Approaching the waterline in Mexico

Many recent reports would lead you to believe that the Mexican government is about to collapse. Yes, the violence along the border has been staggering, but the idea that Felipe Calderon is on the verge of losing control couldn't be farther from the truth. In fact, the opposite is true. Calderon is squeezing the cartels to the point where they have begun fighting each other for increasingly limited turf and the government is feeling the backlash.

It's important to note that the violence does not represent the cartels' death throes, especially since corruption isn't going to disappear overnight in a country as poor as Mexico. The more apt comparison would be to a cornered animal.

There has been a surge of arms heading south across the border. Interception of heavy-caliber automatic weapons is becoming common. Even shipments of grenades and rocket launchers are popping up. With both sides pushing and neither willing to cede, bloodshed is only going to increase. As places like Juarez look more like Anbar than a depressed border town, the shadow of terrorism is already appearing. From The Hill:

Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), whose district borders Mexico, said that while the situation is bad, it could easily get worse.

“The goal of the cartels is to make money,” said Cuellar, who sits on the House Homeland Security committee. “If they can smuggle in drugs and human cargo, then certainly they can smuggle other things in, other devices to cause us harm.”

Before the cartels were being pinched, talk like this could be attributed to fear-mongering. Today it looks like a credible concern. All of this has implications for the maritime threat environment that is conspicuously missing from the current discussion.

With so much pressure on land routes, the arms, human and narco-traffickers are inevitably going to try and exploit sea routes on both coasts. These routes create tangled international considerations that are not present in the conflict as it stands now. Sea-based trafficking is traditionally the forte of the Columbian cartels. Who will control this space as traffic spills over? The Columbians could look to increase their margin and at the same time be less reliant on a perilous Mexican environment by smuggling the goods on their own. Conversely, Mexican cartels might not tolerate being pushed out of the cocaine game and assert themselves in a place and manner never necessary before.

Far from the margins is FARC, a dangerous Columbian revolutionary organization that has been around since the 60s. FARC has known ties to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Castros in Cuba, Basque separatists in Spain as well as the Mexican cartels.

There’s no way to know how this will all play out or how many of these factors will come to bear. At a minimum, we can assume enforcement efforts on land will push the traffic into the water. Both the Navy and Coast Guard should be ready to deal with this surge alongside the Mexican navy. I’m positive plans are in the offing, but part of those plans should involve a large deterrent show-of-force similar to what took place during the Haitian rebellion in 2004.

The U.S. feared a mass exodus of migrants taking to the sea during the protests before Aristide was deposed. A slew of Coast Guard cutters were ordered there and formed a ring around Haiti’s half of Hispaniola. Well within sight of the coast, the presence deterred any attempt at mass migration.

If a similar tactic is taken in the Mexican border situation, the sooner it happens, the more effective it will be. The cartels are likely planning for an increase in maritime trafficking. It will take some time to build-out their fleet of vessels, more if they lean towards semi-submersibles, less if they opt for the traditional go-fast, cigarette boat type. The farther they go down either road, the more committed they’ll be to the maritime approach, and less likely to reconsider this option.

If the cutters had not arrived in Haiti until after an exodus had begun, it would have been an unmanageable situation with Haitians and yolas everywhere, many in distress. Stopping or aiding those already at sea would have limited their ability to slow the tide. In the same way, if the cartels pass the point of no return in preparing for increased waterborne trafficking the effectiveness of deterrence will be almost nil. At that point we’ll already be on our heels and responding to their moves.

If, on the other hand, we can muster a hefty show-of-force soon enough, we may be able to keep the war on these cartels contained within confines that we determine. It will also remain a trilateral engagement with the Mexicans, the cartels and us, avoiding the complications of interdiction at sea, like waiting days for SNOs or DOJ evidential requirements.

In our favor, the mechanisms for a formidable show-of-force are already in place. JIATF is a strong and diverse body. Diplomatic and naval arrangements with Mexico are very strong especially with the recently ratified Merida Initiative in place.

The time to engage is now before the floodgates are opened.