The Navy's Secret Aircraft Carrier Problem

After all the heat and smoke last year, conventional wisdom would suggest that the CG(X), or DDG-1000, or LCS, or LHA(R), or even the Sea Base will be the hot shipbuilding topic of FY2010. Well, conventional wisdom is not correct, the shipbuilding topic for FY 2010 will be the CVN-21 program. Not only are we going to get an announcement from the Navy about the reduction of aircraft carriers from the Navy in FY 2010, there is also a secret problem with EMALS that the Navy has not explained. That EMALS problem raises questions regarding contracts like this:

Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., Newport News, Va., is being awarded a $42,994,547 undefinitized modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2110) for the procurement of long lead time material to support production of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) for CVN 78 (Gerald R. Ford) construction. Under this modification the contractor will procure material for Energy Storage Subsystem (ESS) Induction Motor Stator Assemblies, ESS Induction Motor Rotor Assemblies, ESS Exciter Stator Assemblies, ESS Exciter Rotor Assembly, ESS Rectifier Assemblies, ESS Main Rotor Assemblies and Power Conversion Subsystem Rectifier material components to support the production of EMALS. Work will be performed in North Mankato, Minn., (74 percent); Mt. Pleasant, Pa., (17 percent); and San Diego, Calif., (9 percent), and is expected to be completed by Nov. 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., is the contracting activity.

Peter Frost knows there is a problem with EMALS too, and my guess is he is having trouble finding good details. Still, he steals the show with this article though.

But shipyard and Navy officials — as well as a cadre of industry observers — have questioned whether the unproven system will be ready for implementation on the first ship of its class, which is due to be delivered to the Navy in September 2015.

The Navy confirmed Monday that it is conducting a formal review of the program to determine if it will proceed with its plans to build the system into the Ford.

Then Peter gets LCDR Chen to give a ringing endorsement of EMALS.

"We're still conducting a review to assess and mitigate risks in the program cost, schedule and performance of EMALS," said Lt. Cmdr. Victor Chen, a Navy spokesman. "At this point, EMALS is still the launching system of record for (the Ford)."

"Still" is an interesting word, and I interpret the comment suggesting the Navy has not figured out what to do about the EMALS problem that is under "review." Peter goes one better getting a ringing endorsement from Northrop Grumman.

Shipyard officials have said if the new system isn't ready for the Ford, it will be implemented on following ships.

Signaling the shipyard's concern about the launch system, the GAO wrote that Northrop "anticipates changes to (the Ford's) design based on the results of EMALS testing."

Northrop maintains that EMALS is still government furnished.

Note how Northrop is saying "this is a Navy problem." Peter Frost's article is a good read in full, be sure to read and understand the first paragraph because Peter clearly knows, like I do, there is a problem with EMALS that has not been laid out in detail yet. The rumors are everywhere, but the details remain nowhere.

No one wanted to comment on the GAO report, which can be found here (PDF), so I will. The GAO report suggests the following, and this is before the problems with EMALS I am talking about.

Problems during EMALS development have already resulted in cost growth and schedule delays. In order to meet CVN 78’s delivery date, the Navy adopted a strategy that will test, produce, and ultimately install EMALS with a high degree of concurrency. In September 2008, the contractor completed the first round of high- cycle testing, gaining confidence in the performance of the generator—a source of past problems. Contractor-led integrated land-based system testing will not be complete until the end of fiscal year 2011—2-years later than estimated in December 2007. Assuming no further delays, EMALS will not demonstrate full performance of a shipboard ready system until at least 7 months after installation on CVN 78 has begun.

The report goes on to say:

The program has faced challenges in maintaining its design schedule due to delays in the receipt of technical information on EMALS and the advanced arresting gear; however, the Navy believes this issue has been largely resolved. The shipbuilder anticipates changes to CVN 78’s design based on the results of EMALS testing.

Then goes on to say more:

A February 2008 program assessment recommended a number of changes to the EMALS program to improve performance. The Navy re-planned the test program and changed the management approach. The CVN 21 program office is now responsible for overseeing EMALS production and ship integration, rather than the Naval Air Systems Command. In addition, EMALS will no longer be provided as government-purchased equipment. Instead, the shipbuilder will purchase EMALS, giving it a more direct role in managing the integration on CVN 78. The cost impact of this change has not been finalized.

Bottom line, the Navy doesn't want to talk about the problem until they have decided officially what to do. Here is some of what I do know. The larger opinion is that General Atomics may know how to make UAVs, but they have no idea how to make ships systems. The first Ford class carrier is going to suffer a delay and a pretty significant cost hit, somewhere in the neighborhood of $600 million is the number I am hearing thrown about. Shit happens, and on $11 billion aircraft carriers, when shit happens it is usually dinasour sized piles of it.

Some have suggested the first Ford may end up being redesigned for steam. I've also heard everywhere from a 1 year to 3 year delay as a result, with more informed people saying at least 1 year.

As the GAO report notes, steel has been cut on the new aircraft carrier, and if the decision is made to go with steam, a significant redesign will be required. Steam will add weight to the new ship as well as more crew, and will make the first Ford class a unique design, as EMALS will not be canceled thus making the EMALS version of the Ford, CVN-79, another first in class ship.

The other option could get even more costly, and would be to wait for EMALS to get fixed for the first Ford class ship and take an even larger cost hit if the problem doesn't get fixed quickly. As the GAO report notes, the schedule has already been pushed back as far as possible.

The question is, why is the Navy not talking about the EMALS problem? Simple. In a budget year where the budget axes are being sharpened, the last thing the Navy wants to talk about is an enormous soon to be costly delay for its most expensive platform, the new aircraft carrier. For as long as possible, the Navy is going to not talk about this problem, because only by getting as much money into the program as possible first can the Navy insure it doesn't take a budget hit. In other words, the Navy appears content to say nothing until the budget hearings, and even then I question whether they will bring it up, or be forced by Congress to answer the rumors that are now just about everywhere.

What the Navy should be doing instead is explaining the problem. Hell, run it by me, I'll explain the freaking problem in a way anyone who wants to know can understand, that is what blogs do.

Be honest, talk about the problems with the press and explain them in detail. Aircraft carriers are national capabilities, and no matter what weapons China is producing to attack them, there is still no evidence that missile technology nor the submarine threat has rendered the aircraft carrier obsolete. The aircraft carrier is a platform of national interest, paid for with an enormous investment in national treasure, and a unique capability that has, every single day since the very first day the United States entered WWII with Pearl Harbor been the most powerful warfighting capability at sea.

The biggest mistake the Navy can make is to be intentionally deceptive or dishonest regarding the most expensive single platform acquired by the Department of Defense. The House or the Senate, particularly a representitive from Virginia or perhaps Jim Webb, might want to get to the bottom of this issue under oath. After the last few trips to the Hill, does Barry really need that headache? Can someone give that guy a break for a change, instead of making him the mule for everyones problem...

Before that happens and the Navy makes negative headlines for itself during a budget hearing, the Navy might want to get out in front of this issue. They might find the American people finally give a shit about something related to the Navy. After all, to the Navy's detriment, the aircraft carrier, not any single person, is the symbol of the sea service today. Yes, it is sad but true that a picture of a piece of technology and not an individual represents the Navy of the 21st century.