Australian Defense Will Focus on China

Just as Australia’s strategic outlook has been dominated in past decades by American primacy in Asia, so in future will it be shaped more than anything else by what follows as American primacy fades and China grows. The biggest risk is not that China itself becomes a direct threat to Australia, but that the erosion of American power unleashes strategic competition among Asia’s strongest states, which in turn increases the risk that Australia could face a number of military threats to its interests or even its territorial security.

We can escape that risk if the US, China, Japan and eventually India can avoid escalating strategic competition by negotiating a new set of understandings to replace those that have kept Asia so peaceful for the past forty years. The essential basis of any new understanding would be a more equal sharing of power among these key states.

But is America really willing to treat China as an equal? Will China settle for anything less? And can either treat Japan as an equal? And will Japan — still a huge power — settle for less than China gets? Unless these questions can be resolved, it is hard to see how escalating strategic competition can be avoided in the longer term.

A FOCUSED FORCE: Australia’s Defence Priorities in the Asian Century, Lowy Institute Paper 26, April 2009, Hugh White, Executive Summary

Hugh White's report set the stage a few weeks ago for the upcoming release of the Australian Defense White paper, which in case you have not heard, is expected to reach conclusions in stark contrast to the United States. News reports in Australia have not been able to resist discussing the gap between the US and Australia regarding the future strategic environment of the Pacific. First it was reported that Australia's military planners asked the US to reconsider their dove-like assessment of China, and also rejected the broader "Gates View" that unconventional non-state conflicts being the primary strategic threat over the next 20-30 years. The rebuff was mutual, as 2 days later The Australian reported the CIA and Pentagon rejected the hawkish arguments made by Australia's Defense leaders about the threat poised by China.

It is noteworthy that Australia is calling China the "next cold war" and when they came to Washington earlier this month, the Australian military leaders has expectations to recruit the US towards this view. On the contrary, the US rejected this assessment, and agreed with opinions of Australia's Defense Intelligence Organization and the Office of National Assessments, also known as Australia's spy agencies, which suggest China's military build-up is defensive in nature and unlikely to pose a long-term threat to Australia's security.

Following that assessment, the Rudd Government appointed the head of the Lowry Institute, Allan Gyngall, as the new head of ONA. It is noteworthy that another former ONA chief, Geoff Miller, had recently stated the following regarding the strategic threat regarding China as reported on The Australian blog.

CAMERON Stewart and Patrick Walters ("Defence plan rejects US strategy”, 13/4) report that “a group of senior Defence officials and ... army, navy and air force chiefs” have successfully argued, in the context of the coming defence white paper, that “Australia’s future defence force should be structured primarily for involvement in conventional warfare”, with China as “the greatest strategic danger to Australia”. To meet this danger, Australia should have new frigates, destroyers and 12 new generation submarines.

This view of China as a strategic danger seems at odds with our existing national policies towards China, our second largest trading partner and source of thousands of students at our universities. The main points of current difference are over the non-war-like topics of the timing and content of a free trade agreement, and how much and what kinds of investment each should allow from the other.

Setting aside the question of the validity of the reported “China threat” analysis, it is surely the height of hubris to suppose that if China—a nuclear power and a country now frequently mentioned as a member, with the US, of a coming global “Group of Two”—decided, against all expectations, to threaten us militarily, we could deter it or defend against it by our own efforts. In such extreme circumstances we would have one recourse, and that is our alliance with the US.

We need to question the rationale for this proposed force build-up. Apparently a force including 12 “new generation” submarines is envisaged. How realistic is this when we can only muster crews for half of the six Collins-class submarines we presently have?

I have a serious question. Wouldn't a massive naval and air force buildup in Australia be in best interests of the US? If the United States is going to reorganize towards a balanced force, wouldn't a military buildup by Australia be a good thing right now? We know that absent a major change in global conditions, the Obama administration plan is to maintain static and potentially reduced defense budgets over the next few years. Under these conditions, and with both shipbuilding a mess and the retirement of the F-22 line, the US is making choices that reduce mid-term capabilities in major war in favor of dealing with the current wars the nation is in. Under those conditions, why wouldn't an offset in the Pacific in the form of Australia doing a major upgrade of naval and air force capabilities be a welcome thing for US strategy?

The way I see it, there are plenty of domestic debates that will come out of the defense white paper, most of which will be useful in informing the Australian public about the major military growth taking place in the Pacific. While I think the specifics regarding what kind of equipment is certainly a legitimate debate, particularly in regards to submarines because there have been severe crew shortages with the Collins class, the strategic direction expected in the Defense White Paper that focuses on China as the primary strategic challenge appears to me to be very much aligned with US interests.

It is important to note, the strategic direction of Australia does not necessarily need to match the strategic direction of the US, and the way I see it, a strategic direction that expands the capabilities of Australia in the Pacific at the high end is probably better for US strategic interests right now than creating a force optimized for small wars at this time. If Australia, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan become more hardened against the potential threat of China, this reduces the risk to the US as we shift towards a balanced force.

Until the intentions of China are more transparent and better understood, the increase of defense capabilities at the high end in the Pacific decreases the risk for both the US and Europe who can then increase the capabilities of their military at the lower end. In this way, I see the strategic direction of Australia to make China the central strategic threat to Australia to be very much aligned with the current US direction towards a balanced force.