Thursday, February 5, 2024

The Trouble With Work's Rating Systems

Galrahn has been beating his rating system drum for quite some time, but I have concerns about Mr. Work's system. The fundamental problem with this modern rating system is time. We're here today, Samuel Pepys is not, and technology has dramatically altered the calculus of evaluating naval power.

The first problem in adapting Pepys' rating system to the modern era is Pepys' system was developed in a world where there was just one warfare area, surface warfare, and there was only one major threat, surface platforms. It was a pretty simple exercise then to compare the relative power of competing navies or forces by counting up the guns. Today, most ships must be capable of perfoming in multiple warfare areas, and threats can be in the air or under the surface. For instance, today a surface action group of three or four "battleships" could be destroyed by an "unrated flotilla" composed of submarines and aircraft. Would this have been possible in the era Pepys? I think not.

The second problem in adapting Pepys' model is the relative capability of systems. For example, examine Britain's problem during the War of 1812 when dealing with America's first frigates. The United States, concerned about the relative strength against Britain's legendary force of frigates, built a force of ships using materials and construction techniques that reduced the value of a typical British broadside. After several embarrassing losses, the Admiralty had to order its captains not to take on the American ships in a duel.

And the leveraging potential of technology today is much greater than in the past. Today, innovative technologies in weapons systems can instantaneously improve or reduce the relative value of a surface platform, regardless of how many missiles she carries. If your missile can't reliably shoot down their missile, it doesn't matter how many you have in your launcher.

The third problem is in the relative flexibility of systems. Taking the vertical launch system as an example, you can put a whole bunch of different things in a VLS cell, and not all of them are "battle force missiles". Every cell you fill with a Tomahawk, Enhanced Sea Sparrow or SM-3 will effectively reduce the rating of the ship under the proposed system. And I find it hard to imagine a real-world scenario where a VLS ship would deploy exclusively with "battle force missiles".

While Mr. Work's rating system may have some utility in comparing surface ships, its utility in measuring the relative strength of forces or navies is limited, at best. Don't get me wrong, I agree completely with Galrahn's assessment that our current and proposed mix of ships stands way to close to the "high" end on the high-low spectrum. I just think Work's rating system is an inadequate tool to make the measurement.

No comments: