The letter dated May 11, 2024 from Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead to Senator Edward Kennedy reveals a lot of very interesting information worth analysis. In one massive stroke the entire debate regarding DDG-51s or DDG-1000s has been completely flipped on its head, essentially discrediting most of the testimony by the Navy about the program change and turning the discussion primarily towards the issue of cost. For the first time, we have some data that makes an apples to apples comparison instead of an apples to oranges comparison of the two platforms, and I think the data is quite revealing.Before diving into analysis of the letter, I want to first highlight that it has been over 15 months since the Navy last publicly advocated for the DDG-1000 program, and has spent the better part of 11 months attempting to discredit the DDG-1000 in favor of the DDG-51 with various arguments, none of which were really about costs, and has now essentially admitted in the letter that the last 11 months worth of arguments against the DDG-1000 have been largely inaccurate. To list the number of times VADM McCullough testified under oath something that has been retracted as inaccurate would be an entire blog post in itself. That guy is clearly a loyal soldier, but with all the inaccurate testimony over the last 11 months he has made it very difficult to believe anything he says - even under oath. It is unclear if he has been intentionally dishonest, or been fed information that was intentionally dishonest. Either way, the truth has turned out to be something opposite the testimony of VADM McCullough in both the House and Senate on several occasions.
It should also be pointed out the DDG-1000 program has no momentum that I can see. The Secretary of Defense has clearly stated he wants to end the DDG-1000 program at 3 ships, and the Navy is trying to end the program at 3 ships. Then again, the Secretary of Defense has not publicly committed to the DDG-51 program beyond FY 2011, and has pointed to the QDR as the place where all the chips will fall on future shipbuilding.
What Have We Learned
The revealing point made in the May 11 letter is that the Navy does not see any difference in ASW capability between the two platforms. This contradicts a lot of testimony otherwise over the last 11 months. Of the three original arguments made against the DDG-1000, the Navy has now decided the DDG-1000 will in fact be able to shoot SM-2 missiles, after previously testifying otherwise; and has also now decided the DDG-1000 is equally capable against blue water submarines as the DDG-51, after previously testifying otherwise. The only 'threat' issue separating the DDG-1000 and DDG-51 that has yet to be hit on is Ballistic Missile Defense. However, in making the apples to apples comparison for Senator Kennedy, ADM Roughead gives us a good idea of what adding BMD to DDG-1000 would cost, and potentially look like. All discussions below refer to the details in the May 11 letter, available here.
If you look at table 1, the Navy lists $1.76B RDT&E from FY11 out in order to achieve the apples to apples comparison of the DDG-51 Advanced Capability Build 12 baseline. This figure suggests the cost estimate for software and hardware to bring the DDG-1000 up to the same ballistic missile defense capability as the DDG-51, but also design and engineering modifications necessary to replace both Advanced Gun Systems with VLS. The Navy does not identify whether the VLS would be MK41 or MK57, although presumably one was used for making the estimate.
The DDG-51 Flight IIA Advanced Capability Build 12 baseline is basically the DDG-51 Flight IIA that will be modernized in FY 2012 to include every currently planned enhancement to the combat system including BMD, the most capable of the DDG-51 capability set. The new build DDG-51s are also expected to have a towed sonar array (existing DDG-51 Flight IIA do not have a towed array). The Navy expects these new ships to cost an average of $1.9B according to the letter.
The DDG-1000 being evaluated is basically a modified version without the Advanced Gun System (AGS), but including the other 9 new technologies of the ship class. According to the letter, both guns would be replaced with VLS and would possess a capability "not less than" the most advanced DDG-51 on the books. The AGS is huge. If one was to put the AGS on a DDG-51, it would consume the space not only of the 5" gun but also the 29 VLS cells on the bow of the ship. As I understand it, one AGS can be replaced by at least 1 x 61 Mk41 VLS cell system.
That means the Navy has given us a $2.55B estimate for a stealth arsonal ship with 80 Mk 57 PVLS cells, 2 MK110 57mm guns, and anywhere from 80 more MK57 PVLS cells or 122 MK41 VLS cells, and is comparing this behemoth of missile power to a DDG-51 Flight IIA.
I don't know about you, but I never realized the cost difference between a stealth BMD capable super arsenal ship and a DDG-51 Flight IIA is about the cost of a single Littoral Combat Ship. Is this letter supposed to advocate the position of the DDG-51? I don't think the letter makes a particularly compelling case for the DDG-1000, although the idea of a CNO giving a Senator a quote for a super stealth battleship is kind of a novel concept, but the one thing this letter does not do is make the case for more DDG-51s.
The 2012 Forever PlanI don't know if anyone else reads Ronald O'Rourke's excellent reports, but you should if this topic interests you. Specifically I would encourage everyone to check out Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress dated June 4, 2024 (PDF). The report compares the DDG-1000 to the DDG-51 Flight IIA, and I list all the elements, including the Anti-Surface Warfare/Strike Warfare section, even though it would not apply to a modified DDG-1000 as described in the May 11 letter since the guns are replaced by VLS cells (of some kind).
Growth MarginIn what 4 decade period during the entire history of the US Navy has a ship remained relevant at a static level of technology? Among surface combatants, only the wooden-hulled, three-masted heavy frigates like USS Constitution from 1797 - 1855, and the Iowa class battleships from 1943 - 1992 remained active duty vessels in the Navy for a duration that long. The ships of sail served until steam arrived, while the big guns of the battleships kept them in action only in third world actions where opponents did not have naval capabilities to threaten the big battlewagons.
The DDG-51 and DDG-1000 designs each have about a 10% growth margin. For the roughly 9,000-ton DDG-51, this equates to about 900 tons of growth margin, while for the 14,987-ton DDG-1000, this equates to about 1,400 tons of growth margin.
Ship Mobility
The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of maximum sustained speed, cruising endurance, and seakeeping (i.e., stability in rough seas). The DDG-1000’s draft (28 feet) is somewhat less than the DDG-51’s (31 feet). Other things held equal, this might give the DDG-1000 an ability to operate in (or be berthed at) places where the water depth is sufficient for the DDG-1000 but not for the DDG-51. The DDG-1000’s length (600 feet) is greater than the DDG-51’s (505 feet). Other things held equal, this might give the DDG-51 an ability to be berthed in spaces that are long enough for the DDG-51 but not for the DDG-1000.
Electrical Power for Weapons and Systems
The DDG-51 has 7.5 megawatts (MW) of electrical power for its weapon systems, while the DDG-1000 design, with its integrated electric-drive system, can provide up to 78 MW for its weapons and power systems by diverting power from propulsion to weapons and systems.
Signatures and Detectability
The DDG-1000 has a smaller radar cross-section and lower infrared, acoustic, and magnetic signatures than the DDG-51. The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of the detectability of their radar and other electromagnetic emissions. The DDG-1000’s reduced signatures will make the DDG-1000 harder to detect, localize, classify, and target, giving the DDG-1000 a significant advantage in engagements against enemy forces.
Survivability and Damage Control
The Navy states that the DDG-1000 would be able to keep fighting after an attack like the one that disabled the USS Cole (DDG-67) on October 12, 2000.
The two designs are roughly equivalent in terms of degree of compartmentalization and ship stability when flooded. The DDG-1000’s vertical launch system (VLS) is more heavily armored than the DDG-51’s. The DDG’s fire-suppression system is automated only in the engine room and magazine, while the DDG-1000’s system is automated throughout the ship, making it safer and more effective. The DDG-51’s flood-control system is not automated, while the DDG-1000’s is, which the Navy believes will make it more effective. The DDG-1000’s electrical power distribution system is an “integrated fight-through” system, meaning that it is designed to automatically isolate damaged areas and reroute electrical power around them. All critical DDG-1000 systems are dual-fed, meaning that if power from one source is cut off, it can be routed through a second source. The DDG-51’s electrical power distribution system lacks these features.
C4I/Networking Bandwidth
The C4I121 and networking systems on the DDG-1000 would have five times as much bandwidth as those on the DDG-51. The C4I/networking capability of the DDG-1000 is equivalent to that on the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship. In addition to improved warfighting capability, this increased bandwidth would provide sailors aboard the DDG-1000 a better ability to “reach back” to information sources ashore when conducting at-sea maintenance of shipboard equipment, potentially increasing the availability rates of shipboard equipment.
Flag-Level Command Facilities
The DDG-1000 has facilities for embarking and supporting a flag-level officer and his staff, so that they could use the ship as platform for commanding a group of ships. The DDG-51 does not have such facilities.
Anti-Air Warfare/Ballistic Missile Defense (AAW/BMD)
The radars on the two ships are roughly equivalent in terms of dB gain (sensitivity) and target resolution. The firm track range of the DDG-1000’s dual-band radar—the range at which it can maintain firm tracks on targets—is 25% greater for most target types than the firm track range of the DDG-51’s SPY-1 radar. The DDG-1000’s AAW combat system would be able to maintain about 10 times as many tracks as the DDG-51’s Aegis system. The DDG-1000’s radar has much more capability for resisting enemy electronic countermeasures and for detecting targets amidst littoral “clutter.” As a result of the better performance amidst littoral clutter, the Navy believes that ships escorted by the DDG-1000 in defended littoral waters would have three times as much survivability as ships escorted by the DDG-51.
The two designs would use the same types of area-defense and point-defense interceptor missiles. They would also use the same flares, chaff, and decoys to confuse enemy anti-ship cruise missiles, but the Navy believes these devices would be more effective on the DDG-1000 because of the DDG-1000’s reduced signatures.
Anti-Surface Warfare/Strike Warfare
The DDG-1000 would have considerably more naval surface fire support (NSFS) capability than the DDG-51. The DDG-51 has one 5-inch gun, while the DDG-1000 has two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs). The DDG-51’s gun can fire an initial salvo of 20 rounds per minute and can subsequently fire at a sustained rate of four rounds per minute (20/4). The DDG-1000’s two guns have a combined firing rate of 20/20. The shells currently fired by the DDG-51’s gun have a range of 13 nm. Future shells are to have a range of up to 50 nm. The shells to be fired by the DDG-1000’s guns are to have a range of 63 to 74 nm, and consequently could cover (at 74 nm) more than three times as much area ashore (assuming a 25 nm standoff from shore) as a shell with a range of 50 nm. The shells fired by the DDG-51 carry 8 pounds of explosive, while those fired by the DDG-1000 are to carry 24 pounds of explosive. When fired at less than maximum range, the shells fired by the DDG-1000 can alter their flight paths so that six to eight of them can hit a target at the same time; the shells to be fired by the DDG-51 do not have this capability. The DDG-51 carries 600 of the 13nm-range shells or 230 of 62nm-range shells, while the DDG-1000 carries a total of 600 of its shells. It might be possible to fit the DDG-51 with one of the 155mm guns to be carried by the DDG-1000; it would likely require the removal of both the DDG-51’s 5-inch gun and its forward (32-cell) VLS. In this configuration, the DDG-51 might carry about 120 of the gun’s 155mm shells.
The 155mm guns on the DDG-1000 could be replaced in the future with an electromagnetic rail gun or directed-energy weapon. The DDG-51 does not have enough electrical power to support such weapons.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
The DDG-51’s sonar system is more capable for blue-water ASW operations, while the DDG-1000’s system is more capable for littoral ASW operations. The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar and towed array can interact to more rapidly triangulate targets. The Flight IIA DDG-51 lacks a towed array. The DDG-1000’s radar would have more capability than the DDG-51’s radar for detecting submarine periscopes.
The DDG-51 has six torpedo tubes for firing lightweight (12.75-inch diameter) anti-submarine torpedoes, while the DDG-1000 has none, but the Navy does not believe these tubes to be of significant operational value against potential future threats. Both ships can launch lightweight torpedoes from their helicopters or fire the Vertical Launch Antisubmarine Rocket (VLA), which is armed with a lightweight torpedo.
The ships would use the same countermeasures for confusing enemy torpedoes, but the Navy believes these countermeasures would be more effective on the DDG-1000 because of the DDG-1000’s reduced signatures.
Mine Warfare (MIW)
The DDG-1000’s bow-mounted sonar includes an in-stride mine-avoidance capability; the DDG-51’s sonar suite has less capability for detecting mines. The DDG-51 can be built to a design that permits the ship to embark and operate the Remote Minehunting System (RMS); six ships in the DDG-51 program (DDGs 91 to 96) have been built to this design. The Navy says that the DDG-1000’s reduced acoustic and magnetic signatures would translate into a significantly greater operating area in mined waters.
Missiles for Performing Above Missions
The DDG-51 has 90 missile-launching tubes in its VLS, while the DDG-1000 has 80. The DDG-51’s VLS tubes can accommodate a missile up to 21 inches in diameter, 21 feet in length, and about 3,000 pounds in weight. The DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a missile up to 24 inches in diameter, 22 feet in length, and about 4,000 pounds in weight. The gas-management (i.e., heat-management) system of the DDG-1000’s VLS tubes can accommodate a hotter-burning missile than the gas-management system of the DDG-51’s VLS, so the DDG-1000 might be more capable of using future missiles if they are hotter-burning.
Aviation for Performing Above Missions
The DDG-51 can embark and operate two SH-60 helicopters but does not have electronics for launching and recovering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The DDG-1000 can embark, operate, and provide full maintenance for two SH-60 helicopters or one SH-60 helicopter and three UAVs. The DDG-1000’s flight deck is larger than the DDG-51’s and can accommodate all joint rotary-wing aircraft, including the MV-22, the CH-53, and the H-47. The DDG-1000’s flight deck is 10 feet higher off the water and can therefore be used for full flight operations in a sea state (i.e., sea condition) that is at least one step higher (i.e., rougher) than is possible for the flight deck on the DDG-51.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Support
The DDG-1000 has additional berthing for 20 SOF personnel (i.e., a platoon), as well as a space for SOF mission planning and spaces for stowing SOF gear. The DDG-51 lacks these features.
Boats
The DDG-51 can embark two seven-meter boats that are deployed and recovered with a davit. The DDG-1000 can embark two 11-meter boats and four rubber raiding craft that are deployed and recovered with a stern ramp, which permits faster and safer launching and recovering, and launch/recovery operations in higher sea states.
Habitability Features for Crew
On the DDG-51, enlisted crew berthing spaces accommodate 20 to 60 sailors each. On the DDG-1000, every sailor would have a stateroom, and each stateroom would accommodate four sailors. The Navy believes these features would improve crew quality of life, which can improve retention rates.In addition to the information presented in Table 4 above, another slide in the Navy briefing stated that the DDG-1000’s radar cross section will be similar to that of a fishing boat. Navy officials have also stated separately that the DDG-1000’s acoustic signature will be similar, at certain speeds, to that of certain U.S. Navy submarines.
In elaborating on the point in Table 4 above pertaining to the DDG-1000’s electrical power, Navy officials stated at the briefing that at a speed of 20 knots, the DDG-1000 would have 58 megawatts of power available for powering non-propulsion shipboard systems. The briefing stated that the DDG-51, by comparison, has 7.5 megawatts of power available for non-propulsion systems.
There is no way someone can look at today and suggest weapon and sensor technologies being fielded today will remain the dominant systems in 40 years, not when we have already begun issuing contracts for laser weapon technologies for ships (like the recent laser contract for DDG-1000) and demand for sensors that can extend to space has many feeling even the latest and greatest available on DDG-1000 simply won't get it done against emerging ballistic missile threats.
In order to put new and emerging technologies on the DDG-51, more power must be added, which means new generators and cooling equipment that will consume space that already doesn't exist, thus replace something the DDG-51 uses like one of the helicopter spots. 2+ billion dollars is an enormous investment of funds for a platform already evolved twice from a 1985 design, and it is unrealistic that this 1985 design will be capable of meeting the needs for the fleet in 2055, some 70 years later and before these new DDG-51s will be decommissioned.
It boggles my mind that to make the case for the DDG-51, the Navy would be deceptive about the capabilities of the DDG-1000 to promote the DDG-51, except that the cost argument reveals just how silly it is to make such an enormous investment on either the DDG-1000 or the DDG-51. ADM Roughead is making the argument that the greatest surface vessel to ever be built, a modified DDG-1000 with somewhere between 160 - 200 PVLS/VLS cells (if not more) with an advantage in virtually every single capability a ship could possibly have, including plenty of room and power for growth into the 21st century is a worse deal because the difference in cost between this super 21st century stealth battleship and a DDG-51 is one Littoral Combat Ship?
And we truncated the entire DDG-1000 line in favor of the DDG-51 so we could have ~94 cruisers and destroyers instead of 91? Are those 3 extra ships worth the effort? I wish I could say there is hope in the QDR, but all evidence suggests Secretary Gates doesn't get it. This statement sounds as contradictory and confusing about surface combatant capabilities as the Navy does when it comes to surface combatants.
Where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations. For example, I hope to accelerate the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants. As we saw last week, you don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates. The size of the ship in such cases is less important than having Navy SEALs onboard. To carry out the missions we may face in the future - whether dealing with non-state actors at sea or near shore, or swarming speedboats - we will need numbers, speed, and ability to operate in shallow waters.To build the DDG-51 is to go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, and it can be highlighted by noting the 2 big Navy platforms of our time, the F-18 and DDG-51, are holdovers from said Cold War. We are making assumptions like saying the Littoral Combat Ship will "go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants" and pretending like this even makes sense to anyone who has studied littoral warfare at even a basic level.
We also must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. The need to show presence and project power from a piece of sovereign territory called a United States Navy ship will never go away. But we cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000 - where since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled. One of the things that I am recommending in this budget is to upgrade and build more Arleigh Burke destroyers, still a best-in-class ship that has been the workhorse of the U.S. surface fleet for nearly two decades. And a ship that has proven that it can be upgraded rapidly with new capabilities and technologies.
The United States must not take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that we remain preeminent at sea. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to develop a more rigorous analytical framework before moving forward - the type of framework that will be provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. The purpose was to develop an analytical construct through which we can more precisely determine what will be needed in coming years. To determine what kind of tactics and strategies future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue.
If the surface Navy can't do better than a $2 billion, 25 year old designs with no growth margin and 40 year life expectancies or a $2.55 billion super arsenal ship when discussing our options for surface combatants, and do everything from highlight delivering humanitarian aid to Georgia on a 9,000 ton destroyer or consistently making misleading statements under oath in testimony just to discredit a 14,500 ton destroyer during a time of shrinking fleets, tight budgets, and a contracting global economy...
The future surface Navy could easily find itself stuck in 2012 for decades. At least now when we talk about the DDG-1000, when we talk about costs, we are in line with the Navy. It only took 11 months for cost to become the reason to cancel the DDG-1000, and only after every other reason was discredited.
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