Grand Strategy Framework - Grand Strategy II

In my prior post, I explained my dissatisfaction with the state of grand strategy in U.S. policy formulation, debate or execution. This is a product of my schooling; I was indoctrinated in the strict realist tradition, and as such, that is how I view the world without significant effort to see it through different lenses. However, I view this as an organization principle for observation and analysis, rather than a doctrinaire position.

In this post, I propose to begin the construction of a grand strategy framework, which is a theory-based 'base' for a specific strategy to build from. In order to be of use to us, such a framework must be comprehensible, consistent and positive. It must be able to both explain why certain conditions or policies are helpful or not, as well as offer a prescriptive base for formulating new policy. While the concepts used at this point are fairly generic, they are nevertheless powerful in concert - providing a 'sanity check' for policy involves running a policy back 'up' a strategy tree such as I am proposing, to determine if said policy does, in fact, contribute directly to the goals laid out at each level of the tree. Not all policies or conditions contribute to all goals; in fact, nearly none do. However, all must be able to convincingly contribute to at least one well-defined path up the tree in order to survive a grand strategy based pruning of options. With that said, on to the framework.

The United States is a sovereign nation. As such, it can trace the lineage of its structure and basis of authority back to the Magna Carta. It is, at present, one of the best or at least the most effective in terms of size at channeling the power of a polity (economic, political, and military) in order to achieve its aims in the world.

Its problem, at present, is that it appears to be unsure of what its aims are. Bereft of a viable great-power competitor, the U.S. has for over a decade been espousing the 'big tent' theory of threats - if we can name it, we can declare war on it. Drugs, 'Terror,' Proliferation, etc. etc. All of these are threats that are thrown under the 'big tent.' While these threats may in fact pose a danger to the U.S., it has been much rarer to see a prioritized and logical description from the policy arms of government of how these threats interrelate.

What is a nation state supposed to do? What do we, as Americans, need and want ours to do? At the core, the state must survive - because in order to meet any other requirements, it must be around to do so. What does it mean for a state such as the United States to 'survive'? I would go back to its basis for existence - its definition as a 'sovereign power.' In order to survive, the United States government (whichever it may be at the time) needs to preserve and protect its right of sovereignty over the polity and territory of the United States. This is the sine qua non of state survival.

By 'sovereignty' I here mean the ability to set and enforce policy within its borders, including the arrogation to itself of all legitimate use of force both within and (by the state) outside its borders. This is the core, or root of the tree that a Grand Strategy must grow from.

What next? In order to maintain sovereignty, of course, there are states which must be preserved. In order to be a sovereign nation, the U.S. must have a polity - so the lives and liberty of that polity must be preserved, for without those lives and liberty the polity is unable to create, maintain and operate the sovereign state. The territory claimed by the United States must be protected, for without maintenance of itself as ultimate authority within those borders, again, sovereignty suffers. And in order to accomplish these things, the polity and therefore the state must prosper- in order to provide both the legitimacy of a free and willing polity, and the resources required for the wielding of hard and soft power.

This has, so far, netted us a pyramid, with 'preservation of sovereignty' at the top and just below it the three items 'protection of life and liberty of the polity,' 'protection of territory,' and 'prosperity.' Note that so far, the condition that a strategy must contain a clearly directional means-ends chain has been achieved. In order to achieve sovereign survival, the state must ensure the next three items - conditions - exist.

What falls below this level? Here is where most strategists may diverge, leaving their imprint on their theory - or here is where the means and ends may become less clear-cut. Ideally, an item on this chart is an end from below, and a means from above. The real world begins to impose difficulties here, because now we must venture out of the world of purely theoretical goals and begin to acknowledge messy reality. Here I will begin to argue my own structure, which will of course draw inspiration from and at times owe direct debt to the work of others.

In order to maintain prosperity in the modern world, I submit that there is a single condition which must be maintained. The United States is a trading nation, and a maritime nation. The basis for our prosperity is no longer our own static natural resources; it is our ability to produce and export, or import, modify and export goods, information and services. There is a necessary prerequisite for all of these activities. That is: we must be able to undertake commerce with what partners in the world we choose. As a sovereign nation existing in a strongly anarchic national system, it would harm our sovereign status if we were unable to do so; more, it would strike directly at the means for our prosperity, and thence our survival.

This is not to say that any nation must trade with us. But it does mean that we can permit no nation to prevent us from trading with a third nation, except as we choose to allow it for reasons of our own. If we desire to trade with another nation, and that nation desires trade with us, we cannot allow a third nation or other party the ability to dictate the existence of our commerce.

Nothing, of course, says that this trade must necessarily be easy or cheap. When there are natural barriers to trade including weather and geography which increase the cost of trade, it would be foolish to assume that simply willing trade to be cheap and easy is possible. As we see off of Somalia, it is possible for sovereign and non-sovereign threats to increase the cost of two other parties maintaining commerce - but in that case, it is our own willingness to shoulder the cost, not an inability to choose to do so, which is the limiting factor.

So, we have added 'maintain commerce' as a means leading to prosperity. What else?

Well, as an aside, at this point I need to start a diagram if I don't intend to confuse myself, much less you good readers. You'll have to excuse me; blogger seems to blur it for reasons I cannot figure out even though the sizes match - but if you click on it you should get a 'clear' version.


(It's very late, and I just realized I could have made that diagram much, much clearer by simply switching the positions of two items. I'll try to fix that when I've had sleep. :-P )

In an ideal world, the United States would be able to prevent, minimize or as a last resort avoid major war. Major war - sovereign state war and especially great power war - is a direct threat to two of our second-level goals. Even if the U.S. manages to minimize or avoid it directly, it still threatens our commerce (and hence, prosperity) and may spill over into our borders, or make it difficult for us to protect said borders without becoming drawn into the conflict.

Of course, things don't always work out that way. This brings us to our next goal: the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat any attempt by a sovereign opponent or reasonable coalition thereof to infringe on the lives and liberty of our citizens and the sanctity of our borders. Please note that this differs from the ability to impose our desired conditions in foreign countries - this is the more basic ability to provide classic defense - interdiction - against war or warlike actions which directly affect the United States by sovereign powers.

I specifically note sovereign powers, because at present (despite wild inflation of threat, in my opinion) non-sovereign powers are unable to credibly threaten our borders. They may be able to threaten the lives of our citizens in varying numbers, but they cannot threaten their liberty within the United States unless we choose to sacrifice that liberty ourselves. A sovereign invasion force, however, would threaten life, liberty, and borders, and directly impinge on the sovereignty of the United States. Therefore, this threat is limited to a sovereign power war.

Thus, on our diagram, there is an entry for the desired goal and means of 'deter or defeat sovereign opponent attacks.' It connects upwards to two of the second-level goals and 'maintain commerce' because a sovereign power intent on harming us would, in fact, threaten all three conditions.

Finally (for the moment) comes the current major bugbear. I maintain that the United States must address, as a goal and a means, the ability to prevent or defeat any non-sovereign power threats to both our maintenance of commerce and to the life and liberty of our citizens. I have enumerated earlier that I believe that a non-sovereign foreign threat is unable to directly threaten our borders. While a determined opponent could (and has) successfully carry out attacks against embassies, territories and sites within the United States, none of these attacks (with the possible exception of embassy occupations) has threatened United States control over those locations. I am loath to include embassies in this category, in any case; embassies are not intended to serve as productive territory of the United States. They are a diplomatic fiction of sovereignty, created and maintained to enforce the rules of the game.

Nevertheless, non-sovereign powers can, have and do threaten our commerce and our lives, if not our liberty. I will refrain from arguing whether or not such actions have in fact threatened our liberty, for even if the end condition may be the loss of liberty, a necessary condition for this to occur is our compliance as citizens of the polity. Terrorism does not 'just result' in a loss of liberties; a domestic positive action on the part of the polity and/or the government is required, and if on the part of the government, the polity must at the least acquiesce.

For now, then, we have laid out a basic diagram of means and ends which are consistent and ordinal. In order to secure each level (ends) we must provide for the next level (means). In order to secure those, we must provide for the level below, and so on. Using this diagram, it is a simple matter to evaluate large-scale defense policy. According to this, any large-scale defense policy of the United States must fit into (rather, contribute to one of the three third-level items.

Next up: Getting messier, and starting to think about how the Real World interacts with those three states.