From a long time blog reader overseas. All comments in red were his notes, and I have ultimately decided not to try to shape this article, rather post as received for review.
This is a Working Paper (the first actually) from the Maritime Doctrine and Tactics Centre first published in November 2008. It took me until now to get a copy, because it was much more popular than the MoD expected. Though it isn’t available online the Paper explicitly states that “working papers are based on not-classified information and are meant for the maritime community (military and civil) in the broadest meaning of the word”. That must be true, since I’m a civilian like you and my interest is purely personal and they have sent me it after I requested the Paper.
He provides the following translation for discussion.
Food for life
Working Papers are works in progress about interesting maritime subjects, but are not mature enough to become a doctrine already. They are, by definition, not ‘finished’ products and incomplete. They are also an open invitation to you, the reader, to give comments and discuss the subject with us. (e-mail of the writer is supplied)
This Paper is about the support from HNLMS Evertsen for the World Food Programme (WFP).
Capabilities
HNLMS Evertsen is an LCF class frigate and optimised for operations in the highest spectrum of warfare at sea. The ship can engage with combattants in ASUW, AAW and ASW simultaneously. Crew, armament and internal organization are geared towards these tasks. Total reach of sensors and weaponry is between 2-80 seamiles.
They had a mandate to stop a pirate attack towards any ship with minimal violence. (It means that if push came to shove they had a mandate to sink any pirate vessel attacking any other vessel, not just WFP ships) They were also allowed to operate in Somalian territorial waters.
Pirates and (maritime) pirates use small caliber guns (including RPG’s) and small but fast vessels.
Conclusion is that the standard configuration of sensors and weaponry is not suited for the most likely dangers.
Force Protection (FP)
A team of the Unit Intervention Mariners (UIM) was place aboard, they specialize in anti-terror operations and are capable of opposed boardings.
They were put on the vessel that was being escorted, together with the standard ‘guard’ team from the Evertsen.
The FP-team was put on board of the vessel by fast roping from a helicopter, because:
- fast
- good training
- show of might towards crew and possible pirates
Combination of land tactics and maritime tactics
The crews of the Evertsen and the FP-team were able to integrate specific land and maritime tactics. The FP-team on board the escorted vessel secured it with a Patrol Harbor routine, with observation posts around (on the edges of) the ship. It was being treated as a floating island. The gunmen on board the Evertsen use the principles of the Close Quarter Battle. The fusion of both tactics was a complete success. Having the UIM to follow and see in action, took the normal crew to a higher level.
Logistics
An out of area operation with limited support and a high degree of uncertainty about next departures and arrivals. Food had to be bought at the spot, because standard (the usual) suppliers didn’t deliver in Africa. This was very expensive. The delivery of a water treatment installation was also impossible.
And because of the sudden deployment the crew had to provide for certain ballistic protection themselves for the .50 shooting positions, so they bought steel plates, sand and sand-bags.
It might be wise to upgrade the onboard medical facilities to “role 2” for such mission. The accessibility of these is measured in days.
Does it have to be a frigate?
Isn’t an LCF (Zeven Provincien Class is “ Luchtverdigings en CommandoFregat” in Dutch) overkill (“overdimensioned” would be a more literal translation of the Dutch word used)?
The LCF isn’t overdimensioned for this mission, it’s just not dimensioned for it. Overdimensioned would imply it would be suited for the mission if some capabilities would be scrapped. That is not true. Sensors and weapon systems have restrictions at short range. Therefore they had to improvise with watchposts and shooters on board.
Kan a minehunter do the job? No, it’s too slow, doesn’t have enough crew, has too little fuel. It has too little durability for the job.
But it can be an AOR or a LPD. And although the mission underlines the business case for the OPV’s (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Dutch_Navy_offshore_patrol_vessels it has a ridiculous sensor suite for a ship without any ASUW or AAW duties with sensors that have a range of up to 140 seamiles, but the suite also has specific elements for irregular warfare, such as small boar attacks and swimmers, which is good but they are €31,5 million a piece) the mission also shows that the other large (big?) surface combatants (ships) must be adapted to do these types of mission.
Conclusion
Enhance the abilities for self-protection:
- make structural firing positions for small calibre weapons that guarantee self protection for 360 degrees
- get enough ballistic protection for these positions
- make sure that all boardshooters (the dedicated shooters on board) can operate from all firing positions (so no designated positions for shooters)
- enhance the shooting capabilities (how well they can hit their targets) of the complete crew with small caliber weapons
- get a system for moving targets, to practice firing exercises at sea
- Develop a scenario for the simulator so the board shooters can be trained in nearby-ship-security and can practice the ROE’s
Professionalize boarding teams even more:
- provide a basic training for the normal ‘guard’teams members of ships. Let the Unit Interventie Mariniers provide this training
- Use the NMIOTC in Krete
Log/Med recon:
- do a logistical and medical recon before such a deployment
Interesting I think.
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