In 1794 when the nation decided to build a Navy for the United States, the first thing the government did was talk to the shipbuilders. Talking to shipbuilders about Navy shipbuilding is a tradition in this country OLDER than the official Navy itself. The first name Congress knew relating to the Navy was not an Admiral or Commodore, it was a Quaker named
Joshua Humphreys.
So when I see
Admiral James Lyon's noting the absence of shipbuilding executives at the table regarding Naval shipbuilding problems today, I think he has a good point. Look, costs are challenging the Navy at every turn and the problem isn't specific to shipbuilding. The inflation of shipbuilding looks really bad right up until one calculates the inflation associated with manpower costs in general, and all of a sudden shipbuilding is just one of several issues. There are several aspects of Admiral Lyon's Washington Times piece that could be discussed, but this part stood out as a basis for any shipbuilding conversation.
There is now a great debate about the future structure of the U.S. Navy....
The debate has to do with what kind of naval surface ships the country needs to build for the future. Capable surface combatants are key because they are the backbone and most visible assets for safeguarding U.S. national security interests and ensuring freedom of the seas and economic stability. U.S. strategy has been to forward-deploy our naval forces as one of the key elements in maintaining the proper level of deterrence and stability, in order to meet our global responsibilities. Should deterrence fail, we have had the recognized naval combat power to prevail.
The United States is a global super power and must meet that obligation. Admiral Lyon's piece is specific to the shipbuilding industry, and perhaps that is his greatest concern right now. I have a different concern, and it is less industrial and more specific to strategy. I agree with everything I have quoted from the piece Admiral Lyon's has written, but I think everything I didn't quote is subject to debate, or put another way, is his opinion.
I think the debate begins with strategy, not industry, so I want to avoid the rest of Admiral Lyon's editorial which is almost entirely about industry. Unlike Admiral Lyon's, I do not think the Navy will get the high end of warfare wrong in
their choice between the DDG-51 and DDG-1000. The Navy will ultimately choose the more capable platform that represents the best long term interest of the Navy, and if neither platform meets that requirement, I have every faith the Navy will design an entirely new large surface combatant. I see no reason to waver in my faith that the Navy will do everything possible to meet the high end requirements of surface warfare. This is the only aspect of Navy shipbuilding where my optimism overflows.
Where I am less optimistic is whether the Navy will attempt to optimize the use of the high end surface combatant fleet. I believe the flawed strategic vision in the Navy today is the faith that the same tools that win war in blue water can win the peacetime challenges in the littorals. The requirements are very different, and unless the Navy addresses the requirements at the peacemaking level they will not be effective in preventing crisis from developing into warfighting scenarios; OR a warfighting scenario will always be our peacemaking solution... which in my book is just as bad.
The littoral threats are evolving towards non-state challenges at the same time the littorals are becoming more and more populated. Unmanned systems will increase our lethality in war and decrease our requirements of manpower for being lethal, but there are limits to what technology can do as the RoE becomes more restrictive (as they tend to be in the littorals). The helicopter is a brilliant littoral strike platform, but becomes more limited as the RoE becomes more restrictive in environments where dissemination between the good guys and the bad guys are not easily done. The Navy requires
a physical level of scouting (VBSS) to compliment their tremendous electronic and visual scouting capabilities that come from radar/EW and UAV technologies respectively. Physical scouting, unless someone has invented Terminator style robots I'm not aware of, means manpower and boarding operations.
Many experts have talked in the past about the necessity to have more than one type of fleet to address more than one type of challenge facing 21st century Navy forces. In general I tend to agree with this but I am cautious regarding how to implement such an idea. If it was to be done, the approach to take in my opinion would be two types of fleet strategic concepts, one centered on a hard power warfighter strategy as the dominant fleet, and one centered on a soft power peacemaker strategy as the subordinate fleet. This fits with
Economy A/Economy B fleet ideas, and could be visualized and explained in terms of Nelson's battle line/cruisers operational model. I don't believe taking such an approach changes the fundamental 'global power projection navy' intent of the US Navy, rather embraces the distinction of hard and soft power with naval forces, and describes how one supports the other in war and peace (i.e Phase 0,1,2,3,4 operations).
I completely reject those who argue that small ships are a fighting force for a global power projection navy. This "Visby School" is built on the theories that technology has evolved so much that some missile FAC is able to effectively engage and sink fleets. On this blog history is used to guide strategy, and history suggests the record of FACs vs larger vessels is 43 sunk FACs against 0 kills, suggesting the "Visby School" is built on a foundation of shifting sand and unsound theories. I'm not saying this wouldn't be very effective off the Coast of Sweden, but I am saying it will not be effective in places where the US Navy is projecting power. It is like the Type 022 projecting power off the US west coast. Please stop, because I assure you some Apache Longbow battalion will impliment a blue paint artificial reef project of Type 022 hulls in that scenario. The same would be true of Visby School strategy in projecting naval power.
It is the helicopter, or other similar armed man or unmanned aviation platform; that represents the strike platform of choice in the littorals. Small ships are absolutely necessary in the future fleet of the US Navy, but their primary payload is not missiles, it is people.
I do not believe the Navy should put ASMs on small ships, or try to arm them to fight major combatants, as this does not represent either their primary function to the fleet nor the environment small ships are needed to operate in today. The weapon systems would be gun based and the payload manpower centric. The
Navy today is in dire need of a peacemaking force for stability operations at sea, security enforcement, SOF, soft power training and engagement, and humanitarian response ships. The littorals represent some of the most manpower intensive requirements facing the future US Navy, and a littoral force is not intended to fight modern battle fleets rather help build partnership with global coast guards to increase the security apparatus of the maritime domain. Small ships are the beat cops and manned nodes of a Maritime Domain Awareness network in troubled, populated littorals.
I believe the nation needs small ships to support the US Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard when peacemaking requirements force them to be the point of contact with irregular forces operating in the
complex populated maritime environment the littorals represent. Any small ships built should be prepared to fight the irregular threats, not conventional threats, and those ships should look the part so they hopefully don't have to. Because manpower is costly, the approach to the littorals should be a joint service approach, if for no other reason than to insure the manpower costs are spread around while the individual capabilities and specialties of the various maritime services are utilized efficiently.
I believe
motherships for manned and unmanned systems will be at least as important in the 21st century as the aircraft carrier was in the 20th century. The ability to field unmanned ASW, MIW, ASuW, and AAW systems will change the way the US Navy fights war, particularly as these systems develop autonomous capabilities that don't require direct network links for decision making. Unmanned systems increase range, lethality, endurance, etc.. for warfighting, which is the basis for why I don't believe the Navy needs as many sailors to be lethal in wartime in the 21st century. That means our future high intensity conflict force can afford to have less manpower and remain or increase capabilities towards being lethal.
But unmanned systems are limited to scouting and kinetic solutions only; they cannot replace the roles of manpower centric operation at sea. This is why the
USS Vella Gulf and
USS Mahan act as motherships for both unmanned aviation platforms, manned H-60s, and manned RHIBs when fighting pirates. They are essentially acting as motherships for manpower intensive operations, and are not being used in an optimal way that utilizes their capability.
This is sending the wrong message, an image that takes a thousand words to explain. Using very large ships to combat speed boats suggests to the American people that the Navy has ignored requirements at the maritime security level while also suggesting large surface combatants may not be necessary because they are used in this role. In a time of dwindling fiscal capacity for naval funding, and a time when the Navy is absolutely awful at communicating with the American people the requirements currently burdening the fleet, sending the wrong perception is an unaffordable approach.
I think the Navy can do these operations with
a corvette/PC and LCS combination instead of AEGIS ships and be far more productive along a broader set of low intensity roles. Using AEGIS cruisers and destroyers acting as the principal point of contact vessels is inefficient use of necessary high end capabilities. The Navy needs to invest a little money in order to save a ton of money managing these low intensity challenges, and do so while increasing capability across the broad spectrum of low intensity challenges in the process.
The LCS cannot be a manned mothership due to the flaw of limited berthing space, which really pisses me off btw. The LCS only has a core crew of 40, and it has been suggested that none of that 40 man crew is intended to qualify for VBSS operations, another point I am not happy about if true. A flight crew of 20 is intended to support 1 H-60 and 3 Fire Scouts. Freedom can carry 2 H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts in that hanger; I measured when I was on the ship; but to carry all the equipment possible the module crew of 15 gets shifted to make up the additional flight crew.
That leaves no crew available for unmanned systems necessary for supporting littoral operations, or berthing for manned VBSS teams necessary at the point of contact with the enemy, much less both. People who suggest the Navy can fill the module bays with berthing modules don’t get the concept in my opinion. Not only are the module bays the loudest part of the ship outside the engine room when the turbines are running, but that space is critical to the primary capability of deploying unmanned systems. Fixing the manpower issues to optimize the use of the LCS for the complex human terrain of the littorals needs to be the primary focus in any early evolutions of the platform. More than speed or survivability or weapons kit or any other criticism of the LCS, the inability to support sufficient manpower for littoral operations ranks highest as the limiting factor of a platform intended to operate in the littorals.
While manpower issues prevent flexibility, the LCS is as good a place as any to start for the Navy’s initial approach to unmanned systems. It has tremendous potential for growth as a C2 node in a battle force network. It is badly named; LCS should stand for Littoral Combat Support, because the LCS role in the fleet is in every sense a support ship for enabling other vessels to do their work. The problem is the Navy didn't build any other vessels to operate in the littoral environment for the LCS to support. The one that they planned to build grew into a 14,500 ton money sucking pig, and will hopefully be truncated at 2-3 ships.
So I say build the supporting network. Operating beside four corvettes/PC each carrying a squad of Marines or Coast Guard detachment, the LCS becomes a C2 system for supporting a full rifle platoon or a bunch of Coast Guard capabilities with this squadron package. The LCS carries the manned aviation that can support plenty of operational RHIB teams from the corvette/PC manned motherships, and each corvette/PC can support UAVs similar to how very small vessels like the M-80 have proven they can support ScanEagles. Most importantly, our $500+ million LCS doesn't become the point of contact vessel in the complex irregular sea space, our corvettes/PCs do, which reduces the risk to the LCS and allows it to stand off with NLOS 30mms, and a 57mm. The LCS was designed to be a standoff support vessel, not a hunter, so I suggest the Navy needs to maximize the LCS as a standoff support vessel by building littorals hunters.
To be honest, I don't want the Navy to try to turn the LCS into a strictly manned mothership though, unmanned systems are too important to throw another requirement at the LCS after the fact. Optimize the LCS for an additional helicopter and some VBSS capabilities and call it a day. The Navy needs to get unmanned systems right with the LCS, and 55 is fine IF there are PCs/corvettes for the LCS to support in the complex littorals. If the Navy isn't doing that, and is trying to make the LCS the one-ship-fits-all solution, I suggest the Navy cuts the LCS build at 26 to replace the mine ships and rethinks the surface warfare approach at the low end in the littorals.
That final point is important. This High / Low talk gets all fouled up as historical bias and futuristic perspectives attempt to define what high / low means in the emerging maritime era. Too many people want to suggest that low end combatants need to be able to fight and survive in high end environments, and to do so the Navy should stack missiles of all kinds on small combatants. I disagree. Small ships may support operations in high intensity warfare, but their roles will still be within their capability toolkit (like supporting MIW or escort operations in chokepoints).
High/Low end today for me means how the Navy addresses Hard/Soft power operational demands with fleet forces. It is about
warfighting/peacemaking, and can be (with a lot of words) used to describe conventional/irregular warfare scenarios. I want to see the Navy optimize their high end AEGIS fleet for dominance of the maritime domain when dealing with wartime challenges (train as you intend to fight). I also want to see the Navy optimize the low end to address the Phase 0 and Phase 4 operations in the littoral environment (ABOT and KAAOT is a great example, good thing Iraq has a relatively small coast line).
The Navy should do low intensity with Amphibious ships, MSC, and small combatants; supporting the NECC, Coast Guard, Marines, and other government agencies. The Navy shouldn't be doing this with aircraft carriers, submarines, or AEGIS destroyers. The reason the Navy should build more amphibious ships, MSC, and small combatants is to optimize the use of their heavy warfare aircraft carriers, submarines, and AEGIS ships. Those platforms are going to be more expensive, and the Navy is going to need as many as possible. The Navy must insure the optimal use of high end warships since the cost of high intensity conflict capabilities are making the high end ships more difficult to both build and operate.
An aircraft, including a UAV with exceptional endurance, is not a substitute for presence in the littorals. Their options are limited to watching or destroying. The littorals come with baggage today, just like as the land forces found out in Iraq. When talking about complex populated environments, or the human terrain on the battlefield, the United States doesn't have a political system that enables a RoE for shooting first and asking questions later. In fact, the military often has to ask questions first, which requires a human interaction, and if they don't trust the answer, they may have to verify with physical scouting, another human centric action. A helicopter can do the first part, but it takes a boarding team to do the second.
So in general, I agree with Admiral Lyons that surface combatants are key to the shipbuilding debate, but I think that debate is far more complex than can be summarized in an editorial anymore. The US Navy is way beyond the point where less than 1000 words can even begin to touch the complexities of a shipbuilding discussion, ANY part of it actually. For its part the Navy is silent on the complex challenges they are facing regarding both shipbuilding and manpower, and the industry is simply following the Navy's lead in regards to shipbuilding.
The fleet of today is the best starting place for deciding where the Navy should be striving to be with the fleet of the future, and if the Navy isn't connecting the cost issues related to manpower with the cost issues related to building new ships, then the Navy is not connecting all the dynamics that are directly effecting the fleet constitution strategy needed to deal with 21st century challenges.
The USS Port Royal (CG 73) grounding is going to be expensive, at least I expect it to be. There are a lot of things that can get damaged when a ship goes aground, and tries to pull itself off the coral reef several days in row. A lot of the damage being reported by Navy Times in this article makes sense, but some of the damage bothers me a bit.
