On March 25, 2024 the Pentagon released Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (PDF), the annual report on Chinese military power required by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2000. In years past, opinions of this report have been generally negative, as the quality of the report has not been up to the task of generally reported information, indeed a lot of information inside the report itself would be inconsistent, and generally useless.The 2009 report is a significant upgrade in my opinion, and does a far better job than previous Pentagon reports. The research quality is substantially better, and yet it does not sensationalize while being much more informative than in the past. In particular I thought Chapter One: Understanding China's Strategy, Chapter Two: China's Military Strategy and Doctrine, and Chapter Three: Force Modernization Goals and Trends were well done and particularly useful.
For example, the report was likely finalized for approval sometime in late January or early February, as it usually takes several weeks for a report like this to make the rounds and get the bureaucratic approval necessary to go live. This report likely took the full 60 days, which is why it comes at the end of March as opposed to the end of February like last year.
That means that while the report was probably finalized before the Impeccable incident in the South China Sea, the report demonstrates relevance because it specifically addresses the maritime sovereignty issues that are directly related to that incident. The same applies to the recent open source discussions of the DF-21 missile, indeed the report has a graphic lifted from a 2006 Chinese Second Artillery Engineering College article of the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile concept on page 21 (PDF page 33). Whoever wrote the 2009 report did a much better job than the 2008 report, and it is also clear they were very different people.
A few observations. First, it is clear to me the Pentagon report is borrowing primarily from what is available in the open source, and not being leveraged to reveal intelligence information. The strategic observations appear to match up almost entirely with the work often produced from the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. I think this is very smart actually, because the tone does not come off alarmist in any way, and is structured to be informational while detailed. Indeed, of the many ways to describe the 2009 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China report, neither alarmist nor confrontational would be useful words in description, although I believe the words competition and comparative would both apply. China disagrees, but their lack of transparency is the primary reason for the necessity of the report in the first place. When China learns to act like an emerging superpower with transparency (read like an adult instead of a child), they will find these type of reports are no longer necessary.
As my focus is primarily focused on the PLA Navy, a few observations. In the past, I have considered the best government produced research on PLAN naval affairs to be Ronald O'Rourke's CRS report China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress. If Ronald O' Rourke has used the Pentagon report in the past as a foundation for research, he might recognize that it would appear the Pentagon's report has reshaped itself to align itself with his research found in the November 19th edition of his report. In other words, his research appears to have trumped their research of the past, and while the DoD doesn't cite sources in its report... Ronald is clearly one of their top sources now for naval research.
There are a number of Navy issues to cover in the 2009 report, lets begin by highlighting the evolution of the PLA Navy over the last three Pentagon reports.
| Vessel Type | Total 2007 Report | Total 2008 Report | Total 2009 Report |
|---|---|---|---|
| Destroyers | 25 | 29 | 27 |
| Frigates | 47 | 45 | 48 |
| Tank Landing Ships | 25 | 26 | 27 |
| Medium Landing Ships | 25 | 28 | 28 |
| Diesel Electric Submarines | 53 | 54 | 54 |
| Nuclear Attack Submarines | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Coastal Patrol (Missile) | 41 | 45 | 70 |
If the Pentagon report is the definitive bottom line regarding the PLA Navy construction, then the Pentagon report for 2009 suggests that China commissioned into operation 30 warships in 2008. That number of 30 may not be accurate, but if it isn't it is because the DoD wasn't counting ships in the past. Indeed, if you look at the numbers in the 2009 report, this report appears to be missing some ships that I would think would be counted, and doesn't shape up as accurate either, but we'll cover that in more detail below.
According to the report, the DoD is saying 25 Type 022 fast attack catamarans, 1 Shang (Type 093) class submarine, 1 Type 071 LPD, and 3 Jiangkai II (Type 054A) FFGs entered service since the 2008 report for a total of 30 new warships just in the last year. The problem is, when you try to break down the numbers of hull types for surface combatants and submarines, it all falls apart. Lets examine a few things.
PLA Navy Surface Combatants:
The Pentagon report claims the PLA Navy has 27 destroyers and 48 frigates for a total of 75 surface combatants. When I do my count, I can come up with 75 surface combatants broken down into 26 destroyers and 49 frigates.
| Destroyer Type | NATO Name | Quantity |
|---|---|---|
| Luzhou | Type 051C | 2 |
| Luyang-II | Type 052C | 2 |
| Luyang-I | Type 052B | 2 |
| Sovremenny | Project 956EM | 2 |
| Sovremenny | Project 956 | 2 |
| Luhai | Type 051B | 1 |
| Luhu | Type 052 | 2 |
| Luda | Type 051 | 13 |
| Total | 26 |
| Frigate Type | NATO Name | Quantity |
|---|---|---|
| Jiangkai-II | Type 054A | 4 |
| Jiangkai-I | Type 054 | 2 |
| Jiangwei-II | Type 053H3 | 10 |
| Jiangwei-I | Type 053H2G | 4 |
| Jianghu-V | Type 053H1G | 6 |
| Jianghu-IV | Type 053HT-H | 1 |
| Jianghu-III | Type 053H2 | 3 |
| Jianghu-II | Type 053H1 | 8 |
| Jianghu-I | Type 053H | 11 |
| Total | 49 |
It would be useful to see which frigate the DoD is claiming is a destroyer, or if the DoD would detail out their list to determine what they are counting that is different than what I am counting. My list for surface combatants matches the list found under 2008 at Sino-Defense.com, although I do not think the list at Sino-Defense.com is always accurate.
PLA Navy Submarines:
Last year I was highly critical of the reporting regarding submarines in the 2008 Pentagon report. I think someone was listening. In the 2008 report, the report specifically claims there are 10 Song class submarines. I noted last year that testimony before Congress in March of 2006, not to mention a listing by Janes Fighting Ships 2008-2009 both listed the number of Song class submarines at 13. This number is different than the number listed at Sino-Defense.com, which notes by hull number that there are 16 Song class submarines. I tend to agree with Janes, the Navy, and the latest Pentagon report that the number 13 is accurate for Song class submarines.
While I find it difficult again to match up numbers to conclude there are 54 Diesel-Electric submarines in the PLA Navy, the total number of diesel electric submarines is less relevant. I'll explain more below.
The 2009 Pentagon report claims there are 6 nuclear attack submarines in service. We know how the report comes to this number, by specifically claiming:
Two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and one JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN have entered service alongside four older HAN-class SSNs and China’s single XIA-class SSBN.In other words, the report is specifically claiming the 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) are 2 Shang (Type 093) class and 4 Han (Type 091) class submarines. As I noted earlier, it would appear the Pentagon report is specifically designed not to reveal intelligence, rather allow open source intelligence to drive what is included in the report. In a way, that does reveal intelligence by confirming it. Back on August 3rd, Hans M. Kristensen was playing around with Google Earth when he noted that the current image of Jianggezhuang Naval Base shows the Xia-class (Type 092) SSBN which was previously in drydock was out of drydock and on the pier. He also took note of the other nuclear powered submarines visible from the Google Earth satellite photo (still available if you want to open up GE and look yourself) when he said:
The image also shows what appears to be all of China’s five Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), the first of which are being retired and replaced with the Shang-class SSN. One of the five is a little longer than the others and could potentially be a Shang.The Pentagon report appears to support his speculation that the other 5 submarines visible in the December 5, 2024 satellite image includes 4 Han (Type 091) class SSNs and 1 Shang (Type 093) class SSNs. It would also support the speculation that the first Han (Type 091) class SSN (hull number 401) has expended its nuclear fuel and been retired. The other Han (Type 091) class SSNs (402, 403, 404, and 405) were modernized in the late 80s/early 90s, but will also soon begin running out of nuclear fuel.
Which leads us to the replacement SSNs: the Shang (Type 093) class. In a recent satellite image taken on September 15, 2008, also currently available from Google Earth, Hans M. Kristensen noted that there are 2 Shang (Type 093) class submarines at the new naval base near Yulin on Hainan Island. This is the naval base the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) was operating near when it was harassed by Chinese vessels last month. This suggests that as of just over 6 months ago, long before the Pentagon report was finalized, that the PLA was operating 2 of the new SSNs from this base. One of these is not the two Shang (Type 093) class submarines the Pentagon report is counting for its total of 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines, because the report specifically includes a map that lists 5 SSNs in Qingdao and 1 SSN at Shan Jiang (Hainan Island). The Pentagon report also doesn't include the latest open source reports.
Of late, the Chinese Navy and Air Force have been staging maneuvers almost every month in the East China Sea off Shanghai.This news suggests the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is monitoring the operations of PLA Navy nuclear-powered attack submarines from its north sea fleet naval base at Qingdao. The combination of satellite photography and open source intelligence, and because it is apparent the Pentagon report does not reveal any intelligence, suggests the number of Shang (Type 093) class nuclear-powered attack submarines is higher than the number 2 claimed in the Pentagon report. The Pentagon report also claims there are only 2 Yuan class submarines, one in operation and one undergoing sea trials, but I have photos of those two, and a third which is slightly different in design.
After leaving China's nuclear submarine base in the Yellow Sea, Han-class nuclear subs and newer Shang-class models have been conducting frequent patrol missions in the East China Sea, Western Pacific and elsewhere, according to MSDF sources.
These moves are believed to be aimed at enhancing China's naval maneuverability, presumably with a view to staying abreast of the United States in the Pacific.
If we assume for a moment that as of the end of 2008 there were 2 Shang (Type 093) class SSNs, 2 Jin (Type 094) class SSBNs, and 2 Yuan (Type 041) class submarines in service, than between 1995-2008 the PLA Navy has added 9 Ming (Type 35) class diesel electric submarines, 13 Song (Type 39) class diesel electric submarines, 2 Yuan (Type 041) class submarines, 10 Kilo (Project 636) class submarines, 2 Kilo (Project 877EKM) class submarines, 2 Shang (Type 093) class SSNs, and 2 Jin (Type 094) class SSBNs in 14 years.
That is a total of 40 submarines in 14 years, an average of 2.86 submarines annually, and we already have reports of more Yuans, Shangs, and Jin class submarines in the water at the beginning of 2009.
I have a ton more this week (and I'd bet Feng does too) on this subject. Keep in mind, military shipyard production slowed for the Olymipics last year. We are already seeing a lot of information that since the Olympics have concluded, several new things are happening and the military activity at Chinese shipyards has reached a new high point. As a point, I note the picture at the top of this post is an official photograph of a Shang (Type 093) class submarine. We never see official photography of submarines unless the platform type has concluded meaning all Type 093s are in the water and the Type 95 has begun construction, or the platform has gone to full production which means a bunch of Type 093s are already under construction. Either way, the photo suggests China is rapidly expanding its SSN fleet, and that would match a lot of analysis from various experts last year.
A lot more to come.
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