
Now we know. See here and here. The Marines have gone on the offensive and there are already a lot of issues to think about. I think Ibn Muqawama is hitting this point well over on Andrews CNAS blog, without Afghan government forces and civilian reconstruction experts a COIN strategy for Afghanistan can get off to a quick start, and long uncomfortable second quarter where time can stop.
If this President doesn't get the resources of the Federal Government behind the Marines in executing their mission, then it will be very hard to see the difference between him and the last guy.
All I am saying is I hope we are making big moves with a complete plan in place, and not simply doing something for the sake of doing something. If Obama wants to avoid the pitfalls of Bush, he needs to surge the State Dept. to Afghanistan to support the Marines. The Marines can win the battles, but it will take the PRTs to achieve a strategic victory.
One more thing. Springboard has long been one of the most active bloggers covering the issues surrounding the MV-22. Well, after sitting out that discussion for the most part, I've been reaching out to operators and maintainers to get more information. I'm not sure when, or where it is appropriate to discuss those issues yet, but I find myself coming to a conclusion different than some other MV-22 analysts.
I don't think the MV-22 is the technology problem folks are making it out to be, but I think that program has mega problems that will take a decade to work out. While I still have a lot of research ahead of me, my initial thought is to give the industry team a B+ for the program, and the Marines a big fat F, as in the acronym U-F'D-UP, in execution. The word that sums up the problems with the MV-22, and why it isn't in Afghanistan, is not logistics, or maintenance, or capability...
It is doctrine.
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