On June 10th, I wrote a post called Theories and Considerations that I will be referring back to on occasion. The post was a generic outline for what I call the Go Big, Go Small Strategy as the Navy looks at the QDR. While I will not presume this is the right strategy for the Navy, it is an outline that fits a model for a number of strategic concepts that I have been developing as part of the collaboration effort this blog represents for the emerging strategic naval ideas of our time. I will not take credit for the ideas, as many are produced by the great strategic minds in the Navy discussion today, and I'm simply accumulating them and organizing them into one potential vision of their manifestation.On the United States Naval Institute Blog yesterday, I wrote an article outlining the challenge the Navy faces over the next decade in regards to force constitution. The intent of that article was to highlight how the Navy really has very few options unless a shift in thinking is made, a shift that no one inside the Navy is talking about publicly. That shift in thinking is specific to surface warfare. I'd like to offer some ideas to the debate recently called for by the CNO in regards to what a 21st century evolution in surface warfare might look like. I base these ideas on the following assumptions.
- The US Navy will remain the dominate maritime power until at least 2025.
- The US Navy will remain the only maritime power globally postured and capable of global action until at least 2025.
- The United States will maintain sufficient capabilities and capacity to compete against any belligerent power until at least 2025.
The strategy proposed is called Go Big, Go Small because I believe the Navy must do both over the next decade. I believe that going big and going small must be well defined; articulated in a way that the American people can easily understand the vision, understand how it aligns to maritime strategy, and understand how it aligns to national policy.
On going big, as outlined in Theories and Considerations post, I believe the Navy should build 20 nuclear submarines and 30 major surface vessels as part of the go big strategy over the next decade. Those 30 vessels are 2 DDG-51s, 1 DDG-1000, 2 CGN(X), 1 LHA(R), 2 LH(X), 1 LPD-17, 5 LSD(X), 6 T-AKE, 4 LCS Tenders, 4 MLP, and 2 JCC(X). 19 of the nuclear submarines are Virginia class, while 1 of the nuclear submarines would be a SSBN(X) purchased in FY 2020. I will go into detail on the Go Big portion of the strategy in another post, primarily because I want to see if a ballistic missile defense debate actually takes place as events unfold over the next few weeks, but I will note the three critical aspects of the Go Big portion of the approach is ballistic missile defense, moving up the LSD replacement, and building significantly more logistical capability with 6 T-AKEs and 4 Littoral tenders. As a rule, I believe 21st century fleet structure will include larger ships with smaller crews, and smaller ships with larger crews. The optimization of manpower requirements on ships can never be understated as an operational consideration, but it must also factor costs if the Navy is to develop a larger fleet.
Go Small
I believe the US Navy needs 100 littoral capable combat vessels. I look at the 100 littoral capable combat vessel force as Gate's 10% force of Mullen's 1000 Ship Navy. This force is an enabling capability for meeting operational requirements when facing low intensity, high intensity, and hybrid warfare challenges that naval forces will face in the 21st century. When taking the strategic view of the maritime domain in the 21st century, there are several challenges that must be addressed when applying the Navy's own maritime strategy.
When I talk about 100 littoral capable combat vessels, I am specifically talking about 32 Littoral Combat Ships and 64 PC/Corvettes. I don't have a specific design in mind when discussing the PC/Corvettes, rather a set of requirements.
- 1 57mm
- 1 RAM
- 23 man payload (20 + 3 officers)
- 2 module stations for supporting 2 offboard systems up to 12 meters
- 1 ScanEagle Launcher w/ 2 ScanEagles
- $100 million cost cap
1 DDG-1000 (2 MH-60R/UAVs)
1 DDG-51 (2 MH-60R)
1 LPD-17 (ACE Det)
1 T-AKE (2 MH-60S)
1 Littoral Tender (2 MH-60S)
4 Littoral Combat Ships (Helicopter module, FireScout module)
16 PC/Corvettes (16 ScanEagles)
4 JHSVs (8 MH-60S)
1-2 Rifle Company Marines w/ Equipment
The Littoral Strike Group is a tailored, modular force that can perform across the hybrid spectrum intended to enable maritime awareness, dominance, influence, and engagement as called upon by the Combatant Commander.
The DDG-1000 is likely the platform people will have the biggest problem with in this model, but I do believe the Navy will have to build a 4th DDG-1000 at Bath to sustain that shipyard until the CG(X) design is ready. Well, 4 DDG-1000s fits right into the rest of the force structure I describe here. The DDG-1000 is built for the littorals, and just fits into an operational construct of several smaller, but not missile armed surface platforms. I don't know if the Navy is ever going to get that gun to work as promoted, but I will say this... If that gun can support fires at 400nms as some PPT advertisements suggest, that offensive capability can provide serious fire support to small vessels operating distributed over a broad area. The DDG-1000 is very well designed to act as a command node for a distributed naval network, particularly in the littorals and specifically when the long arm of violence towards land is required.
The DDG-51 for additional firepower and AAW capabilities.
The LPD-17 would act as the mothership for regional engagement and supports the staff of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard attachment elements. The ship doesn't have to be only for that role though, because LPD-17 has enormous space and flexibility that can be loaded up with any number of NECC capabilities, and can support a variety of aircraft including the CV-22/MV-22 for special operations. A Littoral Strike Group should always include at least 1 Rifle Company of Marines, but preferably 2 Marine Rifle Companies at a time, and the LPD-17 would act in the C2 role for those Marine units.When operating up to 30 ships in one group, which is what is being suggested as possible here, the necessity to maintain logistics at sea is critical. The T-AKE and Littoral Tender would fill the on station supply and support roles, and would themselves be supplied via delivery from other ships in the MSC. These ships would be specifically for maintaining logistics and support for the 4 Littoral Combat Ships and 16 PC/Corvettes, although capable of supporting the other major vessels in the force. Small ships do not have legs, so logistics will have to be built in.
This is why I also include 4 JHSVs in this type of force. 2 of the JHSVs would act as shuttles for supply and support to the squadrons when they are distributed at distance from the logistics force. A JHSV is a unique capability that can quickly deliver supply, support, and fuel as a payload to a squadron hundreds of miles away. The JHSV as a logistics shuttle enables persistent, distributed presence.
Squadrons
What can a single squadron with 1 LCS and 4 PC/Corvettes do? Well, alot. I am holding onto a post that expand a concept in detail, but let me briefly discuss an idea that really needs some attention. The Navy needs to seriously think about RHIB operations, and do so while looking at Riverine operations. The small unit riverine craft (SURC) and the RHIB used by surface combatants needs to become the same platform. The technology exists to make this happen, and by doing so Riverine becomes a potential capability organic on major surface combatants.
The PC/Corvette has a payload of up to 23 people, and that would assume 3 are officers and 2 are medical. Options would include support for up to 2 SEAL Platoons, a squad of Marines, a Riverine Boat Team, or a detachment of operators for other modular technologies, including EOD. 4 PC/Corvettes with an LCS could then support an entire SEAL Team, a full platoon of Marines, or a Riverine Boat Division.
The payload is intentionally human, modular, and it scales to the skill sets of the maritime services while allowing for unit integrity to be retained. Equipment and detachment support can be provided from either the LCS, a JHSV, or the LPD-17. The LPD-17 matched with PC/Corvette squadrons could potentially field CB-90s to support a Riverine squadron that can land a company of Marines several miles up a river completely saturated with unmanned ISR and supported by multiple MH-60Rs as fire support. If one Company of Marines was operating on 4 PC/Corvettes squadrons, with another Company of Marines on the LPD-17, a LHA(R) could be added to the mix supported by a JHSV to deliver a MAGTF SC or a reinforcing MEU to an engagement, and could even conduct a battalion sized light infantry strike against a specific targets in the maritime places.
Littoral capable small vessels become the capability of delivering manpower to the point of engagement in a hybrid threat environment. Forces can be tailored to meet requirements, and with JHSVs the human payloads can become interchangeable. In theory, the Littoral Strike Group could deploy with 1 Company of Marines and 1 Riverine Squadron, while one of the JHSVs carries equipment for Sea Bee, engineering support, and equipment for a 3rd expected engagement. As a command node, the LCS would act as a C4ISR platform coordinating PC/Corvette squadron operations, and act as the local air support capability with the MH-60R or FireScouts. In a MIW operation, the LCS would act as a command node for mine clearance operations, while both the LCS and PCs field necessary equipment and EOD to remove the minefield. In an amphibious assault, PCs could field USVs and support escort operations through the 25nm zone for amphibious landings, keeping those lanes clear of the local population which could present a threat.
Most 21st century operations in active hybrid threat environments to date have proven to be manpower intensive supported by unmanned systems. The Navy will face similar conditions in the 21st century maritime domain as the population at sea continues to grow. Small capabile littoral ships expand the Navy's capacity to meet with this emerging challenge.
Population of the Sea
If General McCrystal is trying to tell the American people one thing right now in regards to Afghanistan, it would be the simple phrase "Its the population stupid." The reason this is his primary talking point is because US strategy in Afghanistan consists primarily of developing partnerships with with the people who are present in the terrain that is also his battlefield. General McCrystal knows that not everyone who populates that terrain is a partner, or even a potential partner. The challenge is to make sure that those who are partners, or who represent potential partners, remain partners even as he either kills, or prevents action from those who are the enemy.
This human terrain and the challenges of the population can be directly applied to the South China Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and every Bay, Channel, Isthmus, River, Gulf, or body of water not specifically named. Lets use the South China Sea and potential conflict with China as an example.
Every day in the South China Sea there are over 200,000 private and commercial vessels at sea. The majority of these vessels are within 50nms of land, which means almost nothing considering there are over 250 ~1-km² islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars in the South China Sea, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The population of just the people on a boat in the South China Sea is estimated over 1,00,000 daily.
In a world of hybrid warfare, how will naval forces identify friend and foe in the populated seas? If the intent is to build partnerships, preferably by avoiding the destruction of the folks we are not fighting, how will the helicopter or UAV know which fishing boat to sink and which fishing boat not to sink? Ultimately operations will require manpower at the point of engagement to identify friend and foe if partnership, and not killing our allies, is a core strategic operational objective (which it is).
I envision the squadron components of the Littoral Strike Groups being forward deployed in specific places. Off the top of my head I would suggest 8 squadrons at Guantanamo Bay, 4 squadrons at Djibouti, and 4 squadrons at Bahrain. For the record I would put the other 16 Littoral Combat Ships at Guam (4) and San Diego (12). All of the larger vessels and the JHSVs that support the Littoral Strike Group would port in either Mayport or San Diego.
In the South China Sea scenario, the Littoral Combat Ships in the Pacific would move quickly to support ISR for any naval assets in the South Pacific. The Navy could also quickly move several of the Middle Eastern squadrons, supported by major naval assets in the Middle East until the rest of the Littoral Strike Group arrives, to the Straits of Malacca for sea denial operations. When one thinks about controlling major sea lanes during wartime, particularly crowded sea lanes like the Strait of Malacca and denying communications at sea to the enemy... small ships are ideal for that role. 16 PC/Corvettes with 2 RHIBs each supported by 4 Littoral Combat Ships conducting ASW can establish a pretty damn good blockade, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where Littoral Combat Ships could fill both the VBSS and ASW roles without those smaller PC/Corvettes.
Small ships are not matching capabilities, because no Navy on the planet can match the capabilities and skill sets of US Navy sailors. Small ships are enablers for that manpower to engage at the point of contact with friends and foes during both war and peace, and as our manpower is paired and enabled by emerging unmanned capabilities the US Navy can do things in large areas of ocean that right now present enormous challenges for the top heavy, shrinking fleet.
One more thing. I don't know if a PC/Corvette can be produced for $100 million and be a stealth platform. I would hope so, because if it can be truly stealthy the Navy would for the first time have a surface warfare capability for that no-go 25nm contested zone that the US Navy must be capable of taking control of. In populated seas with small stealthy PC/Corvettes, I think the Navy can exploit that space on the surface to enable capabilities for exploiting that space under the surface, even against sophisticated anti-access, area denial capabilities.
No comments:
Post a Comment