Evangelists Every ~100 Years

If you read this blog and have not read Six Frigates by Ian Toll, what are you doing reading this blog? After reading the hard copy, I bought the book on tape so when I travel, I can throw it in the CD player and avoid draining the battery on my iPOD, where I also happen to have the book loaded. Six Frigates is a history lesson of a time when the United States needed evangelists and developed a maritime strategy.

Last week I had a reading marathon sitting around the hospital next to my daughter. For those who have asked, she is doing much better and returned to school on Monday. Thank You for your prayers and support.

One of the books I picked up and read for a second time is the new book Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century by Henry J. Hendrix. This is another really good book telling a US Navy history story that needs much more attention, and is another reading assignment anyone who reads this blog needs to add to their very short list. What CDR Hendrix has done with this book is offer historical guidance to the process of change, countering several stereotypes that have inevitably proven inaccurate time and time again, while also offering historical guidance to the role of seapower as an instrument of policy during peacetime. I will probably discuss content in the book at another time, but over the weekend I began thinking about where the cast of characters were when the maritime strategy at the turn of the 20th century was developed.

For example, in Tom Ricks book The Gamble, Tom Ricks suggested that it is unheard of for a civilian think tank like AEI and a group of retired officers like General Keane to influence the national strategy of a nation at war like what recently happened with the surge in Iraq. Is this really true though? Based solely on the notion that the nation must already be engaged at war, technically it might be, but we must omit the influence of Theodore Roosevelt, civilians at the Naval War College, and Mahan himself as influential during the time of the Spanish-American war, much less how they reshaped US policy towards the maritime strategy that manifested itself in the Great White Fleet, and ultimately the power projection US Navy that won WWII.

I have been thinking lately about the role of leadership during a period of strategic development, and specifically how today we are witness to a pattern, the latest example being General Petraeus. During periods of strategic development, and I'm talking specifically about when strategy is shifting dramatically, the operational leaders become the lucky (or unlucky) folks who implement policy and strategy, but not necessarily the ones who influence or develop either.

Benjamin Stoddert was no more of a Navy man than Theodore Roosevelt, in fact both are actually cavalry men, not sailors. Indeed, the most influential officers of their respective periods, Decatur and Mahan, were not the leaders of the Navy rather the evangelists of it.

This thought has been on the tip of my mind lately, because I noticed Brigadier General H. R. McMaster was past over for promotion not once, but twice. Why didn't Mahan ever make Admiral until after retirement? General David Petraeus and General Ray Odierno are clearly the top operational leaders in the Army today, but the evangelists in the Army are folks like McMaster, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) John A. Nagl. In my opinion, Lt. Col. Yingling is brilliant, but as the best evangelist in the Army today, he may have a very hard time making General. Both historically and today, evangelists and strategists do not get the nod towards leadership, and it takes strong leadership for the ideas of evangelists and strategists to make it to operations. Luckily for Mahan and Roosevelt, they had Admiral Dewey.

When I think about the maritime strategy, I observe how visible it is in the fleet. Humanitarian deployments, security cooperation, fighting pirates, supporting both wars both at sea and on land in CENTCOM, Global Fleet Stations, medical diplomacy, and international cooperation and participation in exercises all reflect the ways described that the Navy executes the maritime strategy. However, with so much attention focused on Washington, D.C., and because the most popular Navy topic of procurement is not aligned with strategy, the maritime strategy lacks resonance. As I look at the Army and the Navy today, I wonder where are the evangelists and strategists in the Navy, and where are the leaders that support them and put them in position to execute their role as evangelists and strategists? Look, it is easy for ADM Stavridis or ADM Willard to be the evangelist, they are also the leader. However, where is the Navy equivalent of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling in the Navy today? Don't tell me those folks don't exist, because I know they do.

Example, in what bottomless pit did the Navy hide Captain Frank Ponds? I had a chance to speak to him in a blogger roundtable last year, and he was razzle dazzle soft power smart, wit, and charm on steriods, and every one of the folks I spoke to who met him on Kearsarge last year said exactly the same thing. Operational folks like Captain Ponds aren't rare, rather they are hidden. Where are the Admirals in insuring folks like him find their way to panels at conferences, in front of microphones, and on the Daily Show to discuss naval activity when events like Maersk Alabama occur? You want folks like him on YouTube, because interesting is what attracts viewers and some people have "it" when it comes to interesting. Captain Ponds is just one of many, many officers who if identified by leadership and supported by leadership, can make the work of strategic communications regarding the Navy's vital role to the nation by leadership easier.

These evangelists in the Army discussion, they wrote books and speak in public, and did so with the support of General Officers. If the Navy desires similar conditions, it will only happen when encouraged and promoted by Flag Officers. It has always been that way. Why is this important? Because I look at Bob Work and Frank Hoffman, both retired Marines, who are among the very small handful of evangelists outside the Navy at the front of the strategic discussion producing influential reports that reached broad audiences during and after the Presidential transition period. That fact leads to questions like, where are the Naval strategists who were... actually in the Navy?

Now that Bob Work is UNDER, do you know who in the think tank community has the most published works over the last five years in the open source regarding Navy issues? Mackenzie Eaglen, an Army reservist. If all the Navy strategists are insiders, does that mean one has to be an insider to understand the Navy's strategy? I'm just asking rhetorical questions here...

If you haven't read them, I highly recommend both Six Frigates and Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century, because I honestly believe that we either enter an era of the Naval evangelist in the US at some point over the next decade, or we follow the path recently blazed by the Royal Navy.