Demand More From the Lesser Contributors

An article by Christopher J. Castelli in Inside the Navy (subscription) from August 13th titled Pentagon's QDR Red Team Nears Final Recommendation For Gates has been on my mind over the last few weeks, but it has taken me a bit of time to realize why it has been bothering me.

Christorpher Castelli's article is outstanding, and sums up in great detail the work of the QDR Red Team led by General Mattis and Andrew Marshall, two brilliant Americans IMO. In the article, it discusses some comments shared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development David Ochmanek, and also discusses some comments by Andrew Krepinevich of CSBA, whose book 7 Deadly Scenario's has influenced Red Team to some degree.

These are the details in the article that have had me mulling thoughts in my mind the last few weeks.

At the breakfast with reporters, Ochmanek shared an anecdote from the meeting that could foreshadow the kinds of concerns in the Red Team’s final report. Describing the panel as “wise,” he recalled being pressed by the Red Team to identify new concepts for operating against high-end, anti-access adversaries eyed in the QDR. “I had to plead guilty that those concepts are as yet a work in progress,” Ochmanek told reporters.

“The QDR isn’t going to develop a brand new set of concepts for power projection in the six months it has to run, so our challenge is to identify some vectors that we want to move along for modernizing and enhancing capabilities that we’re confident are going to play important roles in that new concept as it emerges over the next few years,” he added. “That would be the way I’d characterize a lot of our thinking and analysis with regard to high-end challenges.”

But in a July 7 speech related to his book, Krepinevich noted he is on the Red Team and underscored the need to develop novel, detailed concepts of operations to address disruptive challenges, stressing revisions to Cold War approaches will not suffice. U.S. officials must focus on how to counter China’s anti-access capabilities; how to counter guided rockets, artillery and missiles when forces such as Hezbollah obtain such weapons; how to respond when developing countries get access to nuclear weapons, how to operate the day after a nuclear explosion and how to handle the threat of loose nuclear weapons, he said. Krepinevich did not propose an alternative force-sizing metric, but cautioned in some cases the steady state posture may be more demanding than the surge posture. He also cited Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey’s critique of the two-war metric earlier this year at the Center for International and Strategic Studies. Further, he noted each armed service has a different idea of what the most demanding contingencies are.

“The Air Force and Navy might well say it’s China and defending the global commons,” he said. “The Army might say it’s the wars we’re engaged in and it’s keeping a lid on everything else and it’s hedging against a conventional attack, points unknown.” Those are two very different problem sets, he said.

I think Andrew Krepinevich is a brilliant strategist and entrepreneur, but I think he has this backwards. The "China" scenario, as well as the "defending global commons" scenario isn't the most demanding contingency for the Air Force and Navy, it is the most demanding contingency for the Army. I also believe "the wars we're engaged in" is the most demanding contingency for the Navy and Air Force, and I think the data proves it. I believe Dr. Krepinevich and I suggesting the same thing, but I think it is important to say it correctly in order to insure the point is delivered accurately.

By subscribing to the way Dr. Krepinevich is outlining what is important to the services, what is missed is how this effects the services and the gaps exposed. It is natural for the US Navy and US Air Force point to the scenarios where their assets will be in highest demand and claim these are the most demanding scenarios they face, but is that actually true? The China scenario may demand more US Navy and US Air Force assets, but the challenge of the China scenario is highest on the Army, for the purposes of being relevant. Think about it, if the US Army isn't relevant in the China scenario, then the question can be asked regarding the necessity for investment for a larger Army. If a military service is unable to justify reasoned arguments for resources for a major military scenario facing the nation, isn't that the most demanding contingency facing that military service?

I think it should be, because I look at Afghanistan and ask myself, is the US Navy and the US Air Force able to justify itself fighting in "the wars we're engaged in?" When one looks at the shortage of Army helicopters, or the inability of the US Navy to conduct major effective interdiction operations against the drug trade from Afghanistan, I think legitimate questions should be asked. The inability of naval forces, with the exception of aircraft carriers and sealift to be relevant in the war in Afghanistan is, in my opinion, the most demanding contingency facing the US Navy today because it goes to the heart of relevance.

I believe the biggest challenge facing the individual military services isn't where they are needed most, rather where they provide the least traditional contribution to the contingency the DoD is facing. In other words, I believe (and hope) a Red Cell for the QDR should be focused on how the US Army can contribute to the China scenario, and where the US Navy and US Air Force can increase their contribution to the "the wars we're engaged in." Without that, there is no such thing as what Gate's calls balance.