The Debate to Arm Merchant Ships

The AP has an article discussing the debate to arm merchant ships. It begins by noting that France has put soldiers on Tuna boats in the Indian Ocean, and Belgium is offering soldiers for its ships moving through the Horn of Africa region. There is already some concern that these moves will increase the level of violence off the Horn of Africa, which is a legitimate debate. While piracy is at the highest point in recorded 'modern' history off the coast of Somalia, very few people are killed by the actions of pirates. Given all the ammo used against merchant ships before pirates actually get on board a ship, it is hard to tell if this is in large part due to sheer luck or not. After all, it isn't like one can pretend a bridge that has been shot, of which several merchant ships have had, is done in hopes no one is hurt. There are also several injuries and deaths associated with piracy, and can never be claimed to be nonviolent.

Following Maersk Alabama, Congress is trying to take action but there are still several concerns what to do. First the AP report.

In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment that would require the Department of Defense to put armed teams on U.S.-flagged ships passing through high-risk waters, specifically around the Horn of Africa where Somali pirates have become a scourge of world shipping.

The amendment now goes to the Senate. A separate bill introduced last month would grant immunity from prosecution in American courts to any "owner, operator, time charterer, master, or mariner who uses force, or authorizes the use of force, to defend a vessel of the United States against an act of piracy."

Both measures face tough debate — U.S. military resources are spread thin and onboard weapons, especially in the hands of civilian crew, are seen as an extreme option.

Last month I had the pleasure of chatting with Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired), who now works with Maersk Line, and several Navy officers who are involved in the discussions surrounding these various concepts in Congress. The only thing that emerges in discussing the issues involved with the various people involved is that there is no clear consensus.

Of all the various issues though, what strikes me as wrong headed thinking is that the Navy is trying to disconnect themselves from the responsibility of putting their people on merchant ships in the guardian role. Of all the various possibilities that could result from the debate, that the Navy doesn't want their people engaged seems first and foremost, wrong headed.

It seems to me that if you start from the position the US Navy assumes the responsibility of protecting ships, then it becomes much easier to articulate the level of legal protection necessary to be articulated by Congress in laws passed. Just as Congress has had to manage legal issues surrounding Air Marshall's, it seems to me that Congress should also be able to manage the legal framework for Sea Marshall's.

But the real reason I believe the US Navy should get involved, probably in conjuction with the other maritime services, is because I see this as an opportunity to collect intelligence and expand the picture of the operating environment. Interestingly enough, Captain Gordan Van Hook, U.S. Navy (Retired) discusses one such possibility in the latest issue of Proceedings.

The Department of Transportation's Volpe Center, a developer of marine traffic management systems, saw the potential for AIS to comply with recent U.S. government direction to achieve maritime domain awareness. Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe (CNE) had been linking the surveillance systems of NATO allies to provide an unclassified common operational picture of the Mediterranean Sea. Using AIS to complete this picture, CNE and Volpe developed an unclassified network to share AIS data, known as the Maritime Safety and Security Information System that quickly enhanced awareness for maritime security forces. However, AIS has limitations, as it can be easily spoofed or altered or can malfunction to provide erroneous information. Professional mariners treat AIS as only one fallible piece of data, and they constantly scan the horizon visually and electronically to confirm their surface picture.

What if maritime security forces could access this correlation and comparison of a ship's AIS with shipboard sensors? Recent experiments by Maersk Line, Limited and Lockheed Martin used a prototype AIS and radar correlator known as "Neptune" that sent data via satellite to a network that could conceivably be used by a maritime operations center. This system revealed thousands of contacts outside the range of shore-based AIS, as well as anomalies that did not match AIS. Such information could greatly enhance regional maritime awareness for commercial vessels and maritime security forces in unstable regions.

These systems could gain widest acceptance if they become available with minimal technical and financial investment. Built on IMO-sanctioned standards, they should not be considered intelligence or surveillance systems, but rather safety systems providing vital situational awareness, greater coordination of efforts, reduced risk of collisions, and identification of high-traffic and congestion solutions through analysis and simulation.

Maersk seems to be a great place to start, and by putting some sailors on the ship, the US Navy can help develop this type of system in real world operations off the coast of Somalia with people to test, manage, verify, and maintain as necessary the new system and integrate it into CTF 151. Even better, we secure the system by placing armed naval personnel on the ship to do exactly that. This type of system, in theory, would allow every US flagged ship (beginning with the Maersk Line ships) be a connected node of the MDA network off Somalia.

The idea that the US Navy is against using US Navy personnel to protect US flagged ships screams wasted opportunity, and quite honestly suggests the US Navy does not take its role for the protection of US shipping very seriously. A US flagged ship with US Navy personnel on board represents an opportunity, and quite frankly I have a hard time believing Maersk Line would be against the US Navy adding not only this type of AIS network, but also allowing the Navy to use UAV systems to give better maritime domain awareness to their ships. It doesn't have to be a big UAV like a ScanEagle, although the way Boeing has touted the latest ScanEagle launch and recovery system as lightweight and mobile, there is no reason it couldn't be either.

When the US Navy is, with its right hand, using the argument they don't have enough ships to effectively manage the piracy problem off Somalia, then with the left hand refuse to provide any additional operational support to protect US ships from piracy except deploying their biggest or newest ships, I think it can legitimately be claimed the problem is attitude, not capability.

The political support to protect US shipping should be, from the US Navy perspective, seized as an opportunity, but I don't see the US Navy trying to exploit this opportunity at all. Part of the suggestion may leave the impression that Congress is trying to militarize US shipping, but the analogy is like saying the Mayor of Chicago should not support the Chicago Police Dept. We know piracy is active in that region, the insurance premiums for shipping through that region reflects that reality, so why not add protection.

And if the US taxpayer is going to add protection, why not explore as per Captain Van Hook's suggestion adding capabilities to that protection that assist US Navy operations instead of just being a burden on resources? I think there is opportunity here just waiting for some clear eyed and resourceful Navy officer to commit some intellectual rigor towards, because I think once that starts... good things will happen.

Regardless, tactical evolution from the other side is just weeks away, the Monsoon season is about to end. I hope our tactical evolutions are ready too...