IDF Submarines

David Axe has a nice, short review of IDF submarine acquisition plans at World Politics Review. To supplement its 3 existing boats, the IDF will soon be acquiring an additional pair of German Dolphin class conventional submarines. As Axe notes, the submarines make both a strategic and conventional contribution; the IDF subs are widely believed to be capable of launching nuclear armed cruise missiles. Given Israel's small size, second strike capability is particularly relevant to Israeli security. Still, this is second strike on a shoestring. The Dolphins don't represent classic Cold War nuclear submarine deterrence. Their cruise missiles have limited range, and each boat is capable of carrying only a very few warheads in excess of its conventional capabilities. Moreover, it's not clear that the Israelis are planning to perform long term deterrent patrols. The current force of three boats is simply incapable of maintaining 24/7 deterrence, and even five boats is pushing it, given that the subs also have conventional responsibilities. On the upside, I don't think that Iranian ASW presents much of a threat to the Israeli sub force, although in a shooting war its unclear how regional states would respond to transit or refuge-seeking on the part of Israeli boats. However, the submarines do fulfill the basic requirements of minimal deterrence, which is to create in the mind of the adversary the idea that a first strike represents an unnecessary risk. Of course, given that even crude Iranian nuclear weapons may be years away, the Israelis probably have some time to work out the details.

Axe notes that some are concerned that the Israelis may be scaling back expectations for their surface fleet in favor of the submarine force. In the absence of any kind of significant conventional surface threat in the Med, the IDF surface units concentrate mainly on interdiction, both near and distant. The Sea Corps has responsibility for monitoring sea transit into Gaza and southern Lebanon, and effectively dominates both areas. Israelis tend to understand the tasks of both the surface and the submarine fleet in existential terms; the submarine force protects, or will someday protect, Israel from nuclear annihilation, while the surface fleet helps enable certain standard of Israeli life by limiting the number of weapon available to Hezbollah and Hamas. A choice between the surface and the sub-surface, thus, represents a decision about the most likely form that threats to Israeli life will take.