5th Fleet Focus: Live and Learn

On November 5th, 2005 a cruise ship named Seabourn Spirit was attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia. It was an unusual target at the time, Somalian piracy was almost exclusively cargo ships at that time due to the smaller crews. The crew of the cruise ship repelled the attack using a long-range acoustic device, which generated a focused, painful noise that turned the pirates away.

I was reminded of that this evening when I was reading through this French news article that showed the Seabourn Spirit as part of the recent NATO convoy through that region. The escorting warship is FS Nivôse (F732), and apparently French soldiers were dispersed onto the private commercial traffic to act as security against pirates.

Good pictures in that article, you gCaptain folks would enjoy the imagery alone. It is a reminder for those who get confused, NATO is not off the coast to fight piracy, NATO is escorting convoys of commercial ships and escorting the World Food Programme ship to Somalia for the UN. If you look through the latest Order of Battle, it is decieving to think of all those ships fighting pirates, because the truth is only about a half dozen are, while several stand off and watch ships that have already been taken captive.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) -> SNMG2
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 2

ITS Durand de la Penne (D560)
FGS Karlsruhe - (F212)
FGS Rhön - (A 1443)
HS Themistokles - (F465)
TCG Gokova - (F496)
HMS Cumberland - (F85)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (712)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Courbet (F712)
FS Commandant Blaison (F793)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS Nivôse (F732)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
HNLMS De Ruyte (F804)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)

Thinking about Naval Surface Fire Support - Part IV

First of all, yep, I'm incredibly tardy with this post. But hey, better late than never, and Thanksgiving gives me both time off from the Real Job(tm) and enough tryptophan to force me to stay in one place long enough to both think (a very little) and write (hopefully enough).

When I left off, at least before the comments, I had finished advocating applique rocket fires for entry-phase and post-landing responsive fires, possibly using GMLRS/HIMARS fired from ship deck positions. Then we had a good go-around in the comments, which I won't rehash. What I had promised you was some discussion of the relevance and necessity of this capability (naval surface fire support) in the foreseeable future.

There are really only two uses for this capability. The first is to support an active amphibious landing, and the second is to provide fire support for troops within range of the littoral whether or not they were originally landed across the beach. Precision strike fires on high value targets and deep interdiction (at least according to my own windage last time) are not NSFS missions. So we have two situations that might come up - one, the U.S. maintains an amphibious forced entry capability which produces the concomitant fires requirement, or two, the U.S. or allied ground forces become engaged within NSFS range of the U.S. surface fleet in such a manner that their organic artillery support and aviation support are either unavailable or require augmentation.

Several modes of argument suggest themselves. We might argue this by force structure, by trends, or by strategy. Arguing it by force structure is almost circular, since the size of the U.S. Marine Corps is legislated at two divisions - and the Marine Corps defines itself by the ability to perform amphibious force entry. It's not completely circular, though - the USMC does a lot of things, and there's nothing that says this capability couldn't be dropped in favor of other ones such as airmobile assault. I'm going to skip the force structure argument for another reason, though - force structures and capabilities should, I think we'd all agree on this blog, be informed by strategy and requirements. While the opposite causal chain still holds due to the 'come as you are' nature of modern war, let's take the high road and think about this far enough into the abstract to actually tackle the question of 'why' or 'why not.'

We might argue it by trends. Here is a list (incomplete) of the past sixteen years of U.S. military actions where naval or ground forces were required.

1992 Kuwait - military exercises in response to Iraq's refusal to recognize border
1993 Bosnia - military intervention via NATO
1993 Macedonia - several hundred soldiers deployed
1994 Haiti - US troops deployed to Haiti (up to 20,000) in uncertain conditions
1996 Liberia - Embassy evacuation
1996 Central African Republic - Embassy evacuation
1997 Albania - Evacuation of U.S. personnel from Tirana
1997 Congo/Gabon - Standby deployment for evacuation
1997 Sierra Leone - Evacuation of U.S. personnel from Freetown
1997 Cambodia/Thailand - US forces deployed to Thailand on standby for evacuations from Cambodia
1998 Guinea-Bissau/Senegal - US forces deployed to Senegal on standby for evacuations from Guinea-Bissau
1998 Kenya/Tanzania - US forces deployed to Kenya to provide security and disaster relief after bombings of US embassies in Kenya/Tanzania
1998 Liberia - US forces deployed on standby for evacuations from Monrovia.
1999 East Timor - US forces deployed as per UN for stabilization.
2000 Sierra Leone - US naval forces deployed on standby for evacuations.
2000 Yemen - US forces deployed to Aden in response to USS Cole bombing
2001 Afghanistan - US forces engage in Afghanistan following 9/11
2002 Phillippines - US forces deployed to train with, advise and assist Phillipine forces
2002 Cote D'Ivoire - Evacuation of U.S. personnel from Bouake.
2003 Iraq - U.S. and allies invade Iraq to topple Hussein government.
2003 Liberia/Mauritania - U.S. forces sent to secure and if necessary evacuate U.S. embassy in Mauritania.
2003 Georgia - U.S. combat troops sent to Georgia for counterterrorist deployment.
2003 Djibouti - U.S. combat troops sent to Djibouti for counterterrorist deployment.
2004 Haiti - U.S. troops sent to secure Embassy and additional troops later to support U.N. mission.
2004 Various - 'GWOT' deployments in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Eritrea.
2006 Lebanon - U.S. forces deployed to evacuate U.S. personnel/citizens from Lebanon prior to Israel/Hezbollah conflict.
2007 Somalia - US forces active in strikes on GWOT targets.
2008 Georgia - US forces enter Georgia for relief following Russian invasion.
2008 Somalia - US naval forces deployed in commerce protection off Somalia against non-state piracy from shore havens.

There has been no shortage of U.S. military deployments. While it is true that there is only one case where an actual forced entry might have been plausible - the 2003 invasion of Iraq - it is also true that there are at least two cases where the capability might have been called into play had circumstances turned out differently. I would identify the 1992 Kuwait deployment, the 1994 Haiti deployment, and the 2007 Somalia actions as possible forced-entry situations. I would also tag the 1992 Kuwait deployment, the 1994 Haiti deployment, the 2002 Philippines deployment, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2004 GWOT actions and 2007 Somalia GWOT actions as possible use cases for offshore fire support for engaged troops even without a beach crossing.

This is not a scientific look at the particulars of these cases, I will be the first to admit. But it appears on first glance that while a full amphibious assault has not been seriously envisioned since the decoy maneuvers of the first Gulf War, there have been numerous potential situations where an amphibious capability and associated fire support have been applicable even if not applied.

I would argue that having a capability in order to not use it, after all, is in no way a strange position for U.S. armed forces. In this particular instance, the assurances that this capability is no longer relevant seem to be somewhat misleading unless we limit our discussion to 'full scale amphibious assaults.' Even then, the capability can serve without use; it is true that U.S. force movements, especially sea mobile ones, acquire a value they would not have without the ability (if not the inclination) to move those forces across the interface - and as the first three posts in this series pointed out, that capability is hand-in-glove with the requirement for the fire support of those troops.

From a strategy point of view, Galrahn has made the point better than I could that the capability for small, agile but capable intervention forces based around the MEU or MEU(SOC) offer the capability to handle most of the notional situations outlined above. One constant of American warfighting has been to consider American manpower a precious, scarce resource (I have written on this and the history behind it in the past prior to blogging here; I may consider posting some of my reasoning if I can get it cleaned up). Given that, American doctrine tends to emphasize the use of firepower as an augmenter of and substitute for troop presence whenever possible. If smaller, agile Marine units are to be used for intervention, then maximum support of those Marine units (whether transiting ashore in a hostile environment or carrying out missions within reach of the sea) is dictated - and as I discussed earlier, for particular phases of such operations, there is no substitute for high-volume responsive fires. If these interventions are kept small, there is even less likelihood that organic artillery assets will be available on shore, putting an even larger burden on external fire support capability.

Finally, I too am a reader of Capt. Hughes and his predecessors. With the U.S. Navy as a predominant fighting force in the blue water, there remains the ability of a materially inferior opposing force to choose its engagements carefully and do disproportionate damage to those targets that the U.S. Navy is tasked with protecting - such as commerce, support or seapower exploitation units rather than seapower combat units. One means of forcing an opposing fleet involved in a guerre de course to engage, fixing it for your own assets to address, is to provide it with a target that it cannot realistically pass up. The threat of a forced entry operation against coastline that fleet is tasked with protecting is perhaps one of the strongest such motivators - and that threat is only possible if the credible capability to wield it exists.

These are the reasons that I consider a plausible surface fire support capability to be necessary for U.S. operations and for U.S. strategic reasons for the next decade or two, at the minimum. Unless U.S. strategy is changed to de-emphasize the capability to exploit sea control via on-shore intervention, NSFS will be something looked for avidly in the heat of action if those interventions do take place. While I'm not suggesting that such interventions are impossible without it, it will certainly result in much after-action finger-pointing and soul-searching if the need for it arises and the capability is not there to answer the call.

Hence, I spend time and energy considering how best to perform the mission rather than (at present) wondering whether the mission will be required.

The Yankee Sailor, TAD To ID

Galrahn has graciously offered me the opportunity to blog here for the next five months or so and I've accepted. The job I'm in right now doesn't allow me the time to maintain my regular blog properly. For those of you that don't already know me, my profile is available at The Yankee Sailor.

See ya 'round the waterfront!

Russia and India Reach Final Stage in Gorshkov Negotiations

Every once in awhile I come across some very interesting analysis on the Russian website shipbuilding.ru, and this weeks article by Gennady Nechaev is no exception. The article basically states that Russia and India have reached the moment of decision with the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, and the last chance for Russia to sell the aircraft carrier to India is approaching in the form of President Medvedev's visit to India scheduled in a few weeks.

The article contemplates the "what ifs" should India decide not to pay the $2 billion price tag Russia is demanding to complete the carrier. Two stand out, the first which the author doesn't think has any real value, is for Russia to keep the carrier. This is not an uncommon position among Russian analysts, given the choice the consensus seems to be a new aircraft carrier would be more of a burden on the Russian fleet at this time than a blessing. Indeed, it seems to be a common view that the Russian desire for six aircraft carriers is Utopian, unrealistic, or worse.

The second option would be to sell the aircraft carrier to China. This is the concluding thought of the analysis, and doesn't dig very deep. I don't think China would buy it, which raises the question, now what?

It is an interesting question to contemplate, raising the possibility that India has more negotiating power than is assumed in this deal. The title of the article is "The Unwanted Carrier" and is very appropriate, because if India doesn't buy it, it raises the question who will actually pay the rest of the money necessary to field the ship, and the answer is ultimately... nobody.

Seems to me that puts India in a very good position, made even better if they can get the Kitty Hawk back on the table as a distant possibility.

Updated Piracy Maps

Below are a few updated piracy maps. The first one is the latest from the NATO Shipping Centre which updates about once a week, usually on Wednesday. This map is as of Wednesday November 26th, 2008 with the activity of the last week.

This is the live piracy map available from the IMB.

Click images for higher resolution.

Still Early in the Mumbai Terror Attacks

It is still way too early to offer any analysis of the Mumbai terror attacks. Like most incidents, early reporting is often inaccurate in regards to what happened, and it takes time for investigators to sort of fact and fiction, and adding speculation and rumor never helps. All we can really do is continue to observe news reporting like this video from the Telegraph, which gives a good summery.

With that said, there does appear to be a maritime interest in this attack that I intend to follow closely. The details are sketchy at best, but news reports like this one, this one, and this one give some hint that the Indian Navy and Coast Guard are very active off the coast of India near Pakistan investigating a couple of maritime aspects to the attack.

While it is still unclear, it looks like there may be two specific maritime aspects of this story to watch for, an act of piracy and a possible amphibious assault terrorism style. There is a lot to think about, but if there was indeed a maritime aspect to the attack there will be important lessons for both the Navy and the Coast Guard in tweaking our own homeland security against potential terrorist attacks of this nature.

Something else that might be interesting to keep an eye on. If you recall, text messaging made a big impact during Hurricane Katrina. Well, it appears Twitter has had a significant impact on the information flow in real time during the attack (see here and here).

Real time, Open Source Intelligence during a terrorist attack on a major city... There is something significant in that statement worth pondering, and worth local responders to consider very carefully regarding the dissemination of information in real time during future crisis. After all, just like text messages to specific people, a cell phone can be a Twitter client to the masses.

David Does Video of USS Freedom

Check out this video David Axe has of the inside of USS Freedom. At about 1:00 in the movie, you will see what many in the comments have called a wide open passageway. That is the main deck (1) and he enters at the very end of it and walks all the way down. That is the only major passageway on the ship. Behind him at the entry point is the bridge.

To give you a sense of how spoiled I was on that ship, if you pause the video at 1:03 into the movie, there is a very short hall to the left with a few officer quarters at the end. I was in one of those quarters, and it was REALLY nice to be right there in the middle of everything. I took some pictures, which I may or may not post of how much space is in there, a lot more than one would see on any other Navy ship.

I'll continue my discussions about the LCS next week, I have already started sorting the some 800 photos I took while on ship, and still have a lot of different things I want to discuss. Interesting video, one thing many may notice in the video is just how enormous the aviation zone is on that ship. 2 H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts? No problem, while the aviation zone door will only allow one aircraft to enter or exit at a time, that space is huge. Also, that is the only elevator to the mission zone below decks, and you'll note it is too small for a vehicle. It actually drops into the middle of three huge mission zones below deck.

There is a larger hatch on the flight deck that can be removed by crane to the mission zone below, but the ship does not have a crane that can lift that hatch nor is there an elevator associated with that other hatch.

One final thought. David's video ends with a look at the USS Freedom bridge. Triangle not rectangle, I thought that was interesting. Two points. You'll notice the middle section of the bridge windows is not a window. Cmdr. Gabrielson came up to me at one point during the transit and told me that was one of the first things he intends to change. I agree with him, it is odd that you can't stand in the center of the bridge and see straight forward. Another thing you can barely notice in the video is those windows, they are built to be quickly replaced when damaged.

While this is a short tour of the ship, if you get a chance to take a tour yourself I highly encourage it. It is not a warship, it is a mothership, and when you take that tour you will understand why the payload that ship brings to the fleet isn't kinetic, it's space.

Observing the Russian Navy Shipbuilding Plan Through 2015

There are a couple of Russian news articles out regarding the ongoing modernization of the Russian Navy. It would get confusing if I quotes those articles, so I'm going to summarize borrowing some additional details from the excellent Navy Nuts website. I've said this a few times, and will highlight again, the best 20 Euros you can spend on Navy information every year is a subscription to Navy Nuts. That website is fantastic. For example.

The Russian articles give a summery of the Russian shipbuilding program between 2007-2015. It is very interesting, no aircraft carriers are mentioned in the plan up to 2015. I note something related to that though, the absence of any major surface combatant construction during that time period implies that shipyard modernization for surface ship construction is almost certain to take place in the time frame between now and 2015, making it more likely the Russians will build aircraft carriers after 2015 as has been stated many times by various Navy leaders.

While the details of the Russian shipbuilding plan are OK in the articles, Navy Nuts does one better, and gives us the names of the various ships. The website does little stuff like that all the time, seriously, best 20 Euro's annually you will ever spend on Navy gouge. Want to know what the EU pirate fighting force will be? I assure you, they will be the folks who not only gather the list, they will cover the rotation durations and replacements over time better than anyone else too. Navy Nuts is the premier English language source online for European ship movements.

The Russian Navy expects to receive several surface ships and submarines over the next several years, including five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered attack submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 frigates, and five Project 20380 corvettes.

Lets break that down a bit.

The Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine RFS Yuri Dolgorukiy was launched on 2-13-08. The next two under construction are RFS Aleksander Nevskiy and RFS Vladimir Monomach.

The first Project 885 Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, RFS Severodvinsk, will be completed in 2010. It is unclear when the second Yasen class submarine will be purchased, but one more is part of the current plan.

The first of six Project 677 Lada class submarines RFS St. Petersburg was delivered to the fleet last year. The second Lada class RFS Kronshtatd was laid down on 7-29-05 while the third Lada class, RFS Sevastopol, was laid down on 11-11-06.

The first of three Project 22350 frigate expected to be delivered in the plan is RFS Admiral Gorshkov, no not that Admiral Gorshkov. RFS Admiral Gorshkov was laid down on 2-2-06 and is expected to be delivered next year and assigned to the Baltic fleet. It is unclear when the other two ships will begin construction, but probably after RFS Admiral Gorshkov is launched.

Finally, the first of five Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvette RFS Steregushchiywas commissioned about a year ago The remaining four will be named RFS Soobrazitel'nyy, RFS Boiky, RFS Sovershen'nyy, and RFS Stoiky respectfully.

In total, over the next seven years the Russian Navy intends to commission 5 SSBNs, 2 SSNs, 6 SSKs, 3 frigates, and 5 corvettes. There are still very persistent rumors the Russian Navy is modernizing a Kirov class battlecruiser and several Udaloy I class destroyers. There is also a Slava class cruiser that is reported to be 96% completed in the Ukraine that may still be purchased, although with relations between Russia and the Ukraine strained since Georgia and over other issues, that sale remains very questionable.

Put another way, the short term future of Russian Naval power is both nuclear and underwater. Some things never change.

Valour-IT Home Stretch

If you have been waiting until the last minute to donate on behalf of Team Navy for Valour-IT, your moment is now. Just click the nice little graphic up on the top right of the blog and away you go. We accept all donations over $1, and every donation counts.

Also there is an auction site up, I highly recommend taking a look at the last three entries. Good stuff.

Why Germany is Worth Watching

EagleOne has long been the best source for Somali piracy online. He comes through today with this article, a very interesting peek into German military activity in the Horn of Africa region.

The German soldiers aboard the remote naval reconnaissance plane (top speed of 745 km/h, range of 9,000 km) must not do more than making films and taking photographs. The only weapon that they can use in line with current laws is the camera. However, if they were permitted, they could also fire with precision, because Orion is heavily armed. It carries, warheads, missiles, tube artillery, torpedoes, mines, and bombs.

"Over the past two months we have been able to film four pirate attacks on merchant ships," says Commander Michael Potthoff (42), who commands the 65-men German Orion contingent in Djibouti. "Eight attacks were prevented because of our presence."

This raises two questions. What is the point of Germany sending a huge number of troops to Somalia to fight piracy if the current laws only allow camera's to be the weapon? Can one of our German readers explain either via email or the comments the events taking place over there regarding the governments effort to open up the RoE for the German Navy, because I think that would be an interesting discussion. If the government changes the RoE for piracy, how does that effect German military RoE in Afghanistan?

Seems to me that if Germany adjusts its laws for piracy, there could be some downstream benefit in Afghanistan. That would be nice...

Second, what is the difference between the way the P-3C described here conducting its pirate fighting efforts and any scenario involving an unmanned aviation systems contribution? As this blog continues to point out, if you need a warfighter, build an unmanned system and arm it up.

If you need a peacemaker for piracy, and unmanned platform is a glorified camera. If you really want a peacemaker, send in the manpower of the Coast Guard, Navy, and Marines, and send them in armed for action.

Somali Piracy and Fish Stories

There is a lot of discussion about the Thai Fishing Trawler that the Indian Navy blew up. The owner of the ship is claiming it was not a mothership.

But it turns out now that the “mother ship” may not have been in pirate hands very long. According to the CNN report, the ship was the trawler Ekawat Nava 5, which had been headed from Oman to Yemen to deliver fishing equipment when it was attacked by pirates off the Horn of Africa, according to Wicharn Sirichaiekawat, owner of the Ekawat Nava 5. The pirates were still taking control of the ship when the Tabar moved in, he said.

The media didn't really dig very deep here. The question is not whether the Indian Navy should have blown up a trawler that was shooting at it, particularly one towing two motor boats. The Indian Navy has the right to self defense, even in the face of the stupidity required for pirates to shoot at a warship with their AK-47s.

The real question here is why a Thai fishing trawler is near Somalia. Are we seriously supposed to believe that fishing trawlers make their money doing cargo hauls between Oman and Yemen? Really? That is a tough sell without a lot more proof than CNNs reporting is providing.

The more likely reason the Somalian pirates raided the ship is because it was illegally fishing in the Somalia Exclusive Economic Zone. Did any reporters ask Wicharn Sirichaiekawat, owner of the Ekawat Nava 5, questions about why his fishing ship from Thailand is way the hell over off the coast of Somalia? If a reporter wants to talk about Somalian piracy, they need to do some basic research into fishing off Somalia, because it is part of the story.

A Thai fishing trawler off the coast of Somalia transporting fishing gear between two countries, and it just so happens to be happening during a fishing season when catches right now are running 50% to 150% better than normal. To borrow a pun, that story sounds fishy to me.

The new PLAN submarine tender

So according to the person posting this photo, this is the new submarine tender ship under construction by Guangzhou Shipyard International Co Ltd. Here are some of the photos of the new submarine tender.






Now, it's kind of interesting that this ship also has the thing in the back (I don't know what you would call it) that is used to lower the LR7 rescue submarine that they are buying from the British. It's also interesting to note that this would be the first submarine tender that PLAN has ordered since Type 648. Considering all the new submarines that are coming out, it's about time that they build a new submarine tender that would make use of LR7. Some people are calling this the 9500 tonne type 926 class.

We also have some new photos of 866 in action.




And finally, CCTV has a clip of different services. The first part is the navy and shows 168 in action. It's actually kind of interesting to watch the different systems (especially the Type 730) in action. You can find the clips here.

JMSDF Drops to 0.500 in BMD

Joining the U.S. Navy on the scoreboard, the JMSDF has racked up a 0.500 average on BMD intercepts so far with a failure to achieve an intercept on their second SM-3 test, this time from the JS Chokai. Again, not knocking anyone involved - just pointing this out to indicate the high variance possible in system performance numbers for this sort of thing. I still owe you guys another BMD post, which I have had on hold due to 'actual job' workload - but that's none of your concern; I still owe you the post. Hope to have it by close of this week. Happy Thanksgiving, and no 'turkey shoot' jokes please.

Oh drat, I made one.

Are Pirates the Problem, or the Solution?

Two of my favorite writers, Robert Farley and Thomas Barnett, have weighed in on Somali piracy, and while I agree with every point made by both, I disagree with both writers regarding how to manage the issue of Somali piracy. It isn't that I disagree with either of them that building international partnerships to fight piracy is the wrong way ahead, I would just point out that the current actions by the US Navy to in fact do nothing to curb piracy is well aligned with US Grand Strategy, even though working with international partners to curb piracy is also well aligned with US Grand Strategy. The point here is not trivial, the point is that Somali piracy is not counter to US interests in Somalia. Rare will you find a blog committed to Naval discussions make the argument that piracy is not counter to the interests of the United States, but when it comes to Somalia it is important to remember that for this country right now, there are other, more important strategic interests at work.

Dear reader, do not be misled by media reporting. Keep in mind that there are a lot of legitimate business interests not of the United States that are facing a difficult challenge with Somali piracy. However, there are no significant US business interests threatened by Somali piracy, Somali piracy does not represent even a minor economic threat to the United States. Even with the hijacking of a Saudi supertanker, and even if every supertanker from the Persian Gulf has to take the long route around the Cape of Good Hope, this amounts to less than 1 penny per gallon cost for the American citizen. Perspective is important.

The most serious cost estimates of Somalia piracy are suggesting it is having a $14 billion dollar impact, and that is probably a very optimistic guess because I honestly can't find more than $1 billion, and I study this stuff. For context, assuming $14 billion dollars, then that doesn't account for much in a $7.8 trillion dollar global industry. Even at the super estimate of $14 billion dollars, that means piracy is impacting the industry a whole 0.1%.

Economic considerations are secondary though, from the US perspective it is important to remember that JTF-HOA has a purpose, is very active, and has nothing to do with piracy. Somalia represents a major front in the Global War on Terror, and the US National Security Strategy for Somalia is essentially to wait for a government that can manage the nation to emerge. The United States destroyed the Islamic Courts because they represented a future likely Taliban. The United States, and specifically JTF-HOA is working towards building up every nation surrounding Somalia. The United States is essentially allowing Somalia to remain an ungoverned country because the status quo gives us more freedom of action in fighting al Qaeda and other extremist terrorism allies in Somalia. Piracy is a side effect, and not necessarily a terrible side effect, of that strategy.

There are very few people dieing from piracy. The areas that are being governed by the pirate companies are functioning and less violent than areas where piracy does not exist, indeed pirate cities are thriving. The pirates are not only commercial in nature, but they are enemies of the Islamic extremists that represent the enemy of the United States. It sounds crazy to say, but the pirates are essentially the secular, liberal capitalists of Somalia, and the United States would prefer to deal WITH not AGAINST those types of people. Know your history, the Europeans preferred dealing with the Brashaws of the Barbary states than the alternative, the Islamic militant armies. We are essentially allowing the pirates to build themselves as regional Brashaws of Somalia with the ransom money from piracy, while the Islamists who remain violent are struggling for funding.

The symptom of our problem is becoming the rest of the worlds problem, and they recognize that piracy is a symptom of our problem. Now they are realizing the terrible truth we already know: namely that 100 years of legal bullshit has left most of the world with anti-piracy laws that date to the 19th century, and all of the 20th century laws work against solving the problem. The 20th century major legal frameworks are built to fight 3rd generation war, and are ill suited for the 4th generation challenges we are facing, including piracy in Somalia.

We do not have the 21st century rule sets to solve these problems, both the Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS are counter towards solving the problem. Even the Europeans know it, it is why only the French have an evolved legal rule set to actually take pirates prisoners, indeed have you noticed nobody has taken prisoners, even the Indians who 'blew up' a mothership? The legal system is better suited to killing them all than capturing any of them. Clearly any such legal system is broken.

For example, have you ever read Geneva III, Article 22? Look it up. Several EU nations accused the US of violating the Geneva Conventions for putting Saddam Hussain on an aircraft carrier after he was captured. The US policy is so damn confusing because the Bush administration never bothered to address the legal rule sets for 21st century challenges. The rule sets, yes including the Geneva Convention, need to be updated to the 21st century, and the US strategy is to force the rest of the world to see it, deal with the same problems we have already run into this century, and help fix the rule sets. Somali piracy is a very inexpensive, non lethal means towards those ends. Once we achieve that, we can forge international partnerships and stomp out the problem quickly.

Its Grand Strategy, often not well understood but easy to follow if you simply apply the facts as they are. The US Navy is not fighting piracy, they are too busy engaged in the GWOT in Somalia to bother with some of the symptoms of the main problem. The US Navy simply has to keep terrible things from happening and continue to prosecute the GWOT, that is their strategic priority and it is in line with policy. Let the rest of the world deal with the symptoms of our problem, symptoms like piracy, because they can either gather an enormous number of warships and try to fight the symptoms, or they can help us solve the real problem. Long term, I think the United States believes the pirates are part of the solution, not the problem the media is making them out to be. Why? Because they are an alternative to the Islamic Courts, an alternative motivated by something the rest of the world can relate too. Economics.

The Inside View of the Bridge Wing

Some additional pictures to go with the damage displayed in this post. This is what it looks like from the inside.
This is the view of the starboard side, the way it should look.

Like I said, it isn't very serious.

A Stop in the Life of Continuing Promise 2008

The Continuing Promise 2008 blog has been updated, and it is worth a read. This part caught my attention.

We had the blessing and fortune to perform a special surgery on a three-year-old girl whose eyelids had been partially fused closed since birth and could barely see. As we were to understand, she had been taken around the country and outside the country to seek medical care and treatment to correct the birth defect, without success.

When she arrived on the ship, she was reserved, shy and obviously conscious of her condition. She rarely smiled and would not look you in the eye. Her father, clearly a man of faith and filled with hope, expressed his gratitude for our offer and thanked us regardless of the outcome. Two days later, after the operation, I visited the small girl in the medical ward and there, in place of the shy and reserved young child, was a vibrant, smiling, playful and confident child filled with a clear view of the world that awaited her.

Her Father, as you could imagine, was overwhelmed and overjoyed for what had been given to his precious gift…his child and as it was clearly evident….his world. Words can not express or explain the feelings of the moment; but I will try….happy, relieved, overjoyed, and blessed. As I scan Merriam-Webster, I am sure there are many more adjectives to choose from...However, I will leave it to you to fill in the blanks with your own words.

This is a view of the US Navy of today at work that doesn't get much attention, but this is a good example of how our nation is using our weapons of wars in new and innovative ways. The blog entry is written by Commodore Frank Ponds, who I have previously spoken to here. I thought his latest update was very interesting, and gives insight into what a single stop on the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) Continuing Promise 2008 deployment is like.

5th Fleet Focus: International Request for Proposals

I know I am way behind on this, but I only caught this news today. I think this is an interesting dynamic in the political space not getting enough attention.

NATO, the European Union and others should launch land operations against bases of Somali pirates in coordination with Russia, the Russian ambassador to NATO said on Wednesday.

Dmitry Rogozin said the view of Russian experts was that naval action alone, even involving a large fleet of a powerful nation, would not be enough to defeat the pirates, given Somalia's geo-strategic position.

"So it is up to NATO, the EU and other major stakeholders to conduct not a sea operation, but in fact a land coastal operation to eradicate the bases of pirates on the ground," he said.

Sounds like hit and run amphibious operations. As I have contended, and been criticized for by Marines, this is why I believe the MEU and not the MEB is becoming more important as the Marines return to sea. These quick strike hit hard and pull off the beach operations are going to be very important in ungoverned spaces, because we can't commit to landing and staying in every location.

With the Russians proposing cooperative land attack activities, this represents something very new towards international cooperation. For years after the cold war many soldiers thought the US and Russian military would fight side by side, and now, in Somalia of all places, the Russians want exactly that. It will be interesting to see if the Russians deploy amphibious ships from the Black Sea Fleet down to the Somalian coast.

Gen. John Craddock was asked about the Russian suggestion today.

U.S. Gen. John Craddock, NATO's supreme allied commander, said Monday that the alliance's mandate is solely to escort World Food Program ships to Somalia and to conduct anti-piracy patrols.

Asked what he thought of a Russian proposal to jointly attack the pirate strongholds, Craddock answered: "That's far beyond what I've been tasked to do."

NATO has four warships on duty off the coast of Somalia, an impoverished nation caught up in an Islamic insurgency that has had no functioning government since 1991. The U.S. 5th Fleet based in Bahrain also contributes to policing the coast, along with frigates from Russia, India, Malaysia and Denmark.

Essentially, if you are following the headlines (and the links on the blog) there are two new proposals on the table. Shipping owners are calling for an all out blockade of Somalia and more air power, while Russia is calling for a joint, international strike on land against pirate strongholds, including what appears to be a land force element to that attack.

If Russia intends to deploy amphibious ships to the coast of Somalia, don't expect it until at least after the Peter the Great rounds the Cape of Good Hope to exercise with India. Several have speculated the Russian warships would join the anti-piracy activities off the Coast of Somalia after those exercises, and in reading the cryptic news reporting from Russian Navy officials, I'd say that is a good bet right now.

The maritime strategy is working exactly as intended on this issue. With the media still all over this issue, and likely to stay on it as the industry continues to pay ransoms and see ships hijacked, not to mention other governments now leading proposals for military solutions, the United States is putting the next administration in position to choose its response.

In the meantime, based on recent responses in the comments regarding US fleet activities off the coast of Somalia, and what I term the absence of any actual pirate fighting, I think it is time to begin the conversation regarding what the US Navy is doing. There is a perception the US is really engaged in TF150, it is a bad perception, it is probably time to quit avoiding the conversation and discuss the true role of the US Navy off the Horn of Africa, because it has nothing to do with piracy.

It Has Been Suggested They Are Expendable

In one of several Q&A periods with Cmdr. Don Gabrielson of USS Freedom (LCS 1), Cmdr. Gabrielson mentioned that one of the first things he intends to do when he gets to Norfolk is to open up the ship so that the fleet can come aboard and see the new ship. I thought this was very smart, it reminded me of several stories I heard regarding the USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750) when it came up to the northeast and visited Baltimore, among other ports, and allowed Congress to get a good look inside that ship. It was noteworthy how many Congressman bit their upper lip and swallowed their tongues regarding criticism of the cutter after visiting the ship.

The reason is simple, when one has a lot of questions and opinions, seeing for yourself is important. The phrase is "Seeing is Believing" or something similar. I don't believe every critic of LCS who takes a tour will stop being a critic, but I do think that the ship will soften anyone who does visit the ship. There are several reasons why I believe that, but I will say I honestly believe the ship has the ability to inspire imagination in anyone who actually has unique ideas, on many occasions my imagination was inspired observing some of the small details of the ship.

Upon departing to Buffalo to meet up with Freedom for my short cruise last week, I left a post up specific to the idea of compromises. With all small ships, there are compromises that must be made, and this ship has several core capabilities that require compromises. For example, the ship only has berthing for about 75 people, more berthing space simply doesn't exist unless it is a mission module. This was a conscious decision by the Navy to force a small crew on the ship. As one who digs deep into the Navy budget, I understand like most do that manpower is the most expensive aspect of the fleet, and despite the headlines, technology including ships are relatively inexpensive. The need to reduce crew size isn't cavalier, it is a necessity if the fleet intends to maintain numbers, the question is how can the US do this without reducing capabilities beyond survivable levels.

There are several side effects of a small crew on a ship, and they require compromises that must be made to account for less manpower. The most popular criticism that results from this compromise is damage control. How will a ship with about ~70-75 people manage damage control on a ship with level I survivability? I went into this trip seeking answers to that question, and specifically focused on three areas of damage: fire, shock, and flooding.

Fire

If you get the chance, take a tour of USS Freedom (LCS 1). When you see the ship the first thing you will probably notice is just how much emphasis towards fighting fires is built into this ship. This goes well beyond automated systems, both Chris Cavas and I agreed we have never seen a ship with so much emphasis in every single space towards fighting fire. There are stories that may or may not be classified regarding the materials on the ship used to protect certain spaces from fire, but if you recall, there was a fire on Freedom while it was still under construction, and it is noteworthy that a lot of this protective fire material that was in place for that fire worked exactly as designed. It was also noteworthy that when the topic of damage control came up, Cmdr. Don Gabrielson was ready to talk about fire. It isn't an accident, I have to say and I think anyone who takes a tour will agree, the availability of fire control equipment is not a concern on that ship. With all of the active and passive fire control capabilities built into the ship, I do not see fire as a major issue in damage control.

Shock

I was given virtually unlimited access to the ship during my stay. Sure, I couldn't go into the lockers where self defense weapons were stored, but I do believe I did visit every other room on the ship except perhaps the quarters of the officers. One of the things I noticed is that several components of the ship that were most likely to be damaged by shock were built for quick replacement. The glass windows are a good example, I studied those windows a bit, and if you take the tour you will notice they are built to be replaced easily and quickly. Indeed without giving away too much information, I noted there are several places this was evident on the ship. If it is a part or piece of the ship that is expendable, you will note that the part or piece is built to be replaced quickly. This is an interesting compromise, it is probably cheaper to replace the parts I noted in this configuration many times than to build these parts to be shock proof,. This is a new philosophy to the US Navy who is used to super specifications for everything on a warship. I look at it like this, the US Navy is adopting some of the damage control concepts more likely to be found on a European ship, and I don't think this philosophical change is a bad thing towards the goals of reducing construction and maintenance costs. It is a change most businesses have made in terms of IT departments, and tomorrows Navy is essentially a floating IT shop.

Flooding

More than any other form of damage control, flooding is best known for being managed by active means best represented in manpower. The reduction in crew creates an unstable situation in this regard, and while we are on this subject, let me note that I believe one of the real unspoken reasons Roughead wants to cancel the DDG-1000 is specific to the absence of flood control capabilities with that platform that has a relatively tiny crew. Ever read Friedman about ship design? If so, consider the hull form of DDG-1000 as you reflect upon the thoughts I've noted below.

With the ship having a core requirement of a small crew, the issue of active flood control pops up quickly as a challenge that needs to be addressed. Lockheed Martin has some sharp folks, and while the specifics are classified, I did pick up one thing (and have had this confirmed since my return) that I found very interesting. Instead of trying to find some novel way to improve active flood control, the design of USS Freedom (LCS 1) builds in a tremendous amount of reserve bouyancy. In other words, to augment the absence of active flood control, the designers built in extra passive flood control. I am very well informed with how much reserve bouyancy was built into the FFG-7s, indeed I believe a few books covering the Stark and the Roberts incidents have disclosed the exact details, and the amount of reserve bouyancy built into the USS Freedom (LCS 1) design appears to well exceed that class of ships, by a lot.

Does this mitigate the issue of damage control? Like all things, we will have to wait and see. It is a big ship with a small crew, but I do think the ship has made a major commitment to addressing the fire issue, one might argue there could potentially be too much active and passive fire control capability on that ship. Shock? Depends, I could see where shock could cause serious damage to the ship, but I could also see the ship turn around from a serious shock event very quickly assuming the supply office is prepared. Flooding is the major question mark because too much of that information is apparently too sensitive to discuss. I did not see a problem with compartmentalization in any spaces other than the mission modules, and as I will highlight later, the mission zones are broken down into 3 compartments, not a single large compartment. Despite the pictures of long, wide passageways on the ship I could really only find one such passageway, and it was not as long or wide as the picture makes it look. I think a tour will fix that complaint.

I would suggest to the NAVSEA folks that they need to find a way to talk about the reserve bouyancy of LCS 1 in a way that doesn't compromise sensitive information, because I think there is something there worth talking about to help ease concerns about flooding. I think this conversation would be useful for the CNO, because any novice design evaluation could quickly highlight how this would be a serious, major, and potentially fatal problem with DDG-1000. After all, there is probably not much reserve bouyancy for a ship that sits almost entirely on the waterline.

In the end, I don't know if the ship can survive a massive hit, but I don't think it is as big a problem as I thought it was when I walked onto the ship. The fact is, I know it has more survivability built into the ship than every frigate in Europe, every single one... so it isn't like picking a European design is a better option in regards to damage control. In many ways the LCS represents a partial adoption of the European philosophy of damage control regarding frigates, they are built so the crew survives battle damage, with the survival of the ship a secondary consideration.

That in and of itself is a new, interesting compromise... one that many who advocate for European designs have probably never considered as part of their advocacy. For small ships, I see it as a compromise towards getting more numbers fielded, and right now I think more numbers of ships that aren't perfect is a better way ahead than a fewer number of ships that could be considered perfect at any cost.

Nominating a New Proceedings Editor

If you read this blog and are not a member of the United States Naval Institute, you should be. Don't want to subscribe to Proceedings? Why not? I assure you, right now the answer to that question is important and the Board would like to know, at least I hope they would.

I am a member, not lifetime, but will be for my entire life. I'm still in my current 3 year plan, but my wife knows there are two magazines I will always be a subscriber to, Naval History and Proceedings. Both are important, Naval History is nothing short of fantastic, and we definitely live in a time where the need for Proceedings is evident. This news has generated a lot of email.

The U.S. Naval Institute, the publisher of Proceedings magazine, has fired its well-known editor, author Robert Timberg.

Timberg, a former reporter, spent three years at the helm of Proceedings, a forum for military thinkers for more than a century. He is the author of several books about naval history, including “The Nightingale’s Song” and a biography of Sen. John McCain.

Bob is also a Pulitzer Prize winner, a former Marine whose service cannot be casually dismissed. I'm torn on this issue, and it is frustrating that as a member I end up learning about this from Navy Times rather than from the USNI, as a member an email with an explanation would have been appropriate. Here are some of my thoughts.

Let no one say there hasn't been progress over the last few years, but whether Bob was responsible is unclear. Proceedings is now available in online format, which is important and necessary. This was a clear step forward.

However, the content quality has been mixed, 2007 marked a very low year for the publication, the content was mostly boring and did not reflect the urgency of a nation at war. 2008 was better, but there are some omissions and actions that definitely deserve criticism.

For example, the shoot down of US 193 did not get enough attention. When a warship shoots down a satellite for the first time in history one would think this deserves major discussion in the nations oldest, most prestigious strategic national defense forum. I'm also very unhappy with the quality of fact checking taking place in articles, there is absolutely no excuse whatsoever for so many articles to get the facts wrong in Proceedings. On that point Bob deserves criticism, he contended the inaccuracy of facts would spawn debate. Sorry Bob, members don't want to debate facts, they want to debate ideas that are well grounded using consistent details.

There are two questions in my mind. First, is Proceedings still an independent forum? It is a serious question, it seems we see a lot of emphasis on ideas coming from existing Navy leadership and perhaps not enough emphasis on ideas counter to those of leadership. It is hard to be independent when you are pushing the policy of the status quo.

Second, where is Proceedings going? In the information age, Proceedings is not performing well in its role as the forum for radicals who are pushing the debate of ideas. Hell, I'm not even sure they are even part of the conversation anymore. Consider for a moment who is doing this, blogs maybe, the Small Wars Journal for sure. In fact, if I was on the Board of Directors the very first name I would float as the new editor is Dave Dilegge. He may not want it, but if Proceedings intends to get back to being the place where the folks carry torches and pitchforks for national security issues, someone like Dave is exactly who Proceedings needs right now.

That is about as far as I'm going to carry this conversation, I know many want to express frustration one way or the other, so in the spirit of a Navy culture who cares about these things feel free to leave your rant in the comments. Several USNI Board of Directors are regular readers, they might be interested in what you say.

5th Fleet Focus: Communication Problems

This is a really interesting article that covers some of the concerns India has with all its good publicity after taking action against pirates. There is a lot to consider here, and a good place for our government to begin the conversation.

The Tabar’s action has been greeted with cheer — from Australia where a newspaper said India’s action was the “template” for the battle against piracy, to the International Maritime Bureau that has asked other navies to learn from India, to the US where the state department spokesperson congratulated India.

At naval headquarters in New Delhi, however, the optimism generated by the Tabar’s action is tempered by a concern over how the Indian Navy will fit into the complex naval grid in the Gulf of Aden. There is also concern that the presence of so many warships from all over the world will invariably lead to “snooping” — efforts to assess the potential of battleships and record radar and communication signatures.

It is for this reason that the Indian Navy now wants to cover the tracks of the deployment of a second ship to the region after first letting it be known that a Delhi-class destroyer would be off Somalia in four days. There are three Delhi-class destroyers in the Indian fleet — the INS Delhi, INS Mumbai and the INS Mysore.

“There are about two-dozen warships there from about a dozen or more countries,” a senior naval officer in Delhi said. “We have to know how to co-ordinate with them.”

The final paragraph of the article has some bite.

In purely military terms, a huge asymmetry exists in the battlefield of the Gulf of Aden — the pirates are armed with AK-47s, speedboats and “mother vessels” that are usually dhows, while the navies have frigates, destroyers, cruisers and helicopters. Yet, they are clueless, in the absence of leadership, on what to do to secure the sea lane.

In other words, the international task force needs a Command Ship. If it wasn't such a national embarrassment, I would volunteer the USS San Antonio (LPD 17). Since it isn't available, I would suggest that perhaps the US Navy should surge a ship for this role. Which ship? Well that is an interesting question, I would volunteer the USS Wasp (LHD 1) for the role beginning next year, and begin the process of working on the communication solutions now.

In the meantime, the USS San Antonio (LPD 17) is clearly the choice to be made, if she can be made available. If not, can the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) be spared for the role? Just one more example why this blog advocates for big motherships, the necessity for international command ships in the future will exist.

Observing the Strategic Success of US Policy Towards Somali Piracy

Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged. They must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.

A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufficient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners. Building and reinvigorating these relationships through Theater Security Cooperation requires an increased focus on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain.

Additionally, the Sea Services must become adept at forging international partnerships in coordination with the other U.S. services and government departments. To this end, the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (PDF), October 2007

This has been an incredible week for the United States strategic goals for fighting piracy, indeed this might have been the best week the United States has had in its strategic goals of curbing piracy this year. I got about 50 emails from a number of folks highlighting various news articles regarding the actions off Somalia, and I thank everyone who sent an email, but if you an American observing events unfolding and thinking these events represent a bad thing, I hate to be the one to tell you but you are completely missing the point when it comes to the strategic goals of the United States. Every American should be fist pumping the good news, and should avoid being misled by the media spin.

It started with what the media rightly notes is a huge development, the hijacking of a 300,000 ton super tanker SOUTH of Somalia in the waters 450nm off Kenya. This is clearly a wakeup call for the international community, and also clearly a godsend for the United States strategic policy towards Somali piracy. With the hijacking of several other ships, not to mention other activities, there is now no question that US policy for Somalia is working.

What do you mean you don't understand? If you read this blog for any reason at all, hopefully it is so you can see the big picture and that when big events occur, you can properly place context to the event in strategic terms towards our national goals. The US policy for Somali piracy is well articulated in the maritime strategy, and is working exactly as defined. The US Navy, and the DoD at large, does not define policy, the Navy's job is to enforce national policy.

The nations policy for dealing with piracy is shaped around the maritime strategy that says cooperative relationships "must be built over time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted" while "forging international partnerships" that "seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of law." That is our nations maritime strategy, and it is being executed exactly as outlined.

The policy is clearly working. Of all the events taking place, make sure you keep track of the important events, like this one.

Meanwhile, countries bordering the Red Sea are holding an emergency meeting in Cairo to discuss strategies for fighting the pirates. Egypt is concerned the attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean will stop shipping companies from using the Suez Canal, one of the country's main profit centers.

And this one.

Kenyan Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula said President Mwai Kibaki has instructed him to convene the meeting as soon as possible.

"The president has directed me to organize an international conference where he will take the leading role on the issue of piracy along the Indian Ocean waters."

It is important to note a few things. Not a single US flagged ship has even been approached by pirates (one might say they are intentionally avoided), and not a single US mariner has been taken hostage. After a year of what is often described as sophisticated attacks, not a single action has been taken against the US due to the threat of US response. The United States still lacks any reason to get involved against Somali piracy, and has responded appropriately by doing nothing. The rest of the world has been getting hammered by pirates, and because the United States did not solve the problem for the rest of the world, they are being forced to take action for themselves. The Russians are sending another ship, the South Koreans are sending a ship, and what can only be described as the most important step yet, Saudi Arabia is joining the NATO effort.

When India, who has nothing else but a less restrictive RoE, arrives on the scene and kicks ass in a period of only one week with one ship, then clearly the problem can be managed better than what we have seen in the past. The Indians have to be getting information from someone, and whether that someone providing intelligence is in Europe or the United States, if India is getting help in the form of information it is almost certainly due to the passive US policy, because it is the same passive position of the US that has the Europeans committing to the problem.

Don't be misled by the media headlines, the US policy has been to do nothing and allow the development of an international response. We are witnessing the slow and sometimes painful strategic gains of this policy, and it all good for the United States. Let it develop and feel good about it, because for once we are witness to our nations maritime strategy producing our intended national goals. It is obviously very difficult to stomach in the rapid information flow of the information age, but the desired result is not the United States to manage this problem unilaterally, rather we want to solve this very difficult problem in a multinational way, and we find ourselves on the verge of our desired national objective to dealing with this problem.

The strategic ways (passive response) has put us in position to fight piracy with a desired strategic means (multinational naval forces) towards a strategic end (defeating Somali piracy). It has been ugly, required a ton of patience, and has often been a frustrating method towards achievement, but it hasn't cost the US anything at all to achieve our strategic goals. Welcome to the 21st century, it is often difficult and confusing in the noise of information to realize you are winning, but the US is clearly making huge leaps in our strategic goals towards defeating piracy. The next phase, which will include a number of political and legal actions that adjust engagement rules towards meeting the conditions of the problem. will only result from more of the international meetings. The political pressure towards adopting these rules continues to mount, and they are driven primarily from the market (see here and here). For the US Navy, and the American citizenry in general, patience is all that is required for success... as outlined in maritime strategy.

7th Fleet Focus: ANNUALEX 2008

No comment necessary. Click for Hi-resolution.

Supporting Valour-IT

Blackfive has a list of books up for auction. The auction funds are not for any specific Team as part of the fundraiser, rather to the general fund in reaching our goal. We have a long way to go and Thanksgiving is Thursday, so every dollar counts.

If something on the list is of interest, support Valour-IT!

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) -> SNMG2
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


Standing NATO Maritime Group 2

ITS Durand de la Penne (D560)
FGS Karlsruhe - (F212)
FGS Rhön - (A 1443)
HS Themistokles - (F465)
TCG Gokova - (F496)
HMS Cumberland - (F85)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (712)
RSS Resolution (L 208)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Courbet (F712)
FS Commandant Blaison (F793)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS Nivôse (F732)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
HNLMS De Ruyte (F804)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)

The Bonds Between Sailors and Ships

One of the first things that jumped out to me while digging through the USS Freedom (LCS 1) on my first day was the very interesting bond between sailor and ship. Unlike many ships in the US Navy, most of this crew has spent at least the last year, if not longer, working towards proving this ship will work before it was even launched. Now that the year (often many years of work) has delivered a well built ship, and it is their ship, this blue crew of USS Freedom (LCS 1) takes every comment made against the ship personally. The word to describe that bond is ownership.

I mentioned yesterday the Navy has cheated with the "Hybrid Sailor" concept, and I don't know if that is the right word but it is one way of looking at it. Unlike other ships, the LCS crew is extremely experienced, the least experienced sailor I could find on the ship had been in the Navy for 6 years. Most of the sailors in the blue crew had helped write the CONOP for the ship, and continues to develop these concepts as they gain experience on the ship.

I took pretty good notes, and according to my notes there were 55 sailors on USS Freedom (LCS 1) during the transit of the last three days from Buffalo to Montreal. Broken down, and this is important, there were 41 blue crew (usually 40) and 11 Gold crew members were brought on board for this specific difficult leg of the trip. The other three were public affairs.

The breakdown was the original 40 blue crew, plus one LT who is the prospective operations officer. Blue crew has been working on a ship that has been delayed in delivery, which has naturally made everyone anxious up until now. Blue crew has been working hard to get the ship ready not only for Norfolk, but on to Panama City for mission module testing, then further on to San Diego to the home port. At this time, that means 9 officers (usually 8), 17 chiefs (usually 15), and 14 sailors. Essentially, the extra time has allowed several sailors to advance.

A few things stood out for example of what I am calling "cheating". The current operations officer is a LCDR soon to go to the NWC. When a civilian would come on board as part of the requirements for navigating the Welland Canal locks, I attempted to get their impression of the crew before they would get off the ship. I was literally the guy in the civilian clothes that was introduced as media, and I think it is noteworthy 3 different civilian Captains, all of whom are old hands on the Great Lakes, walked over without my encouraging and pointed out compliments for specific people, but always the LCDR at the helm. But here is the dirty little secret, I was able to watch that ship make complicated, often some of the most challenging ship handling maneuvers throughout my short tour along the locks, and the best ship driver on that ship in my opinion is actually the assistant propulsion officer, a LT, which if you take my observations as truth will give you a sense of just how much talent this specific crew has. I really can't stress the experienced sailor aspect enough, the most jr sailor on Freedom has been in the Navy for 6 years, if you see someone young on Freedom, they are probably with public affairs.

I have been sent this video by a number of our Canadian friends asking what happened. Well, first the comments on that video are inaccurate, no engine or electric problems at all during the leg from Buffalo to Montreal. Since these types of videos represent legitimate interest, and desire for current information, I want to tell the real story of how the USS Freedom (LCS 1) was damaged as seen in the picture to the right in her journey through the Welland canal. At the time I was the only person on the bridge standing around doing nothing while watching the action, and I was accidentally in perfect position to see it all. See that window on the top left side of the picture? I was right behind there during the accident.

Throughout the trip the tug Ohio was to help the USS Freedom (LCS 1) get through the Welland canal system. Ohio was built in 1903, but had engine work done in the late 1950s. There is some irony the Navy was using a tug that was 105 years old to push the ~105 day old littoral combat ship through the locks, but it was a necessity because USS Freedom (LCS 1) does not have a bow thruster. The reasons for no bow thruster appears to be weight. I think it is an interesting omission, I think a bow thruster would be useful for making port in those places where tugs may not be available for example, but I'm not convinced it is a mistake to not have a bow thruster. Time will tell and this will be something that needs to be determined, but I do not see the Welland canal as a compelling reason for a bow thruster.

The locks along the Welland Canal are only 80 ft wide, while the Freedom is 58 ft from bridge wing to bridge wing. The crew was able to get through lock 7 at 2:00pm OK without a problem, but the big challenge was going to be the three lock combination at lock 6, 5, and 4. Lock 7 was about 45 ft, but lock 6 goes directly into lock 5, which goes directly into lock 4, and the drop of each lock was at least a 45 ft each. Basically the LCS was scaling down the side of a hill through the locks. I had previously heard the Welland Canal is tough on ships, which is one reason I wanted on this leg of the trip, but this particular three lock system seemed to me like the toughest challenge facing the crew. It was.

Everything seemed to be working OK as the Freedom followed the tug into Lock 6. Ohio set up with its bow running into the port wall with the aft of the tug sticking out towards the bow of the Freedom. The crew had run a line to the tug forward, a tight line, and also set up 4 groups to man the 4 lines that would hold the ship to one side of the lock. 2 lines forward, 2 lines aft. The forward lines were manned by 4 sailors each, with 4 other sailors working fenders, and one safety officer. 13 total up front (my count may not be exactly right). In the back there were also two lines, usually 6 sailors per line, with 5 sailors doing fenders, while one officer and the corpsman would act as safety officers for the activity on the flight deck. I can't emphasize enough how impressive a job these folks did, and I took a ton of pictures of them working the lines and will post more in coming days. I'm not a reporter, but I wrote down 9 quotes like a reporter would from the various civilians who came on as pilots and otherwise noting the work of these sailors, and every comment was very positive.

About 4:20pm on Tuesday night, with both the tug and USS Freedom (LCS 1) centerline in lock 6, the lock door opened. As would happen the ship would get pushed back a few meters before getting pulled forward a few meters. The tug Ohio, attempting to maneuver was pushing itself off the wall and jerked the ship to starboard, opposite line side. As it turned out, the lock workers had already pulled the lines for USS Freedom (LCS 1), so she started drifting hard to starboard. In an attempt to compensate, Ohio pulled hard to port, too hard, and with a tight line saved Freedom from a hard hit to starboard, but the pull began pulling Freedom to port. Ohio suddenly found itself in a tough position, lining up directly parallel against the port wall, she was unable to find leverage to push off the wall. Ohio, attempting to find leverage, seemed to increase speed a bit to build some momentum forward. Next thing you know, Freedom, which was doing about 1.5 knots and was centered, was all of sudden accelerating quickly being pulled by Ohio which could not escape from the port wall.

Slowly I could see Freedom accelerating to 4 knots moving down the lock. Freedom was running only about 1 knot of its own power, and was steering to keep itself centered. The port bridge wing began to veer into the now open lock gate, which had some sort of grading system sticking out from the lock door. The Captain, who was calling 'hard starboard' from the bridge wing, quickly recognized the situation, literally pushed me off the bridge wing with a look (I was standing near the door looking out seeing the wall close in while being the curious civilian bystanding idiot), grabbed a fender and tossed it in front of the port bridge wing. Next thing I hear is "BOOM!" The fender caught one of the protruding grates from the door and was smashed open at least 4 knots. The ship jerked quickly pushing to starboard, but the tug was still caught parallel to the port wall of the lock moving at a deliberate pace, and couldn't push itself off the wall.

With the tug still trying to get free and moving at about 4 knots, the ship jerked again as the rope to the tug tightened and pulled Freedom towards the grate on the wall again. I turned to see the Captain, and his face had the look of helplessness as he jumped into the bridge from the bridge wing. Still calling orders to stop the ship, the bridge wing smashed again into the grate. Somehow Captain covered the bridge width in about 10 seconds, grabbed a fender from the starboard bridge wing, and was able to get back to the port bridge wing just in time to prevent a third massive hit, placing the new fender in position to prevent another massive collision between the bridge wing and the last protruding grate of the lock door. That fender exploded too, this time all I saw looking out of the bridge wing door was smoke and the Captain fighting to keep the bridge wing from taking another hit.

The tug, still stuck along the port wall, had reversed engines and stopped the ship just after this moment in what felt like a small jerk from my position of the far left window viewing forward on the starboard side. Captain kept the ship in that position for a minute while organizing new fenders to the bridge, removing some of the debris from the damage, and getting the line loose from the ship and tug. There was about 5 furious minutes of activity as the ship sat still only a few feet off the starboard bridge wing. The tug line was let loose, and the tug was able to work itself free into the middle of the lock before the line was used to reposition the ship in center of the lock. Over the next several minutes the ship advanced into lock 5 at 1 knot before the tug positioned itself for the next lock.

At that moment three very interesting things happened quickly, and it sort of happened simultaneously but took about 5 minutes to complete all three tasks.

The first task was managing future locks. The Captain, XO, the LCDR at helm control, and a brilliant civilian consultant named Daniel Hobbs formulated lessons learned in about 3 minutes and developed a new strategy template for managing the locks. In that moment several things came about that changed the lock procedure. For example, the order which lines would be released from the lock was formulated, in every lock after that one the tug line would be dropped first and the tug would center itself before the lines of Freedom would be released. This was made very clear to the lock operators. Another example, the line between the Freedom and the tug would no longer be so tight, except when the ships would essentially tie themselves to each other as the water dropped. Finally, and this became the new procedure, the Captain and XO would each station a bridge wing, while Hobbs would float to where he needed to be to keep the tug constantly positioned for Freedom, and using the camera system that watched the aft sides of the ship, the LCDR at helm would process the information and instructions from all three and keep the ship off the sides of the locks. This process, while refined a bit each time from that point on, was the core process that allowed Freedom to navigate the rest of the locks from the bridge without any other direct hull hits.

While that process was taking place, I was also watching the CHENG and a few jr officers quickly manage the starboard bridge wing damage. May seem like no big deal, but fenders are heavy as hell, and the ship had lost a few in the accident. After only 2 locks, fenders would have to move from side to side of the ship by two chiefs and lowered to the appropriate level just in case. Sailors would often have to sprint from one side to the other hauling a fender, lower the fender, then pull it up not 2 minutes later to get to the other side and lower it again, and oh by the way, in 20 degrees and sometimes in the face of a few no fun Canadian wind gusts that makes warm seem miles away.

But the most important thing that happened in those 5 minutes wasn't manual labor. There is a major sense of ownership with this crew and this ship, and being around the ship one quickly gets the feeling the bond is very tight. This isn't just about the blue/gold manning scheme, which I will talk about extensively later, but this is something personal. The hit to the ship was personal, and there was a morale blow that swept across the ship. The Captain got on the radio and talked to the whole crew, and in about 1 minute had talked everyone beyond that moment. I can't recall much of what he said, and asking around later most folks couldn't either, but despite the damage, the knowledge that the most watched ship on the Great Lakes was going to be pictured with a bit of damage on the bridge wing could have been a real problem with the vast majority of the locks still ahead of us, particularly as it turned dark. Didn't happen though, a lot of bruised pride, but for what amounts to a bit of superficial damage in an accident the crew couldn't of done anything to prevent.

I had an outstanding adventure, and Montreal has been a lot of fun too. I want to shout out a big thanks to the CHINFO for inviting me to see the Navy's latest ship. I want to also thank Chris Cavas for being my personal free of charge technical consultant on the trip (ha!).

Most of all though, I want to thank the USS Freedom (LCS 1) crew for putting up with a 'blogger' for the last few days. I had an outstanding time, and look forward to sharing the experiences I had on your very interesting ship. I have every intention to share the lessons and observations of my trip with the masses in the near future. There is a lot of interest in this ship, so many questions that many think they know the answer to without ever seeing for themselves. Change is not always recieved well in the Navy, and people who are used to doing things a certain way won't easily understand why the LCS is different, but I think there is something happening on Freedom that is good for the Navy. While I can't promise to change minds, I will insure your perspective is accurately presented. Thank you very much for that opportunity.

So much to say, only so much one can type in one setting. In the meantime, SECNAV joins the Freedom for the next leg, and the Freedom will continue her trip to Norfolk with a new, very interesting and important mission. The USS Freedom (LCS 1) will now give the rest of the fleet a peek into what the 21st century looks like.