
Reflecting the cooperative theme that underscores the maritime strategy, among the roughly 200 participants were representatives from 19 foreign navies, as well as members from other branches of the U.S. military, several U.S. government agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, and participants from the defense and shipping industries. The success of this exercise underscores the importance of international and multi-agency cooperation in helping to meet the challenges of the future security environment.What I find interesting is that this week, the Naval War College published details of the wargame, indeed 80 pages of wargame analysis can be found in this wargame report. I quote some of the findings from the executive summary. I'll comment on each issue independently.
Maritime Security: Game participants unanimously saw maritime security as an important mission, and it was a central focal point of game discussions. International players, in particular, considered maritime security primarily a law-enforcement rather than a counterterrorism function. Many of the participants also preferred U.S. assistance in the form of training and exercises. Finally, most participants perceived the facilitation of maritime security as an activity that could be leveraged to enhance trust between the U.S. maritime services and their counterparts in other countries.It is noteworthy the executive summary lists this item first, although from an international point of view I can see why it is. From a US Navy perspective however, I do not get the impression it is as high of a priority. Maritime Security is one of those action items that goes on the board, rolls off the tongue, and turns out being very hard to do successfully. According to UN statistics, compared to 2007, in 2008 piracy was UP, illegal trafficking of humans was UP, and the smuggling of narcotics (including simi-submersibles) was UP.
If maritime security is really such a high priority for the US Navy, is it wrong for someone to take an objective look at the global maritime environment and point out the statistics suggest that maritime security efforts have been largely ineffective? If maritime security is a high priority for the US Navy, then who is responsible for the failure? The truth is, maritime security is not a priority, cooperation towards building maritime cooperation is the priority, and the priority has not been producing meaningful results that can be calculated using statistical arguments (which is sad, because statistics can usually be skewed).
If you graph the rise in criminal activity by sea, it is noteworthy the rise in maritime criminal behavior globally is inversely proportional to the size of western naval forces, which are reducing in numbers across Europe and the US. Also important is to note the increase in the size of navies in the Pacific has to date had no influence on statistical trends.
I'm not even counting 2009 statistics to date, which for piracy has already been widely reported to be much higher than last year... and it is only July.
Persistent Maritime Presence: Many participants regarded the regular and sustained presence of forward deployed maritime forces as a critical enabler for all other themes, and an important part of the Navy’s contribution to the national security objectives of the United States. Specifically, forward maritime forces allowed the Navy to meet the challenges identified in Global ‘08 as requiring a timely response.This is where current talking points define, rather than innovate, the concept of a global power projection fleet that is globally sustained and persistently present in the maritime domain. Where are the logistical innovations that attempt to support several ships off a long coast line? Where is the evidence the Navy has learned a thing from supporting sustained maritime security just off the coast of Iraq protecting a tiny coastline and only two oil terminals? The only service I see innovating logistics at sea is the Marine Corps, looking for better ways to support Marines on land. I would love to see some new innovations towards the support of many, many smaller vessels at sea to sustain presence, but supporting long endurance requirements of inexpensive, smaller naval vessels does not appear to be a priority for the US Navy.
Credible Combat Power: Participants identified five key components of credible combat power: defeating anti-access strategies, providing integrated air and missile defense, achieving sea control, projecting power ashore, and aggregating and disaggregating forces. They further emphasized two key capabilities associated with credible combat power: the ability to exercise sea control and subsequently project power ashore, and deterrence.This is a huge topic. Anti-access strategies are obviously important, but I still question how this is done with any platform other than an aircraft or a submarine. The US Navy is the best naval force in the world in terms of integrating air and missile defense, but ironically, despite the overwhelming attention the capability gets in terms of funding, the problem is the lack of confidence (due to several reasons) in the existing system. Projecting power ashore is very important to the Marines, but people are running around saying an amphibious assault against another country will never be done again. I hope they knock on wood when they speak such phrases, because amphibious lift sure appeared to be useful to Russia only last year.
The real question is what the definition of Sea Control is these days. Aggregating and disaggregating forces is an operational discussion, but I don't think one can begin talking about operations until first agreeing what it means to control the sea. I believe the definition of Sea Control depends upon a specific variable, Rules of Engagement, and depending upon the RoE the level of Sea Control the US Navy is well suited to exercise is quite debatable. The more relaxed the RoE, the better the US Navy is designed to control the sea, but as the RoE becomes more restrictive, I think the US Navy is quite obviously less capable of controlling the seas.
I can sum it up like this. The US Navy is currently designed to be the 99% solution to less than 1% of maritime challenges, specifically unrestricted maritime warfare. The problem is that for the RoE to ever get to the point of unrestricted maritime warfare, the event that triggers the war will have to be on par with Pearl Harbor.
Building Partnerships: For game participants, building partnerships meant developing relationships with allies, friends, and stakeholders across the full spectrum of maritime activities in order to create trust and effectively accomplish shared maritime goals. They applied this concept of partnership across all regions, futures, and the full range of maritime activities, indicating that foreign partners wanted the U.S. to be involved with their maritime security in most conceivable futures. From that perspective, the participants noted that the United States will have to make significant investments in maritime resources on a global basis to build partnerships that meet the expectations of existing and potential partners. As participants and others have stated, “you can’t surge trust.” Building partnerships will accordingly require tolerance, patience, and some willingness to adapt and conform to partner standards.We may not be able to "surge trust," but reliance on friends and partners has been a losing strategy for the US in Afghanistan. I know a lot of people don't understand how the factors will work together, but the test for both the "Cooperative" strategy and the US Navy is the second half of this year off Somalia. The Global Maritime Partnership is going to look like folly if piracy off Somalia is as bad in the second half of 2009 as it was the second half of 2008, and the credibility of the Navy will be shot to pieces.
Gates has made two things clear: he is retiring after the FY11 budget cycle and his attention is on the Air Force, not the Navy. I think Danzig will be (read - should be) his replacement, and if the press turns sour off Somalia later this year then things will appear to go from bad to ugly in a hurry in the Navy. Piracy is purely a political issue, not a strategic issue, but the politics of piracy will drive more decisions than all but the most brilliantly disseminated US naval strategies, and the US Navy doesn't even have a sub par naval strategy evangelical capacity for itself right now.
Humanitarian Assistance (HA) / Disaster Relief (DR): All of the player cells agreed that HA/DR - defined within the event’s conceptual framework as the ability to “alleviate human suffering and contribute to regional security and stability through deliberate (HA) or immediate (DR) response” - was a valuable component of CS 21. Participants also felt that the role that conducting HA/DR operations and training played in building partnerships and improving coordination with non-U.S. forces was valuable. They articulated three important criteria for the successful execution of HA/DR efforts: timeliness, well-considered strategic communications (in particular, placing a local face on the operation), and preparation (including investment in physical infrastructure and personnel training).I think the Navy is on the right track here, indeed the whole DoD, plus international cooperation, PLUS non-government organizations...
Wake me up when another US agency gets involved outside the embassy level. The use of HA/DR as a national asset in the arsenal of state power would be more convincing if the Department of State had someone in Washington making an effort that was visible. Can Hillary Clinton make a difference in that organization? If so, it would be an accomplishment on par with anything her husband ever did.
Shared Awareness: Virtually all of the players viewed information sharing between stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations) as vital to the development of improved situational awareness. They came up with five primary insights regarding shared awareness. First, information sharing is a key enabler, particularly for information-related concepts such as maritime domain awareness (MDA) and common operational picture (COP). Second, the barriers to the successful sharing and exchange of information are policy-related as well as technical, such that policy changes - not just technological advances - can lead to improved information sharing. Third, trust, developed through engagement activities such as coalition exercises and operations, would help expand the range and depth of interaction between the United States and partner countries. Fourth, information sharing must be a two-way street. Finally, ISR, particularly persistent ISR provided by maritime forces, is a key maritime requirement.I cringe when I see discussions of MDA and COP in this context. What is MDA off the coast of Florida? Observation of the traffic patterns of the American fishing community? What is MDA off the coast of Somalia? It certainly can't be something to sing happy tunes about, the same waters international naval forces have set up a secure transit route against piracy also happens to be one of the largest human smuggling migrations at sea in the world, from Somalia to Yemen.
I look forward to seeing someone define when and why MDA and COP is the environment, and when they are the threat. I don't think these are complicated concepts, but will wait and see what comes of these buzzwords for a few more months before throwing my hat into the discussion ring.
Strategic Communications: All of the cells considered effective strategic communications - defined as the sum of all actions and messages (intentional and unintentional) influencing target audiences - as an integral part of any successful U.S. strategy. An important corollary was that the Navy had to develop and disseminate coordinated and consistent strategic communications. Thus, to be successful, the Navy must establish the ability to design and implement a standardized process at the Navy component commander level for effectively coordinating maritime actions and messages so as to convey consistent U.S. government purposes and objectives.Very wise words, but this is an enormous topic and really is a sea change for the Navy in terms of how they manage information. If you read it carefully you will note the intent is to develop information as an extension of naval activity with the intent of linking that activity to a public diplomacy effort. I think the strategic communication model the wargame suggests is needed would drive the Navy towards the return of naval diplomacy in the information age.
The current Navy information model is about communication of how and what the Navy does, but it lacks the declaration of why and therefore is not 'strategic' at all. It is a model of information that is absent advocacy, and when absent advocacy the discussion is not diplomacy. It is not enough to just do something; one must also declare why you do something.
The Navy's Strategic communication should be used to convince people of the fundamental ideas we as a nation believe in, and to undermine the support of ideas counter to our national virtues. Strategic communication should declare certain principles and objectives as part of our actions with the intent to create a better understanding of the benefits of Navy activity. Until we add advocacy with the intent to influence into our communications, they lack a strategic objective and any associated information carries no value in the activities naval forces conduct.
Bottom line, strategic communication will remain absent in the activities of the Navy until everyone in Navy public affairs is trained (and legally empowered) to advocate principles and objectives as part of naval activity. CHINFO is not organized, trained, or legally empowered to perform such a function today.
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