The Littoral Combat Ship

Walking around the Joint Warfighter Conference the last two days, I've been able to refocus my thoughts on several of the narratives I've been running on the blog. Virtually every discussion on every panel has become a conversation about the challenges the military is dealing with not in the field, not at the operational or tactical level, but fighting the internal organizational inertia that makes adaptation difficult. Communication is hard. Change is hard.

For me, the Littoral Combat Ship, more so than anything else the Navy is doing, represents the difficulty of communication and change. I think the Navy and the Industry share the blame for setting this platform up for failure, not because the platform is a failure, but because neither the supporters or the critics seem to discuss it in a context that is intellectually honest. Innovation is hampered by past failures in transformation and promises of enterprise. It amazes me just how little about the LCS the General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin know about the system they are discussing.

Next week I intend to introduce my narrative, or perhaps better said reestablish my position on this platform. I have gone back and read the comments over the last year of this platform, and I see a consistent pattern. In the long tradition of the Navy, the LCS is up against an organizational inertia that resists change as folks stand strong on skepticism. The LCS is an important step forward for the Navy, and needs to stay the course even if very smart sailors have no idea how to explain why. The LCS development and all the associated criticism is well aligned with history, the only difference being no one has died proving the concepts of the platform.