Navy Irregular Warfare

Galrahn's post earlier on Navy Irregular Warfare included this brief, put together by a great American, Captain Mark Mullins. If ever there were an able, enthusiastic, and articulate advocate for IW within the Navy, it is Captain Mullins.

That said, I'm afraid as I read this brief and as I come to understand the OSD view of IW, I find myself thinking that we've cast too wide a net, that IW--at least to my understanding--includes about 80% of what the US Navy does when it isn't fighting someone--which is 99.9% of the time.

Consider then, the impact of this view on partners, allies, and those with whom we would be more cooperative. Are we conducting "irregular warfare" upon a population when we help their fisheries protection authority with small boat engine maintenance training? Are we conducting "irregular warfare" upon someone with whom a ship's crew is cooperating to repaint a school? Are the much bally-hooed deployments of the hospital ships conducting "irregular warfare" upon the populations they are immunizing and to whom they are providing eye-glasses?

Simply put, I believe it important to make clear distinctions between shaping/engagement activities designed to foster cooperative relationships and COIN/Counterterrorism--irrespective of what the end objective may be in the shaping. Placing them under a single rubric of "Irregular Warfare" has the unintended consequence of sending mixed signals to those with whom we would wish to cooperate, something a nation already befuddled by strategic communications concepts can ill afford.


Bryan McGrath