We have a New Link

This (PDF) was discussed in this mornings hearings. The Flight III is now in play.

Update: No wonder Roughead didn't endorse this. The DoD released the National Defense Strategy (PDF) of the United States today. It does help explain the move towards ballistic missile defense though.

The DDG-1000 Debate Begins a Day Early

Just when you thought you had everything figured out regarding the hearing on the DDG-1000 on Thursday morning, John Murtha decides to do his own thing. In a move we think is best described as a proverbial two handed middle finger gesture to everyone in the House, Senate, Industry, and Navy who thought they were involved in the narrative, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee rejected both the funding for a 3rd DDG-1000 in FY09, and the Navy's plan to replace the remaining planned DDG-1000s with DDG-51s. Megan Scully has the report.

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Wednesday rejected the Navy's new plan to revive production of its DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer next year, but also fell short of backing the more expensive DDG-1000 model service leaders are now hoping to cancel.

During its brief closed-door markup, the panel approved a $487.7 billion fiscal 2009 Defense spending bill -- $4 billion below the Pentagon's request -- that cuts $2.5 billion sought by the Pentagon to buy a third DDG-1000.

But the subcommittee approved $450 million for advanced procurement funding of the DDG-1000.

Note the last sentence, the $450 million is still in the budget markup. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is sending a message: they remain open to possibilities. It is unclear what those possibilities they have in mind, but this debate is chess, and this is one of those unexpected early moves. The report continues with the rest of what we call the "Murtha Move."

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha, D-Pa., cited billions of dollars already invested in the DDG-1000 program -- as well as the costs of shutting down the production line at two shipyards, which he estimates at $600 million -- as reasons why his mark did not support the Navy's latest destroyer plan.

The Defense Department, Murtha added, would have to be "very convincing" to change his mind. "In conference [with Senate appropriators], we may decide to make a change, but I doubt it," he said.

Instead of pumping money into destroyer production lines, the panel opted to boost other shipbuilding projects, including an additional $1.6 billion for an LPD-17 amphibious warfare ship, $941 million to buy two T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo dock carriers and $397.6 million for long-lead items for the Virginia class submarine program.

Nothing is ever really decided in Washington until the ink hits the paper, but we note this as a very smart way to send broadsides at battleships. As we have noted this week, and despite what a certain editorial suggested this week, neither the DDG-1000 or the DDG-51 is actually replacing an existing ship about to retire. The ships the DDG-1000 is suggested to replace were already retired long ago, including the 50 year old pair of Iowa class battleships, but also the Spruance class destroyers which were retired early to save money. The ships in the Navy today about to be retired include the Austin class LPDs, the Perry class frigates, the Tarawa class LHAs, the Kilauea class ammunition ships, and Los Angeles class submarines. In other words, amphibious ships, logistics ships, and submarines. It is noteworthy that the amphibious force is being downsized, the logistics force is being downsized, and the submarine force is being downsized to pay for more battleships.

The Navy will decommission or retire exactly zero current cruisers and destroyers for the next 15+ years under current plans, and will commission and additional 10 DDG-51s and 2 DDG-1000s over the next five years that are already paid for and in some stage of construction.

The "Murtha Move" essentially tells the Navy that Congress will not be building any battleships this year and shifts money that would be used for building battleships to build a new amphibious ship, more logistics ships, and potentially another submarine. Many Congressman and Senators will hate this plan. Murtha stands on solid footing here, the 10th LPD-17 is the #1 priority on the Marines unfunded list, and 'we think' #2 on the Navy unfunded list. The submarine shortage is something that has been discussed every year in Congress so far this century, and the Navy robbed funding for previously purchased T-AKEs to pay for other projects, much to the anger of both the House and the Senate.

We are looking for two things tomorrow. First, Admiral Roughead started this process, he is the source for Gene Taylor and everyone knows it, even though the press can't report it yet (only because they can't prove it, they all know it too). Will Roughead throw Vice Admiral Barry McCullough to the wolves and allow his career to be handicapped by the contradiction crossfire he will almost certainly be called out on? If Vice Admiral Barry McCullough is the primary Navy contact during that hearing, he will never get another promotion. However, Roughead might reward him with a better posting in the future. We think there is an interesting dynamic at play here that will tell us a lot about Roughead. We think he should testify and lead by example.

A major part of the CNO role is to be the spokesman for the Navy, and never has the Navy needed that spokesman more than tomorrow morning. Anyone who spends any time talking to sailors hears the confusion, and the lack of confidence in leadership is evident. It is also often observed the desire for strong leadership is prevalent, and expectations are high, but within grasp. Will Roughead cease the opportunity he has been given?

Second, the $450 million is a carrot. Given the necessity for a "very convincing" argument, will the Navy come swinging with the strategic stick? The Navy has never linked strategy with shipbuilding in a public discussion since the release of the Maritime Strategy. Not Once. Does the Navy have a compelling case to make? Or will the discussion focus on the industrial, not strategic plan? Failure to make a compelling case tomorrow in that setting is validation the Navy doesn't have a compelling case for itself and its strategic vision that includes shipbuilding.

We observe the "Murtha Move" is the only option so far in this discussion that aligns Navy shipbuilding to strategy, but we don't like that it punts the industrial questions. We think complex problems like the Navy's current shipbuilding situation demands a comprehensive solution, and the "Murtha Move" is not that. However, this move does set up an interesting discussion tomorrow. The hearing will begin at 10:00am EST.

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Addendum: People read John Murtha's name, think of a certain episode regarding some fine Marines, and tend to go on a ballistic partisan political rant. Don't. The partisanship of Navy shipbuilding is a fictional creation of partisans. The political debates are almost never divided by political parties, rather are driven by regional interests. Political centric rants belong on another blog, and if you can't find one to sufficiently let it out, just send it in an email. For this discussion partisan political rhetoric adds nothing of substance to the discussion of the issues specific to Navy shipbuilding, and a zero tolerance policy for political rants will be enforced for this discussion. Put simply, stay on topic.

Lockheed Martin is Having a Really Good Week

Have you seen a picture of LCS-1 Freedom yet? If the answer is no, that makes you the only person on the internet yet to see the pictures. Lockheed Martin deserves a lot of credit, the recent news that Israel wants to buy 4 of Lockheed Martin's multi-mission combat version of the LCS, known as the LCS-I, began a string of stories that puts Lockheed Martin in a positive light, and some smart marketing guru at LM is earning their paycheck.

Following the announcement of a potential sale to Israel, we got some photo's of the inside of Freedom just 5 days before builders trials. Have we been duped into being a stooge for Lockheed Martin? If we have, good for them, the way we see it Lockheed Martin just as much a part of this community as everyone else. We've certainly given their executives hell in the past, and will again should it be deserved. Not this time though, the Navy is in dire need of a feel good shipbuilding story and you can credit Lockheed Martin for doing their part. They are in the business of selling ships, and right now business is looking good.

With the arrival of LCS-1 builders trials, it has taken just 3 days for the Navy to get 18 very clear photos of LCS-1 up in their "Eyes on the Fleet" section, all courtesy of Lockheed Martin. Throw in not one, but two videos, and the only thing missing is the ability to embed the videos on blogs. Tim Colton, who sees the PR machine in motion too, has often commented on the inability of Lockheed Martin to build ships. We default to his expertise on that subject, but whether they can build ships or not, they can certainly sell ships better than say, Northrop Grumman.

Consider for a moment that when the USS Green Bay (LPD 20) had builders trials, we are the only ones on the internet who had photos for the public, and they weren't courtesy of Northrop Grumman, who published no photos. Brett Favre and the Green Bay Packers have been the talk of sports news for a hundred million Americans since mid June, and the Northrop Grumman marketing men never came up with a way to showcase their product? In a month, the overpriced LCS is likely going to have a much improved reputation, and the LPD-17, which has been meeting cost targets, will still be a bastard of shipbuilding because of a cost problem of eight years ago.

While the LCS is a feel good story for Lockheed Martin, consider how events completely out of their control only elevate their good news. The Congressional Hearing tomorrow could turn into a major endorsement of AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense. If Congress decides to build more DDG-51s, and cancels the DDG-1000, the net result allows Lockheed Martin to beat back competition from Raytheon's combat system, which is intended for the DDG-1000. That is a major coup btw, Raytheon's combat system is truly open while AEGIS is not.

As if that isn't enough good enough news for Lockheed Martin, the bad news regarding LCS-2 Independence is just terrible timing for Austal. The good folks at the Mobile Press-Register newspaper deserve a lot of credit. DefenseNews tells the tale.

An internal U.S. Navy audit found a "significant breakdown" in oversight and cost controls for the second littoral combat ship, now about $300 million over budget and a year behind schedule at its shipyard in Mobile, Ala., according to a July 30 report.

The Navy document, obtained under the freedom of information act by the Mobile Press-Register newspaper, reported that project managers at Austal USA, the shipyard building the General Dynamics-designed LCS 2, were not keeping Navy acquisitions officials in the loop about the Independence's cost and schedule problems.

The Press-Register blog has the report linked for download. From the report, this is an example of how a shipbuilder, AND the Navy leaves a really terrible impression of management and oversight.

We found that EVM was not sufficiently implemented and overseen by any of the responsible parties on the LCS-2 “Independence” detailed design and construction contract. Our audit identified the following risks associated with the implementation and use of EVM on the LCS program: (1) Austal’s EVMS as related to the LCS program, did not comply with 20 of the 32 DoD established EVMS guidelines; (2) SUPSHIP Bath did not provide adequate surveillance over Austal’s EVM implementation; (3) GD/BIW, as the prime contractor, did not effectively oversee Austal’s EVM implementation; and (4) PEO Ships and PMO did not have adequate visibility over the LCS contractor’s cost, schedule, and technical performance. These conditions occurred because (1) DCMA, as the Executive Agent for EVM, and NAVSEA did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure EVM was properly implemented for the LCS-2 “Independence” contract; (2) Defense Contract Audit Agency had not performed required audits of Austal’s EVMS; (3) SUPSHIP Bath and the contractors did not implement a fully effective surveillance program; and (4) LCS PMO and the contractors placed limited emphasis on the implementation of EVM for the LCS program.

Considering the turmoil surrounding the shipbuilding budget right now, the frustration of so many regarding poor management in shipbuilding across the board, and that "Austal’s EVMS as related to the LCS program, did not comply with 20 of the 32 DoD established EVMS guidelines" which at this point in shipbuilding there is absolutely no excuse for, all that money invested in Austal is starting to look like a questionable investment.

This news comes on the same day it was reported Austal delivered the JHSV Phase II design to the Navy. We have previously covered the JHSV program. That is just terrible timing. Austal is in competition with General Dynamics, who wants to build their Rolls Royce JHSV design (PDF) in Bath, but is also in competition with Incat, who would build their JHSV at Bollinger Shipyards, which happens to be the other shipyard Lockheed Martin would build Littoral Combat Ships.

Lockheed Martin is enjoying a great public relations week, and the competition just happens to be simultaneously dealing with terrible public relations. Lockheed Martini is clearly having a really good week, and it only gets better if the DDG-1000 program dies tomorrow.

George Washington Fire Fallout

With a $70 million dollar repair bill, a deployment on a strict schedule, a bit of irresponsible behavior by a few of the crew, and a political spotlight coming from a major ally in the far east, and the result can't be too surprising. The Navy took action today in the George Washington fire.

The Navy’s Pacific Fleet commander, Adm. Robert F. Willard, in his final endorsement of an investigation into the fire, directed that Capt. David C. Dykhoff and his executive officer be relieved of command.

Dykhoff was fired “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command and his failure to meet mission requirements and readiness standards,” Navy officials said in a statement released Wednesday afternoon.

On Wednesday, Vice Adm. Thomas J. Kilcline Jr. pulled Dykoff from command and also fired the ship’s executive officer, Capt. David M. Dober, “for substandard performance,” according to the statement.

It was probably a good day to be fired, because tomorrow after 10:00am the Navy story everyone will be talking about will be the DDG-1000. By making a statement in the afternoon on the west coast the eve before a major Congressional pissing contest on shipbuilding, this story gets at best a 12 hour news cycle and then disappears.

According to the Navy Times article the combination of unauthorized smoking and improperly stored combustibles started the fire. The full report was not released, but the article mentions some of the report might be released in a few weeks. We hope so.

It is an exercise in futility to speculate what the contributing factors were on the ship itself, only the report could tell us. Were the inspection procedures being followed properly? Was there a breakdown in quality of leadership for inspections with this specific area of the ship? Was there a ship wide systematic problem that led to the change of command? Why wasn't a DC party able to quickly address a fire started by a cigarette before it consumed over 80 spaces of the ship? Lets be serious, if you can't quickly put out a cigarette, how the hell can you expect to put out a massive fire caused by an anti-ship missile consuming multiple decks and burning white hot on rocket fuel? There are plenty of questions, but only the report could tell us the answers.

The Navy continues to send signals to its commanding officers that perfection is demanded, anything short of perfection and the CO can be gone. Actually, that isn't completely true, the only time we ever see this type of perfection demanded by anyone over the rank of Captain is when it involves women, what we call the Tailhook rule. Accidents are not allowed, ever, and every major incident is always the COs fault, always. If an accident happens on your watch, kiss your career goodbye. It's a tough topic to speculate beyond the generic signals, because the Navy never explains why it takes the actions it does, meaning everyone in the Navy is left to speculate the same observations we list above.

In this case, the CO and XO are almost certainly not the smokers who contributed to the fire, but several members of the chain of command and crew would have been responsible for stowing flammables and not smoking in an unauthorized area. The Navy should put as much public humiliation on those folks responsible as they do on the officers. Failure to do so gives disgruntled sailors a lot of power, the ability to 'accidentally' screw up and insure a CO's career is killed.

Five Good Reads

David Axe is discussing Medical Diplomacy and SOUTHCOM over at Danger Room. David is one of many bloggers who will be taking a trip on the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) as it begins its medical diplomacy deployment next week. We intend to cover that deployment as next weeks theme as long as we find live blogging from the event. This humble blogger was invited to participate in this excellent endeavor, and had to respectfully decline such an incredible oppertunity due to work schedule. Yes, we really do have plenty of time to work when not updating the blog, unfortunately plenty of time also means all the time for this sometimes exhausted small business owner.

EagleOne is discussing a real Littoral Combat Ship that has gone to sea with an Army crew. SOUTHCOM again, man do those folks get it. We really do like the capabilities the M-80 brings to the littorals, and we can't wait to see the evaluation the platform gets after this real world evaluation of the platform.

SteelJaw Scribe is discussing Navy Ballistic Missile Defense. We agree with his conclusion, the Navy has done an excellent job evolving the capability and it is nearing the point of production stability. The time is now to start thinking about, and talking about, the approach to put this capability into the fleet as a whole. The way we see it, the more the Navy does BMD as part of strategy, the less the nation needs to make political waves putting BMD capabilities in other countries, including Europe. When it comes to footprints in the 21st Century, less is more, but less footprint doesn't mean we have to settle for less capability. AEGIS BMD works.

Our observations regarding the evolution of Renaissance Networks appears to have legs among many people much smarter than this humble blogger. We note the existence of such networks exist as evidence of this discussion alone. Consider for a moment that armed with my public school high school diploma an idea from this generalist, generated as a result of professional experience in video games, gets disseminated by the professionals at places like The Complex Terrain Laboratory and NYU. If that isn't evidence of the theory in motion, what would be? The term is actually a decade old, I tell the story behind the term in the comments here, a great read. Many won't get it.

Off Topic: For the record, I agree with this list.

Following Two Discussions

There are two items up on Small Wars Journal we want to get linked on the blog. The first is from Dave Kilcullen. While it is easy to be blinded by the class in which he handles his disagreement with the wars, the ideas matter a lot too. Follow the links.

The second item is a new paper by Matt Armstrong, Rethinking Smith-Mundt. If you have not been following the discussion on MountainRunner regarding Smith-Mundt, it really is worth some time to look into it. I wasn't following it until recently, but Matt is on to something here.

Ignoring the importance of linking policy with the psychology of information to persuade and dissuade, American public diplomacy and strategic communication increasingly became an irrelevant whisper and beauty contest in stark contrast to the adversary’s propaganda of words and deeds. In the war of ideas, the United States is largely unarmed and has accordingly fallen in global influence and stature, increasing vulnerabilities not only in the military domain, but in economic, financial, and diplomatic realms too.

Want an example? Ask yourself why the price of oil jumps whenever Iran threatens to shut down the Persian Gulf. The US Navy is the most powerful naval force in history. Iran's Navy is essentially a handful of boats with a few weapons, and several hundred plastic speedboats.

And yet who has the real information dominance on the topic. It matters, because the whole world buys gas and shouldn't be paying more because some Persian makes a gesture or threat. Think about it.

Observing the Absence of the Navy's Expeditionary Ship

While big blue Navy sails the seas in peacetime, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command has gone to war. Shipbuilding may get all the headlines, but the Navy needs only to point to its Medical Corps, NECC forces, and IA program to remind Congress the US Navy is not sitting idle on the sidelines. We have been observing the NECC over the last few weeks, specifically reading as much as we can regarding the participation of the NECC in both RIMPAC 2008 and Operation Brimstone, and it is easy to get excited.

We really like the way this story puts all the pieces we are observing together.

For the first time in a joint task force exercise (JTFX), the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command employed the adaptive force package (AFP) concept as part of "Operation Brimstone" July 21-28.

Capt. Anthony Krueger, commander of Navy Expeditionary Combat Task Group (NECTG) 955.6, said the concept of tailoring the right force to the right job proved itself during the exercise and helped prepare NECC forces to confront actual missions if required.

"If we have to do this for real, we now have a better idea of what it's going to take to make it work in a real-world operation," said Krueger, who also serves commodore of Riverine Group 1.

The NECTG 955.6 staff had task group coordination abilities and responsibilities during Operation Brimstone equal to USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) Strike Group or USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) Expeditionary Group. NECTG directed about 750 Sailors of the expeditionary forces participating among the 15,000 service members from four nations in JTFEX.

Lets start bottom up, because we always start with leadership. Bringing the NECTG at an equal level with the strike group command staffs demonstrates a lot of wisdom in our opinion, because we see the value. We also really like the synergy of bringing three very different types of force packages together for exercises, and we think when one considers the 26th MEU as another force package within this capability set, one can start to see why we believe in the future the MEU, not the MEB, will be a supremely capable unit of action for war or peace from the sea. We recognize the limitations and ramifications of forwarding that position, and will discuss that topic in much more detail in the near future.

The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command adaptive force package (AFP) concept is something we look forward to learning more about, because without knowing about the specific concept at all it is an operational concept we have discussed the potential of on the blog. When we talk about motherships, we talk about them in the context of logistical enablers for manned and unmanned systems to execute naval expeditionary capabilities for war and peace, and in looking at the Littoral Combat Ship as a mothership for unmanned vehicles, it is easy to see that concept. What is less understood when we talk about the manned system is how the Mothership as a logistical support vessel for manned capabilities operates. Consider for a moment the forces in the NECC taking part in RIMPAC 2008.

More than 500 Sailors from Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group 1 (EODGRU 1), Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 9, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 11, Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operational Support Unit 7 and Navy Cargo Handling Battalion 12 are participating in the biennial exercise. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 is also participating from the island of Guam...

During RIMPAC, these units will exercise their combat capabilities such as maritime security, explosive ordnance disposal, diving and salvage, expeditionary construction and logistics and maritime civil affairs.

As an adaptive force package (AFP) the capabilities listed in the last paragraph represents a number of applications where manpower can make a significant impact to the maritime domain in peacetime, but these forces also bring considerable enabling capabilities during wartime, specifically to the ESG. This is why we discuss the mothership as the 4th ship of the ESG. With the mothership, the Navy takes to war the tools necessary for the Marines to do their work, but we observe the same skill set used a different way brings with it considerable peacetime utility.

Consider for a moment the equipment requirements for NECC forces listed. Which platform can carry that equipment forward and self deploy it from the sea? From our point of view, that is where to start designing a mothership. Because we believe the mothership is a warship, specifically because it carries the unmanned scouting capabilities necessary for wartime information dominance, we believe the LPD-17 makes for an excellent choice to carry the bulk of the equipment being utilized by those NECC forces, and still have room for several unmanned mission modules. The manning requirements and capabilities also stack up well. It isn't the only platform that could do the job, rather we observe as an armed warship with low visibility the utility, size, and metrics of the LPD-17 fits the requirement set.

When we look at the maritime environment of the next two decades, we see the US Navy active in the littoral areas of the South Atlantic, South Pacific, Caribbean Sea, and Indian Ocean. With that in mind, for the execution of either war or peacetime strategy, would the Navy deploy a battleship or a mothership fully loaded with a NECC adaptive force package (AFP) to use Command of the Sea in those regions? The Navy has already answered that question, this blog is essentially the discussion of the solo deployments of Amphibious ships for Navy purposes, a trend that will continue next week when the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) deploys without Marines

We think the mothership would forward the nations strategic interests much further than another large surface combatant would, and the deployment of existing amphibious ships for Navy specific, not Marine specific purposes over the last few years reinforces our argument.

One final thought. The NECC is the tremendous success story of the Navy over the last 2+ years. The Navy would be very wise never to forget the amazing job done by Rear Adm. Donald K. Bullard, he deserves tremendous credit for getting the NECC operational. When one considers how very little monetary resources the NECC gets compared to other aspects of the Navy, that 47% of the NECC is made up of reservists, and that the NECC has already gone to war in its short existence, Rear Adm. Donald K. Bullard, who retired back in January, can not be bestowed too many accolades praising the job he did with the NECC in our opinion.

In No Case Can We Exercise Control by Battleships Alone...

If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of actual practice. In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their specialisation has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the converse is not true. We could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet to interfere with them.

If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our theory, it would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. That is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial steps must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea depends on the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include all the other facts on which it hangs. The true function of the battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Chapter 2, Theory of the Means - The Constitution of Fleets, by Julian Stafford Corbett

Since the end of the cold war, the United States Navy has achieved Command of the Sea in the spirit of Mahan, or controlled communications in the spirit of Corbett. This achievement was made possible by decisive victory, but not a decisive victory of war, rather the decisive victory of the cold war. The great question that has plagued the US Navy since the achievement of this decisive victory has not been how to achieve control of maritime communications against competitors, rather how to USE the control the US Navy has achieved. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower answers this question, listing the 6 ways the US Navy will execute its strategy. Those ways are forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster response. The fundamental motivation behind the ways is mutual cooperation, not imperialism.

Today, the average age of the 86 battleships (22 CGs, 62 DDG-51s, and 2 DDG-1000s) the US Navy has or is building is a combined average age younger than the aircraft in the US Navy aviation inventory, younger than the submarine force, younger than the amphibious fleet, younger than the logistics force, and younger the aircraft carrier fleet. It seems strange then that this week the big debate in Congress is not how the United States will leverage the US Navy to forward the foreign policy of the United States by managing peacetime, rather which new battleships the US Navy will build to further increase the command of the sea the Navy already enjoys today.

Command of the Sea exists only where the US Navy is present, and let us not confuse scouting with unmanned technology as the same as presence. Presence requires manpower to exercise control in peacetime, which is why the ability to influence, and more specifically USE Command of the Sea requires forward deployed manpower in sufficient numbers to execute such influence. When Command of the Sea is not challenged, which in today's maritime environment describes almost all points of the maritime domain, the entire maritime domain is available to be leveraged as a base of operations by which to execute strategy. To us this means there must be a commitment to building flexible forces for leveraging the sea as base to connect with the non-integrated gaps, and in this way US Navy can position itself to better manage the maritime challenges of peacetime.

In every maritime era there is always one type of ship that determines the capability of naval forces to execute maritime strategy. In the sixteenth century galeasses and heavy galleys represented the dominate ship of the era. As the age of sail emerged, the Royal Navy became the dominate force by putting sails on all of its battleships, which ultimately became the dominate vessel at sea until the mid nineteenth century, when the armored ship replaced the age of sail battleship as the dominate weapon. Eventually the combination of armor and larger guns evolved the battleship again, until all ships were completely rendered irrelevant all at once by HMS Dreadnought, a technological evolution that combined armor, firepower, mobility, speed, and the flexibility to maneuver heavy gunfire and fight on multiple axis. In the mid 20th century, the aircraft carrier became the dominate platform, and combined with the nuclear powered submarine held the position of the most influential vessel at sea until the end of the cold war.

However, with the end of the cold war, it is time to ask what is the dominate ship to execute maritime strategy in this era. Taking a broad view around the world, we note that almost every nation except the United States appears to have answered this question. Back in 2006, Robert Farley observed the trends and highlighted the shift in the maritime domain. He raised the topic as a question, and has sense written unpublished works regarding. On this blog, we proclaim the idea as a statement of fact, The Dreadnought of the modern maritime era is the Amphibious Ship.

The amphibious assault ship spree is somewhat reminiscent of the drive, around 1910, of a number of major and minor powers to purchase or build dreadnought battleships. Countries that had no business owning major modern units, like Brazil and Argentina, spent enormous sums on modern vessels for reasons of national prestige...

An amphibious assault ship gives a country like Spain, the Netherlands, or Canada a way to involve itself in an expeditionary operation without being excessively dependent on one of the major naval powers. Like their armies, the navies of these countries are becoming less focused on the traditional forms of territorial defense and more on the need for policing, peacekeeping, and other forms of expeditionary warfare.

Essentially Robert is making the case the resource to execute the "ways" of strategy to "USE" Command of the Sea in the modern maritime domain is the amphibious ship, and the trends worldwide, whether in 2006 and even more so in 2008, support that case. The nations currently operating, building, or seeking amphibious ships include the US, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, South Africa, Argentina, Turkey, India, Russia, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, and Brazil.

It is noteworthy that only Taiwan has a battleship (former Kidd class) and is not in the above list, and only 11 of the 21 countries listed have battleships.

Corbett warns nations regarding the unwise approach of building all battleships, noting both the cost constraints, numerical problems, and insufficiency for a fleet to do its work when the number of platforms required to do the work of naval strategy are scarce. Corbett's advice is timeless, and applies just as much today as it did when he wrote it.

The US Navy finds itself at a major crossroads of history. At this point in time, and for only the next 12-15 years, the US Navy has superior battle-fleet capabilities to maintain complete control of the sea, and none of the 86 battleships widely recognized as the most powerful warships in the world need replacement during the entirety of that time. At the same time, the amphibious force continues to shrink, and the small combatant force (what Corbett calls a cruiser, known as the modern frigate) is completely ignored. While Lockheed Martin and the US Navy, to the disgrace of maritime terminology, insist the Littoral Combat Ship is a surface combatant, it is not. By every strategic and maritime definition used for the last several centuries the LCS is an unrated ship of the flotilla, any insistence otherwise is a demonstration in ones own ignorance. Under such misrepresentation we should be counting MCMs as surface combatants.

On Thursday at 10:00AM the United States Congress will take up the discussion of the future of fleet constitution for the US Navy. No where in this discussion is there any evidence that the US Navy is aligning its resources to sound maritime strategy, indeed all options to be discussed promote a plan of action that continues to spend taxpayer money on the tools needed to fight some unknown mythical naval force that will somehow overcome the existing fleet of 86 battleships that can only be described as the most dominate naval force in the history of mankind.

There is another option. The United States is the worlds lone superpower, and as both candidates of the current election are trying to make the case, with that role comes responsibility. The "ways" outlined for executing the Navy's existing maritime strategy promotes a responsible approach for promoting national interests in peacetime. The question to be asked on Capitol Hill is which battleship should the Navy build to fight the future foe somehow capable of overcoming existing naval power. The question that should be asked on Capitol Hill is how do we use shipbuilding money to exploit the Command of the Sea the US Navy enjoys towards the ends of advancing a responsible Grand Strategy for the United States of America and its people.

Freedom Begins Builders Trials

This passed the market line today.

The agile 378-foot Freedom, designed and built by a Lockheed Martin led industry team, is conducting Builder's Sea Trials in Lake Michigan. The trials -- which are a coordinated effort between the U.S. Navy and the Lockheed Martin team -- will include operational testing of the vessel's propulsion, communications, navigation and mission systems, as well as all related support systems.

"Freedom is now under way. Our team is looking forward to this trials period to demonstrate all the capabilities our unique design for LCS will bring to the Navy," said Joe North, director for Lockheed Martin's Littoral Combat Ship program. "We're pleased to be closing in on delivering this advanced warship to the Sailors who protect our nation all over the world."

All images are courtesy the US Navy, and can be clicked for hi-resolution link to Navy.mil.

It is a good day for those at Marinette Marine, or at least the folks who didn't get laid off last week. One wonders how much experience was lost in the layoffs, the ship finally gets to sea and the first thing the yard does is fire the help.

Hopefully all goes well with LCS-1, because Lockheed Martin is on a strict schedule and cannot afford any problems. Setbacks mean another winter trapped in the North, and that would put LCS 2 at sea before LCS 1. Based on the images we highlighted last week, the ship appears to be in better condition than LPD-17, another recent first in class ship that had to overcome several cost problems before getting to sea.

We should know by the end of the week how builders trials went.

This is statement released with the final photo:

MARIETTA, Wis. (July 28, 2024) The nation's first Littoral Combat Ship, Freedom (LCS 1) - the inaugural ship in an entirely new class of U.S. Navy surface warships - underway for the first time during day one of the ship's Builders Trials. The agile 377-foot Freedom -- designed and built by a team led by Lockheed Martin -- will help the U.S. Navy defeat growing littoral, or close-to-shore, threats and provide access and dominance in coastal water battle-space. Displacing 3,000 metric tons and with a capability of reaching speeds well over 40 knots, Freedom will be a fast, maneuverable and networked surface combatant with operational flexibility to execute focused missions, such as mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare and humanitarian relief. Photo provided courtesy Lockheed Martin (Released)

Pink Lines and Red Lines

Back in June we observed several international events at the time that triggered some concern within the authors of this blog, essentially we observed a political time line unfolding that appears to be moving the United States towards a confrontation with Iran. At that time we picked June 23rd as the beginning of what we call a twelve week countdown, that was exactly 5 weeks ago today. Our twelve week metric is a diplomatic phase for the US and Iran to solve the nuclear issue, specifically we see it as the last major diplomatic push of Bush administration with Iran. Five weeks later we are growing more confident that our twelve week window was on target.

Fabious Maximus noted Stratfor'a Intelligence Guidance for this week, and when reading the analysis we observed two aspects of the report we find very interesting.

U.S.-Iranian talks: The United States has given Iran until Aug. 2 to respond to the latest — and most serious — offer of cooperation. Iran is holding out for something more, but also cannot ignore the risks it would be taking in dragging these talks out and missing the opportunity to reach a deal over Iraq with the current U.S. administration. It has never been about nuclear weapons, much less enrichment. Both sides are preparing their publics for a deal, and time is running short. This should be where the final issues get ground under and anyone who wants to derail a U.S.-Iranian understanding will take their best shot. The next few weeks should be lively.

Oil prices: Oil’s plunge from its $148-a-barrel high continues. Has the combination of poor economic news finally convinced the markets that the price was unreasonable? Or is something else afoot? Don’t try to forecast the price — the markets gyrate wildly on the best of days — but look at who benefits from the lower prices and what they are doing to influence events. Prices can and will drop by $20 in a week, but it is not sustainable without a change in consensus about the fundamentals — such a new consensus has not manifested yet. Something else may be going on out there.

The first part is very interesting, because as we have observed in the opinion media, there is widespread consensus the United States is drawing pink lines in the sand that will carry no meaning or consequences. You read that right, and this IHT editorial is an excellent example. That opinion starts with a first paragraph that sounds the alarms for war, then the second paragraph suggests:

Meanwhile, it is already clear that much of the Iranian establishment interprets the latest Western conditions not as a final red line, but as yet another pink line, a vague basis for further negotiations. In consequence, it is unlikely that the Iranians will agree to a complete suspension of uranium enrichment within the six-week deadline set by the West.

As observers, we note this to be a fascinating development, essentially the war that has been predicted by just about every pundit is now seen as an impossibility. What we find very interesting about the development is that as pink line after pink line is passed, and nothing happens, a growing comfort is being created that there will be no action taken against Iran. It is more than a little strange that the most predicted war in the 21st century is developing the potential for political surprise. We wonder if that entails the potential for tactical surprise.

We are on record, and still believe, the United States will not attack Iran directly. If there will be a direct military attack, it will be from Israel. We also note that as the process continues to drag on, and things have become more frustrating for both China and Russia, the framework for influential action short of direct military action has been created, and we expect what the pundits claim are "pink lines" for war are in fact "red lines" for other action.

Few people have actually read UN Resolution 1803 (2008) much less UN Resolution 737 (2006) or Resolution 1747 (2007). We think people should, if anything just to stay informed, and in particular we keep thinking about action item #11 in resolution 1803. We keep wondering whether anyone is going to test the limitations of that item. That item is already part of the UN resolutions against Iran, and we suspect there will some who would cry foul when a UN sanctioned maritime interdiction against an Iranian vessel takes place. It is a safe bet that in both Europe and America we would see demonstrations of political outrage, which will only further diminish the credibility of the UN, which to some, might be the point.

August 2nd, this weekend, approaches the the end of the first 6 weeks in our time line. As we have highlighted, the second six week period, almost certainly not intentionally, will look a lot like a major military buildup for war in the Middle East. The reason is simple, it is, but not for Iran, but rather part of the all at once major force rotations that are coming due in both war theaters and at sea.

But that is also the point, there will be a lot of movement in the region. The period, which we are estimating to occur around September 15th, give or take a couple weeks, is essentially the last window for Israel to take military action during the Bush administration when excess US military forces will be in the region to adapt to any emerging challenge with Iran.

As we have noted in the past, in the Middle East this year Ramadan begins on Sunday, August 31st at sundown and will continue for 30 days until Monday, September 29th at sundown. It is worth noting there is a new moon on August 30th and September 29th. The Olympic Games end August 24th. If military action is going to happen, expect any pink lines established after that date to be a red line.

We believe there are seven weeks left for a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear issue during the Bush administration, and after that point anything could happen.

The Policy That Demands Perfection

For some reason, every time we hear about an incident like this, and a skipper gets replaced, it leaves a bad taste in our mouth.

The skipper of the dock landing ship Pearl Harbor was fired Sunday after running aground July 21 while in the Persian Gulf, according to the Navy.

Cmdr. Xavier F. Valverde, a Bronze Star recipient who started his career as an enlisted sailor, was relieved by Rear Adm. Kendall Card, commander of the Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group.

“Following a preliminary inquiry after a recent grounding incident in the Arabian Gulf, Rear Adm. Card expressed his loss of confidence in Valverde’s ability to command,” said a statement released by Naval Surface Forces in Coronado, Calif. “No injuries or damage occurred as a result of the incident.”

Last year every time a ship ran aground, a CO was replaced, it was like clockwork. While it is entirely possible that the CO did something worth being replaced (in every situation), and we just don't have all the details, we keep thinking this policy carries with it mixed signals that may not be good for the Navy.

How can on one hand the Navy be building itself to operate in the littorals, and on the other hand every time a ship runs aground the Navy fires the CO? Seems to me this is blazing a trail towards timid littoral leadership for the LCS. The USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) has a draft of 20 ft, the LCS draft at full load is yet to be determined, but when the Navy talks about, they don't cite the brochure, they say "less than 20 ft."

We aren't suggesting the Navy was right or wrong here, we have no idea in this specific case, but this is a perfect example why the Navy has a reputation as a risk averse organization. Command of the LCS is starting to look like a career killer, unless you are timid and cautious, which may not be the kind of leadership needed, or the Navy really wants for that environment.

Observing "A Day to Remember"

Part two of three.

Part one was linked here.

NOC and NSP

Zachary M. Peterson reporting for InsideDefense (subscription required) has an article from Friday that suggests the 2008 Naval Operations Concept (NOC) is soon to be completed, perhaps even released publicly. Deep in the article we came across a few paragraphs that grabbed our attention.

The strategy did not offer guidance as to what types of assets the maritime services should procure or how specifically the three services should operate together.

“As we develop how we operate in our programs, we should tell them here’s what we need to do it with and by the way, if you’re not going to fund me with enough to do it with, where then do we increase risk? The where we increase risk piece will be classified, but the what we need piece will not be,” Donegan said. “It’s our hope that the NOC paints a clear picture on that.”

The 2008 NOC is described in the article as being “operational” rather than “strategic” guidance, which has us wondering where the strategic guidance for fleet constitution comes from?

When the Maritime Strategy was released last October, the Navy desires the strategy itself to be an enduring document, but made clear that every two years the classified Naval Strategic Plan and the Naval Operations Concept would be updated every two years. Earlier this year it was suggested a declassified version of the NSP could potentially be released. SteelJaw Scribe discussed both documents in detail last year, and we support his call to release public versions of both for dissemination.

We look forward to the "What we need" piece of the maritime strategy. For example, what was the relationship between the 2008 NOC and the DDG-1000? We'd love to know if the 2008 NOC had any impact on that specific issue, because if it didn't, wouldn't that suggest the 2008 NOC originally supported the DDG-1000? Just asking.

Renaissance Men Are Evolving Into Renaissance Networks

MountainRunner has a piece up called Social Media and Foreign Policy that has us distracted from our usual Navy discussions, so we are going to dive into this discussion a bit. Matt highlights this article up at the State Dept blog that asks about the "impact social media will have exactly on foreign policymaking", which sounds very familiar to the question we continue to ask, "What is the role of blogging in the national security debate?"

These are difficult questions with no clear answers, but we note that the right questions are being asked by many bloggers, for various reasons.

Blog reader calipygian and I traded a few comments on another blog based on a very interesting question he asked, "What is the role of the know-it-all generalist in today's specialized world where there is really no more room for Renaissance men?" It is a facinating question to us because it raises the question of whether Social Media, in particular blogs, are able to form a natural hierarchy to channel challenging, technical and complex discussions. There are plenty of blogger generalists out there, in particular within the scope of politics and entertainment, but what about for science, technology, and in particular the national security debate? They exist, they just aren't as popular as generalists, nor will they ever be.

I am reminded of a post by David Appell regarding professional bloggers. David ranted against Matthew Yglesias because a commenter posted a complex question which Matthew entertains an answer. David rants that Matthew would even entertain the answer and assume the role of an expert, which fair or not, is legitimate criticism. Then David concludes his rant with some thoughts we often consider ourselves.

So I am wondering why I am reading it any more, or why I am even writing meaningless tidbits in this blog (and that's all they are). Or why anyone is reading. Is this seriously the future of this magnificent medium? It would be a full-time job to really blog about a few serious issues on a particular beat, and who can possibly attract 125,000 readers a day and support yourself doing that?

So more and more I am focusing on real writing, detailed reporting for magazines where you can do some real investigation and reporting and your audience isn't just people reading over their calzone at lunch. I don't want to end up some vapid blogger who tries to say everything and so who says nothing whatsoever. Life is too short. I'm really not sure what the solution is.

As I have discussed in the past, I have a professional background building internet communities. 125,000 readers a day was common, one community I built had well over half a million readers a day, and this was nearly 10 years ago when there were much fewer internet users in general. I have some insight into large online communities, which might explain why I am less jaded on how emerging social networks develop... I've seen them mature over time and recognize that blogging is still a young medium. David's point is interesting though, the generalist blogger carries more influence in complex discussions than the professionals do, simply because the generalists have more readers. With that the case, is there any room for Renaissance men? Consider Matthew's response to David.

The only thing I have to say to defend myself from those charges is that I don't think the post was really about why I suck, it was about why the punditsphere as a whole sucks with me just as a prominent example. And he's right.

If, as Matthew suggests, the punditsphere "sucks" because the generalist doesn't have the expertise to answer complex questions in technical spheres of discussion, then what is the value of blogging? I would argue plenty, and if the "punditsphere" and generalist bloggers are seriously asking these questions, they are forwarding the medium more than they realize. What is still missing from the blogosphere is professional hierarchy, but that is developing.

We think the concept of "Renaissance men" is evolving into "Renaissance networks", they range from the generalists (like Matt and David), the interested citizens (you, being a politically active, informed citizen, in the case of this blog interested in military and specifically maritime strategy), and the larger network that extends to the specialists whom takes various forms like media and research, and who ultimately disseminate through various mediums including periodicals like Proceedings or even a Research organization like CSBA.

The point is, when one observes the evolution of social media networks, not only do we see a Think Tank 2.0 replacing the Think Tank in the future, we also see the development of a hierarchy of information dissemination from the generalists to the specialists for discussion, and back up to the generalists for broader information redistribution. This hierarchy is already well developed in politics, information technology, and entertainment, but the emergence of professional and topic centric blogs for the national security debate and foreign policymaking are slow in coming, but those blogs are emerging. It will take time for consensus to build among the "punditsphere" regarding who the professionals are, but we are already seeing movement on that as well.

The opinions expressed by both David Appell and Matthew Yglesias represents their frustration for misunderstanding their place in the emerging blogger hierarchy, their only fault being they are not really sure who the professionals they should recommend are. At the generalists level, they are the traffic cops of the emerging Renaissance Networks. Ultimately, in regards to the national security debate it will be the emergence and most importantly consensus acceptance of professional forums like the Small Wars Journal that the generalists direct traffic to that will complete the Renaissance Network, which in the blogging social media model, will only serve to eventually elevate the generalist even higher in the Renaissance Network.

After all, in blogging traffic is two way, not one way, and the strength of any one node in the Renaissance Network ultimately increases the strength of every node in the entire network as any specific policy conversation continues. In our opinion, the core nodes of the Renaissance Network already exist, and in some cases the professional nodes downstream already exist as well, but the links between the generalists core and the professional nodes are yet to be established.

Stuff We Are Observing

There are three items a bit off the usual beat we want to highlight.

The Navy is a family, what happens to one of us matters to all of us, and in my life I've seen what the support system behind the Navy is, and how it has the ability to do great things. Many of you who live in the Virginia Beach area may have heard about this story. This is a Navy story. I have been told there is more information available on SailorBob, but BostonMaggie is doing her part to highlight this situation. If you have Paypal and wish to donate to the family, in particular help the family with the two young children, PayPal is set up and the email address is [email protected]. SWOSANITY you are in our prayers sir. This blog is called many things, and the red headed step child of Navy public relations is only one small portion of those things. These stories matter to us as well.

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These are the men and women of the Navy I know, or at least an excellent representation. It isn't arrogance that has these guys thinking they can achieve great things, it is confidence. The men and women of the armed forces do a lot more than a few talking points can summarize, they make a difference and impact the world around them.

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Full disclosure. We have not talked to David about this, intentionally. This is something we have been thinking a lot about, and we admit to being heavily influenced as fans of Michael Yon.

The lifeblood of this blog is the media, specifically Emelie Rutherford. Geoff Fein, Christopher Cavas, Joe Katzman, and a handful of other folks drive many of our conversations, but from our perspective what the Navy is doing outside Washington DC matters a lot more than what is happening in Washington DC.

The Navy is doing a lot of experimentation right now with peacetime strategy, recognizing the need for a proactive peacetime strategy but trying a lot of untested tactics in execution. The only media we have seen so far covering these new operations are local media of the target nation or armed forces media. The American media is absent... which is where David Axe enters stage left.

We are not quite sure we know all the places David is going, but we do know he is going on a few cruises starting in the near future that are specific to the execution of peacetime strategy for the Navy, and these cruises will be in multiple places. David is an independent journalist, he has written for a number of periodicals from Proceedings to World Politics Review to the Prospect Online to Washington Times to the Inter-Press service. He is well qualified to give independent evaluation of the Navy's approach to peacetime strategy. We intend to put our money where our mouth is and support David in his efforts to cover these less than flashy stories, because if he doesn't, who will? The Navy is spending a hell of a lot of money on deployments like the humanitarian missions in SOUTHCOM and Global Fleet Stations to Africa. Are these good investments? Without someone there to look into it, we have to trust what the Navy tells us, which is driven by their own metrics, not independent analysis.

Someone besides the Navy needs to get out there and find out if these investments are worth it, and few would be as qualified in our opinion as David. Because these subjects matter to us, we intend to support him in this effort. Read about Donations for David here, and since he is a blog reader, maybe he will put up something new that gives us more details so we can highlight that too (hint hint). As for us, we just ordered a comic book.

Disclaimer: We will never ask anyone to donate to anything we would not put our best foot forward for first.

5th Fleet Focus: Illegal Dumping and Fishing

One of the claims by pirates in Somalia is that they operate as the national coast guard. The claim is that Europeans and constantly dumping chemicals into the water, and they also legitimately protect the fishing off Somalia. Say what you want, but the fishing off Somalia is not trivial, a full boat can haul catches that run 50% to 150% more than fishing in other areas.

The UN envoy to Somalia is trying to sound the alarm.

The UN special envoy for Somalia on Friday sounded the alarm about rampant illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste off the coast of the lawless African nation.

"Because there is no (effective) government, there is so much irregular fishing from European and Asian countries," Ahmedou Ould Abdallah told reporters.

He said he had asked several international non-governmental organizations, including Global Witness, which works to break the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict, corruption, and human rights abuses worldwide, "to trace this illegal fishing, illegal dumping of waste."

There are no coast guards for failed states, and without a coast guard Somalia is an excellent example of the consequences. I guess the odds of forming a European and Asian naval coalition are slim, considering if European and Asian countries really are responsible for all the illegal fishing, stopping that would only negatively impact themselves. That of coarse is the other problem with failed states, they are easily exploited by others, thus reducing the likelyhood and number of participants in a coalition approach to security.

This also caught our eye.

Somalia's coastal waters are now considered to be among the most dangerous in the world, with more than 25 ships seized by pirates there last year despite US navy patrols, according to the International Maritime Bureau.

I'm surprised the IMB would suggest the US Navy is patrolling Somalia, because if they are it is a token presence at best. The US Navy does not take piracy seriously, and we think the IMB knows this, so this is probably a bit of 'flexible creativity' on the part of the report author, and not something the IMB would put out. If IMB really believes the US Navy is putting a foot forward in the fight against piracy, they are mistaken.

Update: EagleOne is also talking about Somalia. Bottom line, nobody cares.

Prepare For Casualties in the Coming Shipbuilding War

The Navy is about to fight its first war in the 21st century, and make no mistake, there will be casualties for the loser of this fight. With an expected cost ranging from $2.8 - $5.0 billion depending upon source, the Zumwalt class is the largest surface combatant constructed for the Navy since the late 1950s, but is sold as being as stealthy as a submarine with the firepower of an aircraft carrier. Unfortunately, the cloaking device was not invented for this 14,500 ton dreadnought, nor the ability to reload its primary missile magazines, and the price tag is potentially half that of a nuclear aircraft carrier or twice that as a submarine, depending upon source.

Government Executive has a short but on target report regarding the way the discussion is being framed on Capitol Hill.

A bipartisan group of 12 senators on Thursday asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates to review the Navy's decision this week to end its DDG-1000 destroyer program after the first two ships are built and instead buy older but more affordable destroyers.

The twelve Senators are Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), John Kerry (D-Mass.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.). Susan Collins (R-Maine), Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), Jim Webb (D-Va.), Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.), Herb Kohl (D-Wis.), Mel. Martinez (R-Fla.), and Norm Coleman (R-Minn.). The report continues.

In a letter, the senators told Gates they were alarmed by the Navy's plans, which follows more than a decade of statements from senior service officials expressing the need to modernize the surface combatant fleet.

"In light of this apparent disconnect between more than a decade of Navy testimony and the recent advocacy against the President's budget, we urge you to undertake a thorough review and evaluation of the Navy's proposal," they wrote.

The Navy is caught in a number of catch-22s thanks to twelve years of total confusion in shipbuilding and strategic direction. Previous CNOs have not done any favors for the leadership of today, and if the DDG-1000 is canceled, with the kind of political and industry lobbying effort that is plainly obvious we will see some casualties of this war.

In the political catch 22, the Senate is essentially challenging the Navy to throw the last decade of leadership under the boat, because the Senate doesn't believe for a minute the Navy can do that. Probably true, particularly considering one of those leaders that would have to be tossed is the current Chairmen of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. Does anyone honestly see that happening? We don't think the current leadership has the brass to do it. That opinion is based on the historic, and as it was pointed out to us, the common view among the officer ranks that accountability for decisions made doesn't exist once you make Admiral unless it has to do with conduct. And the Navy wonders why they can't retain the good Captains...

Another catch-22 is the Navy trying to sell the DDG-51 as the alternative to the DDG-1000. This is a really tough sell, because the argument suggests the critical technology needed by the 21st century Navy right now is AEGIS ballistic missile defense, the only technology that the Burke can do and the Zumwalt can't. The problem there is that ballistic missiles hardly represent the major challenge facing the Navy today, indeed all it really represents is the latest big war threat with the big war crowd hype. This would have so many consequences it requires its own post, one we intend to make before Thursday.

Finally, one wonders if the Navy has even considered the fallout from Thursday mornings hearing, because if they haven't, they should. It took us about ten minutes today to come up with several dozen quotes by Ms. Allison Stiller and Vice Admiral Barry McCullough regarding the DDG-1000, and they have a long history of singing praises for the ship. Lets be clear, their credibility will be completely lost on Capitol Hill on Thursday, and the careers of both will probably be done.

Short of singing the praises of the DDG-1000, and completely rejecting the DDG-51 as an alternative, it is questionable if their careers will survive the political fallout given how much political money is at stake here. Too many Senators are looking straight in the face of political blow back, and if given the chance they will have blood for this... and it won't be their own, rest assured of that. Both Ms. Allison Stiller and Vice Admiral Barry McCullough will have dozens of previous statements matched up against whatever they say on Thursday, and both will be roasted on the fire of politics as an offering to the American defense industry idol.

Gordon England was Secretary of the Navy when the DDG-1000 was developed, and John Young was the Navy's Senior Acquisition Executive when the DDG-1000 was developed. Both are now top guys in the Pentagon, they will sacrifice Allison Stiller to the political fallout of the DDG-1000 in a heartbeat to cover their own careers, even if she is ultimately nothing more than the middle man for their leadership. Just like the Navy will toss Vice Admiral Barry McCullough overboard instead of take on the decisions of previous CNOs. Fair? No way, they are the ones who have done their job, but in Washington it has always been more convenient to screw the middle men then highlight the failures of those currently in major leadership positions.

We keep thinking that the only way either of them survive the coming shipbuilding war is if their bosses testify on their behalf, in other words, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Gary Roughead. At least under that model, they can state they have changed the plans and it has nothing to do with previous leadership or previous spokesman. I don't expect either of them to do it, but if they would putting themselves in a position to leave a meaningful impact on the Department of Defense for the change they both appear to advocate leading into the 21st Century.

Finally, we don't expect the Navy to come out anything short of blooded badly here unless they make the strategic argument, which AEGIS BMD is not. The 313-ship argument that Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss was trying to make in the media last week isn't compelling and doesn't connect, and will fall flat against the political weight of the Senate. The FY-10 POM argument isn't much better, all it does is stall for time. That may work, but if the Navy doesn't fill that time finding something besides AEGIS BMD, the net effect is simply to delay the bloodbath.

Should be an interesting week.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Order of Battle in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Mobile Bay (CG 53)
USS Russell (DDG 59)
USS Shoup (DDG 86)
USS Momsen (DDG 92)
USS Curts (FFG 38)


Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Peleliu (LHA 5)
USS Dubuque (LPD 8)
USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52)
USS Cape St. George (CG 71)
USS Benfold (DDG 65)
USS Halsey (DDG 97)


In Theater

Ocean 6
FS Floreal (F730)
FS Nivôse (F732)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMCS Iroquois (DDH 280)
HMCS Calgary (FFH 335)
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51)
HMS Edinburgh (D97)
HMS Chatham (F87)
HMS Montrose (F236)
HMNZS Te Mana (F111)
HMAS Stuart (FFH 153)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)

Other current OOBs include the RIMPAC 2008 exercise in the Pacific and Operation Brimstone in the Atlantic.

Sell The Strategy to Expand the Fleet

The world has changed quite a bit since the cold war when the DDG-51 was conceived, and quite a bit since the Gulf War when the DDG-1000 was conceived. When the Maritime Strategy was being produced, Mullen made it clear the Maritime Strategy would begin with Seapower 21 (PDF) and use the rapidly changing world resulting from globalization as context. In many ways, many not obvious until mentioned, the Navy has already evolved in the 21st century, but these things aren't self evident until discussed.

The Navy is currently putting bombs on target in support of the Army and Marines, successfully fielding an Army of IAs and others to plug holes in Army force structure, gaining and assimilating experience in unconventional but non-SOF warfare through an aggressive NECC, recruiting sufficient recruits, retaining sufficient experienced officers (although there is work to be done here in regards to experienced Captains), supplying Admirals to top joint and other national leadership positions (CJCS, DNI, Combatant Commanders, etc.), and not unduly embarrassing the country with horrific scandals or with unseemly inter-service turf brawls. These are great reasons why the Nation has a lot to be proud of in regards to the Navy, but these positive trends are often lost in any discussion of the Navy.

The one aspect of evolution in the 21st century not visible is the shipbuilding plan, which carries with it visibility with the American people on a higher plane than those other items. In speaking to the American people about shipbuilding and Navies, we think it is important to keep it simple, make it easy to understand, and insure the explanation is as self evident as possible. Meeting all three goals in Washington DC requires brilliant PPT skills, but it doesn't have to for communicating to a broader audience.

On this blog, we intentionally keep things simple. I have an outstanding artist who works for me, and I could easily instruct him to make this fairly plain looking blog hip and stylish, but to what end? The simplicity in layout insures fast loading of content, and the only stunning visuals we highlight here is the excellent photography we associate with blog posts. In other words, readers aren't distracted by the imagery of the blog, rather the imagery of the blog content. This is intentional. In communicating our message to readers, our strategy is to focus the reader on substance, not style, thus why we keep it simple.

We discuss maritime strategy using the simple visual analogy of a Yin Yang. The Yin Yang represents warfighting and peacemaking as two opposing and, at the same time, complementary (completing) applications of naval power.

We believe the Navy must take a balanced approach addressing the requirements for winning war and managing peace as instructed by the maritime strategy. If the Navy is to balance itself, this means there must be a commitment to building flexible forces for leveraging the sea as base to connect with the non-integrated gaps, and in this way position itself to better manage the maritime challenges of peacetime. Using the Yin Yang analogy, if black is war and white is peace, this analogy is used to recognize the white dot as peacemaking forces as a requirement for winning war, just as the black dot represents warfighter capabilities as a requirement for managing peace. We believe this analogy is self evident to anyone with a clear understanding of modern conventional and asymmetrical warfare.

The current Navy is built to fight major wars against peer opponents. The Navy of today consists of 11 aircraft carriers, 109 surface combatants (22 CGs, 52 DDGs, 30 FFGs, and 5 PCs), 2 Littoral Combat Ships, 53 attack submarines, 4 cruise missile submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 31 amphibious warfare ships (3 LHAs 7 LHDs, 9 LPDs, and 12 LSDs), and 14 minesweepers. This list does not include the 31 combat logistics ships and 17 support ships.

Of the 167 total surface vessels in the fleet, only 51 are less than 4200 tons. That ratio represents 30% of the total surface force, and all 51 are unrated surface combatants. Of just the surface combatant force, 33% are less than 4200 tons, again all of them unrated. The naval force today is completely unbalanced in favor of the wartime requirement for fighting the Soviet Union of 1989 or the Iraqi Army of 1991. 66% of the total surface combatant fleet is designed to do two things very well, destroy targets on land with cruise missiles and shoot down many varieties of cruise missile and aircraft threats in the air. When talking about the threat environment of the 21st century, be it submarines, ballistic missiles, small boat swarms, mines, and a variety of asymmetric threats, the Navy is not well designed for meeting those challenges.

In keeping things simple, we liken the current resource strategy to an upside down triangle. Looking at the upside down triangle, if you were to write war at the top and peace at the bottom, then inside the triangle divide it into three parts with two horizontal lines, write Sea Strike in the large top portion, Sea Shield in the middle portion, and Sea Basing in the bottom small portion (Seapower 21). you just created a PPT slide of the fleet constitution of the US Navy today. We do not believe that type of fleet constitution matches the Navy's own maritime strategy. This is why we find the debate on Capitol Hill regarding the DDG-1000 to be so extraordinarily stupid, because the debate is ultimately about which type of battleship the Navy should fill in the top large "Sea Strike" portion of the upside down triangle, a political debate to ultimately decide if the nation should build the battleship for fighting the 1989 Soviet Union, or the battleship for fighting against the 1991 Iraq Army.

Only because of the ignorance and apathy of the average American regarding the Navy would such a silly debate ever be allowed to occur.

Now take a triangle sitting on a long base with a point at the top. Write war above the tip and peace along the bottom. Inside the triangle divide it into three parts with two horizontal lines, write Sea Strike in the small top portion, Sea Shield in the middle portion, and Sea Basing in the bottom large portion. We believe this triangle would better illustrate the fleet constitution strategy better aligned with the requirements of the Navy's maritime strategy. Allow us to elaborate.

In major power war, the Navy should be very aware by now that Command of the Sea in the 21st century is determined by aircraft and submarines. Between the CVN force, the SSBN force, the SSGN force, and the SSN force all forms of sea control and power projection are achieved. Even today, whether it is with carrier aviation in the current wars or submarines picking off targets with cruise missiles in failed states like Somalia, these are the major combat platforms at sea. This is also self evident in the way the Navy develops its surface combatant force, which is designed to protect high value vessels from air and submarine attack. The surface combatant fleet doesn't even bother putting anti-ship missiles on its most advanced battleships, because the Navy knows that aircraft will sink enemy ships long before the surface fleet is in range to attack.

However, for peacetime roles today the Navy only has a limited number of ships to draw from. The ships pushing the peacetime activities required to achieve the goals of the maritime strategy include the amphibious force, the small combatants under 4200 tons, and the ships operated by the Military Sealift Command. Indeed if you look at activities like that of the Coast Guard cutter Dallas (WHEC 716), the Navy is basically outsourcing its peacetime engagement responsibilities in major maritime theaters to the already stretched thin Coast Guard. The Navy really should be embarrassed that it is incapable of doing the mission the Coast Guard does today in the Persian Gulf, it is a tragedy of leadership the Navy doesn't see its inability to do that mission as a problem, because that is part of the global mission set the maritime domain demands in today's maritime era.

The Navy, indeed Congress and the American people in general, are under the misguided perception that the AEGIS battleship is the dreadnought of our era. This is absolutely false, and would only be true if the Navy was facing a peer competitor. The Dreadnought of the modern maritime era is the Amphibious Ship, and what we call the mothership; essentially the weapon system and logistical enabler capable of saturating the maritime domain with manned and unmanned systems to USE command of the sea, and influence that domain throughout the littorals and into land. Without the ability to saturate the maritime domain with naval power and establish what the Navy calls Maritime Domain Awareness, the Navy is unable to maintain command of the sea, thus unable to exploit its use to promote the conditions necessary for building a stable, peaceful maritime environment that promotes economic growth in struggling states.

By using submarines to alleviate the surface combatant force from having to carry the burden of major war, the surface fleet should reconstitute itself with fewer battleships and more smaller surface combatants to operate within these theater Sea Bases. In other words, using the triangle analogy described above for peacetime, the resource strategy would list submarines and aircraft carriers in the small area labeled sea strike, the battleships in the middle portion labeled sea shield, and a large number of motherships, amphibious ships, small combatants, logistics ships, and support ships filling the large portion at the bottom of the triangle to support the peacetime, or SysAdmin, requirements as established in the Navy's maritime strategy. This force ultimately represents the viable solution for the asymmetrical threats to the maritime domain, because it becomes the forward deployed persistent naval force present to deal with these threats.

It is time to align resources to maritime strategy by recognizing that in the maritime environment of today the Navy is currently in a position to fight its wars with a small number of powerful platforms at the high end, but the Navy requires a saturation force made up of a lot of large flexible amphibious type ships and a large number of smaller surface combatants if the Navy is serious about using command of the sea in peacetime.