The Bitter Tone of the Non-Strategic, Economic Centric Defense Debate

I've decided that I want Winslow Wheelers agent. It is hard to read a story about the upcoming defense budget without the journalist writing the article interviewing that guy for a quote. It is quite remarkable actually, just in the past few weeks he is quoted in defense budget articles in everything, a huge range of publications including CQPolitics, Boston Globe, The Washington Independent, the Navy Times, Defense News, Aviation Week, and even the Politico.

I can sum up every one of his comments in one word: bitter; and the absence of one word: strategy. He has taken a very populist tone in an effort to promote ideas that are largely absent strategy, which isn't surprising actually. Ultimately, no one besides a very rare few (nerds like me) actually read CDI's America's Defense Meltdown, so most people who are enamored by his populist 'bash defense spending message' probably missed the premise of that work as essentially:

• Grand Strategy is too hard for great powers
• Only by destroying the DoD can it be fixed
• The advanced technology industry is the root of all evil in defense

I respectfully disagree with most of CDI's paper, and I am not impressed with 'defense experts' who are widely reported in political media while never using the term strategy and have absolutely nothing constructive to say.

Lets examine the reporting in the Boston Globe article to observe events carefully.

Two defense officials who were not authorized to speak publicly said Gates will announce up to a half-dozen major weapons cancellations later this month. Candidates include a new Navy destroyer, the Air Force's F-22 fighter jet, and Army ground-combat vehicles, the officials said.

More cuts are planned for later this year after a review that could lead to reductions in programs such as aircraft carriers and nuclear arms, the officials said.

As a former CIA director with strong Republican credentials, Gates is prepared to use his credibility to help Obama overcome the expected outcry from conservatives. And after a lifetime in the national security arena, working in eight administrations, the 65-year-old Gates is also ready to counter the defense companies and throngs of retired generals and other lobbyists who are gearing up to protect their pet projects.

The reason Winslow Wheeler stands out as a perfect example of what is happening in the Defense debate today is because the Defense discussion under the Obama administration with Gates isn't about a future we are building towards, it is about meeting the obligations of a predeclared agenda. There is no shift in strategy that is recognizable under Gates, rather a shift in priority. Instead of debating what we need to meet the obligations of political leaders who call upon the military to do, well... just about everything, we are debating ways to save money. There is nothing observable that defense thinkers are working towards, and the predictable result is that everyone is digging in to push back against the pressures.

Winslow Wheelers non-strategic complaining and his strictly bean counter approach to defense has become the tone for the the entire discussion regarding the national defense of the United States under the Obama administration. I encourage Congress to rise above it, because what is needed is leadership, and Winslow Wheeler's public written work lacks every characteristic of that trait.

The new Navy destroyer discussed in the Boston Globe is a perfect example where leadership is needed. That Navy destroyer to be canceled could be the DDG-1000 or the DDG-51. Lets play multiple choice, should it be option A or option B under the guise of "defense reform..."

A. This platform lacks an assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This program lacks validation supported by reviews by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for an Acquisition Category I program. The program lacks an approved acquisition strategy that supports the approved requirements baseline. This program is not consistent with previous Navy studies on what investment is required to support the surface combatant industrial base. This program does not exist due to modeling and simulation, including war gaming conclusions regarding combat effectiveness. There has not been an assessment regarding platform operational availability, cost savings, or penalties from changing the vessels manning levels to accomplish missions as discussed in open sources regarding the program.

B. This platform has been thoroughly supported by all operational requirements and assessments, and is the result of years of wargaming, modeling, and simulation. It is also consistent in meeting requirements for supporting the surface combatant industrial base. This program has an approved acquisition strategy that supports approved requirements baseline, and has years of consistent analysis and testimony supporting the platforms requirements.

In case you didn't know, option A. is new DDG-51s while option B. is the DDG-1000.

And for the record, I pulled everything stated in option A. from a letter sent to the Navy from Senator Kennedy regarding the requirement for new DDG-51s, a letter the Navy never answered. This is why Winslow Wheeler is saying nothing important and has embraced populism, he isn't talking about fixing processes in the DoD, the only process he advocates is cutting funding for procurement because that is his strategic vision for fixing the DoD, as if magically when the money is gone, all is cured!

Think about just how screwed up things are right now. The DDG-1000, which I agree completely is an enormously expensive ship, is the shipbuilding program on cost, on schedule, supported by assessments, supported by years of testimony, has all the latest technologies, and has been approved at every level of the DoD acquisition process. The change for more DDG-51s was done completely absent any analysis, all of John Young's leaked memos have proved it.

Why would continuing the DDG-51 be better? Because the CNO changed his mind, absent any analysis, absent any assessments, and by completely avoiding every single process and standard that is in place specifically to insure DoD money is not wasted. And let us not forget, people celebrate this random, unvalidated and independent shift in course as a good thing. People have to intellectually reject the idea of requirements planning for this to be a good thing based on any metric other than cost, and under oath the Navy told the House on July 31, the change was not about cost. The reason is because the Navy knows the DDG-51 plan runs around the same costs.

Congress will get to hear the Navy come up to Capitol Hill sometime over the next 5-6 weeks and talk about FY 2010. The Navy will have a new plan, which will be different than the plan last July, and also different from the plan introduced last March. We have no idea if this plan has worked its way through the analysis and justification process all new DoD programs are supposed to utilize, but we do know that when evidence of that process is requested, Congressmen and Senators will be given a wink and a nod, and then see their requests ignored.

So what is the answer? The House and Senate appear content with the status quo of being told by the Navy how it is going to be. The Navy is forbidden to discuss the budget, which is clearly a tactic to insure as few tough questions as possible get asked regarding new plans. When a program is on track, justified, and on budget... populism is allowed to trump process. When a program is way off course, well, any number of reasons end up insuring continuation. How can money be the problem when processes are ignored and leadership is never held accountable? No matter how much the defense budget gets cut, the problem is still centric to people and culture, not money.

And worst of all, at the end of the day, just like Winslow Wheeler, the notable absence of a guiding strategy fails to link the budget to any coherent vision for the national defense the United States, something to rally behind and build towards. So upon further review, perhaps it is appropriate that Winslow Wheeler leads the op-ed pages on the future of defense, because in today information environment the person who dominates the message sets the tone for the discussion. That is why the defense budget discussion today is bitter, lacks strategy, and focuses only on money.

* this post is not an endorsement of the DDG-1000, rather is intended to highlight that at no point has the requirement developed over several years that led to the DDG-1000 been proven to disappear by analysis, and that all efforts to cut that program are done based on human intuition alone, not strategic study. When human intuition, essentially gut feelings, are allowed to drive the many billions of defense spending, money is inevitably wasted. Our nations elected officials, the DoD, and both the previous and current administration leaders by all reasonable intellectual standards must share responsibility as part of the problem, or they will not find a realistic solution. Define where we are going before defining how we get there; means should be driven by the ends and ways of strategy, not the other way around.