Robert C. Rubel has an article in the Spring 2009 edition of the Naval War College Review titled The Navy's Changing Force Paradigm. As one of the authors of the Navy's own maritime strategy, this is essentially one authors take regarding what the force structure for the new Navy maritime strategy should look like.I think it is an interesting perspective in that context, and I think there are some useful tips in the article regarding what is being developed through wargames.
I am not sure I buy into several assumptions made in the article. The whole DDG-51/DDG-1000 aspect of the article was highly questionable regarding the facts that compare the two vessels, and the near total emphasis of ballistic missile threats while barely mentioning the littorals suggests to me that even the Navy academics now believe the role of the Navy is to focus on the space over the sea, rather than control the sea itself.
It is quite remarkable how absent the populated nature of the sea is from our strategic force planning discussions. Even in the simplicity of fighting pirates, both Russia and India blew the hell out of fishermen and we still ignore this enormously important aspect of the future battlefield.
I feel like ever since last July I'm observing some sort of laser beam emphasis of ballistic missiles by the Navy, as if that is somehow the major threat is this one potential weapon system China has or may be developing that absolutely no one will talk about, a capability we don't even have nor have we apparently spent any money researching. Sorry, ballistic missiles today and well into the future still fall behind:
1) submarines
2) aircraft
3) mines
4) anti-ship missiles
5) coordinated surface threats
In other words, the Navy and even the Navy academics are focused in on a guided ballistic missile/hybrid cruise missile threat that doesn't even meet the top 5 most likely, historically probable, or future capable threats certain to be widely deployed against naval forces in the 21st century.
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