2008 Navy Year in Review

As 2008 comes to a conclusion, the time has come to reflect on naval activity for 2008 and offer some reflection regarding the most important developments of the year. My list will undoubtedly leave out activities that others believe are important, and will also undoubtedly include items that many don't believe belong. So be it, I am but one observer who looks at periods greater than one year at a time as a practice, but note that in certain years specific actions, events, activities, and items occur that carry with them long term effects that may or may not be immediately evident.

5) The X-47B. No single military technology introduced in 2008 has the potential to radically reform an entire military function like the X-47B has to reform Carrier aviation. The X-47B becomes the prototype for changes yet fully analyzed regarding how naval forces will attack and defend the from the sky over the seas in the 21st century. The ability to add range, payload, and endurance to sea based strike aviation will enhance the most important military capability of naval forces today, and has the potential to overcome many of the limitations of carrier air power the US Navy has dealt with since WWII. The X-47B is far from a sure thing, it must overcome challenges both technical and political to be fully realized, and even then the current platform cannot replace the human being as the decision maker of life and death. However, it is a step towards the future, an evolution towards a model that can potentially advance the US Navy beyond the latest generation of capabilities challengers are producing, and with that the X-47B offers the potential of a capability well worth the time and investment.

4) International Anti-Pirate Armada. The desire to build coalitions and shared security initiatives has long been a purpose of the modern US Navy, and the slow but deliberate development of an international armada off the coast of Somalia to fight piracy has been nothing short of brilliant to observe in formation. Big ideas start with small implementations, and the big idea of shared security responsibility from responsible global economic powers in the form of combating piracy in unison may seem like a small thing, but it is a big step towards better things. The initiatives that fail usually do so by attempting to do too much at once, beyond the means and political will of participants. The international anti-piracy armada on the other hand demonstrates that starting from a small foundation and working up produces positive momentum, and has the potential to be the foundation for similar shared security arrangements in the 21st century. The idea that one nation cannot do everything alone isn't unique to the United States, and is appealing to the global community that understands shared costs, shared risks, and shared ideals can be the foundation for shared responsibility against the shared threats to the global commons.

3) Satellite Shootdown. While politically, both domestic and international, this event was handled with the delicacy of a bull in a china shop, at the technical and professional level this event represents everything that is right in regards to commercial - government - military cooperation. Using the best and brightest throughout industry and government, the US Navy was able to make the technical adjustments and calculations necessary to utilize a weapon system to perform a mission the weapon system was never designed for, and overcome enormous challenges to hit a target only a few feet wide moving at 13,000 mph above the atmosphere of the planet. Oh by the way, it was a direct hit. This represents the very best example in 2008 why evolution using existing technology is always the most productive model for developing new capabilities at lower cost, and while the Navy gets the praise, credit the private sector workforce in the industry as well for the brilliant demonstration of national science and technical power.

2) Soft Power Deployments. While major naval battle groups to the Middle East still capture the attention (and imagination) of political rhetoric, the real demonstration of national naval power that caught my attention this year was the many proactive humanitarian deployments globally. Whether it was the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) Pacific Partnership deployment, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) African Partnership Station Deployment, USNS Grasp (T-ARS 51) for the Navy Diver-Global Fleet Station 2008, USS Boxer (LHD 4) and USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) for the Continuing Promise 2008 deployments, or the various other deployments including the USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716), HSV Swift, and the task orders of major assets that often get overlooked, like the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) following the Tsunami destruction in the central Philippines. While the response by naval forces for humanitarian support is nothing new, the dedication and focus of the mission profile as a major part of national naval power, and in particular the intentional deployment for that function, is relatively new. 2008 demonstrated that this expanded capability of national soft power offers long term promise of how military forces can support joint agency national power, a banner year for a refocus towards the use of true national power with military forces in ways other than the need to actually use force to achieve strategic ends.

1) Hybrid Sailor and Train To Qualify. The single most important development in the US Navy in 2008 is the Hybrid Sailor and Train to Qualify program realized with the Littoral Combat Ship. Even if the LCS platforms do not pan out, the Navy has made significant, perhaps revolutionary progress, by realizing the necessity and rewards of smarter, better trained, motivated sailors who are put in situations that require more responsibility yet more personal accountability. As volunteers who must meet qualification or be failed out of the program, it is hardly a surprise that Hybrid Sailors who qualify end up thriving in an environment of high expectations. I believe this often overlooked but critical change in philosophy of high expectations for sailors is the single most important long term improvement in how the Navy does business since the cold war. The model produces exactly the right foundation for long term benefits towards realizing highly trained small vessel crews able to support dispersed, complex networks of interconnected complex systems on several ships towards the ends of sustainable, distributed battle space presence and dominance. The long term benefits of Hybrid Sailors and the Train to Qualify program will reap rewards for the US Navy for decades to come, and in my opinion, will ultimately be reflected upon as the single most important and remembered evolutionary step towards a 21st century Navy.

Keeping Perspective Regarding What Constitutes as News

The article title basically says it all: Chinese naval fleet completes first at-sea replenishment.

A Chinese naval fleet en route to the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia for an escort mission against pirates completed its first replenishment at sea Tuesday.

The fleet, two destroyers and a supply ship, has entered the Indian Ocean after a four-day voyage which set sail from China's southernmost island province of Hainan.

In the afternoon, the supply ship Weishanhu successfully refueled the two destroyers Wuhan and Haikou with several hundred tons of oil, an operation that an official for fleet support described as "highly efficient."

Seriously, where in the context of any article by a China Hawk lately does this article fit? When China conducts a replenishment at sea and it is so rare it makes the mainstream Chinese news, a little perspective is required.

Salamander is right, this has more in common with the US Navy 2 centuries ago than any other analogy one could use.

Israel's Greenpeace Tactical Capabilities

The Israeli Navy appears fully engaged in the action, doing the kinds of things Navy's do in war.

A boat carrying international peace activists, including former Georgia congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, and medical supplies to the embattled Gaza Strip sailed back into a Lebanese port on Tuesday after being turned back and damaged by the Israeli navy, organizers of the trip said.

The crowds on the docks in the Lebanese port city of Tyre were jubilant and cheering as they welcomed the vessel.

The boat, which set off from Cyprus Monday wanted to make a statement and deliver medical supplies to embattled Gaza. The trip’s organizers said the boat was clearly in international waters, 90 miles off the coast of Gaza, at the time of its close encounter with the Israeli navy.

“Our boat was rammed three times, twice in the front and one on the side,” McKinney told CNN Tuesday morning. “Our mission was a peaceful mission. Our mission was thwarted by the aggressiveness of the Israeli military.”

Yigal Palmor, a spokesman for Israel’s Foreign Ministry, denied there had been any shooting although the two ships had made “physical contact.”

Welcome to the world of maritime commerce, where Greenpeace has used similar tactics for years. Do I have any sympathy? Not really, military blockades are part of war, regardless of cargo a nation either puts up a blockade with a purpose, or it doesn't.

Once upon a time, ramming was the tactic of choice at sea. Nice to see several centuries later the art is still utilized. Too bad we didn't get the name of the Israeli ship.

BTW, I don't know if I would do that with the LCS., even against the tiny SS Dignity one could imagine a pretty nasty dent in a LCS hull. Just saying.

Pondering the Strategic Objectives of Hamas

With the revelations made in this Haaretz article that Israel has been planning for the current conflict for several months, the implication is that the pre-cease fire condition between Hamas and Israel was never an accepted long term condition from the perspective of Israel. The implications of the revelations made in the article are numerous, and interesting from an observers perspective.

We learn that through extended intelligence efforts, lessons learned fighting Hezbollah two years ago, and a disinformation campaign Israel has capitalized on Hamas's decision to break the cease fire agreement by inflecting serious damage through its air campaign against Hamas targets. The high death toll and large number of wounded are expected results. While there are several ways to look at the high number of civilian deaths, I tend to treat these as a trend to be expected set by the conditions these conflicts are now fought under. For example, the Arab media in general but some western media as well, have now accepted the intentional targeting of Israeli civilians has a legitimate tactic by organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. The further condition that overlooks, thus enables the same organizations to conceal hard military targets in civilian neighborhoods, has enabled a condition for greater civilian causalities to be used for propaganda and sympathy purposes, thus further enabling the organizations to utilize such techniques. Without condemnation, of which very little is evident in early Arab media reporting, this trend can be expected to continue.

This condition that overlooks the war crime aspect of those organizations acts as a buffer at the same time for Israel, who in the spirit of moral equivalence is sheltered politically as they use air forces, both fixed wing and helicopter, combined with land based and naval artillery to shell targets in civilian areas. In the end, both sides point to the other for exploiting tactics that endanger civilians, and a hypocritical western culture and propagandized Arab culture issues proclamations of condemnation against both sides, often dependent solely on ones favoritism either politically, or religious in basis. For the purposes of this analysis, it is accepted that war leads to death and the conditions of this war enable plenty of it in that part of the world, taking a moral or political high ground for either side is best done elsewhere.

With expectations that air strikes alone will not stop rocket attacks into Israel, and will only offer diminishing returns for their cost over time, the questions that need to be raised include what are the objectives of each side, and where is this conflict going? From the perspective of Hamas, it is very difficult to find a reasonable explanation for the strategic goals at work here. A singular military conflict with Israel is hardly going to help Hamas, indeed it has already severely damaged the organization and over time only serves to threaten Hamas's hold on power. Hamas has no offensive capability to speak of, no defense against Israeli air strikes, and even the rockets only serve limited function as a terror weapon that requires the rest of the Arab (and western) media to ignore the reality these weapons are solely used for the purposes of killing innocents. There is no functional military capability for Hamas to prevent Israeli military action, indeed even the limited military systems Hamas may have would be effective in a defensive campaign alone, a campaign sure to cause significantly higher civilian causalities among the Palestinians, not Israeli's. Only by the cover of propaganda against Israel in combination with the sacrifice of hundreds, if not thousands of their own people, can Hamas realistically gain any sort of political victory against Israel, and even then the victory conditions are subject to the guilty conscious of Israel, unlikely given the amount of planning done by Israel in the current operation. The real question is, why in the world is Hamas starting this conflict with so very few individual strategic gains apparent? The answer is, most likely, Hamas is acting on the behalf of Iran.

Through the first three days, the strategic effect is all too predictable. Oil prices up, the US dollar is down. Is oil actually threatened by actions taking place out of Israel? Uhm, no. Is the dollar in danger because Hamas and Israel are in another conflict? Again, no. What has everyone concerned is that the conflict will escalate, and right now with the options on the table, this is the most likely scenario. How far will the conflict escalate? Right now, that is difficult to predict, but following the patterns of history, if indeed Iran is involved, I believe the expectation should be high that Israel is about to find themselves fighting on more than one front as soon as they commit ground troops into Gaza.

The next few days will tell the whole story, but predicting the results is not difficult. When Israel commits ground forces into Gaza to go after Hamas, the expectation should be that Hezbollah will begin a major military attack in northern Israel, likely using unguided rockets striking at civilians. The strategic ramifications will result in even higher gas prices and a further hit to the US dollar, with global outrage from the worlds most vocal actors to quickly condemn Israel. Unlike the Arab countries, Israel will protect their citizens and the death toll of Israeli civilians will not be great, but the retaliation against Hamas and Hezbollah will be, resulting in another mess similar to 2006. The question at that point, particularly if the US economy takes a huge hit from these actions, is what will we do and how will the world react?

I could be wrong, but absent any information that shows a strategic objective for Hamas in starting this conflict, it appears to me this conflict is specific to the strategic objective of weakening the US economy, and thus weakening the economies of nations like Israel. In other words, this may look like a simple Israeli conflict with Hamas, and perhaps Hezbollah in the near future, but the intent is to ultimately harm Americans economically. As that objective becomes more apparent to Americans over time, it will be interesting to see how both the outgoing and incoming administrations manage this emerging problem, and if we do nothing in response as per our historical track record, who we blame for the problem.

PLAN - Review of 2008

As we approach 2009, it's time to look back at 2008 in the PLAN world and look forward to what might transpire in 2009. Last year, I took a look at how much PLAN has improved in the past 5 years. I don't think I will need to do that again. Frankly, PLAN improved so much in that 5 year period that it is impossible for it to make an equivalent leap in the next 5 years. As a result of this, this report will be a more abbreviated version.

To recap, some of my predictions from last year didn't turn out so well. In particular, the much anticipated 052D class did not show up at all this year. Although, I have read that work on it has already started in Shanghai, we just haven't seen any pictures yet. And from the new location of JiangNan, it's clear that pictures of 052D will not come as frequently or as clearly as the pictures for 052B/C and 054/A. Right now, we see a lot of overhead shots of the JiangNan shipyard (because everything is taken from aerial view) and a lot of guesses on what each of the ships are. Fortunately, HuDong shipyard still hasn't moved to the new location in Changxin, so its pictures are still frequent. As usual, pictures from HuangPu shipyard, Dalian shipyard and Wuhan shipyard are still frequent and very detailed. Even the extremely secretive nuclear submarine shipyards in Huludao cannot avoid those overhead satellite shots as evidence in those google earth images of 094s. These pictures are the reason that PLAN is the most transparent of four major PLA branches (my personal transparency rank is Navy, then army, then air force and finally second artillery).

In terms of new construction, this year was definitely a lot slower than 2007. In many ways, I consider it to be the slowest year since 2002. In 2003, we saw the 052Bs, 072-III class and 039G1s coming out. In 2004, we saw 052C, 054 and Qiandaohu class replenishment ship coming out. In 2005, we saw 051C, 022s and 039A coming out. In 2006, we saw 054A, 804 class MCM ships and YuanWang ships coming out. In 2007, we saw 071, 093/094, ELINT ship, 805 class MCM ship, Fuxianhu class replenishment ship coming out. Through this time, we also saw 2 Sovs and 8 636Ms inducted into PLAN. All we saw this year were slightly modified version of 039A, the Type 920 medical ship and a new submarine tender. All things considered, this year is not only a downer for the number of ships being built but also lacked the new exciting variants of past years. There are many reasons for this. We had the Olympics, which basically put a moratorium to construction for a few months. One of HuDong's massive cranes collapsed and it was also building 3 F-22Ps at the same time for PN, so HuDong only managed meager progress on a 054A. In fact, I was just thankful the crane didn't collapse on 054A. HuDong had been building 054A, 071 and MCMs in the past couple of years, so there was a huge drop in its deliveries to PLAN. JiangNan was finalizing on its move to Changxin Island, so the only progress we saw were a group of 022s. We've seen basically no work out of Dalian shipyard. For much of the year, the HuangPu shipyard seems to spent more time with tugboat rather than newer 054A. Wuhan shipyard has been working on 039A submarines, but clearly most of the military shipyards haven't done much this year. I think what we saw this year was PLAN finally getting some real work done with these new gadgets. They are trying to work on software with these newly found hardware. Among which, the 052B/Cs, 054As, 071 and 093/094 all joined forces in the Sanya base to form PLAN's most potent flotilla. In fact, I expect this base to be the primary base/headquarters of a future blue water fleet (China's version of 7th fleet and Honolulu base). You can even see that from the recent Somalia fleet. They are sending 169, 171 and 887 from this fleet with 169 and 171 to be replaced by 168 and 170 later. I've also read that 093 might accompany these ships on their way there. This kind of expeditions along with major live firing exercise in the past couple of years are the kind of training needed for the sailors to become experienced with these new ships.

So, what did we see and didn't see this year? We saw the second batch of 054A in Huangpu and HuDong shipyards toward the end of the year. At this point, we still do not know all of the changes on this ship, but we will definitely be following a lot of 054A next year. We saw at least 2 new 039As joining service this year and also a modified variant at works in Wuhan. However, all pictures surrounding this class disappeared by the second half of the year. We saw 866, the first of China's new Type 920 medical ship, joining the ESF. This was a surprise, because I expected it to join SSF to support long range operations, support islands in South China Sea and also do humanitarian relief missions. We also saw a new submarine tender, designed to operate LR-7, under works at Guangzhou shipyard. The need for a new ship in this class is very high with all the new submarines joining service, so we will be following this ship a lot next year. We also saw a lot of 022s in both HuangPu and the new JiangNan shipyard, so it looks like this class is still in mass production. At this point, I think no one knows exactly how many 022s are in service or will be in service. The number is very high and the production should probably wind down in the next couple of years. We continue to see new tugboats coming off the docks of HuangPu shipyard. It's almost astounding how many new units of this ship have came out. We saw the LCAC in the beginning on this year and not much after that. I'm guessing that it is entering service with 071 and we won't see much more of it. As mentioned before, we haven't seen the 052D class photo at all. We also did not see any action regarding to a second unit of 071 or a LPH. There might have been newer units of 805 class, but we didn't really see them outside HuDong shipyard. We saw one new type of Y-8, but did not see any pictures of the ASW/MPA version have already been ordered by the navy. We found out more about 054 series' ASW gear this year from pictures of TAS sonar on Jianghu and an interview with the capitain of 138. We found out that 054 not only has Towed array sonar as we long hoped for, but also may have something like the ASROC. We saw many some new export types of AShM being displayed in Zhuhai air show, but nothing resembling the long rumored supersonic ramjet propelled missile. We didn't see any news/pictures regarding to an AGS like naval gun, but have seen successful development of a new 130 mm gun for next line of destroyers. We have seen the much talked about FL-3000N in Zhuhai air show, but its presence there seems to indicate that it is for export. PLAN will probably continue on its pass of gun based CIWS for air defense. We saw newer gas turbine like QC-70 finishing development early this year and also indigenization of DA-80, which is already been used on at least on one of the 052B class ships. I'm personally looking for more gas turbines like QC-185, QC-260 and UGT-15000 on new ships. They may not happen this year, but their availability in the future would reduce the current bottleneck that PLAN faces for new ships. Getting the right motor has always been a problem for PLA whether it is for tanks, fighter jets, transports, helicopters or ships.

So, what am I looking forward to next year. The one that comes to my mind right away is 052D. It was probably overly ambitious of me to have expected to see photos of the ship coming out this year. I believe we will see pictures of this ship coming out next year, although not as fast and as furious as 052C pictures due to the remote location of the new JiangNan shipyard. Even though the quality of photos from this yard won't be as good, I'm eagerly waiting those photos to see the configuration for this ship. I've read some source speculating that this ship will be at least 1000 tonnes heavier and have more weapons loaded. Now that they've had a couple of years of experience with 052C, we should see a more loaded/combat design for the new ships. I'm also looking to see 054A in both HuDong and HuangPu shipyard. HD might be a little slow next year with more F-22P work and the crane problem, but HP should proceed smoothly now that tugboat and 022 production should slow down a little bit. I am eagerly waiting to see the weapon/sensory fit with these 054A units. We should also see more diesel submarines coming out next year. I don't know whether the newer units will look like the existing 039A or the one with modified hump. I suspect we will see more of the former, because 039A is now a relatively mature design, whereas the new one is likely to go through more testing. I'm sure there will also be more nuclear submarines, but it will be just as difficult to figure out how many will be produced. The other ships I'm waiting to see include more 071 class LPD, some signs of an LPH and a new 1500 tonne class ship to occupy the gap between 022 and 054A. I think we will finally see Y-7 or Y-8 based MPA next year that will be like China's P-3C. After focusing on ASuW, AAW and MCM in the past years, the ASW part of PLAN is finally coming out of ashes and showing up in new hardware. And as always, we saw new ships like the submarine tender, ELINT ship, new tugboats and Type 920 in the past 2 years, it will also be interesting to see newer types of auxiliary ships appearing next year. I guess the final one in mind is the aircraft carrier project. At this point, I don't expect to see any picture coming out of JiangNan that would be clear enough to discern an aircraft carrier. However, we can keep tabs on this project with all the news that are bound to come out. We received a lot of news this year regarding to the naval pilot school and possible su-33 purchase. I would expect more news like this to come out next year.

In conclusion, 2008 has been a quiet year compared to the past few years. The hiatus around Olympics, the specific conditions in several shipyards and possible problems caused by the snow storm early this year are all possible causes. I look forward to 2009 to be another important year as I believe many projects are about to start.

SSBN Module Under Design

Defense Industry Daily brings us news that the UK has, indeed, taken steps towards outsourcing the design as well as the construction of some of its future navy. However, in this case, it's something that makes sense. The U.S. Navy Sea Systems Command has contracted with Electric Boat to design a 'Common Missile Compartment' - a submarine section consisting of the launchers and associated fire-control gear - for the next generation of U.S. and U.K. SSBNs. This makes perfectly good sense, since both nations now use identical missiles and (likely) will continue to do so in future. The U.S. already handles missile management for the U.K., installing missiles (without warheads) from a common 'pool' at Kings Bay, Georgia onto U.K. SSBNs which then are mated to warheads home in Britain.

In any case, the use of modular missile compartments dates back to the first operational U.S. FBM submarine, when the SSN-589 Scorpion, already on the ways at Electric Boat, was cut, plugged and modified to become the SSBN-598 George Washington, first of the Polaris boats. While the modifications did go fairly far beyond the simple insertion of the missile compartment, the basic hull remained unchanged.

It is also significant that only the missile compartment is to be designed via this contract. As Galrahn noted earlier, the U.K. does (wisely) maintain its design and development capability even at the expense of shipbuilding in order to maintain their ability to build a navy. Given this, it makes perfect sense to outsource the section of the boat whose function is already maximally beholden to the U.S. for production and operation, while leaving those parts of the submarine that comprise the ship itself for local design. The U.S., as well, reaps advantages in that we can share design costs for the least mutable part of a new SSBN design, leaving the ship sections later to reap lessons and technology gained in the interim. I would point out that if modularity is the new watchword for U.S. shipbuilding, watch for this missile compartment, when complete, to bear external measurements suspiciously close to current U.S. submarine production such as the Virginia-class boat in the image. While not necessarily intended at the moment, the ability to utilize this design via a plug-in addition to a by-then tried and familiar hull form would be a significant savings - especially since the SSBN mission set is much more predictable than that of the SSN, and the years intervening are not likely to cause any difficulty with mission change, creep or other modification.

Picture is of the Virginia-class submarine USS New Hampshire SSN-778 from flickr user MATEUS_27:24&25 and is licensed via CC.

More LANTFLT Underway Data

A while back, we had a quick look at the underway hours for LANTFLT courtesy of a small avian. Here is some more data from the same helpful source to give us a sense of trends - we have some aggregate class underway hours data for the same classes of ships for LANTFLT 2005-2008, now, and (for comparison) some PACFLT data for 2008. I'm sorry for the image; blogger still doesn't like tables, and thus table images are much saner to look at (if not so good for page layout). Click on the tables to get a full-size version that's easier to read.



The most important trend for our arguments from last time is that indeed we see hull hours creeping upwards.

The LSDs move from 2295 hrs in 2005, steadily up to 3454 hours in 2008. Although the LSD force took a 1-hull bump to 7 in 2006, one of those hulls had a mere 540 or so underway hours...meaning that the average is somewhat misleadingly low for the class that year. The LANTFLT LHA force seems to be dropping in terms of hours, but it's also gone from a 2-ship to 1-ship force. Looking at its numbers, it seems to be maximally committed for a single hull.

ASuW hull hours go up also - CG hull averages rise as the force size drops. DDG hull hours rise as the force size increases, indicating both higher workload and transfer of tasking from the remnants of the DD force, 3 hulls which go offline in the 2006 timeframe and aren't captured here. FFG workload goes up for an unchanging force size.

Amphib hulls are in high demand on both oceans, looking at 2008. Mine Countermeasures are relatively flat, which is interesting given that the entire modern MHC class was stricken and disposed of in 2006-2007 (12 hulls) which indicates that either they weren't being tasked at all near their end of life, or that demands for mine countermeasure time are not being driven by external conditions but by fleet training and testing needs.

We can be fairly sure, looking at even these rudimentary numbers, that shipbuilding plans which emphasize fewer and more capable hulls will swiftly run up against combatant commanders' demands for additional hulls to perform tasking. The fact that the more versatile DDGs see their underway hours increasing as they replace less-versatile DD hulls is an indication that versatility is not a good measure for ship utility - something the LCS proponents will need to keep in mind. As the FFG-7s begin leaving the fleet in large numbers, what will take their place? If the LCS is seen to be capable of doing some or all of their job with the proper mission modules in place, that's fine, but then what will do the other jobs those hulls were meant to do?

Remember, there are only 8760 hours in the year total. Ships showing underway times of 3-4 Khours are running a duty cycle of nearly 1:1 or 0.4-0.5, depending on how you count it. Include in those hours transit times to get on station, which is (for one example) roughly a 14-17 day underway time (336-408 hours) from Norfolk to the Persian Gulf, so 772-816 hours round trip, and we're left with just over 8000 hours available in the year for everything else assuming one round-trip deployment transit. These totals, just like last time, are for hours spent actually underway. Time spent stationary but running generators for hotel load is not included.

Navy Settles Several Lawsuits with the National Resource Defense Council

The Supreme Court ruling that essentially says the Navy right to train with sonar overrides other concerns is having some effects on other lawsuits. I didn't like the Supreme Court ruling at the time, because I don't think it dealt with the actual issues of the case, but that is neither here nor there. Clearly I love the US Navy and didn't like the lawsuits much, but I also think the Navy has a serious duty to respect the marine environment and be diligent in the services obligations in protecting the environment. I for one think the Navy has evolved towards this position, in part due to these lawsuits, and has become a good steward of the environment.

With that said, winning the Supreme Court case, and in particular how they won, has enabled these types of settlements.

The Navy has settled a lawsuit filed by environmentalists challenging its use of sonar in hundreds of submarine-hunting exercises around the world.

The Navy said Saturday the deal reached with the Natural Resources Defense Council and other groups requires it to continue to research how sonar affects whales and other marine mammals.

It doesn't require sailors to adopt additional measures to protect the animals when they use sonar.

What is interesting is that these are not new terms that have come about since the Supreme Court decision, rather the same terms the Navy had been seeking all along.

For example, the US Navy is the number one funding source in the world in regards to sonar affects on marine mammals, and the research is actually outsourced to the nations top academic experts in the best marine studies universities in the United States. That is hardly a loss for the US Navy or the National Resources Defense Council, it gives both organizations something to hang their hat on.

The "additional measures" aspect is also interesting. The US Navy has already established 29 measures to protect marine mammals from the effects of sonar during training, measures which were btw, developed using the data produced from all the previous funding that both sides were using as the facts in all sonar cases. Up until now, the 29 measures weren't enough for the National Resources Defense Council, but now that it has been made clear the Supreme Court won't even listen to the facts of the case anyway, the NRDC is taking what is a very strong commitment by the US Navy and adopting them as a policy (for now).

You can read all 29 measures previously posted here.

Personally I think this is a good move for both sides. The NRDC, for better or worse, has forced the Navy to adapt to positions that do require measures for protecting the environment, which is what the NRDC claims is their role in bringing about the lawsuits in the first place. For its part, the Navy has found middle ground with these environmental groups to settle these cases. Both sides have something they can show tangible results from in these settlements, and both sides can rightfully claim victory in purpose. Like anything though, it will be interesting to see how long the peace lasts.

Remembering Samuel Huntington

Honoring a legend.

One of the nation's preeminent political scientists, a longstanding professor at Harvard University, and founder of the influential journal Foreign Policy, Dr. Huntington died Wednesday at an Oak Bluffs nursing home. He was 81.

"He was a man of enormous influence," said his longtime friend and colleague, Henry Rosovsky. "I think he was one of the really great figures in the field."

A specialist in many areas, particularly national security and military-civilian affairs, Dr. Huntington worked in the Carter White House as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council from 1977-1978. Later, he was a member of the Presidential Commission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy in the 1980s.

He was also active in Democratic politics, and met his wife, Nancy, during the presidential campaign of Adlai Stevenson in 1956. He was a speechwriter for Stevenson, and they met while working on a speech together that the candidate later used during the campaign.

He is well known and will be remembered for many things, but for me, I credit Samuel Huntington for the way I look at Maritime Strategy moving into the 21st century. His article in May 1954 Proceedings titled National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy is one of the single best articles that publication has ever published (and that is saying something), timeless advice and guidance towards maritime strategy.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Nikiforos Fokas (F 466) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)



In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (712)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Mahawangsa (AOR 1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)

Merry Christmas

From our families to your families, Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and best wishes as we celebrate with family and friends this holiday season.

PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii (Dec. 18, 2008) The guided-missile destroyer USS Russell (DDG 59) displays a spectacle of holiday lights during the 2008 Afloat Holiday Lighting Contest on board Naval Station Pearl Harbor Dec. 18, 2008. Hawaii area commanders toured the harbor and judged ships based on best lighting scheme, most creative display and energy conservation. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael Hight

Shipbuilding... At All Costs

One more reason FY10 is going to be a wild ride.

Boeing Co.’s new Navy P-8 patrol aircraft for spotting enemy submarines and ships faces a cut of more than $900 million in the Defense Department’s proposed fiscal 2010 budget in order to pay for a new warship, according to budget documents.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, in an Oct. 31 budget memo, approved shifting away as much as $940 million to complete payment for a new DDG-1000 destroyer that Congress partially funded this fiscal year. The ship is the last of three the service says it will buy from Northrop Grumman Corp. and General Dynamics Corp.

The proposal is an indication the Navy is willing to cut new aviation programs -- even one designed to replace P-3 maritime patrol craft in operation since the 1950s --to sustain its long- range shipbuilding goal. The Navy wants to have 313 vessels in the fleet by 2020, including new ships added as others retire, up from 283 deployable vessels today.

In effect, the Navy is trading 4 aircraft from the P-8 IOC to pay for 1/3 of a DDG-1000. These types of complicated trade offs are going to be interesting to observe, because you can expect there to be a lot of these type trade offs and you can expect a lot of them to not be popular.

The Navy has made it clear they will take money for aircraft to build ships, and with shipbuilding in such a bad state this isn't unforseen. The question is whether it is wise? The surface combatant force has an average age around 15 years old, while some of the P-3s the P-8s are replacing are over 50 years old.

I agree with the premise of this, I'd rather build something American made with stimulus packages than get no product for the dollars spent. That would allow us to not hamper one program to save another, because if people don't think this will likely lead to more costs for the P-8 down the road, you haven't been paying attention.

GAO Rejects Raytheon Protest

I did not see this coming, for some reason I kept thinking the GAO would ask the Navy to compete the contracts in order to keep more than one contractor capable of supporting these systems. The GAO says otherwise, and whether I am naive or not, I believe the GAO always gets these things right.

Essentially, Raytheon didn't produce a good case, and lost because of it. The GAO treats each case individually, so did not account for the big picture here nor should they, so faulting the GAO for making a decision that is only one small part of a larger picture that puts Lockheed Martin ahead of Raytheon in every Navy decision for combat systems work would be unfair and counter productive. Reuters has the report.

The Government Accountability Office has denied three protests filed by Raytheon Co after the U.S. Navy decided to pursue a sole source contract for Aegis combat systems with Lockheed Martin Corp.

The GAO, the nonpartisan congressional agency that rules on federal contract disputes, did not issue a statement explaining its decision. The GAO typically issues a redacted version of its decisions several weeks after they are announced.

Raytheon in September protested the award of contracts to Lockheed for modernization of the Aegis combat system, a system Lockheed built, saying the decision was flawed and violated the most basic U.S. competition laws.

The Navy rejected Raytheon's arguments, saying Raytheon did not demonstrate that it could meet the Navy's requirements, and relied instead on a "speculative promise" to team up with Lockheed. Lockheed said at the time that Raytheon had not approached it about any teaming agreement.

Raytheon has said the Navy repeatedly assured industry that it would open the Aegis modernization work to competition, but then suddenly decided to let Lockheed remain the sole source contractor.

The Navy did repeatedly assure the industry that it would open the AEGIS modernization work to competition, that is not untrue. Doesn't matter though.

The problem here is perception, and the perception is not good for the Navy. Every decision, every single one, gives the wrong perception. The Navy truncates the DDG-1000, with the unstated but widely assumed reason of cost, even though the program is hitting cost targets within 1%... then puts out a replacement plan that costs more than the DDG-1000 plan in favor of DDG-51.

In other words, the perception is the Navy has canceled the Raytheon system that is better in every single way than the Lockheed Martin AEGIS system, including being less expensive, and picked the more expensive but less capable AEGIS system. Then instead of putting billions of AEGIS modernization work out to competition, the Navy sole sources to Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin could make up to eight billion over the next 6 years in AEGIS work, just to make AEGIS as good as a product Raytheon could upgrade for a little more than half a billion.

And in the end, I still can't find any independent technical folks who will certify that AEGIS will ever be truly OA, which the Raytheon system is. Oh sure, we can get some PAO or Admiral to suggest it, but they know they will not be held accountable for their claims. No one with a technical reputation who doesn't work for Lockheed Martin will say AEGIS will be OA, which tells me a lot. Where from here?

No idea. I just hope nothing improper is taking place, because anyone with even a shred of evidence who suggests corruption is going to give the Navy a nightmare. There is absolutely none, ZERO, public information evidence that counters the perception of favoritism or corruption, and that is a serious perception problem. When the Navy picks the more expensive, less capable system option specific to Lockheed Martin in every decision and prohibits competition at the same time, the perception works against the Navy. The Navy should have held competitions where it could and let people win or lose on the merits, and with AEGIS Lockheed Martin would have already had every advantage to win on those merits, but at least that counters the perception issue. Lockheed Martin doesn't need the perception problem either, they do good work and can win fair competitions, let them.

Five to ten years down the road if AEGIS is the only game in town, if Lockheed Martin has a monopoly and the price of AEGIS is sky high the Navy will have no one to blame for a lack of competition except themselves. I just hope the system being produced at that time is world beater, because it will need to be as weapon systems continue to get more capable with longer range.

Observing the Russian Fleets Future Time and Place

The Russian Pacific fleet has dispatched the destroyer RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572), the salvage tug Fotiy Krylov and the tankers Pechenga and Boris Butoma to the Indian Ocean. Operating in the Atlantic Ocean is the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov escorted by the destroyer RFS Admiral Levchenko (DDG 605), and 2 support ships, currently heading for the Mediterranean Sea. The Russian frigate RFS Neustrashimy (FFG 712) continues to operate against piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Finally, the RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099), RFS Admiral Chabanenko (DDG 650), the Ivan Bubnov, and the fleet tug SB-406 has departed Cuba and is reportedly due to visit Cape Town from January 9 to 15, the nuclear paperwork having been filed.

Even with the increased number of forward deployed Russian Navy vessels, there really hasn't been anything interesting to note about any of these deployments to date. For example, it is very hard to get worked up about the RFS Admiral Chabanenko (DDG 650) visit to Cuba when just last year the same ship pulled into Norfolk. If anything, the Cubans should be pissed the Russians sent their Navy to visit us a year before they sending their ship to visit them. RFS Neustrashimy (FFG 712) is operating off the coast of Somalia fighting piracy with the Europeans, and it would be difficult to find a more noteworthy sign of the times.

The Russian Navy currently has 13 ships deployed globally, which is noteworthy only because this represents a post cold war high number of naval forces deployed. To put this into a strange perspective, all 13 ships are currently deployed across three oceans: Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian, although 8 of the 14 ships actually home port just off the Arctic Ocean. The dispersal is certainly an interesting part of the naval deployments, but primarily so the media can hype a port visit to places like Cuba. In real terms, even with all of this Russian Navy activity, to date there is no real significance anywhere.

But as 2008 comes to an end and 2009 comes about, an interesting quark of timing is unfolding as it relates to all this naval activity. Have you thought about where all these ships will just happen to be around say, January 20th, 2009? I don't want to give the impression that Russia is out to stir the pot come inauguration day, but it is noteworthy that the Russian Navy will essentially be deployed in virtually every important major body of water that surrounds the Middle East just as new president takes office, the same incoming presidential administration the mainstream media keeps telling us Russia is going to test in any number of ways.

And that is the thing with media driven rhetorical commentary on foreign relations and alarmist military analysis, you never really know when they might actually get it right. Do I think this means war is on the horizon? Nope, but I'd be pay a little extra attention to Iran and everything happening around the Ukraine just in case, because nothing would make Russia happier right now than seeing something force the price of oil back up, and uncertainty in the form of a new government administration can be a big part of the recipe of contributing factors when the game is speculation, as the oil game is.

France Buys Another Mistral Class

There are two things to note about this. First, this is a result of the French economic stimulus package, yet another country that looks to stimulate the economy by building ships that enhance national capabilities. Second, this is a signal regarding the mindset of a Sarkozy administration, Ares noted the speed of which it was decided and discussed. DO not casually dismiss the possibility we see the same type of thing from an Obama administration.

Defense News has an outline of French military purchases for the upcoming 2009-1014 military budget law, where a new Mistral was mentioned.

As part of the accelerated investment, the government plans to order a third Mistral-class projection and command ship from 2009, advancing an order which had been expected in the military budget law which followed the present 2009-14 exercise.

Robery Farley, call your office, you remain correct in your assessment that the Amphibious Ship is the Dreadnought of the modern era. It isn't just about national prestige though, this is about expanding capability and tells the story of how nations look at what national power from the maritime domain means in the future.

The Mistral class is a cool ship, but it isn't a kick down the door capability, more of an over the horizon helicopter command ship. Cool concept, and is an excellent ship for the Global Fleet Station and medical diplomacy roles, but otherwise isn't really well suited for the way we currently deploy Marines to forward theaters.

For those who think I am down on the ship class you couldn't be more wrong, I just note the US builds bigger ships that fills the same role. Confused? It is noteworthy the most common role for a Mistral class ship is in a power projection/soft power role off the coast of Africa, not much different than what we call Global Fleet Stations.

The Mistral class are big ships, the largest Navy ship not able to support fixed wing aircraft in Europe.

Coalitions Make For Strange Partnerships

I think it is interesting, but to be honest, what has me curious is the logistics.

Iran said on Saturday it had dispatched a warship to the Gulf of Aden to protect Iranian vessels against pirates hijacking ships, state radio reported.

"An Iranian warship entered the Gulf of Aden to protect Iranian commercial ships against pirates there," state radio quoted an unnamed Iranian navy official as saying.

Assuming it is true, I'd be curious which ship, and how long it can be sustained forward for. This would make for a bunch of good questions for both the EU and 5th Fleet folks, because Iran has to be working with someone, a stand alone ship deployment is beyond their means unless this is basically a two week cruise.

Noting the Details

Why two engines matter.

A Navy EA-18G “Growler” made an emergency landing at Nellis Air Force Base in California after its left engine caught on fire on Nov. 17, Navy officials say.

The plane landed safely and nobody was injured. The cause of the fire remains under investigation, said Lt. Cmdr. Charlie Brown, a spokesman for Naval Air Forces.

The aircraft was conducting “routine operational testing” and was one of three assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Nine based at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake in California, Brown said.

The incident was upgraded to a Class A mishap after a maintenance team determined that the cost of the fire exceeded $1 million, said April Phillips, a spokeswoman for the Naval Safety Center.

If this was a single engine F-35C, would we have lost the aircraft? Probably. Credit the pilot for saving the aircraft, something a computer may not be able to do in the future.

By the way, November 17th? What is today's date?

The Design Base Pays for Itself, As it Should

The Navy has invested in the Block III Virginia class submarine in a big way, but what catches my attention is the cost savings because a few elected officials kept their eyes on the ball and paid attention to detail, keeping everyone focused.

The U.S. Navy on Monday awarded a $14 billion contract to General Dynamics Corp and Northrop Grumman Corp for eight Virginia-class submarines, saying it had met a "nearly impossible" target of cutting the cost of each ship by $400 million.

The five-year contract calls for production of one submarine in 2009, one in 2010 and two submarines in each of the following three years, the Navy said, noting it would cut acquisition costs of the 2012 ships by about 20 percent.

General Dynamics, based in Falls Church, Virginia, is the lead contractor for the nuclear-powered submarines, but shares construction equally with Los Angeles-based Northrop.

The Navy said it invested $600 million in more than 100 design changes to make the ship more efficient to produce and cut its build time to 60 months from 84 months. Overall, the effort will cut $4 billion from the overall submarine program.

First, credit both General Dynamics Corp and Northrop Grumman Corp for taking on the challenge to get the Virginia class submarine costs to target, shaving $400 million off a ships cost is not easy, and they did it while increasing capabilities of the submarine. Fantastic work.

Note the lesson here, the $600 million was invested over a period of many years towards the submarine design base, insuring they kept working but had plenty of money to build a better submarine. What is the result? $4 billion in savings for just these eight submarines, and there will be more savings down the road as we buy more.

This is what is missing in the rest of shipbuilding. There is no investment regarding design for the Littoral Combat Ship hull, nor the DDG-51 for that matter. I still think cheap ships start with a robust shipbuilding design industry, something Congress should think about as a way to pull the Navy out of the hell they find themselves buried in with very few designs and several less than exciting options despite really good hulls like T-AKE and LPD-17 to build on.

While I hate to use Great Britain for a model of anything, when the MoD was facing tough choices for cuts, note they have essentially discarded everything over there from ships to shipyards, BUT they have kept funding a robust design industry. Why? Because MoD knows if they lose their design base, they really do lose their ability to build a Navy.

China's fleet to Somalia

I haven't had a chance in the last few days to post, because my internet was cut off (I'm moving to a new apartment). I did receive one shocking news over the weekend. The fleet that China is sending to Somalia looks to be far more formidable than orignally thought. It will be sending ships 169, 171 and 887 there from the Sanya sea base. For those who don't know, 169 is one of the two 052B class destroyers in service with SSF, 171 is the latter construct of the 052C class (making it possibly the most advanced destroyer currently in service with PLAN) and 887 is one of the new generation replenishment ship just joined SSF in the past 3 years. And the Sanya base is the one that was reported with alarm as the home of China's new SSBNs. The Chinese version of the news can be found in Xinhua website.

I'm not really sure what is going on here. It seems that PLAN is very confident with these ships and aren't afraid to show them off. And it doesn't look like they are going to send a tug ship along with the fleet like the Russians did.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Nikiforos Fokas (F 466) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Nivôse (F732)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
HMS Cumberland - (F85)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (712)
FS Courbet (F712)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)

** Take a close look at the photo with LPD-17, note the aircraft type on the fight deck.

The Grey Lady Weighs In

The New York Times has published an editorial on funding the Pentagon in the coming years, along with specific recommendations on various big-name Pentagon procurement programs. I won't repeat their recommendations here, since you can easily read them at the link above, but wanted to touch on a few of them.

They recommend canceling the Virginia-class submarine (SSN-774) program, and instead spending money to 'extend the operating lives of the existing fleet of Los Angeles class fast-attack nuclear submarines, which can capably perform all needed post-cold-war missions — from launching cruise missiles to countering China’s expanding but technologically inferior submarine fleet.' They further claim that this decision would produce net savings of $2.5 billion. Given that they describe the Virginias as costing $2 billion each, recommending that the U.S. put off the replacement of a submarine force which is already aging and which was acquired initially at a high rate, meaning that it will leave service at the same high rate, for savings amounting to little more than the cost of one of the current boats seems foolish to me. Also, given that the Virginia is one of the few programs which does in fact appear to be roughly on budget and on time, the message this would send appears counterproductive.

They recommend cancelling DD-1000 (unsurprisingly) but explicitly choose to do so in order to favor funding the LCS acquisition. I'm not sure I should even bother going into that here - and I won't. I'm sure Galrahn and Yankee Sailor will chime in if they think anything even needs to be said. They want to cut a CVBG (at least one) and offer straight-ahead acquisition cost numbers to justify this.

Their general positions is made explicitly clear on page 2, where they call for reductions in the Navy and Air Force in order to fund needed increases in ground forces. Especially for the Times, this seems odd - since the primary cause of those 'necessary increases' is ground wars which they have been unabashedly critical of in the past. They also seem quite sure that the U.S. Navy's current blue-water dominance is something which can be confidently assumed to continue into the near to medium future, even with said reductions in ship procurement. I would argue instead that while ground forces are a possible reaction to events which affect the U.S. overseas, access to those locations is a prerequisite, and the Navy is what buys the U.S. that access. Furthermore, the Navy is much more about the classic defense of the United States' sovereign territory than the Army. The Army exists in present day to enforce U.S. foreign policy, even if that policy is in 'defense' of the United States. However, in order to perform classic defense of the U.S., you need to prevent intrusion onto the U.S, its territories and those of its core allies. That is done not, in fact, by an expanded Army, but by a strong and ready Navy and Air Force. Claiming that an expanded ground force is the primary means of defense of the United States is to state that either the U.S. has thrown away its traditional advantages of sea power and would prefer to engage enemies after they have come ashore, or that a vigorous prosecution of foreign interventions is now critical to U.S. core defense. While the latter may be possible, it runs counter to much of what the Times has spent a great deal of time claiming.

For this post, I would offer the opinion that for the moment, improving the efficiency, predictability and reliability of U.S. weapons procurement will offer much more valuable savings as well as more assets than a hasty attempt to control total procurement dollars by cutting large programs for their acquisition cost savings. Although I don't presently know the answer, I would be much more inclined to listen to calls for extending the 688 boats vs. funding 774s if there was any evidence presented that the operating costs (as opposed to simply the acquisition total costs) would be lower. None is forthcoming.

Snarkily selected image is a Victor-III being dismantled. Har, har, 'cut submarine,' I'm such a card.

Using Time For Political Agenda's

The Washington Times article suggesting Bill White is a candidate for SECNAV is getting some attention in the Navy blogosphere. Look, Bill White is a really interesting guy, his support for the Navy, the Intrepid Museum, not to mention his support for the troops demonstrates his extraordinary character and quality. He is an entrepreneur with a lot of experience in business and in particular is an excellent fundraiser, a very difficult occupation.

What I find interesting about the article isn't that someone would consider him a candidate for SECNAV, his resume appears to be well rounded and he could be a very good pick. What I find interesting though is that he has allowed himself to become part of a political agenda. I don't want to give the wrong impression, but when you are talking about serious professionals like Bill White for serious jobs like Secretary of the Navy, I admit to being a bit surprised that he he allows the media to make him an object of a political agenda for the sole purpose of attacking the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Regardless of what one thinks about the policy, it seems to me that if Bill White was a serious candidate, he would stress all the real substance he has on his resume and not the particulars of his lifestyle, because to emphasize his sexual orientation essentially disqualifies him as a serious professional candidate and frames him as a political candidate. Bill White is well qualified, he doesn't need a political gimmick to apply for the job.

That is why this Washington Times article isn't a serious article, it is a political agenda driven article intended to shape a political agenda, not a Navy appointment. So what should we think about this?

Well, first lets note the SECNAV has already been picked, it is Juan Garcia, the pick has already been made and a lot of people learned as far back as Monday. What baffles me is that I found out rather quickly, easily might be the better word, and more than a few people wanted to talk about it on Monday. Here we are on Friday and nobody in the press can find enough sources to discuss it? I don't know what to make of that.

Some possibilities might include that I jumped the gun and a memo got sent when that post ran in Tuesdays CLIPs. Another possibility is that the Washington media refuses to reveal selections by the Obama transition team out of order or without official announcements, which is understandable. Another possibility is that people in the press do know, but haven't had a chance to write clearly political agenda driven nonsense like Stephen Dinan did with this article, who for a Washington Times reporter writing about the Navy SECNAV position looks to me like a remarkably uninformed reporter. As an observer, I almost feel sorry for the guy, because being an uninformed reporter in Washington DC selling out to write political agenda news items during tough economic times while his company is in the midst of free fall probably isn't good.

Could I be wrong? I'm confident enough to single out a reporter from the cheap seats, so you tell me. I do it for good reason though, I honestly wonder if Stephen Dinan had permission to shape Bill White as an object of a political agenda, because I can't imagine Bill was happy to be framed as a tool for a political agenda. I could be wrong, but Bill always came off to me as too professional for that.

I don't know much about much, but I do know a little about what is going on in the Navy. I've been following closely an interesting geographic anomaly in my blog visit statistics that I'd love to know more details about, but sadly have reached the extent of what technology can tell me.

Every weekday so far in the month of December, I have had at least 2000 visits from within 50 miles of Washington DC based on source IP information. I think that is an interesting statistic, because first it tells me I live in the wrong town and have a shot at perhaps getting a job in DC where people might respect my work here. Second, I think it is interesting that there are at least 2000 people in the Washington DC area who are interested in Navy discussions on the internet every work day.

I personally think that second part is very interesting.

Thinking About Shipbuilding Costs

I have posted an article over on the USNI Blog to add context to shipbuilding costs. I would encourage anyone interested in shipbuilding costs of current programs or shipbuilding programs of the last few decades to take a look.

For those who read the information and want to do research, I highly recommend checking out the House Armed Service Committee's website and searching for all reports submitted in testimony by Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke, as well as checking out OpenCRS for more Ronald O'Rourke reports and CBOs website for more Eric Labs reports.

Those guys have published some very useful data over the years that helps add context to how much ships cost based on size. There are trends in Navy shipbuilding, smaller is more expensive and quantity reduces costs. When comparing platforms, try to always use figures for the same fiscal year. For that, you will need to find the latest DoD green book to convert current year to fiscal year when comparing numbers of different fiscal years.

Naval Rockets Again

Reader Robert Buss most helpfully pointed out to me an article in Jane's IDR from 1995. The title of the article is "US Navy weighs missile alternatives" and it talks about various experiments in navalized rocketry. In the abstract, handily enough, which is available here, there is a most interesting quote describing Navy TACMS:

The US Navy also tested one such round at White Sands, followed by an at-sea launch from the amphibious assault ship USS Mount Vernon in February1995.The vessel, steaming at 10kt, fired the missile from a standard M270 tracked launcher chained to its helicopter deck (emphasis mine)... An operational variant of Navy TACMS could use either the Mk41 Vertical Launch System (for which United Defense has designed a suitable canister) or fixed deck launchers.The round's six-channel GPS receiver provided 13 position updates,using a total of eight Navstar satellites, during its 75nmi flight to the target area on San Clemente Island off the coast of California. The missile then dispensed some 800 inert grenades, achieving an accuracy of 71% of the weapon's nominal circular error probable.

In other words, there doesn't appear to be any problem firing from an M270 vehicle on board a moving ship so long as you have a guided round. - the launcher doesn't need stable-platform modification, and the fire control system appears to be up to it already.

I harp on this because although various folks have gone on about the pluses and minuses of mounting these launchers on ships, my point has a different emphasis. The fire support problem is one that has been hanging around for a while, and hasn't been solved (at least partially) due to the cost of new platforms. I am proposing a 'use what you have' solution to gain some capability for little additional RDT&E.; The bonus of using full-up launcher sets is, of course, that you can then use them at the far end - and take them off the ship easily when you don't need them. Plus, we already own a whole bunch of them.

There would obviously be issues with navalizing the launchers (or covering them) well enough to withstand deployment, but since they would only need to be available on station, covers would work and be easier to design/fabricate than modifying the launchers themselves for higher salt/water resistance. Heck, if you're using a platform with a hangar, park a couple in there. Or, if it's a big-deck ship, park more than a couple.

Don't Bail Out Automakers, Invest in Shipbuilding

Canada is discussing an interesting idea for an economic stimulus package, they are directing money directly into shipbuilding programs as part of the package. I'm personally not a big fan of government stimulus packages, they don't work very well normally because bureaucracy gets in the way of building effective packages. The New Deal was a good example. As an often politicized project to stimulate the economy during a depression, depending upon your politics one can find arguments suggesting it was critical to the country overcoming the economic challenges of the time, or it was a failure because it prolonged the depression. Such massive government investment projects are never as simple as the political rhetoric allowed, a more detailed review notes some of it worked, some of it didn't.

What didn't work was investment in the service sector. If you look at spending as a tree, the services sector becomes a stick, output with no tangible product that builds larger networks of economic growth. The New Deal investments in manufacturing on the other hand tell a different story, that tree branches out in a number of ways as a manufacturing facility networks with suppliers, subcontractors, and science to produce products. In many way the manufacturing investments of the new deal led to high production rates and more efficiency, was successful in building economic stimulus across several sectors, and ultimately put the US in position to be highly competitive industrially just as WWII arrived. The New Deal sealed the deal for the United States before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor.

In the spirit of encouraging government to be wise in investment during difficult economic times, the Canadian model is very smart, and it could be that several Senators see that. Emelie Rutherford of Defense Daily has an article titled Bipartisan Group Of Senators Calls For Obama To Boost Shipbuilding Support (subscription only) where eighteen Senators have called for the new administration to support "a robust shipbuilding budget and policies" for military and commercial vessels.

Their letter to Obama seeks support for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard shipbuilding efforts, and for re-energizing commercial ship construction.

It notes the 400,000 people employed by the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and says "thousands of jobs" would be generated with a "renewed commitment to shipbuilding that has been lacking in the past decade."

The article goes on to note the Senators who signed the letter.

Landrieu and Collins' letter is co-signed by: Sens. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), John Kerry (D-Mass.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.), Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Mel Martinez (R-Fla.), Joseph Lieberman (I/D-Conn.), Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), David Vitter (R-La.), Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii), and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio).

Today, the US Shipbuilding industry is a mess following eight years of Clinton and eight years of Bush, and due to many, many factors is uncompetitive in the commercial market while also suffering from a seasoned (ie. old) workforce lacking young trained professionals. If Barack Obama does not take serious action, the shipbuilding industry in the United States will be mortally crippled for decades. This letter strikes me as a smart way to look at economic stimulus.

How bad is it? You know how there is this big political debate about offshore drilling? There is a dirty little secret, we couldn't produce more oil rigs even if we wanted to, they are building at capacity and growth simply isn't a real option. It seems to me we are probably going to lose the automobile industry regardless of whether the government bails them out or not, that industry is flat out broken beyond repair and all of those companies deserve to go out of business. Sad, but true. Doesn't mean those workers have to go without though, major investments in the Gulf Coast shipyards would revitalize that region and allow workers losing jobs in Michigan to go south and find similar work down there, where some training can not only revitalize a troubled industry but inject some confidence into the manufacturing sector as a whole.

I'd rather invest $35 billion into shipbuilding over the next 4-8 years of the Obama administration fixing that industry to be globally competitive than spending the same amount just to keep the automobile manufacturers in Michigan on life support for another year. The Coast Guard has extremely old ships is stretched thin right now, and could use the investment towards homeland security. The Navy has not retooled since the cold war, and is shrinking at an extraordinary rate.

In a time of global climate change on a planet covered 70% with water, in a time where the world will soon be competing for fresh water, in a time when the worlds population is growing at a huge rate but most people live in the littorals, and as world trade by sea has become the lifeblood of the global economic system it seems to me that investment in the nations maritime sector has never been more important to our long term national interest. The shipbuilding sector could also be the solution to the automobile industry problems as it relates to the workforce soon to face major cuts, after all the nation needs more than just frigates, and the need for ships like new ice breakers is just the tip of the iceberg, pun intended.

The Navy Discussing Economic Doomsday

The Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy sponsored a policy discussion yesterday focusing on the national security implications of the financial crisis. The featured speaker was James Rickards, the Senior Managing Director for Market Intelligence at Omnis, an applied research organization. As reported in Politico, the four doomsday scenarios Mr. Rickards is focusing on are:

The Bait Effect

Terrorists, and al Qaeda in particular, are fascinated with the idea of destroying the U.S. economy. Rickards worries that the economic meltdown in the United States could serve as bait of sorts for a terrorist attack, as plotters calculate that a strike now could have a “force multiplier” effect because of the already skittish U.S. stock market.

The China Syndrome

The Chinese own more than $500 billion worth of U.S. Treasury bonds, and billons more in the debt of other U.S. entities such as those held by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. And a general sense of mutually assured financial destruction keeps them from wielding that debt like a weapon: if the Chinese dumped U.S. debt on the global market, their own holdings of U.S. debt would decline in value, the U.S. economy would be damaged, ultimately harming the Chinese economy by reducing American ability to buy more Chinese goods.

They’d have to be crazy to try it. But Rickards points out that governments don’t always do the rational thing. And in the meantime, their holdings give the Chinese incredible power over American decision making.

The Existential Crash

A pessimist by nature, Rickards believes that many economic forecasters are wrong, and the recession will get far worse than predicted.

He sees an epic disaster scenario in which the U.S. gross domestic product declines by a staggering 35 percent over the next six to seven years. Crippling deflation could take hold. Unemployment, he says, could approach 15 percent.

That’s a calamitous rate, but it would not be an all-time high: unemployment hit 25 percent during the Great Depression.
...
In this scenario, the possibilities for global unrest increase dramatically as a staggering United States retreats from foreign aid and global diplomacy and the list of dangerous failed states grows sharply.

The Alternate-Dollar Nightmare

“The Number One vulnerability is the dollar itself,” Rickards concluded. “We’re printing them and shoving them out the door, and the Fed is basically out of bullets. So why hasn’t the dollar collapsed? The short answer is, global investors don’t have any other choice.” That is, there simply aren’t enough Euro- or Yen-backed securities for investors to shift their money out of dollars and into some other currency.

But what if some kind of global coalition - say a trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund allied with several countries around the world - banded together to create a gold-backed alternative to the dollar?

Why do I mention this in a forum on naval strategy and policy? Mr. Rickards explains:

“The national security community needs to be conversant with this,” Rickards said. “In defense, intelligence, and national security, you earn your money by preparing for things that may be remote, but pose an existential threat if they come to pass.”

Indeed. So, what are the ramifications for the Navy? On one hand, immediate examples seem to be decreased operating and maintenance funds, long-term impact on acquisitions and perhaps even a surge in seaborne instability, like piracy and smuggling. On the other hand, with a global economic crunch potential peer competitors like China and Russia would also be slowed. The possibilities seem endless, so what say you?

Smaller Ships Could Mean More Guns

If, as Galrahn keeps harping on about, the Navy builds a 1000-ton littoral PC in reasonable numbers, they'll need weapons. Unlike all-up amphib ships and their supporting craft, this is a mission for guns. VLS systems are just too space-intensive for a 1000-ton, 250-foot ship. If the ship is intended to self-deploy and remain on station for reasonable periods of time, it won't be able to head back to port to reload a VLS system. The target set for this sort of combatant is quite different as well - it will consist of small to medium sized boats, aircraft, and targets on the shoreline whether vessels, vehicles or structures. It's not efficient to use VLS for that. This is where the gun will thrive again.

The question would be 'which gun?' I'm not talking about self-defense against Zodiacs, because I think that's best handled using the Marines you're carrying to man Ma Deuce mounts. A PC of the size we're talking would have the room for one or perhaps two main gun systems depending on the type. Unfortunately, it looks like the venerable and flexible Mark 45 5"/54 and its ilk may be too large; the smallest vessel I can find sporting one of those is the Blohm & Voss MEKO. Greece's Hydra-class versions are 117.5 meters long and displace 2,710 tons - too big for our notional ship.

The real questions would be whether this is a direct-fire only gun or a true naval rifle; and if it is a standard mount or some new technology. I would posit that given Gal's $100MM cap, an existing mount is the way to go, and it's not like the world is short of medium gun systems. Otobreda makes a nice 76mm gun system with a 20km maximum range that Israel mounts on its 250-ton patrol boats, just for one example of many. This would give you a nice option against small boats (it can depress -15 degrees) and soft-to-medium shore targets while retaining emergency AAW and cruise missile defense capability.

On a more daring note, it might also be possible to use these craft and the module space on the LCS for a more dispersed NSFS capability - which, if they're carrying Marines, would (I'm sure) be appreciated. I need to get off my tuchus and run some quick Lanchester numbers for the survivability of big ablative vessels with many NSFS assets (foamed tankers, etc.) vs. lots of smaller vessels with single or double mounts.

Another project I keep doodling over but haven't really run numbers for: given the number of helo decks available in the fleet, it might be possible to make a dedicated MLRS or HIMARS 'mounting plate' for a standard helo deck - essentially a flat metal lockdown plate designed to securely hold an MLRS or HIMARS vehicle in firing position. I'd want to know if there are standardized lockdown options on USN helo decks; if so, even if they're different across platforms, perhaps the mount could be a universal adapter. Next number to crunch: will a HIMARS/MLRS and a loading vehicle fit on a helo deck? Is there a sneaky way to load them? Realistically, even, you could put just a HIMARS launcher on the mount - save yourself the truck, unless you had plans to use them at the other end of the trip ashore. There should be more than enough space. While of course the LCS mission module space is a better candidate, helo decks are in goodly supply - and maybe a quickly-assembled force of bombardment ships is something we could keep 'on the shelf' this way.

Hm. Helo decks seem to run around 12m in width by 20-25m in length. If we're lucky, LAMPS RAST hardware could be adapted for the mount to provide power and lockdown. Anyone have a reference for an online copy of NAEC-ENG-7576 I could leaf through? (That is, if it's open - I don't know if it's restricted at all).

These are the things I ponder when I should be working.

Update: There is nothing new under the sun. Field Artillery Magazine has mention of a 'navalized MLRS' way back in 1987 - although that was built onto the ships in question. My proposal above involves utilizing existing launcher sets on an as-needed basis. Of course, what I'd love to know is if the USN actually looked at the feasibility of firing these things from a ship, and if it required stabilization - a commenter says the Germans tried it and it didn't work even with guided rockets. Hm.

Image of the Otobreda 76mm - handily, with small boats in frame - courtesy of Wikipedia