My Favorite Questions Today

From the transcript. This first one is a classic:

Q Can you tell us a little bit more, Mr. Secretary, about the analysis that went into these decisions? Even over the weekend there was some criticism that such bold decisions before the QDR, before this top-to-bottom review, perhaps don't have the analytical framework that would be required Can you give us sort of the 1-2 about how this all was put together?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that there is a very sound analytical basis for these decisions because they emanate directly from the National Defense Strategy, which involved a great deal of analysis on the part of both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs. So there is a strong analytical base.

ZING. Can anyone remember a time when we held our breath waiting for the analytical framework of the QDR to get intellectual and strategic direction for the services? Should the next QDR become an important document, it would be the first time.

Q On the destroyer, Mr. Secretary, it sounds like you've put the ball in the industry's court. Could you say in a little more detail what's going to constitute the success they need to achieve to get to the whole three-ship --

SEC. GATES: Well, I haven't -- I mean, other than the broad decision, I haven't been involved in detail, and certainly haven't talked to the contractors. But the people here in the building believe that building individual prototypes in two different shipyards with one-offs is about as inefficient and cost-ineffective an approach as you can have. So if you can put all three of these ships in one shipyard, then we think that the cost, actually, of all three would not be -- it would be greater than two being built separately, but not at the equivalent of a -- the third would not be as expensive as either of the two -- first two prototypes.

So we think that from a shipbuilding standpoint, that having all three built by the same company in the same shipyard would lead to a much more efficient and cost-effective approach.

That said, if we do that, as I indicated in my remarks, we would then -- this is also contingent on seeing if we can smoothly restart the DDG-51 program in Pascagoula.

It is actually an interesting idea. One DDG-1000 requires the same number of man hours as two and a half DDG-51s, meaning if Bath was to build all three DDG-1000s, it would be like getting a contract for 7 DDG-51s from a labor perspective. Let me say this, I don't believe for a moment that the number of DDG-1000s is completed at three. If Bath builds them on time and on schedule, there could be more than three, particularly if they can show cost savings at the rate predicted by NAVSEA, who still stands by their position under oath, for the build to 7.

If Ingalls was to restart the DDG-51, if FY10 was 1 DDG-51, and FY11-FY13 was 2 DDG-51s each, the workload would be about the same for both yards. Since the AEGIS BMD upgrades are probably going to be in the Atlantic fleet, Bath could also get that work and/or the CG modernization work to cover while DDG-51 got going up there. There really are a lot of options here for the workforce if the folks in Mississippi are willing to agree to the deal.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that this reform was based on lessons learned in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, and that you're concerned about under-investment which could lead to potential vulnerabilities. Based on that, do you believe that the president achieved -- or that he could with our allies in Europe, specifically NATO -- putting enough troops and money to help us in terms of winning the war in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Actually, I think that what came out of -- what came out of the NATO summit in terms of commitments was for me a pleasant surprise. I have believed for some time that there was not much likelihood of a significant increase in the number of troops, and I took the approach in Krakow that what we were really interested in with the other defense ministers was civilian expertise and paramilitary police trainers. And so for the Europeans to have pledged an additional 3,000 or so troops plus the trainers I think was a significant achievement. I think there were some major commitments made in terms of the NATO trust fund to sustain the Afghan force. So I think that the -- I think the summit was actually more successful than I expected in what we were able to get.

Memo to Europe, Gates doesn't have any faith in your political leadership. He thinks they lack backbone and are weak. The relatively small contributions made were seen as a surprise, meaning something beyond nothing exceeded his expectations, which must be very low of Europeans. I think Gates low opinion of Western Europe specifically is something to write down and keep in mind.

Q Mr. Secretary, the debate about Defense spending has been simplified by this conventional versus unconventional - and next war versus current conflict. To what extent do you think that's too simplistic? And how -- can you just speak a little bit more to how this budget reflects that complexity?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that -- let me -- let me give an answer, and then let the -- let the general give an answer.

I think that this debate between conventional and irregular is quite artificial. Most of the people that I talk to are now increasingly talking about, instead of one or the other, a spectrum of conflict in which you may face at the same time an insurgent with an AK-47 and his supporting element with a highly sophisticated ballistic missile, where you -- where you have what we have been calling in the last year or so complex hybrid warfare. And so you really need to be prepared across a spectrum to deal with these capabilities.

And that's why I -- going back to my crude carve-up of the budget of 40 percent dual-purpose, I think we have to be prepared all along that spectrum. And again, I think what people have lost sight of is I'm not trying to have irregular capabilities take the place of the conventional capabilities. I'm just trying to get the irregular guys to have a seat at the table and to institutionalize some of the needs that they have so that we can get the need -- so we can get what they need to them faster and so that we don't have go outside the Pentagon bureaucracy every time there's a need for the warfighter that has to be met in a relatively short period of time.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think probably -- maybe three more attributes that I would use to characterize -- the first is lethality. Heretofore, we always figured high-end war was more lethal than this low-end war, so to speak. The reality that we're coming into, because of proliferation and because weapons of mass destruction are getting out into areas that are non-nation state areas -- so in other words, we're having to deal at the low end, what was considered the low end of conflict in this spectrum, the reality is the lethality is just as bad down at the low end as it was in -- at the high end in the past.

That's point number one.

Point number two is, heretofore, conventional warfare was, I know your home address. I know exactly who we're fighting, and we know exactly where. And the problem is, that's not the case anymore in cyber warfare and weapons of mass destruction, because there are venues without attribution that we have to deal with as we move to the future.

And the third point is that the reality of hybrid warfare is the reality that you're dealing at the entity level. I must know who you are. I cannot accept the collateral damage to just know generally where you are. And that changes the equipping. That changes the mindset of the warfare. It is a much more difficult activity, and yet it is equally lethal. And so, putting all of that together, you start to understand the challenges of a warfighter across this spectrum.

It is pretty clear to me that Frank Hoffman doesn't need to answer his critics anymore, he can just point to the Secretary of Defense and say "that guy gets it even if you don't."

All in all I thought General Cartwright was great when it came to Missile Defense, he had a very good day. Gates is easy to admire and respect, even if one disagrees with what he is doing.

Additional Initial Thoughts:

Looks like times are moving in the direction of the helicopter industry. They need more RW crews in the Army. The Presidents helicopter went down and will be reevaluated. The CSAR-X went down and will be reevaluted. On the flip side, the MV-22 was never even mentioned.

Clearly aviation priorities are evolving. The Joint Strike Fighter, the new Tanker, the Predictor, the Reaper, and even the ISR turboprop aircraft industry were the winners. The F-22, C-17, and the F/A-18 were the losers. Before the USS Enterprise is retired, the Navy needs to test launch and recovery of a Reaper and get in the game. If the US Navy can launch and recover Reapers, they would become relevant in the current wars and take the stress off State regarding the air base closings.

The FCS vehicle program was the biggest loser today. Gates just told FCS supporters that they got requirements wrong and program management wrong. I almost wish Gates would have said that about the entire SC-21 program the way he crapped on DDG-1000 and CG(X). He seems to like LCS, but I don't think Gates really understands very much about naval warfare or strategy, he just knows the Navy needs motherships for unmanned vehicles and the LCS fills that role.

Something important to note. Looking at the way the Navy programs were discussed in the context of contract negotiations, I don't think Gates really added anything significant to the Navy debate, or settled much of anything in regards to the debate. He never mentioned a single program of the Marines. I honestly think Gates looked at the Navy and Marines and saw such a huge messy debate that he punted the problem down to the CNO and Commandant. Ultimately, we won't know much about the context of what was said today until Congress sinks teeth into the budget.

Does anyone else think it is interesting Ray Mabus is being appointed SECNAV, only to have his first priority to tell the Mississippi yards that DDG-1000 will be built in Maine, and Mississippi will build only DDG-51s, with LPD-17s being pushed to the out years.

Historically, the difference between the President's budget and what Congress ultimately decides at the end of the budget process is usually very small. It will be very interesting to see if that pattern continues this year.