Admittedly, we aren't sold on this idea, and are unlikely to be.

What concerns us though is that in March 08 Proceedings, the arguments in defense of the Littoral Combat Ship against both articles comes directly from Lockheed Martin. Specifically, Dan Schultz, Vice President and General Manager, Lockheed Martin, Maritime Security and Ship Systems, disagrees with Lt. Rushton; while Captain Moosally who is president of Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors, responsible for delivery of Freedom (LCS-1), and is also responsible for the C4ISR systems on board the first National Security Cutter, doesn't like Captain Howe's argument.

Does it bother anyone else that the most vocal, and apparently in the eyes of the Proceedings editors, most important defenders of the Littoral Combat Ship work for Lockheed Martin? Both Captain Moosally and Mr. Schultz make good arguments, well Capt. Moosally does anyway, but shouldn't the defense of the Littoral Combat Ship come from somewhere other than the handful of people who work on the program? How about a comment from the strategic office in the Navy maybe, or perhaps a comment from a SWO maybe?

I honestly can't argue with Capt. Moosally's argument, he makes a great point.

Design changes to incorporate NVR would result in huge cost increases to the NSC. The notion of waiving these requirements is unlikely in consideration for crew safety during a naval combat engagement. The Navy did not waive the NVR requirements for the 40 Sailors on board the LCS, and I doubt it would consider such a waiver for the nearly150 Sailors on board an NSC configured as a light patrol frigate...

It is quite feasible to examine reducing the speed requirement and increasing the endurance of LCS. However, we must avoid undertaking an NSC redesign for a mission far outside its design parameters. Such redesign efforts have not enjoyed much success over time, and should not be repeated.

Exactly right, after NVR that NSC will be more expensive than its contribution, and it is much smarter to look at adjusting the endurance of the LCS to match an endurance requirement than trying to scale up to NVR with a ship already at the upper ends of the cost curve.

However we aren't impressed with Mr. Shultz's argument. To be transparent here I'll admit that I've met Dan, he is very smart, and this is a talking point that comes with his job, not something I believe he would conclude if he studied it in the context of maritime strategy. He really is a sharp guy, so we will not be holding this comment against him longer than this single post.

Ironically the LCS is precisely the ship that Lieutenant Rushton describes and our Navy needs. The LCS is designed to support a variety of missions across all three tiers, from high intensity (counter mine, antisubmarine, anti-surface warfare) to low intensity (humanitarian, interdiction, disaster relief, etc) and everything in between where "just being there" is important. Mission flexibility will be of paramount importance to the Navy because likely budget constraints will not permit ships designed for each tier. The modular nature of the LCS, and its ability to swap mission packages in 24 hours, will provide the type of flexibility that will become increasingly important.

I have some facts you won't find in Lockheed Martin's brochure. Freedom is at the top of its weight requirement with MIW mission module already, and the MIW module is incomplete. Freedom lacks the birthing for the required module crew, short 4 spaces. It has already been well documented that the ship has an enormous logistical train, so it will be hard to "be there" when it lacks endurance and can't fix the on board module equipment. Mission flexibility, which is important to the Navy, is not the same as platform flexibility. Budget restraints may prevent the design of a dedicated small ship for each tier, however budget constraints do not prevent the Navy from addressing each tier of warfare. Furthermore, the platform (LCS) has absolutely nothing to offer MIW, ASuW, or ASW because it comes only with a RAM missile system, 57mm, and large payload bay which isn't even unique to the LCS, and could easily be any HSV. Everything used to meet those mission profiles are independent from the LCS hull. Mission package swaps that require 24 hours do not in fact count the time it takes to go to a friendly port to do the swap, assuming the modules are there ready to go, then get back to where the mission package is needed. The measurement of days will turn into weeks for multiple platforms because in fact, there are no LCS tenders in the budget and the Navy is on a slow track for procurement of mission modules. In fact, the most expendable aspect of the entire LCS concept is the LCS hull itself.

Dan, if you read this, say this sentence out loud and tell me if it sounds right. "The entire low mix of the Navy's surface combatant fleet should be an unrated vessel, as that is a good tactical and strategical approach for fleet constitution." Sometimes people need to say things out loud, because it helps clarify whether an idea is good or not. The US Navy plan for the LCS contradicts every historical example one can cite, the sum total of all maritime strategy, to believe they can achieve command of the sea in a shooting war solely with first and second rate battleships and the Littoral Combat Ship, which is essentially an unrated vessel.

That is why we know, without question, the Littoral Combat Ship comes from either the industry or the civilians in the Pentagon, and NOT from the Navy, because no one who actually studies maritime strategy would ever advocate for the entire flotilla of a fleet to be unrated.

Dan, think MMC!

You're Supposed To Read The Tea Leaves

Thomas Barnett calls it: The United States needs a new definition of Grand Strategy. When we learned a few weeks ago he was writing a book on the subject, we have to admit we hope it isn't too little too late. We observe one of the most obvious problems with the new Maritime Strategy is the absence of context.

Barnett is highlighting a new White Paper released by the US Air Force. We note similarities in this document to the Navy's own new Maritime Strategy. We find it noteworthy that in the public strategic planning documents, neither the Air Force or the Navy can publicly name the challengers, and struggle to identify the challenges. Lack of context for strategy has lead to confusion in understanding the purpose of the individual service strategies (ends). The lack of context also fails to convince why the services need to reengineer their methods (ways). Finally, the lack of context in these strategic documents does not offer Congress a compelling reason to rightsize the technologies required for strategy execution (means). Context, ends, ways, means. The Navy only got the ends and ways right, and the Air Force appears fixated on the means.

We agree with Dr. Barnett. Just to start the conversation with what is outlined in the maritime strategy, one basically has to be a student of either Barnett or Huntington to even begin to understand the context of what is being sold as strategy. That is why we have added their most important works on the right side of the blog, so at least we can claim we are trying to help people understand the Maritime Strategy. A military service strategy, for example a maritime strategy, must articulate the strategic purpose of the service; must do so by outlining the strategic methods that will be required for execution; and must define the strategic technologies that will be required by that service to achieve the goals; and should do all of this in context of a Grand Strategy.

We have observed that as the Navy explains its Maritime Strategy, they start by defining its context first, or in other words creating a Grand Strategy as context for the Navy's individual strategy.

We believe until the Navy or the Air Force can articulate the context of their strategy, why they are shifting their priority away from the “functioning core” of globalization toward the “non-integrating gaps” of globalization, and within that context connect the ends, ways, and means as strategy; both services will continue to trip as they attempt to articulate the future.

For context to our point, this is what will happen when strategy fails to impress.

Where Will This End?

The budget battles in regards to the Royal Navy are just difficult to watch. The discussion of late has shifted to base closures, but that is just a distraction from the retreat from the oceans by Great Britain. While observing some of the most recent commentary, I found these statistics depressing.

Since 1987 the Royal Navy has, under both Tory and Labour governments, suffered cuts that have reduced it by 42 per cent.

Put another way, the Navy has lost 54 per cent of its frigates and destroyers (down from 54 in 1987 to 25 today and soon just 20) plus 66 per cent of its submarines (down from 38 nuclear-powered and conventional boats in 1987 to just 13 attack boats and Trident submarines today).

The Royal Navy is about to further reduce surface combatant force by 20% in a single year by removing four Type 22 frigates and one Type 23 frigate from the existing fleet. This will be in addition to the reduction of total Type 45s to only 6 ships, and the reduction in total SSNs built.

Does anyone honestly believe these will be the last of the cuts? I'm starting to think the CVF will not be built, and the delay is simply a way to push the option to cut the program into the next fiscal year.

Russian Defense Budget Continues To Increase

The direction of defense spending in Russia continues to go one way, up.

Russia's Defense Ministry will spend around one trillion rubles ($40 bln) of federal budget funds in 2008, 20% more than in 2007, a ministry official said on Tuesday.

"The Defense Ministry will spend a little less than one trillion rubles in 2008, which is about 20% more than last year," Deputy Defense Minister Lyubov Kudelina said.

She also said that in 2008-10, military spending would account for 15.5-16% of aggregate federal budget expenditure.

The Navy still expects to get 25% of the full military budget. For comparison purposes, last year the Navy spent around 13 billion rubles on shipbuilding, 10 billion of that on new SSBNs. It will be interesting to see how the budget increase effects shipbuilding, and if SSBNs continue to dominate the Russian shipbuilding budget.

Hat tip Rick

Russian Papers Respond to Kitty Hawk

You really should read the original Russian, but if you can't, there are English versions of the story out there. This article pretty much makes it clear, if India goes with the Kitty Hawk instead of the Gorshkov, Russia will bury the Mig-29 contract, but not stop there. Basically Russia is playing hardball. This probably isn't the most politically correctl reactions, but it is certainly very Russian.

Within the framework of bilateral cooperation, a few large contracts are presently being implemented, including licensed production of Su-30MKI fighters, T-90S tanks in India and delivery of Smerch multiple launch rocket systems.

"If the initiative of President George Bush ruins these plans, the military and technical cooperation Between Moscow and Delhi will drop to the level of mere after-sales follow-up of the hardware delivered to India before," the paper said.

That is not a small thing. India has a lot of money invested in its military ties with Russia, and Russia appears ready to play hardball. The article basically reports on the Weekly Standard article we discussed last week, then tosses around the threats.

This might be more bluster than substance, India has a tremendous amount of money lined up for military purchases over the next few years, it is hard to believe that Russia would sacrifice up to $10 billion in sales on the fighter purchase alone over what amounts to about $600 million on the aircraft carrier.

As the AP is reporting, Gates is in India, and he is basically playing the role of ambassador. The AP article notes it is unlikely the winner of the $10 billion fighter purchase will be announced anytime soon, and cited next years election in India as a reason. The topic of the Kitty Hawk remains out of the public discussion among government officials in both the US and India. From our perspective, the lack of any denial is a sign that the US is ready to allow negotiations between India and Russia to play out while the Kitty Hawk is still commissioned. This approach makes sense to us, time is on the side of the US in this deal, not Russia, and the time frame is defined by India, not the US or Russia.

Focus on Shipbuilding

National Defense Magazine has an excellent article out in the March 08 issue on shipbuilding. As you might guess, it isn't pretty. Alan L. Gropman educates the reader on a number of issues, from shipbuilding construction worldwide to an internal look at the issues specific to US shipbuilding. There are about 6 points within this article that make it a must read, but this part stuck out for our discussion.

As a result of labor shortages at U.S. yards, domestically built ships will become more expensive, which makes it even less likely the United States can recapture a major market share of global shipbuilding. According to shipyard executives, companies are having difficulties finding younger workers who are interested in providing the manual labor required to build ships, at the current wages that the industry pays.

Maintaining the country’s shipbuilding industrial base will probably not be achieved unless domestic shipbuilders can maintain a certain threshold level of industrial activity. When a country stops building a certain class of vessel, it can rapidly lose its intellectual ability to resuscitate the industrial capability.

One major challenge is the cost/quantity paradox with respect to building warships. Ships cost more today because of low volume procurements. This is a significant factor that drives up costs because of increased overhead expenses to maintain the country’s shipbuilding industrial base. The current Navy fleet consists of 276 ships — the lowest since 1929. The Congressional Budget Office in 2006 concluded that unless shipbuilding budgets increase significantly in real terms, or the Navy designs and builds much cheaper ships, the size of the fleet will fall substantially.

You can talk about build rates and fleet size all day, but at the end of the day the real challenge is maintaining qualified people in the industry. Congress can artificially add or subtract ships from a Navy or Coast Guard annual budget, and in fact they do, but if the industry doesn't find a way to maintain qualified people in the yards and within the design base, it doesn't matter how many ships Congress wants at some later date, the expertise required to fill those orders won't be there, and the quality of product won't meet requirements. Loss of skill in the workforce is certain to lead to higher costs and lower quality, regardless of any other factor, which makes the workforce issue the most important.

Alan L. Gropman produces this story as part of a comprehensive study recently completed by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The report is very interesting, and provides a number of areas of guidance for Congress. We note that it is the oil and natural gas industry that appears to drive a large percentage of the commercial shipbuilding market in the US, too bad that industry is under assault by political interests.

However, as we see it, Congress needs to find a way to offer the Navy some flexibility in fleet design while maintaining the industrial base. The challenge for Congress is not to create 30 year plans of shipbuilding for the purpose of the industry, rather insure that the Navy orders warships for 30 years well rooted within the context of strategy. We believe that within the context of that process, the Navy will produce more ships to support the industry, and will find more success on Capital Hill for the money that will be required for a healthier shipbuilding industry.

The Stone Age Approach to Networking

The "Conversation with the Country" continues, in Portland. I really want to attend one of these instead of always getting footnotes. This is a very Mahan approach to strategy, which unfortunately I can't seem to find in the download section of the Maritime Strategy section on the Navy's website.

Linking the past with the future, Dr. Karl F. Walling, professor in the department of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, began the discussion of future strategic possibilities by presenting a "Backward Look at Forward-Thinking Strategies." Walling discussed historical approaches to maritime decision-making and highlighted fundamental issues faced by the country's forefathers.

"We look to history to see the present and future more clearly and find that it is normal and proper to have these conversations, as these are the same conversations previously had by former leaders," he said. "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" emphasizes core capabilities from previous strategies - forward presence, deterrence, sea control and power projection - in addition to two maritime strengths that have been newly elevated to core capabilities - maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster response.

That sounds fantastic, context for strategy, bravo! Where can I download that podcast, or youtube, or how about a PDF? Can someone explain why the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are actively rejecting the internet as a communication tool? Given the number of Congressional staffers reading blogs daily, that's just dumb.

Too bad the context for strategy is limited to only the several dozen in a certain city. Most active duty officers I know haven't seen this presentation as part of the Maritime Strategy that they are being asked to execute.

Implementation of this strategy will require that the sea services demonstrate flexibility, adaptability and unity of effort in evolving to meet the enduring and emerging challenges and opportunities ahead. At the end of the conversation, Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Robert D. Papak, director, Joint Capabilities Assessment and Integration Directorate, challenged the audience to continue the conversation about maritime strategy with others.

Marinelink is clearly doing an editorial bit here, we guess to sell the story, not exactly a good day for journalism. Adaptable and flexible requirements? I totally agree, but where is it? Deepwater, DDG-1000, LCS, Increase Manning for the Marines, Sea Basing; all of this existed before the strategy and still exists afterwards, so where is the change?

Are we honestly supposed to believe that "Conversations with the Country" is the best approach all three services could come up with in communicating the maritime strategy? In the 21st century, this is the joint services best foot forward for networking ideas with the public? Is there an Admiral or General who would kindly claim that out loud in front of Congress? I think it would be hard for that Admiral or General to keep their job if they actually claimed to Congress these in person conversations are the best approach to reaching the American people, because the media would crucify that person for advocating a strategy for the 21st century while executing a communication strategy that utilizes the best practices of the era prior to the telegraph.

Apparently the joint services find incredible value selling the new maritime strategy to "Rotary International" and the "Portland World Affairs Council" (not a joke, read the story!). I'm not really sure what this story says to most veterans, who like the rest of us use http, but it was a 26 year navy veteran from my lodge who emailed me this story (that's smtp for those in the Navy over the age of 50), and his opinion was not family friendly. Am I being sarcastic and condescending? Hell yes, and it is a direct reflection of the opinions in my inbox.

The French Military Sales Market Runs Underwater

Previously covered here, DCNS has worked out all the contract details to support the refit of a pair of Type 209/1300s for the Ecuadorian Navy. DefenseNews reports the refits will take place in Chile.

The contracts, signed Dec. 22, were worth more than 10 million euros ($14.8 million) to DCNS, the French company said.

Under one of the contracts, signed by DCNS' wholly owned subsidiary, UDS International, a German-designed combat system will be replaced with DCNS' Subtics system, which comprises a combat management system supplied by DCNS and Chilean company SISDEF. The new system will link up with a Thales sonar suite and a new-generation torpedo system from WASS of Italy.

Under the second contract, teams from DCNS' Cherbourg shipyard will provide technical assistance to Asmar in cutting the hulls of the Ecuadorian submarines in half to allow overhaul and replacement of the diesel engines and generators. Asmar will do the cutting work at its yard in Chile.

This is good for Chile, who will be able to utilize this experience in maintenance of their new Scorpene submarines. This comes a day after DefenseNews reports on a possible joint nuclear submarine program between Argentina and Brazil. However, that does not appear accurate as first reported, as The Sub Report is highlighting, there is an article out in the International Harold Tribune that claims there is a misquote in the original story.

Brazil is working with Argentina to develop compact nuclear reactors to generate power — not to build a nuclear submarine — the Defense Ministry said Monday in denying a newspaper report.

So did the Defense Minister really discuss nuclear reactors or nuclear submarines? It is unclear, but I don't know many defense ministers that get involved in discussions of joint ventures for civilian nuclear power, perhaps in Brazil things are different.

However, France is certainly involved in the Brazil nuclear program, as we have previously covered here. In our internal discussions, we can't help but notice that France has really stepped up under Sarkozy regarding defense related sales, a trend we expect to see continue. This line of thought has led us back to another recent discussion, in particular, the Indian defense industry.

In thinking about the various angles of Russian-Indian relations, we observe many programs that are interlocked between India and Russia. Joe Katzman at Defense Industry Daily has done a fantastic job covering all angles.

• HAL and Irkut’s Joint Tactical Transport Project
• India, Russia Cooperating re: “Fifth-Generation Fighter”
• India Issues RFI for “Stealth Frigates”
• India’s Fighter Modernization: Add MiG-29s to the List (updated)
• India’s ATV SSN Submarine Project

As we observe the list, there is an alternative to each current project if relations between Russia and India turn south in a hurry over the Gorshkov. Note, for the HAL there is the C-130J, for the "Fifth Generation Fighter" there is the F-35A, for the Stealth Frigates there is the LCS-I, for the Fighter Modernizations there are options all over the 3rd world, but the hard part is building the ATV, as Russia is a major contributor to assisting with the nuclear reactor and the Akula class submarine lease is no small part of that deal.

However, with India already looking at purchasing 6 more Scorpenes in the future, which would add to the existing 10 Russian Kilo-class, four German HDW-class and two Foxrot-class submarines; one wonders if the French would step up to fill a void should Russia decide to play hard ball. France and India have had very good military relations for a long time, in fact as far as exercises go, France and India have been working together for far more years than the US and India.

Given the recent history of French military sales under Sarkozy and its desire to export submarine technology, one wonders how long India would have to wait should relations between Russia and India go sour before France comes knocking at the door. Probably not long, and given the choice between French nuclear power and Russian nuclear power, which would you prefer? I'll take the country where 88% of all civilian power generation is nuclear.

Just one more reason why Russia will find a way to work out the problems between them and India on military deals, although we admit to being impressed with the way the French continue to expand their influence in the submarine market, a market that has been dominated by Russia over the last several years. The next big submarine export opportunity will be in the late summer, when Saudi Arabia makes a bid for submarines. Should be interesting, as it could be France, or Russia.

A Strategy That Fails To Convince

Effective transformation requires that organizations address four specific considerations: the geostrategic setting (the context for transformation), the ends (the purpose of the organization), the ways (the methods that the organization uses to achieve those ends), and the means (the resources used to accomplish the ways). This approach of “context, ends, ways, means” provides a holistic, coherent approach to transforming an organization; without it, an organization does not truly transform.

The context provides the purpose for undergoing transformation. It could be the geostrategic setting or perhaps an emerging technology or method that demands dramatic, innovative change. For the United States, the context of the geostrategic setting changed dramatically in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent downfall of the Soviet Union. Today we still grapple with the impact of those changes—and the world keeps changing while we contemplate the end of the Cold War. Regardless of whether one believes that the world is shaped according to the “core” and the “gap,” as does Barnett, or by a “clash of civilizations,” as does Samuel Huntington, or the myriad other ways of depicting the world, we do not have a bipolar world on the edge of a superpower confrontation—at least not today. Since the world has changed dramatically, the military must do so as well or become irrelevant.

Organizations generally don’t have the luxury of setting the strategic context, but they do have a choice in their reaction to contextual change. Once the context is determined, three approaches—one of which is transformation—address the changing needs of large, complex organizations (similar to changes in the business world). The approaches, which deal with the ends (purpose or product), ways (methods), or means (technology and resources), include transforming the organization’s purpose (focusing on ends), reengineering its methods (focusing on ways), or downsizing or “rightsizing” its technology and resources (focusing on means).

Military Transformation: Ends, Ways, and Means, Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired

In the time of Rumsfeld, the use of the word transformation was often substituted for the word strategy, as they were seen interchangeable by those who believed in transformation. The new Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower failed to mention the word transformation, even once, highlighting a way ahead that substitutes strategy for transformation, as it should be. However, in evaluation of the Navy's maritime strategy we observe it is incomplete, as it only truly forms part of a strategy. The Maritime Strategists within the Navy attempt to reject this criticism, which we continue to find strange as I have recently observed they admit as much themselves.

From the release of the Maritime Strategy we observed an overwhelming rejection of it. First it was the blogosphere led by CDR Salamander, he did what needed to be done, used the proverbial scissors that cut away the fat and left only the substance. CDR called it 6-6-3, and the name stuck. The Navy then took their strategy on the road, a "Conversation With the Country" they call it, and to describe the reception to date as lukewarm is to be polite.

On this road show the 3 services introduce the strategy, explain it, and find few believers among the audience. In introduction of these conversations the presenter begins by highlighting the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is but only 1/3 of the total strategy, with the classified NSP and CONOP (NOC) forming a trilogy that makes up the whole of the Maritime Strategy. This follows a predictable pattern the Navy should have been prepared for.

When the Maritime Strategy was introduced to the internet masses, it was quickly labeled an incomplete strategy, and naturally the Navy didn't like it. This process was repeated with Congress who called it a "really slick brochure". The Navy has since introduced their document as only 1/3 of the strategy in its conversations in person which has also been received less than favorably, after which we observe the Navy defending themselves because no one believes in their work as a strategy. Among the few impressed by the strategy is Kaplan, who calls it a “strategy of elegant decline". Ouch.

We believe it is time to look at the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower for what it is, an incomplete strategy that consists of a "Strategy of the Ends" (purpose or product), a "Strategy of the Ways" (methods), with a "set of priorities" as guidance for executing the strategy. We believe this is accurate, because as everyone, particularly Congress, has observed the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is absent a "Strategy of the Means", a strategy that outlines a fleet; and that is one of several problems that reduces the value of the document as a strategy.

Building upon the outline of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower we observe the "Strategy of the Ends" to include six purposes; Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power; Deter major power war; Win our Nation's wars; Contribute to homeland defense in depth; Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners; and Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system as explained. We observe these ends to be excellent within the context of strategy, but alone they do not constitute a strategy.

We then observe the "Strategy of the Ways" to be six methods; Forward Presence; Deterrence; Sea Control; Power Projection; Maritime Security; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response as explained. Again, we observe these to be excellent methods to be applied in the pursuit of a comprehensive strategy, but alone they do not constitute a strategy.

Finally we observe the three guiding priorities to be Improve Integration and Interoperability, Enhance Awareness, and Prepare our People as explained. We support the Navy in identifying the priorities that will help execute the maritime strategy, but it is important to point out, alone, or in combination with the ends and means above, this does not constitute a strategy.

Within this context we observe the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower to be an incomplete strategy, one that leaves a reader looking for a Strategy of the Means. The people, like Congress, want to discuss that aspect of a maritime strategy, and most importantly, they want that aspect of the new maritime strategy to match the ends and ways as laid out as 6-6-3.

Does the 313-Ship Plan do that? Are there any defenders of the 313-ship plan who believe it aligns itself with the strategy produced? If the Navy polled an audience that question at one of these "Conversations with the Country", what percentage of the audience would believe the 313-ship plan aligns itself with the strategy? I'd bet money the percentage would be very low, because the community of this blog is a good sample of those who would make up that audience and supporters for the 313-ship plan are few indeed.

We suggest few believe that the 313-ship plan for the future constitution of the fleet aligns with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. We believe the defenders of the 313-ship plan do it solely for the sake of preventing further shipbuilding inflation. We believe the desire by the Navy to bring stability to the shipbuilding industry is driving the process for retaining annual shipbuilding orders under the 313-ship plan, and yet it is the lack of orders for more ships within the 313-ship plan that is reducing the shipbuilding capacity of the nation. We also note the annual shipbuilding plan changes in Congress anyway, so the Navy desire for stability appears to be a false hope.

Many who want to connect with the strategy saw the focused, directed, stated 1986 Maritime Strategy as the American way, because it stated and confronted the challenges facing our nation. Many have asked how the Navy can so clearly define the ends (purpose) and ways (method) if they can't even clearly and specifically define the challenges (name thy evil). In that way, it is often noted that the lack of clear definition for challenges gives the Navy flexibility to shape the “means” any way they see fit. As long as the Navy can define the threats and challenges in secret or on demand, the Navy can define the means in public any way they want without defending their position based on strategy.

In this way, it is easy for the Navy to say the 313-ship plan meets the challenges of the Maritime Strategy. It is why we will soon have the DDG-1000 ready for action to meet the challenges of the 21st century, you know, the challenges that aren't identified in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

As a stockholder in the Navy, I believe it is time the Navy starts talking about the “Strategy of the Means” that aligns itself with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in a way stockholders, also known as taxpayers, can believe in. In a few weeks the Navy will to sit down in front of Congress and talk about the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, and we do not expect that process to go well for the Navy.

Congress has expectations of the Navy, they desire a “Strategy of the Means” to define the requirements of the Navy shaped in strategy that guides Congress in the process to fund new ships. Because the “Strategy of the Means” is absent in the Maritime Strategy, the ends and ways as represented by 6-6-3 will mean little to Congress, and has meant little to date. There is a division of labor here, and the Navy is going to have to step up if it wants to sell its strategy. Until the Navy produces a “Strategy of the Means,” Congress will not be interested in the ends and ways outlined in the Navy's maritime strategy, which allows Congress to do its own thing with shipbuilding money again, as should be expected when there us no public intellectual basis they are beholden to by the stockholders (voters).

Over the coming days and weeks we intend to explore the Maritime Strategy further, and utilize Julian Corbett’s chapter on the Theory of the Means in terms of fleet constitution to reinforce why a “Strategy of the Means” needs to be produced to tackle the challenges of the 21st century. We outright reject that strategies for fleets need to be classified, it argues in the face of over 200 years of open government. One would imagine with all the DoD emphasis of "Sea Enterprise" and application of business practices, the Navy would have learned about business communication strategies for stockholders. The stockholders need to believe they are getting a return on investment if the business is it to retain the investment. The Navy's stockholders are taxpayers, also known as voters, and as things stand today, taxpayers do not have the information necessary to advocate for further investment in a time of competing interests for national defense investments.

Some might say I'm being harsh; the crew thinks so. I plead guilty, however I am also aware of some very well written intellectual contributions soon to be released in the open source which raises excellent questions of the new Maritime Strategy, so this discussion isn't going away, in fact it will soon get much louder, and much smarter.

When All You Can See Is Conspiracy

As you may or may not have heard, last week the Greek frigate Bouboulina (F 463) responded to an SOS by a Russian Navy repair ship, the PM 138, when the repair ship lost power during a heavy storm. The rescue by all accounts was a success, involving a tug and the frigate, the Russian ship was towed to port where repairs were made. The Russian Naval vessel has departed port and is back to sea.

As observers of such maritime incidents, we didn't think much of it, but a comment made on the excellent militaryphotos.net forum caught our attention the other day, and while it was an interesting side note, we didn't think much of it. That doesn't stop Debka though, who loves to make news from rumor, and had no trouble breaking out the black helicopters.

DEBKAfile’s military sources reveal that the Russian Amur 1 Class PM 138 naval boat, caught up in the heavy storm raging across the Middle East and Mediterranean last week, flashed a distress signal Tuesday Feb. 19. The vessel was on its way from a Syrian port to Sevastopol on the Black Sea when it was thrown off course by the high seas. A Greek Navy frigate responded to the call and escorted the PM 138 to the island of Chios.

The Russian Navy spokesmen said the ship’s crew numbered 99. It was unarmed and was heading for home port after a long stay at one of the Syrian Navy’s Mediterranean bases.

Ya well Debka's military sources are, as usual, questionable. First we note the ship was with two other auxiliary ships that deployed for the recent Admiral Kuznetsov deployment, so the ship has hardly been stalking the Israeli coast as implied. The other two ships, the tanker Iman and the fleet tug SB-36, both made a port of call in Algeria back on January 22nd.

Second we note there was a comment made on the excellent militaryphotos.net forum about 16 hours prior to the DEBKA story that questioned if this was a spy ship. We don't know whether PM 138 is a spy ship or not, but we observe that the only known open source photography of the ship since the rescue were taken off Chios island, and it is observed the Greek frigate HS Psara (F 454) (note MEKO class, different ship than the rescue ship) appears to be in the picture. Those pictures are excellent quality, but we do not see the smoking gun evidence that Debka does. Maybe you can, we leave this for the reader to decide, as the pictures can be found in the same militaryphotos.net thread.

From our POV, this looks like Debka military disinformation.

From the Department of Duh

From the newspaper of record I present the naval analysis by the New York Times.

Several recent events, from an eagle-eyed spotting of an image on Google Earth to an overt military delivery from Russia, suggest that China is continuing its rapid expansion of a submarine fleet that would be particularly useful in a conflict with the United States over Taiwan, analysts and military officials said.

I can't say there is anything in this article that is new, or interesting, but I do think it is important something like this gets into the New York Times. We are rapidly approaching a news cycle where China's submarine fleet growth is going to be the discussion. The rate of increase is going to be difficult to ignore, and as one year comparison go, we are in the middle of a really good year for PLAN growth.

In the Office of Naval Intelligence Chinese Navyreport last year, I believe it was released last April, the report highlighted 55 submarines for the PLAN. In the report Taiwan released as its 2007 review in December, it identified 60 submarines. According to those who watch the shipyards, there have been 2 submarines put to sea since the new year, meaning the number could be as high at 62 today.

If that number holds, and it could certainly go up, China will have built 7 new submarines in a single year, with no sign of letting down and NONE of those submarines imported by Russia, vs the US Navy's one annual submarine construction rate. Wait until they start talking about frigates and destroyers, much less if the DoD decides to provide an exact number of Tye 022s. Unless I'm missing something, China has put to sea something like 20 ships and submarines since last year, and while not all are combatants, 20 isn't a low number and there is no evidence the rate of construction is slowing down.

Quantity has a quality all its own. I read the ONI report again over the weekend, and this stuck out under the PLAN submarine training section. (Page 37)

The old concept of single submarines departing early in the morning and returning late on the same day was replaced with the concept of multiple submarines conducting navigation training together over multiple days throughout the day and night.

The old concept of single submarines conducting independent training was replaced with multiple submarines attacking as a task force.

The PLAN replaced the old basic training method of simple and redundant training with mission-oriented training subjects.

The old method of training on single submarine tactics per sortie was replaced with training on several ombined-arms tactics simultaneously in a combined-arms environment.

Everywhere I read lately, "multiple submarines" and "training as a task force" seems to pop out. In modeling the PLAN for simulation, if this isn't streetfighter and wolfpacks. then what is it?

Observing the Daily Discussions

How was your first week XO? Check out YankeeSailor's first week on the job as XO of the USS Russell (DDG 59). It is a nice wrap up to the intercept of US 193.

Also interesting is the interview with the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) CO at Navy Times.

This Sevmash shipyard story isn't getting the attention it should. If a shipyard is willing to dismiss the largest commercial export shipbuilding contract in Russia, I wonder what India is expecting in regards to that aircraft carrier being built there?

Japan returns to action in the Indian Ocean.

SecDef visits Australia. F-22A is in play?

Bring on more SINKEX? That is what the story says. I know so many of you, like me, are huge fans of the SINKEX at a time when the fleet continues to reduce numbers. The Navy Times reports 2 Spruance class destroyers and the USS Forrestal are among the list.

It sure would be nice if we didn't sink the reserve, but hey, who needs a reserve right? I somehow forgot to post this the other day; the following chart was included with the FY09 budget, which includes many but not all the ships expected to be discarded by SINKEX.

The Story Behind the Story

In observing the recovery of the two F-15Cs that crashed earlier this week in the Gulf of Mexico, I found a few bits of the rescue interesting. As David Axe notes, the USAF used a CV-22 and a AC-130 to help locate the pilots. He makes some excellent points about both platforms in that regard.

While it is unclear if they were useful in the recovery, the story of the survivor is also interesting.

Lynn Haven boat captain Thomas Niquet said he just followed the trail of wreckage Wednesday to rescue an Air Force pilot downed in the Gulf of Mexico.

“We started finding pieces of the plane, then we found the life raft, and about 30 minutes later, we found him,” Niquet said. “He still had his sunglasses on, man. I don’t know how they do it, but those sunglasses don’t come off for nothing.”

The story goes on to highlight another rarely discussed platform recovered the pilot from this civilian boat, the FSF-1 Sea Fighter sent a RHIB over to recover the pilot, and eventually support his transfer to the Coast Guard and medical attention.

BZ to these civilians of the Nina who assisted in the rescue of this airman.

We find it interesting it is usually this type of non-mission specific context the Sea Fighter finds itself into the news. Duncan Hunter must be frustrated, but at the end of the day this is either the most overrated platform in the Navy, or the most underutilized. Either way, right place at the right time is appropriate to describe its role here, swimming in the Gulf of Mexico for a downed airman is a fast way to hypothermia, speed means a great deal in surviving exposure to the sea, and minutes can mean life or death in too many sea regions during the winter.

Our thoughts and prayers go out to the family and friends of 1st Lt. Ali Jivanjee. Excellent coverage here and here.

Air Force Times also covers the story from top to bottom here.