'Tis a Rare Thing To See Him Criticized

Strong public criticism of Secretary Gates is a rare thing, so when it happens I think consideration should be given to the alternative view.

The problem is, there is clear evidence that a lot of analysis is being rejected and many processes are being ignored in the acquisition planning in the Pentagon. Absent the analysis and processes, the Secretary has (probably rightfully) taken the initiative himself and made enormous decisions for the defense of the United States. The man is clearly the right guy for the job running the wars overseas, but the Secretary of Defense does not inspire me much when it comes to the direction of the services.

I don't agree with everything in this article by MacKenzie Eaglen and Rebecca Grant, but I find myself in agreement on a lot of it. This portion of the article may be written by the two ladies bold enough to speak their mind, but I have to tell you, this article is a reflection of a much broader commentary, and suggesting there is a political, ideological divide in these opinions would be a false assumption.

As Gates himself said last year, his national defense strategy flowed from George W. Bush's national security strategy. Unless President Obama is now adopting Bush administration policies, we're left with the cart before the horse. That's a problem, because by law the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is supposed to reflect the new administration's national security strategy, not retread the old one. Defense policy is supposed to be subordinate to foreign policy.

It looks fishy. The chiefs were silenced, Congress wasn't given full information on the budget out-years, and the Pentagon is now rushing through what amounts to a rubber-stamped QDR. Is this the type of transparency in government we were promised?

We believe both the process and recommendations it has produced thus far could seriously undermine national defense. We question how Gates can emphasize preparing for "the wars we are most likely to fight," while accepting greater risks that undermine our extended deterrence. We cringe when we hear the dismissive tone surrounding key decisions, such as ending the modernization program for search-and-rescue missions. And we shake our heads when the Secretary adopts a threats-based approach to Navy force structure planning, choosing to focus on the "actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries," instead of taking a long-view of the fleet that will be required for tomorrow. This kind of hubris may threaten the military's ability to stay ahead of technologically sophisticated threats and compromise what's left of our industrial base.

Media reporting this week noted a National Defense Panel was written into the House Defense bill. I may be wrong, but I think that idea was first proposed by MacKenzie Eaglen. The NDP would be an independent bi-partisan panel assigned to review the findings of QDR, what I would term a risk assessment. The authors are correct in my opinion, I continue to see evidence that analysis is being ignored and processes are being skipped, perhaps intentionally, to achieve a predetermined conclusion regarding the defense needs of the United States. That is very dangerous in my opinion. Predetermination isn't strategic; its religion.

The lack of explanation for several multi-billion dollar decisions do not inspire confidence. I probably disagree in many ways with both authors regarding the constitution of forces the services require to meet the challenges of future adversaries, but I will say this... I do not make any recommendations regarding Navy force structure without providing significant evidence and supporting information for my arguments, often with many posts and several thousand words, and I'm just a blogger. Gates provides very little supporting arguments for billion dollar decisions of enormous consequence to national security, then gets dismissive with questions, and apparently reporters are so thankful Gates is not Don Rumsfeld they ignore the absence of a public argument in the major decisions effecting the future security and defense of the country.

And in my opinion, this approach combined with clear advocacy is undermining the efforts of those like me who believe institutionalizing COIN would be a good thing for the military services. When Gates is gone, thanks to a lack of considerable intellectual support for major acquisition decisions made to date, I fear it will be back to where we came from because his approach doesn't inspire and doesn't advocate.

I was trying to avoid it, but I'm going to write about the F-22 again next week. If you are reporter, here is a tip. OSD planning reveals the Air Force needs more than 187 F-22s, and Gates is ignoring the analysis conclusions of his own people. In the meantime, we think Congress is crazy for keeping the F-22 line open for maintenance and parts. Why is Congress crazy?

Supposedly because Gates makes brilliant intellectual arguments for how to conduct wars, but people are giving him a pass when he offers no intellectual argument for major defense acquisition decisions. I don't get it, Congress is doing what they should do, making important decisions when credible information isn't offered to counter previous analysis.

I call the approach to Gates the zero sum assumption model, he is the right leader for the war, so he must be right in everything he does. Hmm... I don't think asking for an intellectual basis of important, and obviously difficult decisions is asking too much. In fact, as I understand it... it's part of his job.