"COIN" Means More Than Countersurgency Today

A few years ago, the Center for American Progress appeared to me to retool their national security research to focus almost exclusively on the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a business decision, it was unfortunate, due primarily to the unexpected success of the surge which in general the organization opposed, but also because the quality of analysis for DoD policy in virtually every area but the war dropped off shortly afterward.

However, despite their opposition to the surge, what has come about over time as the surge was successful was excellent analysis by CAP of conditions on the ground in both theaters, and the quality of their research for both wars has led to CAP being well positioned to offer the administration insight and advice towards political policy related to both war theaters. It will take the organization awhile to retool their national security research towards being able to offer insightful DoD policy for awhile, but with the withdrawal of forces from Iraq and a strategic review currently taking place in Afghanistan, CAP still offers some of the highest quality analysis regarding the conditions in both wars.

Peter Juul, Research Associate at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, has put up an excellent contribution regarding the context and options being weighed in the Iraq pullout debate over at Wonk Room. My position is to support whatever President Obama decides to do, because he has the best information available from the Generals on the ground, but I think this analysis frames well the challenges in context involved in the various choices.

I originally intended to post and focus solely on Peter Juul's contribution, which is very good, but then the first commenter, Cernig of Newshoggers came along... and I simply can't ignore this.

This also leads us into another subject ignored by Ricks and all the COIN enthusiasts in the military. Although most would agree that the nation building/reconstruction/aid & assistance portion of modern integrated COIN thinking are a handy tool to have around, there are still some of us (a bipartisan some, at that) who don’t think it’s a great idea to centralize and institutionalize it in the military.

What the CNAS neo-liberal shadow-pentagon doesn’t point out is that COIN is only useful if you’re occupying somewhere (usually somewhere you invaded) - and the more useful it is the more temptation there will be to do just that. Since when has having a better (non- nuclear) weapon led to inclinations not to use it? It’s akin to suggesting that tazers are better because they’re less lethal, but that moreover that no-one will use them over-zealously or against innocent targets.

I’d rather there was a “wingtips on the ground” element, utterly divorced from the military, that could move in and do USAID properly in allied 3rd world nations that don’t have security problems and therefore where no COIN operations are required. If needs, and with effort, that capability could then be mobilized in a COIN occupation setting. But welding the two together at the hip from the get-go is “white man’s burden” thinking if you’ve already conceded, as the new Government COIN guide does, that you’re looking to future venues rather than just Iraq and Afghanistan.

If we are going to move into another subject debate, I'll address this argument. I believe the common use of the word "COIN" has come to mean multiple things, and perhaps we need a better term. I prefer peacemaking, but small wars and SYSADMIN are also terms used to describe the strategic tenets behind the use of COIN in a strategic discussion.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is but one tactical application of a broader strategic concept of peacemaking emerging from the DoD COIN strategic view in the 21st century, but the term is used in discussion as both COIN at the tactical level and COIN as a strategic concept. I disagree with the commenter, I believe it is critical to the future successful application of military power to centralize and institutionalize peacemaking into the military, because the long term benefits well outweigh the short term pains of change.

We are seeing two very different rapidly evolving strategic theories for the application of military power in the 21st century, and both have proven successful at the strategic level.

The warfighting strategic theory applies less manpower, leverages unmanned systems, sophisticated distributed intelligent networks, and seeks superiority in air/space/sea/cyberspace. Military power then saturates the battle space with surveillance capabilities for supporting mobility centric land warfare forces intended to concentrate precision fires on the enemy. A warfighting strategic approach is more effective when the rules of engagement are less restrictive.

The peacemaking strategic theory leverages military power with greater levels of manpower in association with a whole of government approach for construction and development, aid and assistance, and most importantly the constitution of security at the local population level towards the development of credible governance that can apply the rule of law; a condition set requirement for the development of local economic capacity with the intent of establishing stability. A peacemaking strategic approach is more effective when the rules of engagement are more restrictive.

The reason I believe it is important to centralize and institutionalize peacemaking into the military services is because just as we export our credible and capable warfighting capability as an application of political policy towards the elimination of existing threats to national security; we must also develop the capability to export a credible and capable peacemaking capability as an application of political policy to prevent the development of emerging threats to national security.

When I speak of exporting security to other countries, it should be noted the DoD already does this today with security cooperation engagements. What is missing though are strategic theories on how to do this as part of a strategic application of peacetime military power. While I can't speak for the land forces, allow me to suggest an example that could be applied to the Navy.

In Bob Works recent CSBA report (PDF) he suggests we build 4 Littoral Combat Ships every year indefinitely and after a specific period of time, we simply retire the ships and give them away. Part of this model is to apply an evolution model to the platform to slowly grow it into exactly the capabilities we need as we develop lessons of fast, modular vessels with a lot of room for space. However, the other side of this proposal is to have credible naval vessels ready to be essentially given to other nations as a long term strategic approach towards building regional security in nations that otherwise cannot afford to build their own credible maritime security forces. As a platform that requires a small crew, and by delivering the platform with a static single mission profile instead of as a modular system, the ship can be operated at lower costs and perform the local security function in developing countries.

It is a really smart idea, and while there is room for debate whether the LCS is the right platform or not, the concept is what is important. Essentially the idea is to develop a capability to export security towards the strategic concept of peacemaking, the intent to develop security capabilities at the local level overseas and once these security forces are developed, essentially give them the tools necessary to utilize their security skills towards contributing to a distributed regional security network. I have a similar theory inspired by Bob Work I'll pitch on the blog next week, but I note the core concept of exporting a peacemaking strategic concept is similar and rooted in the same fundamental strategic theories discussed in the COIN debates.

The fundamental requirement to insure regional security is why the DoD must play a central, even if often a subordinate role in the development of our national strategic approach of soft power. It isn't enough to simply deliver humanitarian and medical assistance to a region struggling from violence, security conditions must also be influenced positively and the core application of COIN theories in this regard is the development of security through local populations.

Preventing war through the export of security is central to the strategic application of emerging COIN theory, which is why it is fundamentally inaccurate to suggest "COIN is only useful if you’re occupying somewhere." At the strategic level the application of COIN theories scale horizontally to all the services and offer a broad strategic blueprint towards peacemaking and preventing war in the 21st century.