Everything Hinges on QDR Decisions

“There are some folks that would say that the best way to do cooperative security is with small, cheap and benign little patrol boats operating in various areas around the world,” he said. “I would argue that the model that we have, with the Africa Partnership Station on Nashville, is a great way to do cooperative security.”

- Admiral Gary Roughead, Inside the Navy May 9, 2024

Inside the Navy (subscription only) ran an article on May 9th, 2009 called Roughead Amphibious Force Structure A Top Issue For Navy In QDR where the above quote comes from. Roughead goes on to add some details to his line of thinking.

“If I put five Country X sailors on one of our small patrol boats, and we teach them how to do maritime security, that’s great for those five sailors,” the admiral explained. “But consider what we’re doing with Nashville. She goes into an area and can still do, using the indigenous country’s capabilities, ways to do maritime security patrols. And oh, by the way, she has a well deck where you can bring boats in and teach and work with sailors from that other Navy on boat maintenance and boat repair, which is another way of teaching skills.”

Nashville also hosts officers who teach their counterparts in the various West African navies staff procedures, organization and maritime security constructs. And the ship is large enough “that if we want to have a maritime security conference to bring in other agencies from that country, we can bring them together,” Roughead added.

“At multiple levels we’re engaging and we’re working with not just the sailors who are responsible for the operations of their Navy, but with the leadership, and then being able to work in the broader maritime security construct,” he said. “For me, amphibious ships are great for that.”

Recently the H1N1 swine flu popped up among the crew of the USS Dubuque (LPD 8), which had been scheduled to conduct Pacific Partnership 2009, the annual medical diplomacy partnership operation in the southern Pacific. ADM Willard decided to keep the ship home, which turned out to be a smart decision as other crewmembers have come down with the bug. The replacment ship will be USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4). HSV Swift conducted the global fleet station in central America earlier this year. My point is ships other than amphibious ships have been carrying out the security cooperation role even as fewer Marines are available on amphibious ships, so there is plenty of room for a debate whether or not the amphibious ship is the appropriate platform for security partnerships.

In general I disagree with the premise of what ADM Roughead is suggesting, as if the choice is somehow either small patrol boats or amphibious ships. This is an artificial choice, hopefully the QDR rejects these type of myopic opinions and takes a realistic view of ship types and missions.

While I think that is an interesting topic, this was the key quote for me in the article.

An additional key Navy discussion area for the QDR will be irregular warfare, and “what are the components that make that up,” Roughead said, including the role of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command and riverine forces...

“For the first time, we did a force structure assessment on expeditionary combat command, and, remarkably, as we went out into the [combatant commands], there was not a definitive requirement that came through loud and clear on riverine,” he said. “So I want to get into that.”

Roughead noted that holding the discussion about irregular warfare component plans, including NECC, during the QDR process will allow the Navy to more effectively factor in the military’s ambitions writ large.

Riverine gets a lot of attention because of Iraq, but I do wonder where the irregular warfare component plans for the Navy will fit in, and how well will these plans align with the Marine Corps. With the Marines developing the SC MAGTFs, my question is what does the matching Navy component look like? Does it include an amphibious ship? Should it? Is the JHSV a more appropriate platform? Is this where the Influence Squadron has legs?

One last quote from the same article.

In an April 15 interview, Brig. Gen. Ronald Johnson, who directs the Corps’ operations division, told Inside the Navy that the 38 amphibious ship requirement “is the absolute bare minimum,” a figure generated with “an extreme amount of rigor and risk.”

The Marines are sizing their amphibious force based on what operations conducted in Fallujah, which is basically two full Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Is this the proper metric? What about Sea Basing? Why didn't Gates cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

These are just a handful of questions I look forward to discussing this week. Be sure and check out the history of amphibious operations between 1990-1999 and 2000-2009 to get a feel for what the Marines have been up to since the end of the cold war.